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Colgan 3407 - 10 years today

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  • #61
    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
    I don't beleive that the AF pilot was thinking "tail stall".
    To which 3BS gives credence to the theory that he used cowboy improvisation that full nose up will give you many good things:

    -Avoid overspeed
    -Possibly get you above the storm and iced up pitot tubes
    -A good slow but safe airspeed- provided by HAL and the FBW, stall protection system (Evan likes to use the insider term alpha protection)

    And that he was, unfortunately, mistaken about item 3....

    Still....after 20,0000 feet of wallowing, mushy descent (with the Airspeed starting to work again AND the stall warning working)...maybe...just maybe try some nose over 172 full stall recovery methods....I now it's an A-300, but you only got 10,000 feet to go and maybe a nose-over input- as described in the 172 POH, might work.
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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    • #62
      Originally posted by 3WE View Post
      To which 3BS gives credence to the theory that he used cowboy improvisation that full nose up will give you many good things:

      -Avoid overspeed
      And why would overspeed be of concern?

      -Possibly get you above the storm and iced up pitot tubes
      Maybe, but I don't think that they had that clarity of mind.

      -A good slow but safe airspeed- provided by HAL and the FBW, stall protection system (Evan likes to use the insider term alpha protection)

      And that he was, unfortunately, mistaken about item 3....
      7000 fpm, 3WE
      You don't do half of that taking off with a lightweight plane at sea level and full rated TOGA thrust.
      Let alone at 35000 ft and cruise thrust 5 minutes after you discussed how given the weight and density altitude you don' t have performance to climb to 37000 ft.

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

      Comment


      • #63
        Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
        Picking at 3BS's theories.
        And what is YOUR theory as to why someone SUPPOSEDLY with some basic aviation training, PLUS plenty of type specific training AND DECENT EXPERIENCE executes a very good procedure on how TO stall a 172.

        I know my theory has holes...but just like Colgan and tail stalls, it offers a tiny shred of LOGICAL EXPLANATION- even IF the logic has flaws.

        And it's "credence", not absolute firm belief.
        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

        Comment


        • #64
          Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
          And why would overspeed be of concern?
          Because you confuse the ECAM message MAX SPEED........330KTS/.82 to be an overspeed warning and believe that is your current speed?

          Let alone at 35000 ft and cruise thrust 5 minutes after you discussed how given the weight and density altitude you don' t have performance to climb to 37000 ft.
          Let alone after you've just reduced thrust and N1 has gone from 100% to 84%. Still, I agree with 3WE. The PF WANTED TO CLIMB, even before the event. He seemed preoccupied with the idea. He HAD the performance to climb to 37,000, but that would be close to REC MAX and therefore risky in turbulence, so the idea was ruled out. However, it was only vaguely dismissed by the Captain, and he seemed to leave the decision in the hands of the relief crew.

          Comment


          • #65
            Originally posted by Gabriel
            And why would overspeed be of concern?
            Dude...search your memory banks...35-whatever thousand feet is close to coffin corner where a slight inattention/descent/speed up could lead to a high-speed nose over, dive, break up and die. See footnotes too.



            Originally posted by Evan View Post
            I agree with 3WE.
            It's cloudy here, but has the sun exploded?


            Footnote 1: FL35-whatever IS CLOSER to coffin corner than FL-10-whatever.
            Footnote 2: I guess you could select a familiar robust power setting and attitude, but I don't think that's allowed.
            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

            Comment


            • #66
              Originally posted by 3WE View Post
              Footnote 2: I guess you could select a familiar robust power setting and attitude, but I don't think that's allowed.
              Sure, such as the robust one you were at when the AP gave up. 0° and CL. 100% N1. Just keep it there! Except you're not at full CL power, you're thrust-locked at 84% N1. But you don't know that because checklists are for chumps. So you start to sink. But the control law wants to maintain load factor so the pitch increases. You are slowing down, but you don't know that either because you've got no airspeed indicator. Your stall warning threshold at this altitude is only about 5° AoA. You hear the word "stall". Well, that's not possible, not at CL and 10°. Your cowboy fundamental airmanship tells you that. And the FD is still engaged and agrees. Must be erroneous... Must not sink...

              I wonder why that's not allowed?

              Comment


              • #67
                Originally posted by Evan View Post
                Sure, such as the robust one you were at when the AP gave up. 0° and CL. 100% N1. Just keep it there! Except you're not at full CL power, you're thrust-locked at 84% N1. But you don't know that because checklists are for chumps. So you start to sink. But the control law wants to maintain load factor so the pitch increases. You are slowing down, but you don't know that either because you've got no airspeed indicator. Your stall warning threshold at this altitude is only about 5° AoA. You hear the word "stall". Well, that's not possible, not at CL and 10°. Your cowboy fundamental airmanship tells you that. And the FD is still engaged and agrees. Must be erroneous... Must not sink...

                I wonder why that's not allowed?
                You are right. With no protections, no AP, and not speed indication, the control law should revert to direct law. At least you would have natural speed and AoA stability.

                --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                Comment


                • #68
                  Originally posted by Evan View Post
                  Sure, such as the robust one you were at when the AP gave up. 0° and CL. 100% N1. Just keep it there! Except you're not at full CL power, you're thrust-locked at 84% N1. But you don't know that because checklists are for chumps. So you start to sink. But the control law wants to maintain load factor so the pitch increases. You are slowing down, but you don't know that either because you've got no airspeed indicator. Your stall warning threshold at this altitude is only about 5° AoA. You hear the word "stall". Well, that's not possible, not at CL and 10°. Your cowboy fundamental airmanship tells you that. And the FD is still engaged and agrees. Must be erroneous... Must not sink...
                  Wow, amazing...you just almost 100% totally not get it.

                  What you do is:

                  Select an attitude and power setting that gives you a nice robust airspeed- not to fast, not too slow, and approximately level.

                  You keep attitude level.

                  What you do not_do is:

                  -You do not "just keep it there"...you move power to a setting that you use during almost all of your cruise. [Edit: Above you blabber some bologna about being at 100%, but really at 84%, the below say "just keep it there"...The answer is whatever- you use a known power setting...if you are going fast and fear overspeed, you pull the power back to some OTHER known robust setting. If you've ever listened to ATC, you'll know that they ask planes to slow down at cruise...so yeah, you could leave the power right where it is and maintain altitude per your prior cruise or you could slow down if you deem it good for safety...in any case, please continue to be lost in the trees, because forest works very well with known power settings and attitudes.]

                  -You do not hold altitude...instead you will probably climb a little or sink a little...gently...

                  -You do not hold airspeed...instead, your speed probably fluctuates a little. (repeating a little.)

                  -But the biggestest mostest importantest thing you don't do is get into a crazy fast or slow speed, attitude or altitude.

                  /what you don't do.

                  -You sit there in relatively stable flight...not in a 7000 ft/min climb followed by a stall...not in dive/overspeed/high-speed tuck.

                  -WHILE you sit there in relatively stable flight, you very calmly review Evan's blessed checklist to diagnose UAS, and then take proper remedial action.

                  -Eventually, you can return to your assigned altitude, heading, course, and speed, as appropriate. That is not_part of using known power and attitude.
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • #69
                    Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                    You are right. With no protections, no AP, and not speed indication, the control law should revert to direct law. At least you would have natural speed and AoA stability.
                    And manual pitch trim with no yoke, and control using only a small sidestick with short-throw inputs, making it more sensitive to inputs and more difficult to fly than a yoke/column-controlled aircraft. You could do that. Or you could just follow procedures in Alternate Law and be perfectly fine. And the latter choice is much easier to do.

                    Comment


                    • #70
                      There was another Air France boo-boo in 2011. This time the event was triggered by a transient overspeed warning during serious turbulence. The F/O was PNF, but that didn't stop him from suddenly hitting the priority take-over button, which disconnects the AP, and pulling unto a rapid 3000ft climb to around 38,000. This time the control law remained Normal, so the Alpha Prot saved the day.

                      The BEA attributed his actions to startle factor. This is their summarization of that phenomena:

                      Originally posted by BEA
                      “Sometimes (such a sudden) effect sparks primal instinctive reaction, instant and inadequate motor responses. These basic reflexes may prove to be incorrect and difficult to correct under time pressure and may affect the pilot’s decision-making ability. The surprise effect typically occurs when there is a difference between the mental representation that the pilot has of the aeroplane’s behaviour and its real behaviour (instrument failures, trajectory upset) or when an unexpected event occurs. Its intensity depends on the severity, frequency and predictability of the event, as well as the previous experience of the crew. In some cases the surprise effect may lead to:

                      • Disturbance of memorisation mechanisms
                      • Reduction or loss of situational awareness
                      • Forgetting procedures
                      • Absence of reaction or an over-long reaction time”
                      Now, apply this to AF447 and Colgan...

                      Comment


                      • #71
                        Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                        -You do not "just keep it there"...you move power to a setting that you use during almost all of your cruise.
                        Why not? it was working fine up until the disconnect. And power is set at CL, which IS a setting that you use during almost all of your cruise.

                        -WHILE you sit there in relatively stable flight, you very calmly review Evan's blessed checklist to diagnose UAS, and then take proper remedial action.
                        But instant-recall procedures intended to first stabilize the flight are for chumps, right?

                        Comment


                        • #72
                          Originally posted by Evan View Post
                          There was another Air France boo-boo in 2011. This time the event was triggered by a transient overspeed warning during serious turbulence. The F/O was PNF, but that didn't stop him from suddenly hitting the priority take-over button, which disconnects the AP, and pulling unto a rapid 3000ft climb to around 38,000. This time the control law remained Normal, so the Alpha Prot saved the day.

                          The BEA attributed his actions to startle factor. This is their summarization of that phenomena:

                          Now, apply this to AF447 and Colgan...
                          But then we are doomed. What you propose will also not work either.

                          - Forgetting procedures
                          Yet, a dummy pilot with less than 200 hours who never flew anything with more than 1 piston engine and 2 seats, and nothing with a stickshaker, can correctly react to a totally unexpected stickshaker immediately after rotation in a 747.

                          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                          Comment


                          • #73
                            Originally posted by Evan View Post
                            with no yoke, and control using only a small sidestick with short-throw inputs, making it more sensitive to inputs and more difficult to fly than a yoke/column-controlled aircraft.
                            (and no force feedback and no movement of the stick when the other pilot moves his)

                            You are right. I had forgotten how much the Airbus cockpit design philosophy sucks.

                            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                            Comment


                            • #74
                              Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                              Yet, a dummy pilot with less than 200 hours who never flew anything with more than 1 piston engine and 2 seats, and nothing with a stickshaker, can correctly react to a totally unexpected stickshaker immediately after rotation in a 747.
                              Well, to begin with, you're no dummy. One part of the solution is to increase the depth of pilot training requirements to a more Gabriellian standard of understanding on the underlying aerodynamics. If they can't grasp it firmly, in its entirety, they don't get to grasp anything in the cockpit either. The days when the most essential attributes of piloting were instinctive motor skills and sang froid are over. It's largely a cerebral job now. Motor skills are no less important, but are only one half of the modern requirement.

                              However, as far as startle factor goes, your heroic performance was achieved at 0' altitude with 0 chance of death awaiting you, and I assume you were not at the weary end of your fourth day of a rigorous simulator duty roster. Nor did it come suddenly after four hours of sitting next to BoeingBobby watching him snore and clean his fingernails. That does make a difference.

                              Startle factor is real...

                              Therefore, what I propose is to do EVERYTHING practical to prevent pilots from being surprised by things working as they are designed to work. That means training, deep and technical training for unusual events, system reversions, abnormal operations and upset recovery. What I also propose is concerted efforts to provide pilots with the awareness of and mental preparation for human factors and to combat the bravado and overconfidence that pervades the profession. Give me a couple of airmen (airwomen... airpersons...) with your level of knowledge and a healthy dose of humility and I will have no reservations about boarding their airplane except for the reservations I need to board their airplane.
                              As long as it's not a 737-Max.

                              Comment


                              • #75
                                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                                (and no force feedback and no movement of the stick when the other pilot moves his)

                                You are right. I had forgotten how much the Airbus cockpit design philosophy sucks.
                                You have to keep in mind, the Airbus is not intended to be flown for any protracted length of time in Direct Law. Aside from the last moments of flight, it is a provisional control law intended to be used while working problems and restoring autoflight. The Bus in Direct Law is indeed inferior to the Boeing in the same situation. I agree there. But how often does that happen?

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