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  • #76
    Just to correct the record on one minor point...
    Originally posted by Evan
    When you fly a DC-3, you make a flight control input and the result more-or-less matches your expectations.
    Originally posted by Evan
    Seriously, go back to DC-3's and we will eliminate this problem.
    So some dude's flying along in his DC-3, initiates a descent, is sitting there watching the world go by (while skillfully flying the airplane) and all is good. Until the left engine sputters a bit and then stops, and a moment later the right engine does the same thing. Oops! Someone forgot to put the mixture levers to "rich".

    DC-3's got systems too.
    Be alert! America needs more lerts.

    Eric Law

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    • #77
      God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, (Computer flying the airplane)
      Courage to change the things I can, (Hand-flying)
      and the Wisdom to know the difference. <-- This is important

      Be alert! America needs more lerts.

      Eric Law

      Comment


      • #78
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        It's not one OR the other. It is one AND the other.

        Air France, Colgan, Diet Pepsi four one oh, Asiana, Turkish, Emirates...

        All these could have been avoided by proper understanding and use of the type-specific automation. All of these could be avoided, AFTER THE TYPE-SPECIFIC AUTOMATION FAILED to perform as expected (due to issues with the expectations, not with the automation), by proper understanding and use of the UNIVERSAL DON'T-CARE-WHAT-TYPE BASIC FLYING SKILLS. And I don't buy "startle" as a magic bullet for all those. In fact, for none of those. Startle could have been a factor in the first second or two of SOME of those.
        Back up...

        You said:
        So yes, you basically need to know how to fly an airplane
        ...to get an ATPL. As I suspected.

        Then you said:
        but the focus is not there. No time to "play" with the plane and understand her "language" (i.e. to understand what the plane is telling you with its performance and the force feedback, and how to tell her what you want her to do), no time for playing "what if" beyond the minimum requirement, no time for practicing lots of different approach scenarios and landing techniques that are not part of the test scope.
        Again, tell me where this was a factor in any of these crashes. None of this was about nuance. None of them failed due to unpolished handflying skills and flawed inputs. AIr France: the extended inputs and apparent intention was entirely in conflict with 'basically need to know how to fly an airplane'. Same with Colgan. Same with Turkish. All of these pilots broke a cardinal rule taught to every pilot learning the basics of how to fly an airplane (and then subsequently taught by every CPI to their own students and CERTAINLY refreshed in subsequent training needed for an ATPL). Asiana had nothing to do with handflying skills. Monitoring the instruments is not a handflying skill. You get all the practice you need on automated approaches.

        These things happened due to HUMAN FACTORS that result in bewildering errors of judgement and flawed situational awareness, not weak handflying skills. If the pilot of AF447 had good situational awareness, had intended to stay in level flight and was concentrating on flying I have no doubt that he had the skills to do so.

        We need to address the things that cause pilots to be surprised and become disoriented. A big part of that lies in knowing what it's doing now, and what it will be doing next. And what it won't be doing, ever, that you must do yourself. And what you should never do to it. And that's all very teachable.

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        • #79
          Originally posted by elaw View Post
          DC-3's got systems too.
          Complex ones at that...that must be thoroughly trained and understood!

          But the critical concept is: You make a control input and the result more-or-less matches your expectations, because it responds like almost like every other airplane ever built responds.

          Contrast Airbus- where the 'relentless pull up' = maximum climb...(99.9% of the time, anyway)...that differs from almost every other airplane ever built.
          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

          Comment


          • #80
            Originally posted by elaw View Post
            Just to correct the record on one minor point...



            So some dude's flying along in his DC-3, initiates a descent, is sitting there watching the world go by (while skillfully flying the airplane) and all is good. Until the left engine sputters a bit and then stops, and a moment later the right engine does the same thing. Oops! Someone forgot to put the mixture levers to "rich".

            DC-3's got systems too.
            Exactly my point. There is no safe, universal "I know how to fly an airplane". You have to know the specific systems if you don't want to end up eating those words.

            Comment


            • #81
              Originally posted by elaw View Post
              God grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, (Computer flying the airplane)
              Makes you wonder what all those knobs are for, doesn't it.

              Comment


              • #82
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                ...Knowing what it's doing now, and what it will be doing next. And what it won't be doing, ever, that you must do yourself. And what you should never do to it.
                You list 5 scenarios in the quote and then mention lots of knobs right above. I suggest this as a single, simple solution: Fly the GD plane (or at least check the instruments if it's flying itself).

                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                And that's all very teachable.
                I agree it's teachable.

                But I look at the long list of accidents (see post #70, Item #2) and ask why it wasn't taught, including the basic stuff that you say must have been taught way back in their history somewhere.
                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                Comment


                • #83
                  Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                  I agree it's teachable.
                  Congrats Evan- you now have me arguing with myself.

                  The issue is actually that it doesn't have to be taught.

                  Gabriel and I are two, self-confessed, dumbasses. We have no business flying an airliner.

                  BUT- with zero type specific training at all, whatsoever:

                  -We would not have stalled Air France nor Colgan nor Pinnacle.

                  -We would not have run Asiana's 777 out of airspeed, altitude and ideas on short final.

                  -We might even be able to make a 737 go around at 400 feet and not enter a steep climb due to somatographic illusions and powerful underslung engines.

                  We don't need shit in the way of 'teaching' for those particular incidents.

                  God help us if we are called upon to legally navigate an airliner to a New York airport.

                  Important note on that 737 go-around: It would indeed be dangerous of me to try to turn the autopilot back on during that go around- I am NOT properly trained in its use. To do so would be distracting and might make me miss it if an extreme-nose up attitude crept in...

                  But hey, Gabe and I have got that covered too! We've been trained to fly the GD airplane and NOT BE DISTRACTED by automation...somewhere around 3000 feet...if things are stable, I'll call you up on the radio and you can help me with the automation.

                  Yes, we were once taught basics. Yes, all pilots were once taught hand flying. Yes, we would need lots of type specific training. Yes, we have not forgotten the basics.

                  But some pilots seem to forget the basics (and kill people) and some training programs seem to neglect the basics and some airplanes are designed to not need basics and some type-specific trainings tell you to not hand-fly above 250 feet...

                  ...maybe some correlation?
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • #84
                    Originally posted by Evan View Post
                    Exactly my point. There is no safe, universal "I know how to fly an airplane". You have to know the specific systems if you don't want to end up eating those words.
                    There IS a universal "I know how to fly an airplane", and then there IS specifics. (Did I say AND lately?)

                    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                    Comment


                    • #85
                      Originally posted by Evan View Post
                      Again, tell me where this was a factor in any of these crashes. None of this was about nuance. None of them failed due to unpolished handflying skills and flawed inputs.
                      Lack of proper understanding, experience and skills in hand flying can result in worse than just "unpolished" performance, like pulling up to go up beyond the max lift that your wing will give, like not properly monitoring the flight parameters, like not realizing that you are not being pushed against your seat back and that means that something is wrong with the GA thrust...

                      Air France: the extended inputs and apparent intention was entirely in conflict with 'basically need to know how to fly an airplane'. Same with Colgan. Same with Turkish. All of these pilots broke a cardinal rule taught to every pilot learning the basics of how to fly an airplane
                      You seem not to understand the difference between being taught something, learning something theoretically, learning something in tageted practice (like " let's go and so some stalls), and having something really incorporated to your most intimate understanding (understanding with the whole soul and body, not just after a thought process). Do you drive a car? Have you ever learned to drive a car or were you born knowing how to do it? Does it feels NOW as if you were born knowing how to do it, as if it part of your self, or is it something that you learned and can reason around, like it could be maybe some calculus problem?

                      Saying "this will never happen to me" is a big no-no in aviation, but I honestly feel that some things will never happen to me. Take Colgan. To begin with, even if I don't understand the effects of the "ice" switch in the stall warning and approach speeds, my first reaction on the stall warning would have been maybe to lower the nose a bit (especially since I knew that I had altitude to spare), but immediately after I would have said "wait a minute... pitch slightly nose up, airplane flying level, this is low AoA, this is NOT a stall". And it is not that I would have needed to think about. The thought would have come by itself. I might have become distracted or disoriented and crashed in some other way, Pulling up relentlessly against the stick shaker and stick-pusher and then keep pulling up all the way down? That would not have happened to me. Take Turkish. Not only they were I don't know how many seconds not realizing of the speed decay and that the throttles were at idle, all the engine instruments were showing idle, the engine noise was idle, and the airplane felt as at idle (you are being pushed "forward" by the deceleration). The stall warning sounded and, initially, they reacted correctly. The FO lowered the nose and advanced the thrust levers. At this point it was still recoverable. Then the Captain said "my plane". With that, the FO took his hands off the controls, including the throttles, and the captain didn't put the hands on the throttles. Seriously? You are hand-flying a stall recovery, where you were taken to by the automation (for reasons X, I don't care at THIS point in the accident sequence) and you let the automation do things? Some criticize them for not turning the AT off. I can't believe that the pilot flying the plane out of a stall didn't have one hand in the thrust levers all the time!!!! THIS would not have happened to me.

                      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                      Comment


                      • #86
                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        THIS would not have happened to me.
                        Perhaps not.

                        Or perhaps that is hubris. After studying the canon of literature known as the NTSB archive, amongst others, you find that there is something very humbling about human nature and proficiency. And clearly, there is something that happens to the mind under surprise and stress that seems quite random and inexplicable and unrelated to experience. As this becomes more apparent to us, we can't simply take refuge in confidence and denial.

                        I think:

                        a) Some pilots are inherently more susceptible than others to confusion under surprise and stress and sensory disorientation, while some are more apt to remain clear-headed and perform reliably.

                        b) It is possible to screen for this susceptibility and to condition pilots to be more prepared for it, but the methods would be too extreme for the industry to accept (a la the USN inverted dunk test).

                        c) Practiced proficiency under non-stressful, non-disorienting conditions may help but will not prevent the phenomena, as the phenomena itself momentarilly deprives pilots of their learned skills and reasoning.

                        d) Since we can't prevent it, since we can't go to the extremes of testing and screening for this, and we can't reliably prevent this through non-extreme training, we must (as best as possible) prevent the things that cause it (this is similar to the existing design philosophy that, because we can't make airplanes crashworthy, we must build in better provisions and redundancies to prevent crashes from ever happening).

                        e) We know many the things that cause surprise, stress and disorientation. They are sudden events and/or inverted expectations. Some of these events are open to chance and can't be overcome but inverted expectations can be through training because THEY ARE THE DIRECT RESULT OF INADEQUATE TRAINING. For example, a sudden, uncontained engine failure or a sudden decompression cannot be entirely prevented at this time. It's going to happen from time to time. Our best defense is rote training on memory procedures and practiced airmanship (executed in that order). But a sudden confusion and emergency recovery brought about by erroneous expectations concerning the behavior and capabilties of autoflight —which is behind quite a number of these events—CAN be entirely prevented through better training and a deeper type-specific understanding.

                        f) Even veteran pilots experience these "brain farts" as we call them, and subsequently cannot account for them. Some never experience them. Some have a perfect history until that one day when they almost land on a crowded taxiway. But because we cannot screen for pilots who are immune to these human factors (assuming there really are any), we have to create an environment that provides for the ones who are not immune. We have to build in safeguards (TOO LOW GEAR) that might seem idiotic on the surface, and we have to make certain that nothing the aircraft is DESIGNED TO DO will ever confuse and thus distract and/or disorient the pilot entrusted with it.

                        e) We are not currently doing that consistently, across the industry. In some cases it seems we are not doing that at all.

                        f) Handflying skills and universal, fundamental airmanship, which are no less important, are a seperate issue which also needs to be addressed. But I'm not addressing that here, other than to point out that these things alone are not going to prevent the preventable aspects of the phenomena.

                        Comment


                        • #87
                          Originally posted by Evan View Post
                          Perhaps not.

                          Or perhaps that is hubris. After studying the canon of literature known as the NTSB archive, amongst others, you find that there is something very humbling about human nature and proficiency. And clearly, there is something that happens to the mind under surprise and stress that seems quite random and inexplicable and unrelated to experience. As this becomes more apparent to us, we can't simply take refuge in confidence and denial.

                          I think:

                          a) Some pilots are inherently more susceptible than others to confusion under surprise and stress and sensory disorientation, while some are more apt to remain clear-headed and perform reliably.

                          b) It is possible to screen for this susceptibility and to condition pilots to be more prepared for it, but the methods would be too extreme for the industry to accept (a la the USN inverted dunk test).

                          c) Practiced proficiency under non-stressful, non-disorienting conditions may help but will not prevent the phenomena, as the phenomena itself momentarilly deprives pilots of their learned skills and reasoning.

                          d) Since we can't prevent it, since we can't go to the extremes of testing and screening for this, and we can't reliably prevent this through non-extreme training, we must (as best as possible) prevent the things that cause it (this is similar to the existing design philosophy that, because we can't make airplanes crashworthy, we must build in better provisions and redundancies to prevent crashes from ever happening).

                          e) We know many the things that cause surprise, stress and disorientation. They are sudden events and/or inverted expectations. Some of these events are open to chance and can't be overcome but inverted expectations can be through training because THEY ARE THE DIRECT RESULT OF INADEQUATE TRAINING. For example, a sudden, uncontained engine failure or a sudden decompression cannot be entirely prevented at this time. It's going to happen from time to time. Our best defense is rote training on memory procedures and practiced airmanship (executed in that order). But a sudden confusion and emergency recovery brought about by erroneous expectations concerning the behavior and capabilties of autoflight —which is behind quite a number of these events—CAN be entirely prevented through better training and a deeper type-specific understanding.

                          f) Even veteran pilots experience these "brain farts" as we call them, and subsequently cannot account for them. Some never experience them. Some have a perfect history until that one day when they almost land on a crowded taxiway. But because we cannot screen for pilots who are immune to these human factors (assuming there really are any), we have to create an environment that provides for the ones who are not immune. We have to build in safeguards (TOO LOW GEAR) that might seem idiotic on the surface, and we have to make certain that nothing the aircraft is DESIGNED TO DO will ever confuse and thus distract and/or disorient the pilot entrusted with it.

                          e) We are not currently doing that consistently, across the industry. In some cases it seems we are not doing that at all.

                          f) Handflying skills and universal, fundamental airmanship, which are no less important, are a seperate issue which also needs to be addressed. But I'm not addressing that here, other than to point out that these things alone are not going to prevent the preventable aspects of the phenomena.
                          Oh no, is it to early in the morning or have I not had enough coffee yet? I am agreeing with Evan.

                          Comment


                          • #88
                            Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                            ...Take Colgan. To begin with, even if I were dog tired AND flirting with the opposite sex, I want to think that I'd peek at the airspeed a few times as the flaps and gear went out and the props went "flat". On these specific airplanes (almost all of them except Airbus) these things can cause a marked speed decay, leading to stall if you or the autopilot are holding altitude. But let's say I'm too tired and forget and I don't understand the effects of the "ice" switch in the stall warning and approach speeds, my first reaction on the stall warning would have been maybe to lower the nose a bit (especially since I knew that I had altitude to spare), but immediately after I would have said "wait a minute... pitch slightly nose up, airplane flying level, this is low AoA, this is NOT a stall". And it is not that I would have needed to think about. The thought would have come by itself. I might have become distracted or disoriented and crashed in some other way, Pulling up relentlessly against the stick shaker and stick-pusher and then keep pulling up all the way down? That would not have happened to me...
                            Fixed.
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                            Comment


                            • #89
                              Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                              Oh no, is it to early in the morning or have I not had enough coffee yet? I am agreeing with Evan.
                              Do you agree to the point that "we" need an extra runway-alignment warning system?

                              DFW is a most amazing place with who knows how many N-S strips of concrete...and most of them aren't runways.

                              Or is 'always* tune a localizer, or check the magenta line when you line up' good enough...maybe even somehow stress it or 'sort-of-require it'?

                              *Ok, almost always.
                              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                              Comment


                              • #90
                                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                                Exactly my point. There is no safe, universal "I know how to fly an airplane".
                                1. Concur with Gabriel, yes there is.

                                2. It would seem to be good practice to utilize this, as-appropriate, to maintain/improve safety.

                                3. There is evidence that sometimes this has been deprioritized AND crashes where it appears it was sorely missing.

                                4. There is evidence that you have disdain for these concepts.
                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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