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MD-80 skidded off runway at LGA

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  • #76
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    I think that well exceeds the 'brain fart' regime. As pilot-monitoring, I have one VERY CRITICAL yet incredibly simple thing to do after landing
    A thing called check / call spoilers check / call autobrakes check / call reversers in transit check / call ready reverse check / call speed call speed monitor landing performance be ready to take over if needed...

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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    • #77
      And when, from the last 3000 landings, in 3000 of them the spoilers deployed, the mechanical reaction is to say "spoilers up" just as you did the last 3000 times. It takes a conscious effort to avoid that, a conscious effort that is well applied 99% of the times of the 0.1% of the times that the spoilers do not self-deploy (apparently including the accident subject of this thread). All in all, a very human mistake even trying to do the things well.

      Oh, pilots are humans.

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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      • #78
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        And when, from the last 3000 landings, in 3000 of them the spoilers deployed, the mechanical reaction is to say "spoilers up" just as you did the last 3000 times. It takes a conscious effort to avoid that, a conscious effort that is well applied 99% of the times of the 0.1% of the times that the spoilers do not self-deploy (apparently including the accident subject of this thread). All in all, a very human mistake even trying to do the things well.

        Oh, pilots are humans.
        The F/O in this case noticed the autospoilers were not deployed and deployed them manually. It happens. That is pilot material. I'm not referring to this accident.

        I'm sorry, but I have to draw the line somewhere. Yes, there are a number of checks involved but none of them are as critical as this ONE SIMPLE CHECK. If you have to make a conscious effort, than welcome to the adult, professional world. You are not pilot material if you can ever lose sight of the dreadful responsibility you have taken on, especially to the point where even the incredibly simple task of visually confirming the spoiler lever position is too much to ask of you. Get a sandwich job. That's one place I have to draw the line. I know that if I were a pilot I would always, religiously, check that lever upon touchdown.

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        • #79
          Originally posted by Evan View Post
          The F/O in this case noticed the autospoilers were not deployed and deployed them manually. It happens. That is pilot material. I'm not referring to this accident.

          I'm sorry, but I have to draw the line somewhere. Yes, there are a number of checks involved but none of them are as critical as this ONE SIMPLE CHECK. If you have to make a conscious effort, than welcome to the adult, professional world. You are not pilot material if you can ever lose sight of the dreadful responsibility you have taken on, especially to the point where even the incredibly simple task of visually confirming the spoiler lever position is too much to ask of you. Get a sandwich job. That's one place I have to draw the line. I know that if I were a pilot I would always, religiously, check that lever upon touchdown.
          Wonderful. But that's not how humans work. Dedicated and well trained humans applying due diligence and good will do mistakes too. The conscious effort reduce the frequency of said mistakes.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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          • #80
            Talking about how humans work...
            Is it not true that pilots are not only taught to perform checklists but to also reach out and touch the item being checked ? Its certainly how my flight instructor taught me. The reasoning behind this is that when you reach out and touch something you tend to automatically look at it and notice if something is wrong. In the airline world you also have a second person checking your actions.

            In my job as a paramedic I would not only draw up a drug but would tell my crewmate what I was drawing up and show them the ampoule. I spent 34 years doing my job and knew my drugs inside out......but I still managed to make a handful of errors during those years. My failsafe crosschecks stopped the errors from progressing any further and no patient was ever put at risk....because EVEN AFTER 34 YEARS....Mistakes were possible.
            If it 'ain't broken........ Don't try to mend it !

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            • #81
              I think in many cases that's true and helpful. But you're still going to have that case once in a blue moon where all external signs point to things being a certain way, but somehow in someone's mental image it still ends up the other way. And once in many blue moons, you'll get two or more people in the cockpit having that problem simultaneously.

              Witness the AF90 crash where during the takeoff checklist one pilot said "Engine anti-ice?", the other said "Off" and neither caught the problem. That's in spite of the fact one pilot checked the setting, saw it was wrong, verbalized that fact, and both heard it.
              Be alert! America needs more lerts.

              Eric Law

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              • #82
                Brian,

                On many modern aircraft there's not much point reaching out and touching because system condition is based on ECAM/EICAS response, not on the switch position. The presence/absence of a message, or a light, or a display on a screen is what determines the checklist response rather than where the switch is. Looking at the switch is actually a really tough habit to get out of, and one instructors love to tell you off for.

                One way to look at it is that the switch is a request button - the FMA/other indicators tell you if that request has been granted.

                That's in spite of the fact one pilot checked the setting, saw it was wrong, verbalized that fact, and both heard it.
                Thats an interesting point. Its clear, really, that the pilots didn't 'hear' it. It may have been audible, but it wasn't processed by the brain. We all know the concept - similar to when you meet someone for the first time, and then 20 seconds later say 'what was their name again?'.

                In a slightly different way, hearing is one of the first things to go in an overload scenario, which is why a pilot flying will often not respond to the guidance of the PM when things are getting a bit pear-shaped. Its not that he's wilfully ignoring him, but that he is overloaded and simply does not hear him. 'I didn't hear you say that' is a common phrase after a very high work load approach.

                Its all good and well to have a procedure to do - for example, check that the speed brake is up. But when we get overloaded we will do the task (looking), but won't necessarily process what we actually see.

                A very common one is a landing clearance - if it comes at the wrong time (high workload in the cockpit) the brain will perform the automated task (read back the clearance), but then 20 seconds later neither pilot will remember if they'd received a landing clearance or not! The brain has done its job, and performed its automated task, but the conscious memory doesn't recall it.

                If you're ever particularly bored listen to some Tower ATC tapes, and listen for how many times pilots ask for the landing clearance to be repeated despite being read back perfectly the first time. Its not frequent, but its certainly not rare.

                Its really easy to say 'I would always check it'... all pilots would. But in the heat of the battle, when there's a dozen distractions, all of which could be as critical, the 'check' isn't as robust as it should be. And thats not through lack of intent, but the way the brain functions in load shedding.

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                • #83
                  Originally posted by MCM View Post
                  Its really easy to say 'I would always check it'... all pilots would. But in the heat of the battle, when there's a dozen distractions, all of which could be as critical, the 'check' isn't as robust as it should be. And thats not through lack of intent, but the way the brain functions in load shedding.
                  What are the distractions the PM faces after the MLG has touched down that would make it difficult to focus on the the spoiler deployment?

                  It seems to me that forgetting to do this is like forgetting to rotate on takeoff, it's just such a basic, critical and simple task that should be a core instinct.

                  Comment


                  • #84
                    Originally posted by Evan View Post
                    I know that if I were a pilot I would always, religiously, check that lever upon touchdown.
                    No, you wouldn't. Not "always, religiously". I'm not calling you a liar (tempting as it is), I'm only saying you're incorrect in this particular instance.

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                    • #85
                      Even, even you to would have a number of "failed to perform" checks (per say .. 1,000), against your scorecard.

                      Just like taking the SAT's you may score perfect one time but the chances of repeating that task get slimmer over time.
                      Live, from a grassy knoll somewhere near you.

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                      • #86
                        Originally posted by Evan View Post
                        What are the distractions the PM faces after the MLG has touched down that would make it difficult to focus on the the spoiler deployment?

                        It seems to me that forgetting to do this is like forgetting to rotate on takeoff, it's just such a basic, critical and simple task that should be a core instinct.
                        Forgetting to rotate gives you numerous, immediate, extremely-obvious, direct and indirect, life vs. death feedbacks right in front of your eyes pretty much 100% of the time. If you want to live, you better rotate.

                        Forgetting to double check that the spoilers auto-deployed, and that you pulled the lever all the way back and that it's interlocked with auto-brakes gives you relatively little, not all that critical feed back, well behind your eyes nearly 100% of the time... And, if the spoilers don't pop, so what there's several thousand feet of runway, still a fair bit of weight on the wheels and reverse thrust is supplementing things nicely on 99% of your landings anyway.

                        ...along with the fact that the pilots are almost always expected to provide the rotation but almost never expected to provide the spoiler activation.
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                        • #87
                          Originally posted by MCM View Post
                          A very common one is a landing clearance - if it comes at the wrong time (high workload in the cockpit) the brain will perform the automated task (read back the clearance), but then 20 seconds later neither pilot will remember if they'd received a landing clearance or not! The brain has done its job, and performed its automated task, but the conscious memory doesn't recall it.

                          If you're ever particularly bored listen to some Tower ATC tapes, and listen for how many times pilots ask for the landing clearance to be repeated despite being read back perfectly the first time. Its not frequent, but its certainly not rare.
                          ...and a reflection of the broad, fundamental rule, Aviate, Navigate, Communicate.
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                          • #88
                            Final report out. If you had 'rudder blanking', step up receive your plaque.

                            Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

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                            • #89
                              The accident that wasn't:

                              There was a plane already cleared to land behind the MD-80. The tower could not see the MD-80 because of the weather conditions. When the tower failed to contact the MD-80, they assumed that they had already switched to the ground frequency, and didn't cancel the landing clearance of the other plane.

                              We have 2 issues here:
                              - Landing clearance issued before the preceding plane lands and vacates the landing. In most of the world (but not in USA) that is forbidden. The tower cannot issue a landing clearance until the preceding airplane vacated the runway. That's what "expect a late landing clearance" is for. Especially if the tower cannot see the runway!!!
                              - The tower assuming....

                              We had 2 slices still available, that prevented the accident:
                              - Whiteness that saw the accident and advised the tower, who then finally instructed the other plane to go-around.
                              - The MD-80 stopped far enough to the side that a plane keeping more or less the center line would not have crashed against the MD-80.

                              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                              Comment


                              • #90
                                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                                The accident that wasn't:

                                There was a plane already cleared to land behind the MD-80. The tower could not see the MD-80 because of the weather conditions. When the tower failed to contact the MD-80, they assumed that they had already switched to the ground frequency, and didn't cancel the landing clearance of the other plane.

                                We have 2 issues here:
                                - Landing clearance issued before the preceding plane lands and vacates the landing. In most of the world (but not in USA) that is forbidden. The tower cannot issue a landing clearance until the preceding airplane vacated the runway. That's what "expect a late landing clearance" is for. Especially if the tower cannot see the runway!!!
                                - The tower assuming....

                                We had 2 slices still available, that prevented the accident:
                                - Whiteness that saw the accident and advised the tower, who then finally instructed the other plane to go-around.
                                - The MD-80 stopped far enough to the side that a plane keeping more or less the center line would not have crashed against the MD-80.
                                I think maybe we've got our wires crossed. Did you read the final report I linked to?

                                Vnav nailed it on page 1. Maybe I get an honorable mention for speculating a ground spoiler deployment failure, which did happen here, but the F/O caught it immediately and manually deployed them. Pilot Material.

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