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  • #31
    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
    Now, how does that contribute to the fact that they never firewalled the throttles?
    They did... eventually.

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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    • #32
      Originally posted by elaw View Post
      I guess the one exception would be if the pilot believes that too much power would cause the plane to pitch up and stall. I'd think any decently-designed plane would have enough elevator authority to overcome that even with the trim grossly off, but maybe not?
      No, there have been cases where the trim grossly off + changing from idle to TOGA made elevator by itself not enough to keep the AoA below stall. Of course that a bit of nose-down trim (or better, a little less of nose-up trim) would have fixed it. THIS WAS NOT THE SCENARIO IN PALM 90 WHERE THE TRIM WAS UNDER NO WAY GROSSLY OFF OR MODERATELY OFF.

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

      Comment


      • #33
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        They did... eventually.
        Adjusted my wording for factual accuracy.
        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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        • #34
          Originally posted by elaw View Post
          ***I'd think any decently-designed plane would have enough elevator authority to overcome that even with the trim grossly off***
          Actually responding to Gabriel's comment- I think I'm with elaw and have the outsider ass-hat opinion that a decently designed airplane should not be so stall-able!

          I will pile on that the more in-cockpit videos I watch, guys are doing what I was taught NOT to do: Fly with trim.

          Is it really that bad to have to PULL on the yoke to keep the plane in a high-performance climb.

          Reduce control forces- fine. Totally eliminate them...I guess that doesn't bother me unless it makes the plane where you can't prevent a stall if you power up.
          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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          • #35
            Originally posted by 3WE View Post
            Actually responding to Gabriel's comment- I think I'm with elaw and have the outsider ass-hat opinion that a decently designed airplane should not be so stall-able!

            I will pile on that the more in-cockpit videos I watch, guys are doing what I was taught NOT to do: Fly with trim.

            Is it really that bad to have to PULL on the yoke to keep the plane in a high-performance climb.

            Reduce control forces- fine. Totally eliminate them...I guess that doesn't bother me unless it makes the plane where you can't prevent a stall if you power up.
            The typical scenario is a B737 in an ILS approach with the throttles at idle due to a mistake or technical fault. As the plane bleeds speed the AP adds nose-up trim to pitch up and keep the airplane in the glideslope, until the stickshaker goes off and the AP disconnects. So at this point, with the engines at idle, the plane is trimmed for stickshaker AoA (that is what I'd call grossly off). You will advance the throttles but the engines will take a few seconds to spool up from idle, so you will lose more speed. Now the engines are at TOGA adding more pitch-up moment, so what was trimmed for the stickshaker AoA now is trimmed beyond stall AoA, and at a very slow speed (below stall speed) where the elevators have little authority. In the 1 case that I know that elevator alone was not enough, the pilots realized about the low speed 1 second before the stickshaker so they started a go-around that, other than advancing the throttles to TOGA, they retracted the flaps from 30 to 15. That was the straw that broke the camel's back. The pitch up was uncontrollable, they fully stalled and started to fall, the nose went down and they gained airspeed, up they went again but this time they had enough airspeed for the elevator to have enough authority to, for the first time, reduce AoA and silence the stickshaker. ONLY THEN it occurred to them that it could be a good idea push the nose-down trim button a little bit. Had they done that early in the process they would not have been so close to die and kill as they were. Why a pilot is fighting for nose-down control (with high push force and full deflection) and doesn't think to use the trim for help is beyond me, it is what pilots do all the time to help with pitch control in non-daring situations. But it can happen in moments of intense stress, especially f the drill is not practiced (and BB, correct me if I am wrong, but scenarios where you need trim to aid in a stall recovery are not practiced often if ever, maybe once or twice in the life in an upset recovery program?)

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • #36
              Originally posted by 3WE View Post
              Sorry man, you just contributed nothing.

              Do you want to say that the captain was an extremely competent, well trained, highly-experienced, safety-conscious pilot? I don't doubt it. Airline pilots generally are.

              Now, how does that contribute to the fact that they did not 'promptly' firewall the throttles? I acknowledge that it's very easy to see that at 0 kts and 0 ft AGL. But in all seriousness- they should have done that and they didn't.

              I confess- I can see myself doing the exact same thing they did...well actually I did something a somewhat similar and continued a genuine short field takeoff with the carburetor heat left on. Pretty scary incident as my highly trained experience (all 30 hours of it) CORRECTLY told me that I would make it with a minimum safety buffer. I do not claim to be SMARTER than them.

              Any thoughts on what could have been done differently that day to help those great humans from making human errors? (And by the way there was more than one significant contributing factor thing cited in the NTSB report?)- Or do you just want to brag about all of your hours? We respect your hours and all, but there was a good dose of hours in command of Air Florida, and here today, 35 years later, we discuss and dissect related failures in new close calls and new crashes.

              Not what I said, I knew Larry well, and was involved with the NTSB investigation. But whatever, you ALL know so much about something that happened in 1982!

              Comment


              • #37
                Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                Not what I said, I knew Larry well, and was involved with the NTSB investigation. But whatever, you ALL know so much about something that happened in 1982!
                What you said was a veiled threat to Gabriel to "Be VERY careful."

                I was 21...watched it happen sort of live on TV, read about it afterwards with more discernment than the standard newspaper reader. Read the NTSB report. Wondered about my personally late liftoff and dragging over the trees and subdivision houses and how I was tunnel visioned that things were acceptable and that I didn't abort. I remember some sort of call from the tower to AF: "Cleared for an immediate takeoff, traffic short final". That's what I know- yeah maybe not much, but...

                What did we miss because you still have not added one single thing to this discussion.

                C'mon man, you knew the pilot, you have the hours, you were involve in the investitgation, you know so much about what happened in 1982, please educate us.

                Or is it just about the power trip of I know but you don't know and I'll just brag that I know and that you don't know...
                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                Comment


                • #38
                  Originally posted by Gabriel, paraphrased View Post
                  You are in a situation where you need lots of nose up trim and then the situation changes where you need nose down trim.
                  Yeah, that's the point.

                  Why is the damn thing (or the system) not designed to prevent that.

                  I don't think it would kill the pilots to have to pull back some to go slow and push over some to go around.

                  But, no, we have to trim it all away (and I do me ALL of it)...leaving us with a plane that you can't prevent from stalling...

                  As elaw said..."A good DESIGN" (or not a good design).
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • #39
                    Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                    What you said was a veiled threat to Gabriel to "Be VERY careful."

                    I was 21...watched it happen sort of live on TV, read about it afterwards with more discernment than the standard newspaper reader. Read the NTSB report. Wondered about my personally late liftoff and dragging over the trees and subdivision houses and how I was tunnel visioned that things were acceptable and that I didn't abort. I remember some sort of call from the tower to AF: "Cleared for an immediate takeoff, traffic short final". That's what I know- yeah maybe not much, but...

                    What did we miss because you still have not added one single thing to this discussion.

                    C'mon man, you knew the pilot, you have the hours, you were involve in the investitgation, you know so much about what happened in 1982, please educate us.

                    Or is it just about the power trip of I know but you don't know and I'll just brag that I know and that you don't know...
                    Nothing to do with your crappy attitude at all. Out of respect for Larry, and so as NOT to defame another flyboy in public, (which was the caution to Gabe.) If you PM me I will be glad to enlighten you.

                    Comment


                    • #40
                      Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                      Nothing to do with your crappy attitude at all. Out of respect for Larry, and so as NOT to defame another flyboy in public, (which was the caution to Gabe.) If you PM me I will be glad to enlighten you.
                      BB, I am not defaming or intending to defame anyone. However there are facts out there. I am sure the crew did the best they could, which doesn't mean that it could not have been done better.

                      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                      Comment


                      • #41
                        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        BB, I am sure the crew did the best they could, which doesn't mean that it could not have been done better.
                        Actually, that IS what 'did their best' means. But whatever, humans will fail on fundamentals under stress and time compression. We should all have learned that by now. You and 3WE keep asking why pilots would fail to do something fundamental (or do the opposite) and the answer is writ large in so many accident reports. The human mind is complex and not designed to fly. That is why we need to create as much redundancy as possible and train procedures that seem unwarranted. Pilots might fail to do this but then don't fail to do that and so they can still recover in time. We can train pilots better, to react under stress more reliably, but we will never eliminate the human factor and for every close call we never hear about, there will be a rare tragic exception that makes the news. The only way to improve on that reality is to add more layers of defense against that human factor.

                        The human factors that work against us: shock, confusion, disorientation, reality conflicting with expectation and confirmation bias.

                        The human factors that works against us taking stronger steps against human factors: denial, arrogance, indifference, greed.

                        Comment


                        • #42
                          Originally posted by Evan View Post
                          1. You and 3WE keep asking why pilots would fail to do something fundamental (or do the opposite) and the answer is writ large in so many accident reports.
                          2. The human mind is complex and not designed to fly...
                          3. That is why we need to...train procedures that seem unwarranted.
                          4. We can train pilots better, to react under stress more reliably
                          5. The only way to improve on that reality is to add more layers of defense against that human factor.

                          ...
                          1. No, I keep expressing questions about what they ARE trained.
                          2. Flying is complex.
                          3. Yeah, let's train for unwarranted procedures.
                          4. More training...
                          (and more and more and more- keep piling it on Evan. You don't think training has been being adjusted for 35 years? So, if we add YOUR trainings, then Me and Gabe will not_have to ask why folks violate huge, valid fundamentals? (You think maybe some reminders of fundamentals might be a reasonable part of all that new training you want?)
                          5a. I object to absolute statements
                          5b. ESEPECIALLY when YOUR way is the ONLY way to fix human factors.
                          5c. A reminder that Boeing Bobby and a number of his coworkers are scoffing at us- because, remember the insiders (not to be confused with we outsiders (which YOU used quite liberally by the way)) are working pretty damn hard and spending careers trying to be trained and competent. Yeah, I think we have the right to ask why fundamental stuff is seemingly botched since we are usually killed along with the crew. But, I'll stop short of such bold proclamations of how pilots are trained in such a crappy manner, and instead scrutinize your training programs.
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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                          • #43
                            F.A.O.: Gabe

                            I feel the need to apologize for the NEAR TOTAL HIJACKING of the thread.

                            So much for your 'incident of the month' of someone messing up and making a long takeoff, when a smartphone app (or an ATL BB old-school-non-electronic speed-distance check) might be able to give them a valid, reasonably fail safe, reasonably early warning that acceleration was amiss.
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                            Comment


                            • #44
                              Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                              And you were how old when Palm 90 happened? I knew and used to fly DC-3's with the Captain of that flight, and had just come back from a trip to South America in the 707 the same day.
                              Relevance?

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                              • #45
                                Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
                                Relevance?
                                None at all, frustration...

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