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787 Engine Failures

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  • 787 Engine Failures



    Did the cowboy engineers follow procedures for designing engine fan blades?
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

  • #2
    Layoffs. Labor friction. Boeing has really got problems all over. I read the Seattle Times daily. I get this sense people are blaming the previous CEO. McNerney?

    Comment


    • #3
      Um... Boeing didn't produce the engines, GE did. And based on the info in the article, it sounds more like a design than a manufacturing problem.
      Be alert! America needs more lerts.

      Eric Law

      Comment


      • #4
        Did GE just not test the engine this thoroughly?: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5xlObdXF8VE I'm sure that they still had this facility in operation when the engine in question was tested. I just don't understand-did they try and cover something up?

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        • #5
          Originally posted by Bloomberg
          Airlines must also instruct pilots within seven days how to prevent engine icing while flying above 12,500 feet.
          What? How about airlines must instruct their pilots before they become pilots?

          But this sounds like another case of "operational issue" workaround where the engineering was flawed, the product doesn't stand up to the environment and the fix is to add complexity to the pilot requirements.

          They should be able to fix this within the 150-day AD requirement but EVERY aircraft with the affected engines should lose its ETOPS rating until the fix has been made on at least one engine. That might speed things up and nobody should have to put their life at risk to protect GE's bottom line.

          Comment


          • #6
            Originally posted by Evan View Post
            What? How about airlines must instruct their pilots before they become pilots?
            There is nothing wrong with flying through moderate icing conditions if the plane is certified to do so, as this one was (wrongfully) certified.
            This seems to be an additional requirement to teach pilot what and how to avoid in this plane, where you would not be avoiding it in other planes.

            But this sounds like another case of "operational issue" workaround where the engineering was flawed, the product doesn't stand up to the environment and the fix is to add complexity to the pilot requirements.
            Modern airplanes are extremely complex devices and from time to time it is discovered during the operation something that was missed during design, testing and certification.
            And while that is an engineering flaw, it doesn't necessarily mean that it was an engineer's flaw.

            When these things are discovered, yes, operational patches are put in place while a long term solution is implemented. Very much like when a plane takes off with MELled equipment that restrict the operation: a technical flaw that is temporarily fixed with a temporary workaround that increases complexity to the pilot work, to the point of some times being a factor in an accident (for example TAM at Guaruhos).

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
              There is nothing wrong with flying through moderate icing conditions if the plane is certified to do so, as this one was (wrongfully) certified.
              This seems to be an additional requirement to teach pilot what and how to avoid in this plane, where you would not be avoiding it in other planes.


              Modern airplanes are extremely complex devices and from time to time it is discovered during the operation something that was missed during design, testing and certification.
              And while that is an engineering flaw, it doesn't necessarily mean that it was an engineer's flaw.

              When these things are discovered, yes, operational patches are put in place while a long term solution is implemented. Very much like when a plane takes off with MELled equipment that restrict the operation: a technical flaw that is temporarily fixed with a temporary workaround that increases complexity to the pilot work, to the point of some times being a factor in an accident (for example TAM at Guaruhos).
              So how do you feel about the FAA allowing these engines to fly ETOPS for the next 150 days?

              Comment


              • #8
                i won't be flying on one any time soon. there are enuf risks already. thankfully AA doesn't fly them on any of my usual routes so i should be good without having to jump through hoops.

                on another note, it's fairly effin amazing what risks the gubmint imposes on the public to protect corporate profits

                Comment


                • #9
                  I agree! What we really should have is some big government agency, with thousands of employees and thousands of pages of regulations, solely dedicated to regulating all things that fly. They could call it the "federal aviation agency" or something like that.

                  And if you don't think it's important that aircraft operators make a profit, maybe you'd like to try flying on some different airlines? Eastern, Pan-Am, Aloha, Braniff... just to name a few.

                  Cynicism aside, I agree that at times there have been compromises to safety in the name of airline profits. But the reality is that if there are no profits to be made there will eventually be no airlines, at least in capitalist countries.

                  And in this specific case I think the "safety is being ignored for profit" argument is pretty weak. A fault was found in certain engines that can cause a problem under extremely limited climactic conditions ("climactic" includes altitude in this case). Those climactic conditions are pretty much impossible to duplicate on the ground or in a test cell, and nearly impossible to model on a computer. So the fault was missed during design and testing and only appeared once the engines were flown on aircraft. A workaround has been put in place, and apparently they already know how to permanently fix the issue. At least to my ignorant eyes the fix sounds pretty simple and I expect it will be implemented quickly. So personally I think the response is reasonable.
                  Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                  Eric Law

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Originally posted by Evan View Post
                    So how do you feel about the FAA allowing these engines to fly ETOPS for the next 150 days?
                    I have conflicting feelings.

                    One one hand, I feel like you. There is an increased risk of common point of failure affecting both engines, and that seems to conflict with ETOPS philosophy.
                    On the other hand...
                    - There was one such engine failure so far, so it is not that engines are failing all around due to this issue.
                    - The single case was a single engine failure, the other one remained alive and kicking.
                    - If you encounter conditions that would cause both engines to fail at the same time, non-ETOPS will not be of much help. 60 minutes or 180 minutes are both beyond gliding range.
                    - ETOPS is NOT designed for dual engines failing due to common cause, but for one engine failing and reducing the chances that another engine fails independently. Run out of fuel, fly through volcanic ashes, shut down the good engine, etc and being 200% ETOPS compliant will not help.

                    So the question is more whether the risk is such that the plane should be grounded, not just ETOPS restricted. And here comes the calculations of how much is the additional risk due to this flaw and how much of that risk is offset by the workaround.

                    I feel comfortable enough that I would take a flight in a 787 without any particular concern (and with some excitement, since it would be my first 787 flight), and with the "normal" concern of pilot skills (including both discipline and knowledge to follow procedures, and classic airmanship) and airline safety culture and REAL policies that are far more risky.

                    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Originally posted by elaw View Post
                      A fault was found in certain engines that can cause a problem under extremely limited climactic conditions ("climactic" includes altitude in this case). Those climactic conditions are pretty much impossible to duplicate on the ground or in a test cell, and nearly impossible to model on a computer. So the fault was missed during design and testing and only appeared once the engines were flown on aircraft.
                      Haha, yes, I agree that the climactic conditions were probably not forseen in development. This latest dent in the 787's reputation certainly seems climactic. Let's hope it results in a very boring second act.

                      The climatic conditions, on the other hand, should have been foreseen. From what I can gather, it sounds like ice accretion was not adequately provided for in the fan-clade to housing clearances. Doh!

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        I have conflicting feelings.

                        One one hand, I feel like you. There is an increased risk of common point of failure affecting both engines, and that seems to conflict with ETOPS philosophy.
                        On the other hand...
                        - There was one such engine failure so far, so it is not that engines are failing all around due to this issue.
                        - The single case was a single engine failure, the other one remained alive and kicking.
                        - If you encounter conditions that would cause both engines to fail at the same time, non-ETOPS will not be of much help. 60 minutes or 180 minutes are both beyond gliding range.
                        - ETOPS is NOT designed for dual engines failing due to common cause, but for one engine failing and reducing the chances that another engine fails independently. Run out of fuel, fly through volcanic ashes, shut down the good engine, etc and being 200% ETOPS compliant will not help.

                        So the question is more whether the risk is such that the plane should be grounded, not just ETOPS restricted. And here comes the calculations of how much is the additional risk due to this flaw and how much of that risk is offset by the workaround.

                        I feel comfortable enough that I would take a flight in a 787 without any particular concern (and with some excitement, since it would be my first 787 flight), and with the "normal" concern of pilot skills (including both discipline and knowledge to follow procedures, and classic airmanship) and airline safety culture and REAL policies that are far more risky.
                        I look at it like this: In the case of a twin, the FAA certifies an aircraft as safe to operate for a given amount of time even with a single engine out. The reason they award the certification rests largely on the reliability of the remaining engine. Now we have a situation where a somewhat common meteorologic condition presents a common point of failure and the engines have proved to be unreliable in this environment. To be exact, they have proven to be less reliable than certification requires. If this vulnerability had presented itself during certification testing, it would have prevented certification. Why should it not prevent certification now? The risks are the same. Technically, the 787 should be grounded until at least one of the engines is replaced or modified (with a limited time provision for the second, so perhaps 150 days for the SECOND engine mod).

                        The reason I bring up ETOPS is that, if a compromise must be made in the name of airline (or manufacturer) survivability, then allow the 787 to fly unmodified for a short time without ETOPS routing. I know, most 787's are flying ETOPS routes so that is a virtual grounding, but at least the overland routes with diversions under 75 mins would still be possible. Keep in mind that the 787 has up to an ETOPS 330 rating.

                        I realize though, if both mills die on you, even 60 mins is going to be useless. But I think most non-ETOPS routes have an alternate (acceptable alternate or flat-ish hard-ish surface) within 100nm. You won't find that under the unofficial ETOPS definition of "Engines Turn Or Passengers Swim". But I would prefer to see them grounded until one engine is replaced or modified (and tested for compliance), with both required within 150 days.

                        The current five month allowance is too risky in my opinion. Remember how AF447 never happened until one day....

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                        • #13
                          once again evan and i are in agreement! champagne anyone?

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Originally posted by Gabriel View Post

                            - The single case was a single engine failure, the other one remained alive and kicking.
                            It seems that the incident aircraft, Japan Airlines 787-800 registration JA822J had only one RH GEnx-1B "PIP2" - I guess PIP stands for Performance Improvement Program - LH engine was not configured at same standard, didn't encounter vibrations, is not subject to FAA's AD.


                            Corrective action is a minor work: abrasion of 1/10th in from casing, to enhance blade tolerance. Can be performed on wing, 16 man-hours.

                            787 flying with both engines at PIP2 configuration should be dealt with highest priority, or refitted with one "non PIP2" engine until correction is made.


                            http://www.air-cosmos.com/boeing-787...e-la-faa-70427

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