Last week saw an astonishing moment of frankness from the A380’s biggest customer. Tim Clark, President of Emirates, told Bloomberg that not only had discussions on a new re-engined A380neo version of Airbus’s 525-seat jet “kind of lapsed,” but that his “main concern is that they stop producing the plane.”
This was the first intimation that sudden death is a possibility for the troubled super jumbo. And the numbers highlight this risk.
It has been years since there was any significant commercial demand for the A380, aside from Emirates steadily growing its position to 142 orders. In April, Airbus executives admitted that output in 2017 could be as low as 20 aircraft. This is far below the 30 aircraft needed for annual recurring breakeven (this excludes program nonrecurring costs; there is no way to even begin to recover the $25-30 billion or so invested in the development of this aircraft).
How long can this keep up? Emirates has just reported its first annual sales decline in a decade. Its load factor dropped 3.1 points to 76.5%. Its yield fell 10%. Ramping up capacity hardly seems like the right move now.
Meanwhile, Emirates has ordered 150 Boeing BA +3.55% 777-9Xs, with deliveries starting in 2020. This jet has the same range as the A380, more belly cargo, just 25% fewer seats (the discounted ones, of course) and has two fewer engines. They’re more modern engines, too.
Thus, the question becomes, how long is Airbus willing to lose money, particularly when there’s no doubt about the ultimate outcome? Assuming that next year’s rate of 20 isn’t too ruinous, and assuming that Emirates can keep taking 14 per year (despite declining traffic growth rates and falling load factors), that means Airbus can sustain about three more years of production (14 Emirates planes per year, plus six for other customers). But then again, since Airbus is losing money on all of these planes, Tim Clark is correct to worry that Airbus could simply end the program at any time
Seems like the "jumbo" types are becoming more of a niche aircraft, or is the author blowing smoke?
I say bring on the Boeing 797 BWB with 1,000 seats. (Yes, it's sarcasm.)
This was the first intimation that sudden death is a possibility for the troubled super jumbo. And the numbers highlight this risk.
It has been years since there was any significant commercial demand for the A380, aside from Emirates steadily growing its position to 142 orders. In April, Airbus executives admitted that output in 2017 could be as low as 20 aircraft. This is far below the 30 aircraft needed for annual recurring breakeven (this excludes program nonrecurring costs; there is no way to even begin to recover the $25-30 billion or so invested in the development of this aircraft).
How long can this keep up? Emirates has just reported its first annual sales decline in a decade. Its load factor dropped 3.1 points to 76.5%. Its yield fell 10%. Ramping up capacity hardly seems like the right move now.
Meanwhile, Emirates has ordered 150 Boeing BA +3.55% 777-9Xs, with deliveries starting in 2020. This jet has the same range as the A380, more belly cargo, just 25% fewer seats (the discounted ones, of course) and has two fewer engines. They’re more modern engines, too.
Thus, the question becomes, how long is Airbus willing to lose money, particularly when there’s no doubt about the ultimate outcome? Assuming that next year’s rate of 20 isn’t too ruinous, and assuming that Emirates can keep taking 14 per year (despite declining traffic growth rates and falling load factors), that means Airbus can sustain about three more years of production (14 Emirates planes per year, plus six for other customers). But then again, since Airbus is losing money on all of these planes, Tim Clark is correct to worry that Airbus could simply end the program at any time
Seems like the "jumbo" types are becoming more of a niche aircraft, or is the author blowing smoke?
I say bring on the Boeing 797 BWB with 1,000 seats. (Yes, it's sarcasm.)
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