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Plane with 71 on board goes missing after taking off from Moscow

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  • #61
    Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
    I can't win for loosing with you Gabe, I think sometimes there are nuances that are lost in the translation. Here it is right out of the manual. This is an immediate recall item. No time for pulling out books. Pull out the books after you are up, away and safe.

    [ATTACH=CONFIG]13921[/ATTACH]
    I don't know what does that have to do with my previous comment.
    And I don't know what translation are you talking about, but let me clarify:

    Evan: The memory items (or immediate recall items) for UAS at high altitude in the A330 are 1) AP/AT/FD disconnect, 2) thrust: CLB, 3) pitch: 5 deg nose up. If the pilot does anything that is a hair different than that it is unacceptable and I don't care about what is reasonable or what the pilot likes or about generally safe pitch and power settings. (and, by the way, I agree with Evan)

    BoingBobby: I agree with you. In a situation such as that, wings level, pitch 5 - 10 degrees ( I like 10 in the 74) and MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST! Just a little less pitch than for wind-shear.

    Do you see the contrast?

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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    • #62
      Ho Hum ! Time I think for a favourite video of mine. For the old time regulars here you can go make a coffee now because yes, it’s “Children of the Magenta” time. For the newbies, watch this all and take especial notice of the comment at 24.10.

      If it 'ain't broken........ Don't try to mend it !

      Comment


      • #63
        Originally posted by Evan View Post
        The link is to a Ground Proximity Warning procedure. Or did you post this just as an example of an immediate recall item?

        Yes

        Comment


        • #64
          Originally posted by brianw999 View Post
          Ho Hum ! Time I think for a favourite video of mine. For the old time regulars here you can go make a coffee now because yes, it’s “Children of the Magenta” time. For the newbies, watch this all and take especial notice of the comment at 24.10.

          https://youtu.be/pN41LvuSz10
          And, more importantly, 20:05 to 20:40.

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

          Comment


          • #65
            Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
            If the pilot does anything that is a hair different than that it is unacceptable and I don't care about what is reasonable or what the pilot likes or about generally safe pitch and power settings. (and, by the way, I agree with Evan)
            I don't agree with that. I'm not advocating some sort of rigidly precise execution (where did you get that idea... oh, right, 3WE). It might not even be possible in turbulence. Look, the idea—for the millionth time—behind immediate recall items is to have an immediate reaction trained into the minds of pilots that assures that the plane will remain stabilized within the envelope until they have had ample time to gather their situational awareness and made the appropriate decisions regarding all that awareness. As long as they have the memorized procedure in mind when they execute it with a small margin of error (which it accomodates), that's a win as far as I'm concerned. Saying things like "anything that is a hair different" makes it sound oppressive. And this 'procedures are oppressive' mentality is at the heart of the problem.

            Comment


            • #66
              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
              And while following the procedure is the best and only acceptable way to live through UAS, it is by no means the only one.
              It is the only acceptable one.

              If I had an airline and found that one of my pilots had lost speeds, failed to execute the established procedure (where nothing prevented it) and rode it out without incident, that pilot is going to be reprimanded. The reasons for procedures go beyond what is needed to control the plane. They come from everything that has been learned from accident investigations and all that knowledge is worthless if pilots don't value it. Human factors, complex systems interdependencies, stealth factors, uneven pilot proficiency, these are the hidden dangers.

              Again, following the procedure is the best and only acceptable option, just not the only viable one.
              Here is the immediate recall procedure at my airline:

              1) Execute well-trained and memorized procedure > stabilize > CRM > whatever is viable.

              2) Where well-trained and memorized procedures are not available (or forgotten), then skip to whatever is viable.

              Keeping in mind that 'viable' is a subjective assessment subject to grievious human error.

              I have a little more sympathy for the PNF who, by the design of the Airbus control system, had no feedback on what control inputs the PF was doing
              Seriously? You don't consider the PFD feedback? I agree that the sidestick is a disadvantage here, but come on... And during the botched stall recovery the plane was responding to those inputs, but the focus needs to be on not ever getting to that point.

              My point is that I would not trust a pilot with following any specific procedure for any specific condition in any specific airplane type if they don't give me confidence that they are capable to use their general workmanship to do better than what AF did. Or Colgan. Or Pinnacle.
              But what if they did prove themselves capable, as these pilots almost certainly did to become certified and employed by AIr France? Once again Gabriel, you are discounting human factors, the reason we have to have these procedures in the first place.

              Comment


              • #67
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                1) Execute well-trained and memorized procedure > stabilize > CRM > whatever is viable.
                Another way to look at this is AVIATE > COMMUNICATE (CRM) > AVIATE > NAVIGATE > COMMUNICATE (RADIOS)

                Where the first AVIATE stabilizes you enough to safely COMMUNICATE (CRM) so that the second AVIATE is done with the correct situational awareness.

                Comment


                • #68
                  Evan, 2 yes/no questions:

                  1) Do you agree that we need to ensure, to the extent possible, that we have good pilot material that understands well the generalities of airmanship before teaching him specific procedures for specific circumstances in specific types?
                  2) Do you agree that a pilot that meets 1) and gets so confused / startled / disoriented / paralyzed / panicked to react to UAS (or to any other abnormal circumstance) at cruise by pulling a 1.5G, 7000 fpm, 2000 ft climb and when the stall warning activates, pull up again and keep pulling up all the way to the ground (or sea), may (vs will) fail to make a correct UAS diagnosis in the first place and then fail to recall or apply the UAS memory items correctly even if said procedure was taught, demonstrated and trained? (else you are proposing that the startled pilot will fail to fly the plane reasonably straight and level will not fail to recognize a specific situation and apply a specific procedure)

                  If you reply YES to both questions, then we have nothing else to discuss.
                  If you reply NO to one or more of those questions, then we have nothing else to discuss (but for totally different reasons).

                  In any event, we have nothing else to discuss. I am done here.

                  --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                  --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                  Comment


                  • #69
                    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                    Evan, 2 yes/no questions:

                    1) Do you agree that we need to ensure, to the extent possible, that we have good pilot material that understands well the generalities of airmanship before teaching him specific procedures for specific circumstances in specific types?
                    2) Do you agree that a pilot that meets 1) and gets so confused / startled / disoriented / paralyzed / panicked to react to UAS (or to any other abnormal circumstance) at cruise by pulling a 1.5G, 7000 fpm, 2000 ft climb and when the stall warning activates, pull up again and keep pulling up all the way to the ground (or sea), may (vs will) fail to make a correct UAS diagnosis in the first place and then fail to recall or apply the UAS memory items correctly even if said procedure was taught, demonstrated and trained? (else you are proposing that the startled pilot will fail to fly the plane reasonably straight and level will not fail to recognize a specific situation and apply a specific procedure)

                    If you reply YES to both questions, then we have nothing else to discuss.
                    If you reply NO to one or more of those questions, then we have nothing else to discuss (but for totally different reasons).

                    In any event, we have nothing else to discuss. I am done here.
                    1) You know I do.

                    2) That's gotta be a no, BECAUSE even those who have a poor understanding of the concepts and dynamics of aerodynamics and piloting may still be trained like monkeys to RELIABLY react in a certain way to a given circumstance. If, at that moment, the brain lacks a trained response, the brain will improvise, as it did on that fateful day, and many other fateful days. Again, the procedures are not there to inhibit stellar pilots with perfect situational awareness, they are there to protect us all from pilots like the one who doomed AF447. But in order for that to happen, ALL pilots have to follow them.

                    Here's my question to you: when someone suddenly pushes you from behind and, completely disoriented, you fall forward, do you have to think about raising your arms in front of you?

                    These immediate recall procedures are very simple and designed to be almost that instinctive.

                    Sudden decompression! Boom! Oxygen mask! Pax Oxygen ON! Now you have time to think, for CRM. And you didn't go to the QRH in a state of hypoxia.

                    Ground Proximity! Advance to climb thrust! Establish 20° pitch (don't stall)! Now you have time to think, for CRM. And you didn't add pitch while spacing out the thrust levers.

                    UAS! Level wings! Fly 5* pitch! Move the thrust levers to climb (or out of the detent and back in if you're driving the bus)! Kill the FD's! Now you have time to think, for CRM. And you didn't fall for the instinct to climb above the weather (even though it seemed viable).

                    If only they were taught, practiced and respected to the extent needed. What gets in the way, I think I'm finding out...

                    Comment


                    • #70
                      Originally posted by Evan
                      ... my question to you: when someone suddenly pushes you from behind and, completely disoriented, you fall forward, do you have to think about raising your arms in front of you?
                      You can’t stand it when we suggest that it’s ok for the elbow to hinge parallel to the the body- because some procedure says your elbows must hinge out and away from the body.

                      In the meantime we ask why Bonin deliberately landed teeth first while he worries which way to fold toilet paper when wiping front to back and wondering why his 2-ft thick anti push suit failed.
                      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                      Comment


                      • #71
                        Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                        You can’t stand it... etc., etc.
                        I'm also done try to arguing this here, except to repeat this simple and obvious truth:

                        The procedures are not there to inhibit stellar pilots with perfect situational awareness; they are there to protect us all from pilots like the one who doomed AF447. But in order for that to happen, ALL pilots have to learn them, practice them and follow them.

                        Comment


                        • #72
                          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          In any event, we have nothing else to discuss. I am done here.
                          I doubt that somehow...

                          Comment


                          • #73
                            Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
                            I doubt that somehow...
                            Me too!

                            Comment


                            • #74
                              Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
                              I doubt that somehow...
                              I meant for this specific discussion with Evan.

                              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                              Comment


                              • #75
                                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                                ***(where did you get that idea... oh, right, 3WE)***
                                I think I actually taught Gabriel something...once...

                                But the concept that you could select a familiar, robust power setting and attitude and maintain desired, fat, dumb and happy horizontal and vertical speeds...and that sub-par pilots might remember that from 172 school since it amazingly ALSO applies to an A330...

                                ...he learned that elsewhere...

                                Probably some CFI or textbook or something.
                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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