Plane with 71 on board goes missing after taking off from Moscow

[Evan]

Fascinating...YOU are spitting out FAMILIAR ROBUST POWER AND PITCH SETTINGS- which give you known, robust horizontal and vertical speeds...

And yes, THAT is the idea. Level pitch and 75% power = level flight and a nice speed with fat margins between stall and overspeed. 5 degree ANU gives you a nice climb with fat margins between stall and overspeed.

no..no..no... You see, this is the problem! What one pilot thinks is a familiar pitch/power setting will differ from what another pilot has in mind, and some of those "familiar" assumptions will be wrong enough to get you into trouble. But what do the engineers of these aircraft know for sure? That a given pitch and power setting will NOT get you into trouble. So they provide that, pilots are taught to memorize it (memory items training) and everyone follows THAT procedure until they can fine tune things and fly by airmanship alone. No one dies.

You, however, just stated that a pitch of 0-1° is going to do nicely. It's not. Before the F/O of AF447 selected a speed reduction via the autopilot, the N1 was where it typically is at this point, in the high 90's. The reason it was down in the 70's at disconnect was due to the speed reduction command, and would need to come back up very soon to maintain that reduced speed. If you fly at that pitch, weight and altitude at 75%N1, you are going to descend, and if you react to that by adding pitch, in alternate law, you are on your way to a stall warning. On the other hand, if you simply leave the thrust levers where they are (CL detent) and fly the pitch you were at, the same thing is going to happen because the thrust is now locked at 75%N1. And if you, instead rely on the flight directors for pitch, you might end up there too because the FD's are now unreliable.

You see all the hidden pitfalls that await you if you try to apply the familiar to an unfamiliar situation?

On the other hand, you can follow the procedure and avoid them.

Your choice, but the passengers don't get to choose and they die with you.

[3WE]

Your choice, but the passengers don't get to choose and they die with you.

I struggle with logic. Please explain how the power setting and attitude that was used yesterday and for the previous 600 flights kills people today, but not_on the previous 600 flights.

[Evan]

I struggle with logic. Please explain how the power setting and attitude that was used yesterday and for the previous 600 flights kills people today, but not_on the previous 600 flights.

1) As I just pointed out, many pilots today are not so familiar with power and attitude settings for phases of flight where autoflight is REQUIRED.

2) You, yourself just provided a perfect example of this. Level pitch and 75% power DOES NOT equal level flight and a nice speed with fat margins between stall and overspeed. Not for an A330 at 250,000lbs and FL360 (or whatever is was).

3) Other incidents of unreliable airspeed revealed by the AF447 investigation showed that pilots did not always fly pitch and power that resulted in level flight and a nice speed with fat margins between stall and overspeed.

The logic is simple: there are less-than-stellar pilots out there, maybe more than we care to admit, who will do this wrong if they improvise based on what they think is 'familiar'. So we have established settings that will work safely for both the stellar and non-stellar pilots.

No upset, everyone lives. That's the logic.

[3WE]

You, yourself just provided a perfect example of this. Level pitch and 75% power DOES NOT equal level flight and a nice speed with fat margins between stall and overspeed. Not for an A330 at 250,000lbs and FL360 (or whatever is was).

Damn...busted...all my Airbus 330 hours and I blow it on straight and level power settings.

[Gabriel]

1) As I just pointed out, many pilots today are not so familiar with power and attitude settings for phases of flight where autoflight is REQUIRED.

2) You, yourself just provided a perfect example of this. Level pitch and 75% power DOES NOT equal level flight and a nice speed with fat margins between stall and overspeed. Not for an A330 at 250,000lbs and FL360 (or whatever is was).

Evan, I am all for following procedures including and especially memory items. But this is ridiculous. 5deg and CLB won't give you level flight either. And the attitude and power setting that you had before UAS are an excellent start. Again, memory items are even better. But if you keep the nose just slightly up and any reasonable cruise power setting (again, what you had immediately before the UAS is a good start) should keep you safe. Level flight? No. But safe. AF was with a somehow reduced power because they were slowing down to turbulent air penetration speed. So if they kept pitch and power the speed would have gone down, and the airplane would have started to descent, at constant pitch, and the speed and VS would have stabilized at some safe level. Again, am I proposing this? No. Again, by all means follow procedures. But just not following procedures is not enough to explain these accidents. There were other much more rational ways to bust the procedures. Saying "they did not follow the procedures" is almost like saying "they did not keep the required clearance from the ground".

[Evan]

Evan, I am all for following procedures including and especially memory items. But this is ridiculous.

What is? That pilots repeatedly messed up on this and got themselves into upsets? That pilots pull up at stall warnings or pitch over in go-arounds? That pilots fly planes into the ground?

Concur. It's ridiculous! But it's also reality. You can't have a policy that says "just improvise and do your best" when this is the reality. You can't have any tolerance for that. And you can't have a policy that says "only the good pilots can improvise" because the bad ones, especially the bad ones, think they're the good ones. You have to have a policy that says "all pilots MUST follow these procedures and CRM must never be disregarded". Sure, the good ones can handle the situation without these things, but it is the bad ones that must drive policy. Everyone follows the procedure. Everyone lives.

Now, what do I mean by 'good ones' and 'bad ones'? 'Good ones' are pilots with well-taught, well-practiced airmanship AND situational awareness AND are not affected at THAT MOMENT by the spectrum of human factors to which THEY ARE susceptible. 'Bad ones' are all the rest, including the 25K hours ex-combat veteran hans solo genius pilot of the millenium not falling under my definition of 'good ones' AT THAT MOMENT.

The most disturbing thing for me is that, after all of these tragedies and all of the lessons learned about stealth factors and the weakness of the otherwise sound human mind and the effects this has on both judgment and physical reaction, so many airman (and very knowledgeable forum members) still resist accepting that reality.

If we want everyone to live through UAS, we need everyone to agree to follow procedure no matter how ridiculous they might find it. That is the reality.

5deg and CLB won't give you level flight either.

Why are we talking about level flight? I'm talking about staying in the middle of the envelope and avoiding things that may lead to upset.

And the attitude and power setting that you had before UAS are an excellent start.

Great, quick... what were they? Go dig up the pilots of AF447 and ask them what the pitch/power settings were prior to the event. I'll give you $20 if they get it right. Pitch, maybe (I doubt it). Power, forget about it.

Again, memory items are even better.

So what are we arguing about? Isn't it better to do what is better? Isn't it safer to do what is safer for everyone?

Again, the bottom line: if everyone adhered to memory procedure* we wouldn't have ever heard of AF447. Or maybe this one either...

*required JP forum disclaimer: unless circumstances make those procedures unsafe.

[BoeingBobby]

What is? That pilots repeatedly messed up on this and got themselves into upsets? That pilots pull up at stall warnings or pitch over in go-arounds? That pilots fly planes into the ground?

Concur. It's ridiculous! But it's also reality. You can't have a policy that says "just improvise and do your best" when this is the reality. You can't have any tolerance for that. And you can't have a policy that says "only the good pilots can improvise" because the bad ones, especially the bad ones, think they're the good ones. You have to have a policy that says "all pilots MUST follow these procedures and CRM must never be disregarded". Sure, the good ones can handle the situation without these things, but it is the bad ones that must drive policy. Everyone follows the procedure. Everyone lives.

Now, what do I mean by 'good ones' and 'bad ones'? 'Good ones' are pilots with well-taught, well-practiced airmanship AND situational awareness AND are not affected at THAT MOMENT by the spectrum of human factors to which THEY ARE susceptible. 'Bad ones' are all the rest, including the 25K hours ex-combat veteran hans solo geius pilot of the millenium not falling under my definition of 'good ones' AT THAT MOMENT.

The most disturbing thing for me is that, after all of these tragedies and all of the lessons learned about stealth factors and the weakness of the otherwise sound human mind and the effects this has on both judgment and physical reaction, so many airman (and very knowledgeable forum members) still resist accepting that reality.

If we want everyone to live through UAS, we need everyone to agree to follow procedure no matter how ridiculous they might find it. That is the reality.



Why are we talking about level flight? I'm talking about staying in the middle of the envelope and avoiding things that may lead to upset.



Great, quick... what were they? Go dig up the pilots of AF447 and ask them what the pitch/power settings were prior to the event. I'll give you $20 if they get it right. Pitch, maybe (I doubt it). Power, forget about it.



So what are we arguing about? Isn't it better to do what is better? Isn't it safer to do what is safer for everyone?

Again, the bottom line: if everyone adhered to memory procedure* we wouldn't have ever heard of AF447. Or maybe this one either...

*required JP forum disclaimer: unless circumstances make those procedures unsafe.

Evan, you need to catch up with the times. They are now called immediate recall items. But seriously, I agree with you on this one. In a situation such as that, wings level, pitch 5 - 10 degrees ( I like 10 in the 74) and MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST! Just a little less pitch than for wind-shear.

[TeeVee]

if we all REALLY, REALLY, REALLY wanna live through UAS (and stalls for that matter), then the idiots that program these wonderful flying computers need to either (1) make an idiot/save my ass button or (2) teach the damn thing to ignore UAS, set an acceptable pitch and power setting THAT IS SURVIVABLE, and allow the fallible humans to sit back and figure WTF is going on.

if for UAS it's as simple as: ok, i'm not sure how fast i'm going for whatever reason, but if i pitch up 5 degrees and set power at x% i absolutely will survive, then it is (at least to me) unimaginable that these machines have not already bee programmed to deal with this. Rather, they disconnect and expect the humans to take over and figure it all out, sometimes with only seconds to spare. giving up and shutting down is not a proper failsafe

[3WE]

***it is (at least to me) unimaginable that these machines, which have been programmed to act in a total vanilla fashion with robust protection, requiring very minimum airmanship, have not already bee programmed to deal with this. Rather, they disconnect, revert to acting more like a real and unforgiving airplane (which the pilots have minimal experience flying), and expect the humans to take over and figure it all out, sometimes with only seconds to spare.***

Important nuances enhanced.

[3WE]

Evan, you need to catch up with the times. They are now called immediate recall items. But seriously, I agree with you on this one. In a situation such as that, wings level, pitch 5 - 10 degrees ( I like 10 in the 74) and MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST! Just a little less pitch than for wind-shear.

I don't know that Evan agrees with your rather arbitrary choice of 5-10 degrees (nor even your declaration of a single figure of 10 degrees & full power).

You see, it depends on weight and altitude and temperature...

[3WE]

***the attitude and power setting that you had before UAS are an excellent start.***

Much like the concept of a radian's worth of an angle, I just cannot understand how this would work. Can you explain it in four or five sentences?

[Evan]

I don't know that Evan agrees with your rather arbitrary choice of 5-10 degrees (nor even your declaration of a single figure of 10 degrees & full power).

You see, it depends on weight and altitude and temperature...

I agree with whatever values the pointy heads who designed the plane and tested it in flight wrote into the procedure.

But here's where you keep missing it: These... ahem... "immediate recall items"... are to s t a b i l i z e things in a situation that has gone suddenly awry. From there, now stabilized safely in the envelope, you get out the FCOM and fine tune things based on weight and altitude. Because now you have t i m e to think. As opposed to an improvised reaction, which in certain pilots is to establish a safe pitch and power setting while in others it is to pull back and climb without touching the thrust levers...

[Evan]

Evan, you need to catch up with the times. They are now called immediate recall items. But seriously, I agree with you on this one. In a situation such as that, wings level, pitch 5 - 10 degrees ( I like 10 in the 74) and MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST! Just a little less pitch than for wind-shear.

Maybe they should be called 'total recall items".

[Evan]

if we all REALLY, REALLY, REALLY wanna live through UAS (and stalls for that matter), then the idiots that program these wonderful flying computers need to either (1) make an idiot/save my ass button or (2) teach the damn thing to ignore UAS, set an acceptable pitch and power setting THAT IS SURVIVABLE, and allow the fallible humans to sit back and figure WTF is going on.

if for UAS it's as simple as: ok, i'm not sure how fast i'm going for whatever reason, but if i pitch up 5 degrees and set power at x% i absolutely will survive, then it is (at least to me) unimaginable that these machines have not already bee programmed to deal with this. Rather, they disconnect and expect the humans to take over and figure it all out, sometimes with only seconds to spare. giving up and shutting down is not a proper failsafe

I suggested this waaaaaay back somewhere. It makes sense to me. But I'm sure there are ramifications we mortals haven't though of...

[Evan]

Again, by all means follow procedures. But just not following procedures is not enough to explain these accidents.

Gabriel, that's a different matter. We will never be able to definitively explain why the pilot of AF447 did what he did, but I have a number of theories, all of them based on distraction, disorientation, misunderstanding the ECAM or following the flight director.

But this much I know: he didn't execute the proper procedures, nor did the PNF, and both of them threw CRM out the window. So I think we should work with what we know went wrong.

As far as we know, training remedies have been put in place. However that intransigent pilot confidence problem still remains and is still resistent to these 'ridiculous' procedures. That is what has to change.

And we are just starting to understand how the human mind works (or doesn't work). So humility is part of the solution.

[ATLcrew]

However that intransigent pilot confidence problem still remains and is still resistent to these 'ridiculous' procedures. That is what has to change.

I hate intransigent, resistent things...

[Gabriel]

I agree with you on this one. In a situation such as that, wings level, pitch 5 - 10 degrees ( I like 10 in the 74) and MAX CONTINUOUS THRUST! Just a little less pitch than for wind-shear.

"I agree with you" and your later explanation are incompatible one with the other.

If you agreed with Evan, ambiguous ranges like 5 - 10 deg, what you like, and whether it is little more or less than for wind-shear is all irrelevant and out of place.
You should have recited the immediate recall items verbatim and follow them as a robot as if they were an automatic code programmed in the FMS/autoflight/FBW logic (which, by the way, I agree with Evan that's what needs to be done).

[BoeingBobby]

"I agree with you" and your later explanation are incompatible one with the other.

If you agreed with Evan, ambiguous ranges like 5 - 10 deg, what you like, and whether it is little more or less than for wind-shear is all irrelevant and out of place.
You should have recited the immediate recall items verbatim and follow them as a robot as if they were an automatic code programmed in the FMS/autoflight/FBW logic (which, by the way, I agree with Evan that's what needs to be done).

I can't win for loosing with you Gabe, I think sometimes there are nuances that are lost in the translation. Here it is right out of the manual. This is an immediate recall item. No time for pulling out books. Pull out the books after you are up, away and safe.

[Evan]

I can't win for loosing with you Gabe, I think sometimes there are nuances that are lost in the translation. Here it is right out of the manual. This is an immediate recall item. No time for pulling out books. Pull out the books after you are up, away and safe.

The link is to a Ground Proximity Warning procedure. Or did you post this just as an example of an immediate recall item?

[Gabriel]

You can't have a policy that says "just improvise and do your best" when this is the reality. You can't have any tolerance for that. And you can't have a policy that says "only the good pilots can improvise" because the bad ones

And that's why I don't endorse any of that.

If we want everyone to live through UAS, we need everyone to agree to follow procedure no matter how ridiculous they might find it. That is the reality.

I don't think that anybody said that the procedure is ridiculous. And while following the procedure is the best and only acceptable way to live through UAS, it is by no means the only one.

Great, quick... what were they? Go dig up the pilots of AF447 and ask them what the pitch/power settings were prior to the event. I'll give you $20 if they get it right. Pitch, maybe (I doubt it). Power, forget about it.

Pitch would be just a little bit nose-up (no matter exactly how much just a little bit is)
Power will be whatever they have. Yes, they had a somehow reduced power since they were slowing down to turbulent air penetration speed. Doesn't matter, the only difference is that they will establish themselves in a descent.

Again, I am not advocating this. By all means , do follow the procedures.
But the only thing they needed to do to survive was anything-not-what-they-did. Including nothing at all whatsoever but refraining themselves from touching anything.
Between following the procedures and not following the procedures and crashing, there was an enormous range of not following the procedures and not crashing that I don't advocate but was not only available to them but should have also been more natural to do for any pilot (compared with what they did, not with following the procedures).

So what are we arguing about? Isn't it better to do what is better? Isn't it safer to do what is safer for everyone?

Yes, it is, and I never said anything contrary to that.

Again, the bottom line: if everyone adhered to memory procedure we wouldn't have ever heard of AF447.

Yes, and also if they had not adhered to the memory procedure in other 20 better, more reasonable, more natural ways not to adhere to the memory procedure othern than what they did. Again, following the procedure is the best and only acceptable option, just not the only viable one.

We will never be able to definitively explain why the pilot of AF447 did what he did, but I have a number of theories, all of them based on distraction, disorientation, misunderstanding the ECAM or following the flight director.

All of which can have created a situation where the pilots don't follow the correct procedure even if in the sim they nail it 10 out of 10 times. Sure, the chances that they get it right are much better if the procedure is trained in the sim first, which was not the case with the AF pilots. But startle and mis-diagnosis can happen always (again, training, training and more training reduce the chances).

But this much I know: he didn't execute the proper procedures, nor did the PNF, and both of them threw CRM out the window. So I think we should work with what we know went wrong.

Here is my problem: That is NOT all that we know went wrong.
And UAS was NOT they only procedure that they didn't follow.

We may never know why, but the general airmanship of this pilot was terrible. I have a little more sympathy for the PNF who, by the design of the Airbus control system, had no feedback on what control inputs the PF was doing, I can only imagine his face (and his palm in the face) when he heard "But I have been pulling up all the time" a couple of seconds before dying.

My point is that I would not trust a pilot with following any specific procedure for any specific condition in any specific airplane type if they don't give me confidence that they are capable to use their general workmanship to do better than what AF did. Or Colgan. Or Pinnacle.

Did they follow the procedure? Of course not. The procedure is not to pull relentlessly up and when the plane stalls and the stall warning activate respond with more pull up and then crash and die.

But like as I said before, I would not teach the correct overturn procedure to a driver who reacts to an overturn by setting full parking brake, engaging reverse, turning the steering-wheel all the way to the stop into the turn, and turning on the wipers. Not until something else at a more fundamental level is fixed FIRST. Nor I would simplify it saying that such thing happened because the driver didn't follow the overturn procedure.