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Thread: Southwest Airlines Engine Failure, Passenger Near Sucked Out of the Aircraft

  1. #81
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schwartz View Post
    Additionally, where do you draw the line? Should they inspect every week? The inspection period should be chosen very carefully because it will have a large impact on the airline and costs. Because not everything can be controlled or predicted sometimes it takes an accident to figure out a better system.
    In both of the incidents cited, the fan blades failed due to fatigue. You don't have to inspect a part that frequently to detect fatigue before it becomes failure, but obviously you have to inspect it with greater frequency than is currently required. And that isn't just true of the CFM-56, it's true of all turbofan engines.

    The FAA is restrained from doing that by collusion with the industry. It is not their mission to provide a healthy economic outlay for industry. Their mission is to ensure it is as safe an industry as is practically possible. Increasing, even doubling, the inspection requirements is not impractical but it is necessary to ensure safety. Therefore there should be no mission conflict in doing so. The airline industry must remain a pay-to-play industry, where profits will always come after safety. Corruption currently works to reverse those priorities.

    "Uncontained" in my definition is any failure in which the damage is not contained within the engine containment structure, for whatever reason. When the engine containment is breeched, there is no reliable defense or contigency, thus everything must be done to prevent this from happening in the first place.

    I think the current policy is more like 3WE's "you can't make an omelet without breaking a few passengers" version. That's not true. You can prevent blade failures by catching them before they fail.

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    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Evan, how much do you understand fatigue? Fatigue is statistical in nature. You have X% of the sample that will fail at less than Y million cycles. Make Y small enough, and X can be 0.001%, 0.0000001%, or 0.000000000000001% or.... you get the idea. There is NO inspection period that is short enough that GUARANTEES that NO BLADE EVER will fail due to fatigue before the next inspection. So where you draw the line? 2 blade failures after in hundreds of million of hours doesn't seem so bad.

    The definition of contained failure is that internal parts of the engine remain inside the engine or exit the engine through the tailpipe..
    I don't think that anybody ever considered a cowl that separates in flight (as the A320 had many incidents) an uncontained engine failure.

    I don't know if this failure was contained or not, but single blades failures (critical blade at max RPM) are required to be contained by the FAA regulations, and the requirement also states that such blade failure shall no originate an engine failure or vibration/forces that would separate the engine.

    It is not stated directly, but evidently the spirit of the requirement is that a single blade failure should not be a critically dangerous event, but rather just the loss of thrust. Whether the failure was contained or not (i.e. whether pieces of the blade or other internal parts flew out radially as shrapnel or not), I am concerned that what seems to have been a single blade failure generated such level of destruction of the engine that killed a passenger and could have cause much more damage to the airplane that could have put in risk the safety of the flight.

    That concerns me more than the blade failure itself. Not that the blade failure doesn't concern me, it does. But not as much as the fact that the blade failure, which should have been a relatively mundane engine failure and which cannot be avoided 100%, become something so dangerous.

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  3. #83
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    Evan, how much do you understand fatigue? Fatigue is statistical in nature. You have X% of the sample that will fail at less than Y million cycles. Make Y small enough, and X can be 0.001%, 0.0000001%, or 0.000000000000001% or.... you get the idea. There is NO inspection period that is short enough that GUARANTEES that NO BLADE EVER will fail due to fatigue before the next inspection. So where you draw the line? 2 blade failures after in hundreds of million of hours doesn't seem so bad.

    The definition of contained failure is that internal parts of the engine remain inside the engine or exit the engine through the tailpipe..
    I don't think that anybody ever considered a cowl that separates in flight (as the A320 had many incidents) an uncontained engine failure.

    I don't know if this failure was contained or not, but single blades failures (critical blade at max RPM) are required to be contained by the FAA regulations, and the requirement also states that such blade failure shall no originate an engine failure or vibration/forces that would separate the engine.

    It is not stated directly, but evidently the spirit of the requirement is that a single blade failure should not be a critically dangerous event, but rather just the loss of thrust. Whether the failure was contained or not (i.e. whether pieces of the blade or other internal parts flew out radially as shrapnel or not), I am concerned that what seems to have been a single blade failure generated such level of destruction of the engine that killed a passenger and could have cause much more damage to the airplane that could have put in risk the safety of the flight.

    That concerns me more than the blade failure itself. Not that the blade failure doesn't concern me, it does. But not as much as the fact that the blade failure, which should have been a relatively mundane engine failure and which cannot be avoided 100%, become something so dangerous.
    Well put.

    Given how cheap cameras are, it wouldn't be that expensive to record the wings throughout the flight to capture what actually happens. It is not surprising that the engine containment tests on the ground don't replicate the real environment the engine is exposed to when flying in the sky. If you can't replicate the real environment properly to simulate failure, record everything you can in the field and then you'll learn what happens.

  4. #84
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    The definition of contained failure is that internal parts of the engine remain inside the engine or exit the engine through the tailpipe..
    I don't think that anybody ever considered a cowl that separates in flight (as the A320 had many incidents) an uncontained engine failure.
    We shall see.

    I don't know if this failure was contained or not, but single blades failures (critical blade at max RPM) are required to be contained by the FAA regulations, and the requirement also states that such blade failure shall no originate an engine failure or vibration/forces that would separate the engine.

    It is not stated directly, but evidently the spirit of the requirement is that a single blade failure should not be a critically dangerous event, but rather just the loss of thrust. Whether the failure was contained or not (i.e. whether pieces of the blade or other internal parts flew out radially as shrapnel or not), I am concerned that what seems to have been a single blade failure generated such level of destruction of the engine that killed a passenger and could have cause much more damage to the airplane that could have put in risk the safety of the flight.

    That concerns me more than the blade failure itself. Not that the blade failure doesn't concern me, it does. But not as much as the fact that the blade failure, which should have been a relatively mundane engine failure and which cannot be avoided 100%, become something so dangerous.
    But isn't that the nature of these things? What begins as a departing fan blade escalates into a catastrophic failure that is most definitely uncontained? Sure, you can design around a certification requirement that the containment structure will withstand the initial impact of the blade, but then what? Fragments ejecting forward that cause the intake cowl to disintegrate? Or fragments ingested that cause compressor blades to separate and pass through the containment, the wings and the fuselage like knives through butter?

    According to your definition of 'contained engine failure', this was uncontained, unless you think the cowling failed due to vibration alone. In the incident that resulted in the CFM-56 AD I mentioned above, after the blade was initially contained, the blade left the engine containment to destroy surrounding structures.

    There is NO inspection period that is short enough that GUARANTEES that NO BLADE EVER will fail due to fatigue before the next inspection. So where you draw the line? 2 blade failures after in hundreds of million of hours doesn't seem so bad.
    I wonder if that is true, and I wonder where you would draw the line. Those two incidents seem very bad to me.

  5. #85
    Senior Member TeeVee's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    (Because the lawyers take such a big cut and nobody else gets much at all. It's called a class-action suit.)

    But it's not just Boeing. The EC-150 crash last month was a clear instance of the FAA failing to heed a VERY clear warning from the NTSB.

    Uncontained engine failure is one of very few things for which on-board technology cannot provide an adequate defense. If the thing throws shrapnel, good luck. That is why ground-based technology must prevent it from ever happening. The FAA clearly isn't doing enough in that respect.
    Most cases involving aviation accidents are not typical class actions where the class members get a few bucks each. But hey, the lawyers suck anyway.

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    Senior Member TeeVee's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schwartz View Post
    Also, it is CFM the engine manufacturer and the airline that is at financial risk, not Boeing so them being in bed with government is a not a factor.
    Correct. I meant GE which is half of cfm.

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    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    But isn't that the nature of these thing? What begins as a departing fan blade escalates into a catastrophic failure that is most definitely uncontained? Sure, you can design around a certification requirement that the containment structure will withstand the initial impact of the blade, but then what? Fragments ejecting forward that cause the intake cowl to disintegrate? Or fragments ingested that cause compressor blades to separate and pass through the containment, the wings and the fuselage like knives through butter?
    No. In the tests, the initial event is a blade fracture at the root of, if the blades and hub are integral, no less than 80% of the blade length. Not only that blade, but everything that happens after that, has to be contained. You can have a cascade of compressor and turbine blades failing after the initial one, and all have have to be contained. And it works quite well. What cannot be contained, and it is not so required, is the failure of a compressor or turbine disk. Typically blade failures (including cascade failures) are contained, and disk failures are uncontained.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=736O4Hz4Nk4

    According to your definition of 'contained engine failure', this was unconstrained, unless you think the cowling failed due to vibration alone.
    The definition is not so clear in these cases. Maybe the containment worked ok in avoiding that the blade flies radially out, but instead the blade bounced around the intake damaging it and left the engine at low energy either forward or through the now missing intake duct. I would not consider that an unconstrained failure but a structural failure of the containment structure.

    But the names are not so important. In any event, this is unacceptable. The engine should fail safely after a single blade failure (as initiating event, more blades can fail after that). Period.

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  8. #88
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    ***That concerns me more than the blade failure itself.***
    Bullcrap on tidy little boxes of contained, uncontained, cowl, point of exit and their regulatory and textbook definitions.

    A ton of tight tolerance stuff is spinning really fast and chunking a blade is gonna be ugly. Nice that it tends to be contained, but:

    We've taken out wing spars on A380s, killed people in the back of MD-80s, shredded DC-10 hydraulics and keep trashing the engine cowl liveries where the WN web link is painted.

    You can study and bucket all you want, but 'we' still need to avoid turbine/blade failures if 'we' can.

    (Not arguing with your whole statement, just the emphasis.)
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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    Quote Originally Posted by TeeVee View Post
    But hey, the lawyers suck anyway.
    Annoying getting painted with a broad brush, isn't it, Counselor?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Those two incidents seem very bad to me.
    Based on what? Or at least compared to what?

  11. #91
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 3WE View Post
    Bullcrap on tidy little boxes of contained, uncontained, cowl, point of exit and their regulatory and textbook definitions.
    So I said...
    But the names are not so important. In any event, this is unacceptable.
    A ton of tight tolerance stuff is spinning really fast and chunking a blade is gonna be ugly. Nice that it tends to be contained, but:

    We've taken out wing spars on A380s, killed people in the back of MD-80s, shredded DC-10 hydraulics...
    And remind me which of them was a blade failure and not a disk failure. None? That's what I thought.

    You can study and bucket all you want, but 'we' still need to avoid turbine/blade failures if 'we' can.
    And we do. Most of the times. By large. 350 million hours at how many RPM (that is how many revolutions per hour) in how many blades blades per engine is how many gazzillions of cycles that blades did NOT fail? Sorry, the perfection department is closed for good. Now, we have the back-up and containment department that tries to avoid that things get too ugly when things go wrong, because things do go wrong once every gazzillion times.

    Oh, and by the way, who was the one that said... Not that the blade failure doesn't concern me, it does. Oh it was me!?

    There are two ladies in an elevator. A guy gets in and tells to one of the women "You are a fair lady" and the other woman says "And why do you think I am ugly?" That's the kind of logic (or non-logic) you are using here.

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    Senior Member TeeVee's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Annoying getting painted with a broad brush, isn't it, Counselor?
    not at all. i have never given 1/2 a shit about what people say about lawyers. i'm not the type they talk shit about. in fact, i'm a more vocal critic of lawyers than probably any person you've ever met.

    and while it appears that i am defending them, i'm merely speaking the truth: lawyers are hated fairly universally UNTIL someone needs one, then al is forgotten and forgiven. those that talk shit about class action lawsuits doing nothing but enrich lawyers are just plain ignorant. class actions when successful are more of an incentive for big companies to straighten out their shitty practices then some paltry government fines. corporations feel only one thing: losses to their bottom line, and nothing works better than a class settlement to wake up management to their crappy ways.

    finally, in EVERY class action EVERY class member is advised in writing well in advance of the settlement being approved by the court that they have the absolute right to opt out of the class and pursue their own cause of action.

    spend five minutes searching for famous class action suits and then come back and tell us all that you still really think they do nothing except make lawyers rich (which i admit they do)

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    Quote Originally Posted by 3WE View Post
    1) Did you see my comment to Bobby about the Northeast corridor and high levels of air traffic.

    [Below edited after Bobby's post]

    2) In airplane school, they USED to teach you the THEORY behind stuff (I know this stuff doesn't really interest Evan all that much, it's not procedures and checklists). Regulations say 12,500 feet for EXTENDED time periods. You can even go up to 14,000 feet briefly AND keep your passengers at 14,000 feet without 02. While I cannot quote chapter, verse, regulation number or even the correct altitudes (without Bobby's reference) it's inconsequential to level off at 11,000 feet instead of 10,000.


    AND MORE UNWRITTEN COWBOY IMPROVISATION COMMENTS: I contend that ATC INFERRED (magic word there) (or it was simply understood) ...Level at 11,000 if you can, please, otherwise there's a bunch of planes you will be mixing with- I'll have to scramble and there's some risk of a TCAS incident.

    WN Inferred (or understood): That's fine, we can stay at 11,000 with no meaningful hypoxic stress on our passengers...you know and we know we're gonna be going lower in a few minutes.

    Not super secret stuff here, but professionals doing what professionals do (and that's NOT ONLY and NOT ALWAYS memorizing and barfing back exact words and exact regulations from checklists and books).
    Also:
    What cabin altitude does the warning horn sound and the passenger masks drop? About 14,000 ft ?
    So if you were flying at 12,000 ft and this happened the masks would not even deploy (automatically).

    NTSB said that when the engine failed the aircraft executed a rapid roll to 40degrees bank.

    The pilots train for recovery from unusual attitude. They train for rapid decompression. They train for engine failure.
    But they don't get training for all three at the same time.
    It seems from the NTSB briefing (@NTSB_Newsroom) that they got a false engine fire warning and Cabin altitude warning at the same time with 40degree roll thrown in.
    The pilots showed excellent airmanship in dealing with multiple failures and landing safely.
    Maybe they did maybe they didn't tell ATC about the decompression. ATC has mode C so I think they probably figured it out.

  14. #94
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    But the names are not so important. In any event, this is unacceptable. The engine should fail safely after a single blade failure (as initiating event, more blades can fail after that). Period.
    Gabriel, I get everything you are saying, but I don't think there is a way to ensure that a blade failure remains contained (as this and the previous incident have shown). The AD does not even recommend exploring that possibility. Certainly there is no way to ensure containment of a rotor disk failure. Both have occurred over the last 18 months as a result of metal fatigue, and we are seeing both high-cycle fatigue and low-cycle fatigue (due to manufacture weaknesses). I am focused on one thing: the frequency in which these components are inspected for fatigue seems inadequate.

    Consider the AA 767 incident from October 2016:

    Quote Originally Posted by NTSB report
    Investigators further determined the defect had been propagating microscopic cracks in the disk for as many as 5,700 flight cycles – one takeoff and one landing – prior to the accident. Although the disk had been inspected in January 2011, the NTSB said the internal cracks were also most likely undetectable at that time because the current required inspection methods are unable to identify all subsurface defects.
    So five and a half years (how many cycles?) since the last deep inspection, and cracks that may have been detectable for thousands of flight cycles. Undetected because uninspected. Yet detectable. Preventable.

    In that incident, a 57lb section of the rotor disk was thrown almost 3000ft AFTER passing through the wing and the fuel tank! We can't have that happening, ever. Even low-cycle fatigue exhibits warning signs well before failure. I realize the stats on these things are extremely rare, but they could be—and must be—virtually zero. There is no possible reliable contigency for uncontained engine failure in the air. It must be prevented on the ground.

    So my question is: what is the current required frequency for fatigue inspections of crucial engine parts?

  15. #95
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    Gabe said-3BS said-Gabe said.
    Deep breath...

    You somewhat deemphasized rapidly spinning parts for how containment was so great...

    I would hope CFM-56 blades might be fixed to stop this horrible trend of shredding the intake dialing (and A-380 wing spar incidents from such a new aircraft.)

    Yeah, I used razz vocabulary, but I partially agree with Evan that maybe we need an extra bead of welding at the root of the blades, and maybe a few more inspections...(whatever makes sense from a scientific engineering standpoint).
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Gabriel, I get everything you are saying, but I don't think there is a way to ensure that a blade failure remains contained (as this and the previous incident have shown). The AD does not even recommend exploring that possibility. Certainly there is no way to ensure containment of a rotor disk failure. Both have occurred over the last 18 months as a result of metal fatigue, and we are seeing both high-cycle fatigue and low-cycle fatigue (due to manufacture weaknesses). I am focused on one thing: the frequency in which these components are inspected for fatigue seems inadequate.

    Consider the AA 767 incident from October 2016:



    So five and a half years (how many cycles?) since the last deep inspection, and cracks that may have been detectable for thousands of flight cycles. Undetected because uninspected. Yet detectable. Preventable.

    In that incident, a 57lb section of the rotor disk was thrown almost 3000ft AFTER passing through the wing and the fuel tank! We can't have that happening, ever. Even low-cycle fatigue exhibits warning signs well before failure. I realize the stats on these things are extremely rare, but they could be—and must be—virtually zero. There is no possible reliable contigency for uncontained engine failure in the air. It must be prevented on the ground.

    So my question is: what is the current required frequency for fatigue inspections of crucial engine parts?
    If you read the full report, they noted that post 2000, the type of manufacturing defects that caused the accident had greatly reduced. They also extensively discuss the fact that they are quite aware that will be no containing broken rotor disks as they have done analysis to predict the likely path of exit of such parts. The part that cracked in the 2016 incident was manufactured in 1997 prior to changes in the manufacturing process. There is no such things as virtually zero, and so we have the current rate of problems which will continue to reduce due to steady improvements in manufacturing and inspection.

    Frankly, I'm not sure why we're talking about compressor disks though since it is the fan blades that are far more likely to be damaged because they are much thinner, lighter, and they bear the brunt of anything the engine intakes on the front end.

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    Quote Originally Posted by 3WE View Post
    Deep breath...

    You somewhat deemphasized rapidly spinning parts for how containment was so great...

    I would hope CFM-56 blades might be fixed to stop this horrible trend of shredding the intake dialing (and A-380 wing spar incidents from such a new aircraft.)

    Yeah, I used razz vocabulary, but I partially agree with Evan that maybe we need an extra bead of welding at the root of the blades, and maybe a few more inspections...(whatever makes sense from a scientific engineering standpoint).
    There will be no containing failed compression disks when they fail due to the amount of energy released -- they weigh 150+ lbs and are spinning really fast. Loss of life will only be minimized by knowing where the pieces will fly if they fail, and locating the engines strategically to avoid loss of critical systems or by detecting defects and damage before critical failure occurs.

    Trying to contain fan blades makes a lot more sense, because unexpected ingestion of things like birds or drones will likely cause a blade to break. A broken blade is much easier to contain because the energy is far lower (much lighter part). Welding was not the problem here as the fasteners did not fail at the hub. The blade itself cracked due to fatigue over time.

    I still think the issue is that the cowling gets damaged and then subsequently ripped off by what I assume to be the wind, something that wouldn't be caught in testing on the ground so I'll be they've never looked at that too carefully. Still, I'm with Gabriel on this, they'll have to find an inspection frequency that makes sense.

  18. #98
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schwartz View Post
    If you read the full report, they noted that post 2000, the type of manufacturing defects that caused the accident had greatly reduced. They also extensively discuss the fact that they are quite aware that will be no containing broken rotor disks as they have done analysis to predict the likely path of exit of such parts. The part that cracked in the 2016 incident was manufactured in 1997 prior to changes in the manufacturing process. There is no such things as virtually zero, and so we have the current rate of problems which will continue to reduce due to steady improvements in manufacturing and inspection.

    Frankly, I'm not sure why we're talking about compressor disks though since it is the fan blades that are far more likely to be damaged because they are much thinner, lighter, and they bear the brunt of anything the engine intakes on the front end.
    Because were talking about inspection intervals. Whether they catch a fan blade crack or a rotor disk crack is immaterial. It's encouraging that manufacturing methods have improved, but we still need to inspect these things more frequently. Two pronged approach: build them better, inspect them more to catch them before they fail, and I'm willing to bet these things won't happen anymore.

    As usual, it's a matter or will. And the corruption of will.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Quench View Post
    The pilots train for recovery from unusual attitude. They train for rapid decompression. They train for engine failure.
    But they don't get training for all three at the same time.

    Have you ever had a Part 121 PC in a full motion simulator?

  20. #100
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Gabriel, I get everything you are saying, but I don't think there is a way to ensure that a blade failure remains contained (as this and the previous incident have shown).
    Why? If a 777 or A380 blade can be contained, I don;t see why a 737 wouldn't.

    Anyway, this is deviating the discussion. As far as we know so far whether the blade failure was contained or not in this particular incident doesn't seem to have a thing to do with the outcome. It was the destruction of the containment , and not its ability to contain, what caused the damage. It is quite evident that the damage in the slats and the shattering of the window were caused by relatively large and relatively low-energy objects, not shrapnel. A blade falure should not cause an engine disintegration, even leaving aside the containment discussion.

    I want discuss the rest of your comment that deals with disk failures and neither with blade failures nor engine destruction after such blade failure, which are the things on the table in this case.

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