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  • #16
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    Source?
    You want a source? Uh sure no problemo. In short...

    The original source of my comment yesterday was . . .
    Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation


    …which has since been updated removing that remark regarding second landing attempt. Now, because I think I hear people already madly typing a flame out at me...this is the background and why it was likely an errant report.

    Apparently, a ground witness to the crash said to a Russian reporter "The pilot tried to make a second landing attempt but failed to climb."

    SOURCE: para4 @


    That witness comment/quote was interpreted (rightfully so) to mean the pilot was making a second landing attempt – based on his words “the pilot tried to make a second landing attempt.” This witness quote was picked up by various outlets such as Av. Herald, NTV, and others and was disseminated accordingly on the 15th/16th See, e.g.:

    SOURCE: way down towards end of article...
    ONE of the pilots involved in the plane crash in Kyrgyzstan was seen hauling himself out of the wreckage and walking around following the smash, before later dying in hospital. The death toll has n…


    SOURCE: para5
    A Turkish cargo jet, operated by ACT Airlines, crashed while en route from Hong Kong to Istanbul Monday into homes near Manas airport close to the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek, where it was supposed to make a stopover.


    SOURCE:: para4
    A Turkish cargo plane trying to land in dense fog crashed Monday morning near Kyrgyzstan’s main airport, killing 37 people – including entire families of a village struck by the jet, authorit…


    [NB: the date (17th)shown on the SUN article reflects the last updated date, not first publication date].

    These reportings even made it to the Wiki on Flight 6491 as pilots crashed on 2nd landing attempt – in the Jan 16th version.

    SOURCE: Flight 6491 WikiL earlier version


    You’ll note that Wiki sources a comment from Deputy Prime Minister Muhammetkaly Abulgaziyev, who said the plane had tried to land twice.

    ADDITIONAL SOURCE re: Dep. Prime Minister comments…
    A Boeing 747 cargo plane, owned by Turkey's ACT Airlines, departed from Hong Kong International Airport and crashed in a residential area near Bishkek on Monday.


    That’s about when I popped into the picture with my OP, though hesitated by saying ‘apparently’ . . . which was fully reasonable given the eyewitness comment which was seemingly backed up by a gov’t spokesperson.

    Now, I hear typing again – “plane crash witnesses are like the worst ever, you shouldn’t have remarked based on that!”

    Indeed, we all know witnesses of any type (plane crash or otherwise) are generally pretty lousy. However his comment wasn’t the sort of witness statement we are used to hearing, you all know the type:

    “omg the wings fell off then I saw a huge massive explosion when it was up high which I heard before it happened yet after it hit the ground with the wings afire but very clearly attached – it was wobbling and the engine was making an odd sound, I’ve never seen anything like this before!”

    His statement was more of ‘this was his second attempt’ sort of thing which was matter of fact – and as a matter of fact – later echoed by the Dep. Prime Minister (as noted).

    And we also know all too well ‘the media’ sucks in lots of reporting - not just plane crashes but regular stuff like 'email' - but yes plane crashes are definitely not their forte. The thing to do seems to be pump out/regurgitate whatever can be found in order to get a clickable headline with the least possible effort or knowledge or (gasp!) research. Heck, look no further than a huge chunk of our population that - through some slick marketing and some tragically bad ‘reporting’ - has come to believe that deleting emails is some sort of crime. And it’s like totally not. But anyway…

    …the media also isn’t really to blame on this kerfuffle either. So where did it all go so very, very wrong? STELLLLLA!!

    Well the witness was in fact correct, but what he said while fully accurate was interpreted (it seems!) differently by the media (and me) because of his use of English that while accurate was ‘different’ than how it’s perceived by English speakers.

    Because he said ‘the pilot was making his second landing attempt’ meaning that the 1st attempt didn’t land so he was ‘going for try #2’ or ‘second landing attempt’ which is, after all, true. But his words as used it appears were construed as the pilot was in the act of actually commencing his 2nd landing, vs. what the witness was really saying – the pilot crashed while at the very start of his second landing attempt (i.e., the go around which failed).

    Happily, AV Herald and most media outlets today (early this AM) seem to have realized the mistake in interpreting the witness (who knows, maybe the Dep. Prime Minister misspoke based on this too?) and corrections are already rolling out.

    SOURCE: current Flight 6491 Wiki

    “At 7:31 a.m. local time on 16 January 2017, the aircraft impacted the ground, near the end of runway 26 at Manas International Airport, amid thick fog.[4] Initially, it was reported that the plane had crashed during a second landing attempt.[5] Kyrgyz authorities later stated that the plane had crashed on its first landing attempt.[6]”



    The MarketWatch article in fact notes this small nuance in verbiage and interpretation – both of which were in and of themselves correct, but for folks not realizing what 2nd landing attempt meant to the witness, which was ‘pilot crashed while initiating go-around as part of his 2nd landing attempt’

    QUOTE “The pilot [didn’t succeed in landing attempt #1 and thus] tried to make a second landing attempt but failed to climb [out on the go-around from failed landing #1].”

    It was just an innocent misunderstanding – witness and media were just looking at things from different perspective. I got caught in the middle – at least according to multiple sources.

    Comment


    • #17
      UCFM 160130Z VRB01MPS 0150 R26/0550 FZFG VV001 M09/M10 Q1024 R26/19//60 NOSIG
      UCFM 160100Z VRB01MPS 0050 R26/0300N FZFG VV001 M09/M10 Q1023 R26/19//60 NOSIG


      That's some thick soup...sad crash and horrible that so many on the ground perished

      Comment


      • #18
        On Feb 8th 2017 information sent out to Russian Flight Crew (see the attached graphics of the flight trajectory below) became known stating, that the aircraft was conducting a CATII ILS Approach to Bishkek's runway 26, the crew however did not monitor their altitude, the aircraft passed the final approach fix 650 feet above the glideslope, therefore no glideslope capture occurred and the aircraft continued to descend to 3400 feet at 200 KIAS and levelled off at 3400 feet (Autopilot Modes: LOC CAP and ALT HOLD), the glideslope deviation indicator showed a full scale down deflection. About 0.8nm before the runway threshold the aircraft passed through the false glideslope (9 degrees) resulting in valid glideslope deviation indications for about one second, the autopilot changed to G/S CAP (Capture) mode and the aircraft began to descend, the glideslope deviation indicator returned to a full scale down deflection. The crew did not detect that it was not possible to descend to the runway from 3400 feet (runway elevation at 2055 feet) within 0.8nm, did not cross check their approach trajectory nor did the crew notice the full scale down deflection of the glideslope deviation indicator. The aircraft thus descended parallel to and above the actual glideslope. At 100 feet radio altitude the captain called for a go-around due to lack of visual references, TOGA was activated at 52 feet radio altitude, the aircraft however touched down 900 meters past the runway end and 60 meters to the right of the extended runway center line, broke through a concrete fence, bounced and fell into the village about 1000 meters past the runway end, following the impact at the concrete wall the aircraft began to break up and spilled fuel which resulted in a fire. All crew and 37 people in the village lost their lifes, 8 villagers were seriously injured.
        Aviation Herald - News, Incidents and Accidents in Aviation

        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

        Comment


        • #19
          Aha. The old false glideslope routine. And the old not flying the plane routine. Where do they get these guys...

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by Evan View Post
            Aha. The old false glideslope routine. And the old not flying the plane routine. Where do they get these guys...
            Are you saying that the glideslope should always be captured from below?
            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

            Comment


            • #21
              Well in this case, capturing it at all would have been a good start!
              Be alert! America needs more lerts.

              Eric Law

              Comment


              • #22
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                Aha. The old false glideslope routine. And the old not flying the plane routine. Where do they get these guys...
                A lot of things done wrong... How can you get as low as 100ft without ever crosschecking anything to see if you are in the right place? Altitude checks vs distance, at least check the glide slope indication!!!

                Yet, one thing was done right: With 100ft (which was the official DH) and with no visual cues at sight, they initiated the go-around. ALWAYS when you initiate a go-around you will descend a bit more as you transition to climbing, but 100ft should have been more than enough. Imagine if they had flown the approach correctly and spotted the runway just at 100ft, that should be enough to flare, even without adding power.

                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                Comment


                • #23
                  Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                  Are you saying that the glideslope should always be captured from below?
                  It should be but it doesn't have to be if you can capture it and remain in the stable approach criteria. It should be because it leads to pilot errors such as abusing FLCH, getting into a high vertical rate and extended period of idle, or this little phenomena known as the false glideslope. If you are capturing the GS from above, you have to be especially vigilant that you have captured the correct one. False glideslopes are a collateral phenomena of the analog nature of the signal and occur at multiples of the original one, usually having a false one at 9° (but they can also occur at 6°, 12° and 15°). If you are flying the plane, it's not hard to recognize the situation (DME, crossing altitudes, rule of three, vertical speed etc.) But as even you will one day have to admit, perfect airmanship is worthless when the brain is offline.

                  In this case it seems the false glideslope was passed through, not followed, but in passing through it, the autopilot G/S CAP mode was initiated (from ALT HOLD) and for reasons I don't fully understand (BoeingBobby might help us out), this resulted in a 3° autopilot descent angle. So correct angle of descent too far down the approach.

                  Originally posted by Gabriel
                  Yet, one thing was done right: With 100ft (which was the official DH) and with no visual cues at sight, they initiated the go-around. ALWAYS when you initiate a go-around you will descend a bit more as you transition to climbing, but 100ft should have been more than enough.
                  And when you call for a GA at 100' and initiate it at 52'? But of course, they didn't even do the GA right because that GA should have commenced the moment the approach became unstable, long before visibility issues came up. But they didn't bother to notice, did they...

                  Anyway, apparently another fatal lesson in stealth factors taught to a crew who probably thought their gut level airmanship was all that was needed.
                  Attached Files

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Originally posted by Evan View Post
                    ...you will one day have to admit, perfect airmanship is worthless when the brain is offline...
                    Maybe some day you will understand logic.

                    Perfect airmanship includes having the brain online and perfect airmanship means flying perfectly down the glideslope, and going around with perfect attention to altitude, and isn't going to result in crashing unless maybe the Russians are moving trees around ahead of the crash.

                    I have however resigned myself that you will never understand that procedures fail miserably when the brain is offline, and that, in spite of all the great scientific engineering, perfectly executed procedures have resulted in crashes...

                    And I'm still looking for the fundamental airmanship rule that says "pull up relentlessly".
                    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                      Maybe some day you will understand logic.

                      Perfect airmanship includes having the brain online and perfect airmanship means flying perfectly down the glideslope, and going around with perfect attention to altitude, and isn't going to result in crashing unless maybe the Russians are moving trees around ahead of the crash.

                      I have however resigned myself that you will never understand that procedures fail miserably when the brain is offline, and that, in spite of all the great scientific engineering, perfectly executed procedures have resulted in crashes...

                      And I'm still looking for the fundamental airmanship rule that says "pull up relentlessly".
                      Procedure = CRM

                      Procedure: PM to PF upon noticing full downward GS deflection: "glideslope"

                      Procedure: PM to PF upon getting no LAND annunciation: "go-around"

                      Procedure: PM to PF upon not having FLARE armed: "go around"

                      etc etc etc etc.

                      There were so many indications here that something was wrong, and all of them could have triggered a go-around long before reaching DH, if only CRM PROCEDURE had been followed. Because without CRM all you have is airmanship, and when that fails there is nothing to fall back on.

                      Redundancy 3WE, procedure is redundancy.

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Evan View Post
                        And when you call for a GA at 100' and initiate it at 52'?
                        That's 4 seconds. More than what I like or it's acceptable, but not a awful lot of time either. Yet, 52' to go should be enough to arrest the descent.
                        It is possible that they wanted to do it smooth and nice. GA at minimums in a CATII ILS approach has to be an aggressive maneuver. You are going around at 500'? You can do it smooth and nice.

                        But of course, they didn't even do the GA right because that GA should have commenced the moment the approach became unstable, long before visibility issues came up. But they didn't bother to notice, did they...
                        I've already agreed with that.

                        Anyway, apparently another fatal lesson in stealth factors taught to a crew who probably thought their gut level airmanship was all that was needed.
                        What? If by gut level airmanship you mean "by the gut and only by the gut", that's no airmanship at all. Not looking at the PRIMARY FLIGHT DISPLAY (which has the words PRIMARY and FLIGHT in its name for a reason) is not airmanship, gut or no gut. As well as not looking at the ILS needles in an ILS approach is't.

                        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Originally posted by Evan View Post
                          Procedure = CRM

                          Procedure: PM to PF upon noticing full downward GS deflection: "glideslope"

                          Procedure: PM to PF upon getting no LAND annunciation: "go-around"

                          Procedure: PM to PF upon not having FLARE armed: "go around"

                          etc etc etc etc.

                          There were so many indications here that something was wrong, and all of them could have triggered a go-around long before reaching DH, if only CRM PROCEDURE had been followed. Because without CRM all you have is airmanship, and when that fails there is nothing to fall back on.

                          Redundancy 3WE, procedure is redundancy.
                          LAND? FLARE? Where they in Auto-Land? In a CATII approach? Do you know something that we don't?

                          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                            LAND? FLARE? Where they in Auto-Land? In a CATII approach? Do you know something that we don't?
                            Naw, his mind is so full of procedures and acronyms, he sometimes gets basic things confused...heck, I see CATII and the T almost passes for an I if you read it quickly...but hey, I loves me some acronyms!

                            And I think really good CRM includes stuff like the PF saying "one dot high, correcting" or the unwritten gross fundamental that if you aren't established and kinda stable at the marker you simply go around then. But what do I know, maybe the procedure is different on a 747-800 than a -200.
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                              LAND? FLARE? Where they in Auto-Land? In a CATII approach? Do you know something that we don't?
                              No, pure speculation but it smells like CAT II autoland to me, given the weather conditions and the fact that the crew was basically sitting this one out. Of course, if it was intended as autoland, it would have been a NO AUTOLAND long before 100'. I'd really like to know what the vertical mode was after GS CAP failed... does it transition to V/S by default?

                              Autoland or not, my point remains. A crew focused on good CRM procedure would not have flown this down to DH.

                              Comment


                              • #30
                                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                                That's 4 seconds. More than what I like or it's acceptable, but not a awful lot of time either. Yet, 52' to go should be enough to arrest the descent.
                                It is possible that they wanted to do it smooth and nice. GA at minimums in a CATII ILS approach has to be an aggressive maneuver.
                                Maybe they spent a lot of time reading aviation forums and were concerned with underslung engines and pulling up too much?
                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                                Comment

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