Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Southwest Airlines Engine Failure, Passenger Near Sucked Out of the Aircraft

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Originally posted by Evan View Post
    If the blade—or fragments of the blade or other blades—is thrown forward, the engine casing isn't doing you any good. That is what the prior AD addressed, by requiring immediate inspections, because that is really the only way to 'contain' the problem.
    No, that is not correct. Throwing the blade forward in a way that it is no longer a high energy projectile capable of destroying critical system is exactly the goal. The inspections are to prevent blade failures period. It is still desirable to prevent blade failures in flight due to the risk of significant damage or risk to passengers even from the unexpected loss of thrust at an inopportune time. Plus it might even save money depending on the inspection requirements vs the cost of a new engine.

    Destruction of adjacent structures, namely the inlet section, which is not intended to contain anything. I think the engine casing held. The picture I'm getting is that a fan blade departed, the debris got thrown forward into the undefended inlet section, the inlet section was damaged and then aerodynamic forces and vibration caused it to fail, throwing debris and causing damage to the leading edge and window, causing the decompression and subsequent blow-out of the window. This is why I speculate that the decompression did not occur immediately, and explains why the pilot did not report decompression, declare emergency or initiate an emergency descent. I think her original transmission of "descending" may have been due to the engine failure alone and inability to maintain RVSM altitude. The delay between the engine event and the decompression event is something I guess we have to wait for...
    Then why is it reported that the oxygen masks dropped immediately after the first explosion? Another problem with your hypothesis is that I'm pretty sure there were more than 10 seconds between hearing the alarms in the cockpit and the second explosion when the decompression certainly occurred.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
      Yep, we NEVER train for more than one emergency at a time!

      I just wanna know how you recover from a 40 degree bank. Would your head explode since you never see anything like that?
      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Evan View Post
        Because were talking about inspection intervals. Whether they catch a fan blade crack or a rotor disk crack is immaterial. It's encouraging that manufacturing methods have improved, but we still need to inspect these things more frequently. Two pronged approach: build them better, inspect them more to catch them before they fail, and I'm willing to bet these things won't happen anymore.
        I don't get the impression you are looking at inspections with the right criteria. You can't just arbitrarily say inspect more. Why don't we inspect after every flight? Because it is not free and costs matter a lot. Inspecting the compressor rings is a lot more costly than inspecting the fan blades which are accessible without disassembling the whole engine. So the difficulty and cost of inspection is most certainly material in this discussion.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by 3WE View Post

          I just wanna know how you recover from a 40 degree bank. Would your head explode since you never see anything like that?
          ROTFL

          Comment


          • Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post
            Just out of idle curiosity, in the event (Krishna Forbid) one of your kids were to get sick, would you take him/her to a credentialed physician or would credentials not matter in that instance either? I agree that paperwork isn't everything, but your rather flippant attitude towards other people's accomplishments and expertise (which those credentials reflect) reeks of either envy or disrespect or both. Said envy and disrespect annoy some forum members like me.
            Rather flippant attitude towards other people's accomplishments and expertise (which those credentials reflect) reeks of either envy or disrespect or both??????

            Didn't you read my comment??? I explained how BB could have used his expertise to contribute to the discussion.

            Let's put it in this way. I don;'t know you, but if my kid gets sick I WILL take him to a credentialed physician.
            And I don't know you, but if I said to that credentialed physician "my kid has fever, I think he got the flu" and said credentialed physician replied to me "When was the last time you attended the medical school?", then I turn back, leave the office of said credentialed physicist forever, and find another credentialed physicist with a better attitude.

            Credentials are important, and I am very happy with mine, because it shows the effort that the person put towards learning something and shows a recognition from other persons that this person knows that thing. Also, people with credentials is more often right, and less often wrong, than people without credentials in that field. But...

            One can learn things in ways that don't involve getting a credential.
            People with no credentials have some times found to be right.
            People with credentials have sometimes found to be wrong.
            People with KNOWLEDGE (with or without credentials) can explain things.
            That's why there are experts but no authorities or holy books in science... or engineering for the matter.

            In short, credentials give an a-priory reason to believe that there is a good chance that the person knows what they are talking about. But what really matters is KNOWLEDGE or EXPERTISE, not the credentials. Again, the credentials are a proxy for knowledge or expertise when you don't know better about tht person. And it is very useful because, for example, when you apply for a job, they don't know better, so the put a heavy weight in credentials, and also because for many jobs a credential is required by law. But nobody should say "I am right because I have credentials" (what BB did not do) or "you don't know what you are talking about because you don't have credentials" (what BB implied).

            Also, I live by me word. I consider my self to have everything between an interesting understanding in some range of knowledge to no clue whatsoever in other aspects. I don have credentials in some of the fields where I do have an interesting understanding (and I even my have credentials in one field where I don't deserve it). Now, if I think I have something to say in a field where I am not precisely an expert, I say it, and I am more than happy to be confronted and shown wrong by a person than knows better, with or without credentials. But explain it to me. Saying "you are wrong because I am an expert (with or without credentials) and I say it" will not work. On the same toke, I NEVER impose my credentials or self-declaration of knowledge in something to make my point. The most that I can say, when people don't take me seriously, is "hey, I have this credentials, so perhaps listen what I have to say and see if it makes sense".

            Sorry for the length of this post, but this is a really important matter that I take very seriously and is a foundation of my life philosophy.

            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

            Comment


            • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
              Gabe, you are reading way more into it than what I was referring to. Look at the part of the quote of his. He specifically said that we are not trained for "multiple" emergency's at a time. " Originally Posted by Quench View Post
              The pilots train for recovery from unusual attitude. They train for rapid decompression. They train for engine failure. But they don't get training for all three at the same time". So now maybe you will see my "contribution" and I will accept your apology!
              BB, if I misunderstood you, then I apologize. However, it is very clear from the part yourself quoted above that Quench said that they don't train for these three things at the same time: engine failure, rapid decompression and recovery from unusual attitude..

              So an improper reply to your original reply could have been "BB, when was the last time that you had an engine failure with severe damage and engine fire that caused fuselage and wing damage and rapid decompression together with a sudden uncommanded roll of more than 40 degrees, trained in a PC in a Level 4 simulator?" I am not really asking the question, and while the answer could be really interesting it would not contribute to the discussion because it would tell nothing regarding whether these pilots in particular got, or pilots in general get this particular combination of failures in a PC.

              And... you knew (or at least had a strong suspicion regarding) the answer to your own question too, didn't you? So, again I apologize if I got it wrong, but I took yours was a rhetorical question, with the rhetoric being "You don't know what you are talking about because you've never been in a PC".
              So allow me a straight question: What did your question contribute? Many of us (let me risk the vast majority of us) didn't know what a part 121 PC was.

              Now, the rest of your latest reply to me, that one I loved. You could have made a similar reply to Quench in the lines of "It is impossible to train all the possible combinations of failures, but we do practice combined failures" and then go on with what transpires in a PC, as you did in the reply to me, and maybe talk about resilience and how one of the most important skills of a pilot, and specially a captain, is to identify and manage the priorities.

              Side question, what you described in the second day of the PC is what is known as LOFT or that is a different thing?

              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                If the blade—or fragments of the blade or other blades—is thrown forward, the engine casing isn't doing you any good. That is what the prior AD addressed, by requiring immediate inspections, because that is really the only way to 'contain' the problem.

                Destruction of adjacent structures, namely the inlet section, which is not intended to contain anything. I think the engine casing held. The picture I'm getting is that a fan blade departed, the debris got thrown forward into the undefended inlet section, the inlet section was damaged and then aerodynamic forces and vibration caused it to fail, throwing debris and causing damage to the leading edge and window, causing the decompression and subsequent blow-out of the window.
                Ok, if it is as you said, point made, I need to understand more about the mechanics of these 2 failures.

                This is why I speculate that the decompression did not occur immediately, and explains why the pilot did not report decompression, declare emergency or initiate an emergency descent. I think her original transmission of "descending" may have been due to the engine failure alone and inability to maintain RVSM altitude. The delay between the engine event and the decompression event is something I guess we have to wait for...
                Again, I don't think so. We can hear what seems (to me and others) to be the high cabin altitude warning before the first post-event transmission which was something like "Engine fire, single engine, descending". I posted the you tube video some posts ago.

                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                Comment


                • Originally posted by 3WE View Post

                  I just wanna know how you recover from a 40 degree bank. Would your head explode since you never see anything like that?
                  Haha.. That's what I thought too. I don't even know if that even qualifies as unusual attitude. Well, it is unusual in the sense that airliners almost never bank 40 degrees, but.... Anyway, I think that 30 degrees is the maximum standard bank, at 35 degrees you start to get the "bank angle" warning, and past 45 degrees you are officially in an unusual attitude. Arbitrary limits since there is nothing substantially different between 44 and 46 degrees.

                  That said, when you are up there near the top of climb, having a strong explosion and vibration, plus an engine fire warning, plus the cabin altitude warning... an uncommanded and unexpected 40 degrees bank is not a welcomed addition (for the "uncommanded and unexpected" part than the "40 degrees" part).

                  --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                  --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
                    No, that is not correct. Throwing the blade forward in a way that it is no longer a high energy projectile capable of destroying critical system is exactly the goal. The inspections are to prevent blade failures period. It is still desirable to prevent blade failures in flight due to the risk of significant damage or risk to passengers even from the unexpected loss of thrust at an inopportune time. Plus it might even save money depending on the inspection requirements vs the cost of a new engine.
                    There are two goals that need to be met to prevent destruction of critical systems*. One, as you say, is to prevent high-energy projectiles from directly penetrating the fan case, and according to Gabriel, that goal has been met. The second goal is to prevent subsequent damage to the cowling, which, unless you know a way to encase the fan completely, isn't going to be possible. The second goal can only be met on the ground, by detecting fatigue before it becomes failure. Hence the airworthiness directive:

                    Originally posted by Airworthiness Directive 2018-0071
                    An occurrence was reported of fan blade failure on a CFM56-7B engine. The released fan blade was initially contained by the engine case, but there was subsequent uncontained forward release of debris and separation of the inlet cowl. Preliminary investigation determined that the fracture in the blade initiated from the fan blade dovetail. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to fan blade failure, possibly resulting in uncontained forward release of debris, with consequent damage to the engine and the aeroplane,
                    Note that the scenario is defined as 'uncontained'. This airworthiness directive was moronically weak, limiting to only specific versions of the CFM-56 despite the obviously common design vulnerabilities, requiring only one-time inspections and giving a nine-month window for compliance. Since the event last week a more comprehensive and urgent directive has been issued. If the mission of aviation safety is preventative, why is it so often taking a reactionary approach? This is what has to change.

                    I don't get the impression you are looking at inspections with the right criteria. You can't just arbitrarily say inspect more. Why don't we inspect after every flight?
                    You should know by now the hyberbolic counter-argument doesn't work on me. Of course we can't inspect after every flight, nor is there any reason to. Fatigue will reveal itself long before failure. We just clearly aren't inspecting frequently enough. Inspection that can catch fatigued components before they fail IS economically feasible, albeit somewhat to the diminishment of profits. They are also imperative.

                    I am looking at the criteria of human life, not just economics. If you hadn't noticed, a woman was robbed of her life here by an industry that failed to adequately address a known threat. We also need to be asking why that was, and how much regulation is tilted in favor of economics in this current environment of regulatory corruption.

                    * (I consider pressure-vessel windows and leading-edge devices to be rather critical)

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                      Side question, what you described in the second day of the PC is what is known as LOFT or that is a different thing?
                      My original comment was meant to be a much shorter version of my answer to you, not a put down or a this is what I did. I will spoon feed from now on I promise. A LOFT (line oriented flight training) is not always used as the second day of the PC (at least at Atlas). LOFT is usually a real flight scenario, in our case it was usually a flight from SFO to LAX, so you don't burn up too much simulator time. The instructor may throw an Easter egg or two into the mix, but not often.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
                        ROTFL
                        I need to be as complete as I can here so I don't offend anyone. Unusual attitudes is something done once a year in the simulator. 40 degrees sounds worse than it is. Steep turns are practiced at 45 degrees, 280 knots and 10000 feet.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                          There are two goals that need to be met to prevent destruction of critical systems*. One, as you say, is to prevent high-energy projectiles from directly penetrating the fan case, and according to Gabriel, that goal has been met. The second goal is to prevent subsequent damage to the cowling, which, unless you know a way to encase the fan completely, isn't going to be possible. The second goal can only be met on the ground, by detecting fatigue before it becomes failure. Hence the airworthiness directive:
                          How did you jump to that conclusion? We know very little about the exact mechanics involved in the damage to the cowling. I do not believe it is a foregone conclusion that cowling design can't be improved to lead to a better outcome.

                          Note that the scenario is defined as 'uncontained'. This airworthiness directive was moronically weak, limiting to only specific versions of the CFM-56 despite the obviously common design vulnerabilities, requiring only one-time inspections and giving a nine-month window for compliance. Since the event last week a more comprehensive and urgent directive has been issued. If the mission of aviation safety is preventative, why is it so often taking a reactionary approach? This is what has to change.
                          This AD is reactionary because something happened outside of the expected boundaries. You just keep saying something needs to change and you keep saying more inspections. Again, how many more inspections? How do you figure they should determine the rate of inspections because that is the hard part. What inspection period do you consider to be proactive (oh, and BTW any inspection is proactive by definition)? How do you propose they figure out the proper inspection period in a proactive way?

                          You should know by now the hyberbolic counter-argument doesn't work on me. Of course we can't inspect after every flight, nor is there any reason to. Fatigue will reveal itself long before failure. We just clearly aren't inspecting frequently enough. Inspection that can catch fatigued components before they fail IS economically feasible, albeit somewhat to the diminishment of profits. They are also imperative.
                          Again, words without real suggestions. How do you propose in a proactive way, they determine the appropriate inspection period that is different from what is done today? Your presumption of diminishment [sic] of profits is perhaps naive. Elimination of profits is a real possibility which would translate to a significant increase in consumer costs and all sorts of economic impacts further down the line. As an investor, I know that airline investments in the past were notoriously unprofitable.

                          I am looking at the criteria of human life, not just economics. If you hadn't noticed, a woman was robbed of her life here by an industry that failed to adequately address a known threat. We also need to be asking why that was, and how much regulation is tilted in favor of economics in this current environment of regulatory corruption.
                          I disagree. You are looking at safety inside a bubble and ignoring economics by the tone of your arguments. In the end, that view is a guaranteed failure because costs are an essential component of the system and safety is impossible to achieve at a level of 100%. Given the steadily improving safety record, how do you reconcile the argument that there is an unbalance of regulatory corruption?

                          * (I consider pressure-vessel windows and leading-edge devices to be rather critical)
                          Agreed.

                          As an aside, I do think that a far bigger issue is the leaking of combustion gases into the cabin and that the FAA is completely ignoring the health effects of this. I would gladly live with the odd broken blade and potential loss of my life from a broken window (since I always pick window seats) to make sure I breathe clean air on every flight.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                            ***Steep turns are practiced at 45 degrees, 280 knots and 10000 feet.***
                            Just parlour talking, but that seems rather shallow (from the bank aspect) AND narrow from the airspeed aspect...

                            Steeper banks might be irrelevant to a 747, but I'm thinking there's been some wake turbulence events, etc that got uglier than 45 degrees...and I'm guessing that wake encounters might not occur at exactly 10,000 feet and 280 kts...
                            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
                              ***inside a bubble***
                              Indeed.
                              Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
                                How did you jump to that conclusion? We know very little about the exact mechanics involved in the damage to the cowling. I do not believe it is a foregone conclusion that cowling design can't be improved to lead to a better outcome.
                                I jumped to that conclusion by reading the AD's and the service bulletin from CFM. And again, neither is even suggesting that the cowling be redesigned at this point. That's a fools errand. This problem must be remedied by doing a much better job of preventing uncontained engine failure.

                                This AD is reactionary because something happened outside of the expected boundaries. You just keep saying something needs to change and you keep saying more inspections. Again, how many more inspections? How do you figure they should determine the rate of inspections because that is the hard part. What inspection period do you consider to be proactive (oh, and BTW any inspection is proactive by definition)? How do you propose they figure out the proper inspection period in a proactive way?
                                Nonsense! The same scenario already exhibited itself in 2016. The reactionary response to that one was compartmentalized and insufficient instead of being preventative. This was a preventable incident and a preventable death. That's a fact.

                                Again, words without real suggestions. How do you propose in a proactive way, they determine the appropriate inspection period that is different from what is done today? Your presumption of diminishment [sic] of profits is perhaps naive. Elimination of profits is a real possibility which would translate to a significant increase in consumer costs and all sorts of economic impacts further down the line. As an investor, I know that airline investments in the past were notoriously unprofitable.
                                Schwartz, I can't debate things with you if you keep taking pendulum swings at everything I say. I say the added inspections will have a hit on profits and you start talking about the elimination of profits. You have to stop taking what I say to extremes, because I am talking about moderate measures.

                                How often? I should first let CFM have a go at that. They are saying:

                                Originally posted by CFM International
                                ...inspections by the end of August for fan blades with 20,000 cycles, and inspections to all other fan blades when they reach 20,000 cycles.
                                After reaching a certain age, the engines should be inspected approximately every two years.
                                Then I would ask the NTSB to give their recommendation. I would also immediately review ALL passenger jet engine inspection intervals for all critical parts and ensure that they are in synch with expected low-cycle fatigue rates, so that these parts can be reliably caught before they fail.

                                This is currently not the case, as several recent uncontained failures have clearly shown.

                                Comment

                                Working...
                                X