Originally posted by Gabriel
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Unstable approach and Pilot overload
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostThey went as slow as 1 knot above the stall speed. The report says that the stickshaker should have activated, but they could not confirm it because there was nothing to record such data.
There is no reason to think that the stickshaker didn't work as designed. Everything seems to be working ok with the plane (except the pilot).
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostThey went as slow as 1 knot above the stall speed. The report says that the stickshaker should have activated, but they could not confirm it because there was nothing to record such data.
There is no reason to think that the stickshaker didn't work as designed. Everything seems to be working ok with the plane (except the pilot).
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Originally posted by Evan View PostWould that not be recorded as audio? Or was there no HOT mike?
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostThey went as slow as 1 knot above the stall speed. The report says that the stickshaker should have activated, but they could not confirm it because there was nothing to record such data.
There is no reason to think that the stickshaker didn't work as designed. Everything seems to be working ok with the plane (except the pilot).
1 knot, 500 feet, 30 knots slow, high performance plane and distracted as hell and we blame the training on recovery technique?
How do we prevent crashes like this?
No one bit on my suggestion that the stall warning (or a slow warning) kicks in sooner...
Could this have helped: Colgan? Hui Theiu Lo? These guys?Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostThey went as slow as 1 knot above the stall speed. The report says that the stickshaker should have activated, but they could not confirm it because there was nothing to record such data.
There is no reason to think that the stickshaker didn't work as designed. Everything seems to be working ok with the plane (except the pilot).
At the same time, the pilot emphasized the need to watch that the airspeed did not become too slow. At that point, the airspeed had decreased to 99 knots, within a few knots of the stall speed of 95 knots. The pilot rapidly advanced the power levers to their full forward position.
As the airplane approaches a stall, a lift transducer mounted in the leading edge of the right wing responds to changes in airflow over the wing [...] and actuates the shaker 4 to 9 [knots] before the stall. [...] The lift transducer incorporates a heater element for ice protection. During flight conditions when ice accumulates on the wing leading edge, the stall warning system may not always actuate the stick shaker prior to stall. Flight tests have demonstrated however, that natural aerodynamic buffet precedes the stall.
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Originally posted by 3WE View PostThank you...
1 knot, 500 feet, 30 knots slow, high performance plane and distracted as hell and we blame the training on recovery technique?
How do we prevent crashes like this?
No one bit on my suggestion that the stall warning (or a slow warning) kicks in sooner...
Could this have helped: Colgan? Hui Theiu Lo? These guys?
A stall warning that is too much above the actual stall can be annoying, distracting, can create a tolerance to it (when it should be the most intolerable warning that should trigger the most ractive and automatic response among all the warnings in a plane), and can make "escape" maneuvers less effective (windhshear escape, terrain escape) unless you fly them within the stall warning regime and in that case you don't know your margin over stall. Stall warning should start at the point where the lift-to-AoA ratio starts to flatten and where the drag starts to increase quickly, so you know that beyond that point you really have nothing to gain to keep increasing the AoA.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by 3WE View PostCould this have helped: Colgan? Hui Theiu Lo? These guys?
These guys? Maybe
Colgan? Air France? NO F#%@$ING WAY!!! Those guys pulled up hard the moment that the stall warning activated.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostI don't know if the stall warning, but maybe a "pre-stall" advisory warning or an airspeed alert could be handy. Similar to the "glideslope" GPWS call or the altitude chime you get when the plane deviates more than(I think) 200 ft from the selected altitude. Of course that would work only in planes that have an airspeed bug.
A stall warning that is too much above the actual stall can be annoying, distracting, can create a tolerance to it (when it should be the most intolerable warning that should trigger the most recessive and automatic response among all the warnings in a plane), and can make "escape" maneuvers less effective (windhshear escape, terrain escape) unless you fly them within the stall warning regime and in that case you don't know your margin over stall. Stall warning should start at the point where the lift-to-AoA ratio starts to flatten and where the drag starts to increase quickly, so you know that beyond that point you really have nothing to gain to keep increasing the AoA.
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostA stall warning that is too much above the actual stall can be annoying, distracting, can create a tolerance to it (when it should be the most intolerable warning that should trigger the most recessive and automatic response among all the warnings in a plane), and can make "escape" maneuvers less effective (windhshear escape, terrain escape) unless you fly them within the stall warning regime and in that case you don't know your margin over stall. Stall warning should start at the point where the lift-to-AoA ratio starts to flatten and where the drag starts to increase quickly, so you know that beyond that point you really have nothing to gain to keep increasing the AoA.
Stage 1 may 'come to be expected', but I want Captain Colgan AND MU-2/ADD Newbie guy to get a 'mundane' reminder so they CAN calmly apply power...and CALMLY address the warning without a relentless pull up...
I concur that this would not help Air France...
I would also say that I worry that you and me and our light plane experience may have had life too easy...with the autopilot holding altitude and / or the pilot and his super handy thumb-trim switch...I think it's a lot easier to get a rather relentless pull up going without having to PULL REAL HARD/FAR on the yoke like we do. I can recall a time or to on MSFS when the stall warning and the stall came as a surprise- and a very quick surprise at that...
Clearly it's unwise to drink beer, listen to the football game, talk to the wife and fly airliners on MSFS at the same time...Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by Evan View Post(3WE likes to paint me as someone who dismisses fundamentals because I stress procedure, as if I have to choose between the two)
Still, as Gabriel's analogy illustrates: Drunk, 120 MPH in a car with no brakes, and you fixate on training for high-speed cornering.
Many posts ago, I said that you had spoken some truth and gave you 20%...but the mind of great absolute black and whiteness argued on...
At some point, every MU-2 pilot has 150 hours in type. How many training hours does he need doing stall recovery so that he instinctively is gentle on the power levers.
It is a fact that it's better to focus on never ever ever ever ever getting close to stall speed (and that does not say never ever ever ever ever discuss nor practice and actual stall).
I would bet that the guy WAS trained on stall recovery...I would bet the training said, "Go gentle with the power levers"
However, that is of limited value at 4 knots above stall at 500 feet...ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU HAVEN'T BEEN PAYING A DAMN BIT OF ATTENTION AND ARE WAAAAAAAAY BEHIND THE AIRPLANE.
Edit: There is part of me that would want every MU-2 pilot at the point of his type rating to have it totally ingrained in his muscle memory to gently advance the power and be ready for a serious wing dip...but conversely and repeating: How many hours must we practice stalls when it might be better to practice how to conduct a decent descent to be on course, and at a good altitude and speed in stable flight and maybe even brief for a missed approach...
By the way- I also wish to say "Concur" to Gabriels comments of "they don't know the details"- including one important detail- what was going through the guys mind...I suspect, it was holy shit we are BAD LOW AND SLOW...HIT THE POWER...I DOUBT he thought, "Gee manitly, we are 4 knots above stall, let me gently and calmly add power like I was taught 125 hours ago"...however, that is all just speculation on my part.Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by 3WE View PostYou have made some progress in recognizing the linkage.
Still, as Gabriel's analogy illustrates: Drunk, 120 MPH in a car with no brakes, and you fixate on training for high-speed cornering.
Many posts ago, I said that you had spoken some truth and gave you 20%...but the mind of great absolute black and whiteness argued on...
At some point, every MU-2 pilot has 150 hours in type. How many training hours does he need doing stall recovery so that he instinctively is gentle on the power levers.
It is a fact that it's better to focus on never ever ever ever ever getting close to stall speed (and that does not say never ever ever ever ever discuss nor practice and actual stall).
I would bet that the guy WAS trained on stall recovery...I would bet the training said, "Go gentle with the power levers"
However, that is of limited value at 4 knots above stall at 500 feet...ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU HAVEN'T BEEN PAYING A DAMN BIT OF ATTENTION AND ARE WAAAAAAAAY BEHIND THE AIRPLANE.
Repeating- how many hours must we practice stalls when it might be better to practice how to conduct a decent descent to be on course, and at a good altitude and speed in stable flight and maybe even brief for a missed approach...
By the way- I also wish to say "Concur" to Gabriels comments of "they don't know the details"- including one important detail- what was going through the guys mind...I suspect, it was holy shit we are BAD LOW AND SLOW...HIT THE POWER...I DOUBT he thought, "Gee manitly, we are 4 knots above stall, let me gently and calmly add power like I was taught 125 hours ago"...however, that is all just speculation on my part.
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Originally posted by 3WE View Post
Still, as Gabriel's analogy illustrates: Drunk, 120 MPH in a car with no brakes, and you fixate on training for high-speed cornering.
AGAIN: not either this or that, but BOTH of these things. If you end up driving drunk with no brakes while carrying PASSENGERS, wouldn't it be good to make that corner and live despite all the violations and bad judgment that led you there?
Your moralistic rants about always doing this and never doing that get timesome because YES, we all know that already. It called pilot error. Ok already, acknowledged.
The conversation is only interesting to me in terms of what can be changed to mitigate the damage from pilot error or poor airmanship. What can be done to allow pilots to recover from their lapses and errors without killing everybody in the process? Recovery training for one, which in some cases is type-specific.
That is why I don't really focus on pointing out the initial error or violation. It isn't because I don't recognize it. It's because that IS going to happen, always, until the end of time.
Example: we have stall warnings and stick shakers. We didn't always have these things, but fortunately the conversation was about what we can do to mitigate stall, not just condemnation for poor airmanship. Same with TAWS, same with TCAS. Second lines of defense were created ASSUMING pilots would make mistakes.
Still, if a pilot reacts improperly to these second lines of defense, they don't work. So that must be worked on.
If this was merely a pilot condemnation forum I would have gotten bored with it long ago.
At some point, every MU-2 pilot has 150 hours in type.
It is a fact that it's better to focus on never ever ever ever ever getting close to stall speed (and that does not say never ever ever ever ever discuss nor practice and actual stall).
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I want to highlight an important point here that was overlooked and that 3we reminded me:
At some point, every MU-2 pilot has 150 hours in type. How many training hours does he need doing stall recovery so that he instinctively is gentle on the power levers.
(Yes, I know you will be an FO in Initial Line training with not only a captain on the left seat but another pilot in the jumpseat, but even when that 3rd pilot is gone I don't think you'll have 100 hours on type).
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by Evan View Post***AGAIN: not either this or that, but BOTH of these things.***
***Not one or the other 3WE. Both.***
Gabriel- help, please...how many absolute statements have I made EDIT: versus statements which acknowledge "both" /Edit ...(just above your second "both" quote, don't I say "this doesn't say you never discuss or practice a stall"...in other words, "Both") Didn't I say Evan was 20 or 30% correct that poor understanding of the stall behavior was a contributing factor?
I moralistically rant that one should always do this and never do that???...yeah, I do like to always monitor airspeed (would have definitely helped Hui Theiu, Colgan and these guys). Regarding relentless pull ups and how to recover, I am much more liberal with wiggle words.
This is the ole elephant in the room deal...and you are focused on a house fly. Both can drop excrement in the room, that excrement is undesirable, but one is a bigger problem than the other and might deserve more focus...get the elephant out...and yeah, sure, then get your flyswatter and work on the fly...Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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