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Southwest Airlines Engine Failure, Passenger Near Sucked Out of the Aircraft

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  • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
    If anything, I am pretty sure that the CRM here was nothing but top notch. Who cares what came first, the chicken or the egg! I am willing to bet, the first thing was the engine coming apart. Followed by an almost immediate decompression from the thrown fan blade striking the window. Again, this is what they were trained for. We do this in the sim 2 times a year. Have they practiced a catastrophic engine failure followed by a decompression? Who knows? But I am willing to bet it will be done from time to time now!
    My impression--based also on the previous CFM-56 incident---is that the fan blade initially tore up the inlet section a bit and then aerodynamic forces did most of the damage that we are seeing, so the fragment that hit the window and caused the decompression could have been immediately after the fan blade separated or it could have happened some time after that. Gabriel's point about what seems to be the cabin alt warning suggests it was immediate. A number of other things seem to contradict that. It would all make more sense to me if there was a delay between the engine failure, the initial comms with ATC and the decompression, but then what it that intermittent souund on the ATC tape?

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Evan View Post
      My impression--based also on the previous CFM-56 incident---is that the fan blade initially tore up the inlet section a bit and then aerodynamic forces did most of the damage that we are seeing, so the fragment that hit the window and caused the decompression could have been immediately after the fan blade separated or it could have happened some time after that. Gabriel's point about what seems to be the cabin alt warning suggests it was immediate. A number of other things seem to contradict that. It would all make more sense to me if there was a delay between the engine failure, the initial comms with ATC and the decompression, but then what it that intermittent souund on the ATC tape?

      Again, who cares? Airpwane has a pwablem, piluts fwy de airpwane da way dey was tawght. Dey wand de airpwane, no mo pwablem

      Comment


      • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
        Have not read anywhere that it was a COWL latch! And it really doesn't matter anyway! Fact is the window got broken. Maybe it was Simon Cowell.
        From AVHerald update: https://avherald.com/h?article=4b7725fb&opt=0

        The NTSB stated: "A large gouge impact mark, consistent in shape to a recovered portion of fan cowl and latching mechanism, was adjacent to the row 14 window (see figure 4; the window was entirely missing. No window, airplane structure, or engine material was found inside the cabin."
        They have a picture of the piece that matches the damage marks at the fuselage and window 14.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Evan View Post
          My impression--based also on the previous CFM-56 incident---is that the fan blade initially tore up the inlet section a bit and then aerodynamic forces did most of the damage that we are seeing, so the fragment that hit the window and caused the decompression could have been immediately after the fan blade separated or it could have happened some time after that. Gabriel's point about what seems to be the cabin alt warning suggests it was immediate. A number of other things seem to contradict that. It would all make more sense to me if there was a delay between the engine failure, the initial comms with ATC and the decompression, but then what it that intermittent souund on the ATC tape?
          They have the part matching the fuselage damage at the window. See the picture at AVHerald.
          I really don't understand the confusion:

          1) Engine fan separates, gets contained, and severely damages cowling
          2) Cowling rips off due to extreme aerodynamic forces (which aren't tested on the ground)
          3) Piece of cowling and latch hits the fuselage right ahead of window 14 damaging fuselage and probably the leading edge seal of window 14 causing decompression immediately after engine explosion.
          4) Pilots start dealing with all the problems they described, yaw, bank, and explosive decompression, they start descending
          5) It takes ten seconds for the air flow and broken window seal to completely dislodge the exterior and then interior window which leads to second explosion in the cabin (reported by passengers) and sucks the poor passengers head into the hole causing severe head, neck and torso trauma resulting in eventual death
          6) Once they have the plane under control, the pilots notify ATC they lost an engine, are descending and want to land fast -- the pilots probably didn't notice the second explosion due to the noise and they were not in the section that lost the window
          7) Only when nearing the airport are the pilots informed about injuries and opt for a short approach, and they call for emergency services

          I'm not sure why you're confused. All of this aligns with NTSB evidence, passenger reports, the ATC communications, and the pilot reports.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
            If anything, I am pretty sure that the CRM here was nothing but top notch. Who cares what came first, the chicken or the egg! I am willing to bet, the first thing was the engine coming apart. Followed by an almost immediate decompression from the thrown fan blade striking the window. Again, this is what they were trained for. We do this in the sim 2 times a year. Have they practiced a catastrophic engine failure followed by a decompression? Who knows? But I am willing to bet it will be done from time to time now!
            Evan is fixated on the fact that the crew did not say the "E" word nor say "Depressurized".

            As stated earlier, that is mildly curious.

            I have accused Evan of never doing anything involving motion from tricycles, bicycles to car driving.

            The concept that the crew might have had their hands full AND might have been working through Evan's beloved, involved checklists, and being extremely careful, ALL AT THE SAME TIME, escapes him...

            ...as does the concept of Aviate, (seems like they prioritized that), Navigate (don't see any problem there), Communicate...(oh my did they give that third billing?) DEAR GOD NO!

            The behavior of the human mind as your bicycle is falling over, might lead one to forget to be totally thorough with ATC communications...yes, we have engine fire warnings and depressurization warnings and view towards the left back is ugly...(Nothing ATC can do about any of that anyway)...yeah, maybe they forgot to mention the pressurization to ATC...

            I suggest physical punishment for the crew
            .
            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Evan View Post
              Agreed. That much is clear. They both showed uncommon nerve, sound instincts and veteran skills under pressure. They deserve all the praise they have gotten for that. I'm sure there is nothing more they could have done to save that life.

              The bantering (on my part) is about:

              - ascertaining the actual sequence of this thing,
              - wondering what--if any--vital CRM and procedures may have been overlooked,
              - recognizing the real-world limitations of CRM and procedure in high-stress, high-workload scenarios.

              I know the mentality BoeingBobby: 'any landing you walk away from', and it's hard to argue with successful outcomes, but it's not without a purpose. Investigating these things is very important for reasons that seem to often elude pilots.
              These events show the actual effectiveness and practicality of procedures under real-world stressful circumstances. They also often expose weaknesses in recurrent training for abnormal operations and hopefully catch those weaknesses before they lead to less successful outcomes.
              But just ignore me; the NTSB will most likely be asking the same questions.
              My 2 cents:

              I care so little about whether they explained the full situation or not. In aviate-navigate-communicate, communicate comes last for a reason.
              And then, it is to the extent necessary for the safety of the flight.
              Immediately after the event, they informed ATC that they had an engine failure and where descending. Yes, they did not use the correct phraseology with the E or M word, and it would have been very nice from them to use it, but "engine fire, descending (without a clearance) has "EMERGENCY" very clearly implicit, and ATC very clearly understood so.
              They requested and got vectors to their diversion, ATC put other traffic out of their way, and they coordinated the landing and emergency help on the ground.
              All that for me is not perfect, but as good as if it was perfect. All that was needed to ensure the safety of the flight was done in coordination with ATC. Doing more than that is a plus but if you are busy with something else, please go ahead.

              The only thing that strikes me, and is not related with ATC, is the slow descent. It didn't look as an emergency descent, it barely exceeded a normal descent. And THAT can jeopardize the safety of the flight (including and specially thinking of passengers that did not put on their masks correctly or at all). When structural failure is suspected, procedures call you for keeping your current airspeed instead of going to for the red line, but there are no limitations with vertical speed, and I know that full spoilers, even at reduced airspeed, will give you much higher vertical speed than what they got, and then you can lower the landing gear and get even more. Getting down from above the 30's to below the 20's should be a very high priority, once you are about FL200 it is not so critical any more. People without supplemental O2 may be like drunk, feel bad, vomit, lose useful consciousness but will not suffer brain damage and will immediately recover when they start getting more O2. But spending time above FL300 or in the high 20's is different, is dangerous and prolonged exposure can have permanent and irreversible consequences.

              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

              Comment


              • 1) Engine fan separates, gets contained, and severely damages cowling

                You mean fan blade.

                3) Piece of cowling and latch hits the fuselage right ahead of window 14 damaging fuselage and probably the leading edge seal of window 14 causing decompression immediately after engine explosion.
                4) Pilots start dealing with all the problems they described, yaw, bank, and explosive decompression, they start descending
                5) It takes ten seconds for the air flow and broken window seal to completely dislodge the exterior and then interior window which leads to second explosion in the cabin (reported by passengers) and sucks the poor passengers head into the hole causing severe head, neck and torso trauma resulting in eventual death

                I doubt this is correct. Airplanes leak. It takes more than a damaged window seal to cause immediate decompression, let alone explosive. I say that the decompression happened when the window let go, not before, and that the window immediately after or within a few seconds of the fan blade failing.
                Also, if the plane was already decompressed by when the window fully failed, the passenger would not have been sucked out.

                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                  My 2 cents:

                  I care so little about whether they explained the full situation or not. In aviate-navigate-communicate, communicate comes last for a reason.
                  Aviate, Navigate, Communicate? Never heard of it.

                  Don't you find it just a teeny tiny bit curious they didn't mention depressurization?

                  Wonder what's going through their minds?

                  Don't you think that ideally they maybe should have said the "P" word?

                  I'm not talking multiple-post curious, but maybe a Mr.-Spock-cocked-eyebrow sort of curious.

                  Yeah, the work load might explain it...but heck, what good is an aviation forum if we can't second guess every little thing the crew does.
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                    Aviate, Navigate, Communicate? Never heard of it.

                    Don't you find it just a teeny tiny bit curious they didn't mention depressurization?

                    Wonder what's going through their minds?

                    Don't you think that ideally they maybe should have said the "P" word?

                    I'm not talking multiple-post curious, but maybe a Mr.-Spock-cocked-eyebrow sort of curious.

                    Yeah, the work load might explain it...but heck, what good is an aviation forum if we can't second guess every little thing the crew does.
                    Yes
                    Yes, I said "I care so little", not "I give a damn". I meant that, while I am curious, it is inconsequential.
                    No, they should have used the M or E word. Using the P word for engine failure with explosive depressurization would be more puzzling than no word.

                    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                    Comment


                    • All the banter...
                      "Southwest 1380, just so I can understand, you are single engine and... what else?"

                      "We're single engine, that's it"
                      I'm the only one that finds that problematic? Really?

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                        I'm the only one that finds that problematic? Really?
                        You seem to be. You're also quoting without proper context. You are pulling this quote from when she was still talking to NYATC, they had just been handed a new controller who started by clarifying that they had single engine plus fire. Then she clarified they were single engine no fire. The controller, then came back to clarify again and she clarified her earlier statement that they had single engine no fire. That is where you quoted from, the second clarification. I am guessing that ATC is asking because their routing and reception at Philly would highly depend on whether there was an active fire. Later in the conversation, they discuss fuel and single engine. Since they were already at 11,000' the state of decompression was irrelevant to ATC at that point. In fact, I would say adding the decompression might have even distracted ATC from what was important, which was a nice smooth vector to Philly.

                        She communicated exactly what ATC needed to know to help them and nothing more. The pilots clearly felt they had a secure flyable plane at that altitude, plenty of fuel, no fire, and one working engine. As Gabriel keeps repeating, communicate was last on the list. It is a busy airspace, and ATC was quite busy re-vectoring planes out of the way. The communication was concise, short and told everyone exactly what they needed to know to do the job of routing properly.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          1) Engine fan separates, gets contained, and severely damages cowling

                          You mean fan blade.

                          3) Piece of cowling and latch hits the fuselage right ahead of window 14 damaging fuselage and probably the leading edge seal of window 14 causing decompression immediately after engine explosion.
                          4) Pilots start dealing with all the problems they described, yaw, bank, and explosive decompression, they start descending
                          5) It takes ten seconds for the air flow and broken window seal to completely dislodge the exterior and then interior window which leads to second explosion in the cabin (reported by passengers) and sucks the poor passengers head into the hole causing severe head, neck and torso trauma resulting in eventual death

                          I doubt this is correct. Airplanes leak. It takes more than a damaged window seal to cause immediate decompression, let alone explosive. I say that the decompression happened when the window let go, not before, and that the window immediately after or within a few seconds of the fan blade failing.
                          Also, if the plane was already decompressed by when the window fully failed, the passenger would not have been sucked out.
                          Right as usual. I also read a couple more passenger reports, notably the passenger sitting on the aisle on row 14. Updated:

                          1) Engine fan blade separates, gets contained, and severely damages cowling -- passenger hears sound like spoon in a blender, then a bang
                          2) Cowling rips off due to extreme aerodynamic forces (which aren't tested on the ground)
                          3) Piece of cowling and latch hits the fuselage right ahead of window 14 damaging fuselage and window causing the window to blow out immediately after engine explosion.
                          4) Pilots start dealing with all the problems they described -- yaw, bank, explosive decompression, and extreme vibrations -- they start descending to 11,000'
                          5) The decompressing plane sucks the poor passenger's head and upper torso into the hole causing severe head, neck and torso trauma resulting in eventual death (only 10 minutes later are 2 men able to retrieve the passenger from the window, the passengers beside her are unable to pull her in, and they are worried because they were also being pulled toward the window)
                          6) Once they have the plane under control, the pilots notify ATC they lost an engine, are descending and want to land at Philly -- the pilots still don't know about the missing window or injured passenger
                          7) Only when nearing the airport are the pilots informed about injuries on board and opt for a short approach, and they call for emergency services

                          The passenger's account is interesting because she was on the aisle, with a younger girl between her and the window. Her and the girl tried to pull the lady back in, but couldn't the pressure was too great. Then she was worried, the girl would get sucked out as well, because she could feel being pulled herself. She also noted, she couldn't get the mask on, so gave up. The noise was so loud, no one could hear anything.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            I'm the only one that finds that problematic? Really?
                            Problematic? Yes, you are the only one that finds it problematic. For the rest of us, it is mildly curious; however we do not struggle to find reasonable explanations for this minor inconsistency. Ironingly, your are so consumed with this, your listening abilities are much like Northwesterner's regarding the premeditated murder and bombing of the Polish president.

                            And based on your repeated posting on the subject it begs the flame we sometimes give you: Get out of the bubble and ride your bicycle...ride it fast and have some fun...see what motion and human factors is like (along with fresh air and sunshine).

                            Your use of the keyboard in Mom's basement has never shown much understanding of those sorts of things.

                            As to the timeline- yeah, when the final report comes out, we can see if there was a fraction of a second or seconds or minutes between engine anomalies and pressure anomalies. Please inform us as to those results when the time comes.

                            And don't forget- there's always that shred of crew performance admonishment in your tone..."what they should have done"

                            As long as we are talking about strange things and admonishing people, what's with the serious bank the plane got into? My instant gut, parlour talking, judgemental outsider opinion is that co-pilot should have been right on it...then again...shock factor and a brief delay as the brain processes stuff, and then right aileron (DEAR GOD, DID HE TOUCH THE RUDDER PEDALS?????) As I think about bicycle riding and car driving and even 172 driving...they performed exactly the way humans perform...
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
                              You seem to be. You're also quoting without proper context... Since they were already at 11,000' the state of decompression was irrelevant to ATC.
                              That is incorrect. When the New York controller asks them to define their situation (very specifically: "you are single engine and... what else?"), it is 01:44 after the first distress call and they are descending through 24,600. They have already informed the controller that there is no engine fire and he has already acknowleged this. At no point does the crew report decompression or emergency expedited descent.

                              So what's the danger in this? Prior to that, less than a minute after the first distress call, the previous controller advises them:
                              ZNY10: Southwest 1380, you have traffic just below you.
                              It appears that they did not hear this transmission:

                              SW1380: "Say again for Southwest 1380"
                              This is followed by loud interference, and then they are handed off to the New York controller.

                              I get the very strong impression that he was unaware of the need for an expedited (emergency) descent, since single-engine ops alone would not require that. He had no way to extrapolate loss of cabin pressure from the flight crew communications. Typically, the crew would declare emergency or mayday and report decompression by this time and would certainly report decompression when asked to fully describe their situation during the emergency descent. So, yes, I find that problematic, meaning it doesn't sync with our current understanding of what happened here.

                              Comment


                              • There is an old expression about a dead horse and something about beating it, but I just can't remember how it goes exactly.

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