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  • #76
    Originally posted by Evan View Post
    But instant-recall procedures intended to first stabilize the flight are for chumps, right?
    1. "First stabilize flight according to UAS procedure." Evan Happy.

    2. "Stabilize the flight according to super broad, basic knowledge that you learned on day 1 and practice every flight since." Evan Mad.

    3. "Become confused over a myriad of warnings and exactly what procedure to do." A-300-load of people Dead.

    When 3 happens, what is easier to remember? 1 or 2?
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

    Comment


    • #77
      Originally posted by 3WE View Post
      1. "First stabilize flight according to UAS procedure." Evan Happy.

      2. "Stabilize the flight according to super broad, basic knowledge that you learned on day 1 and practice every flight since." Evan Mad.

      3. "Become confused over a myriad of warnings and exactly what procedure to do." A-300-load of people Dead.

      When 3 happens, what is easier to remember? 1 or 2?
      Easier to remember? I don't know, I want to think it's 2.
      But you are rated for the type, for sure you should know by hart at least the memory items, there are not so many emergencies that have memory items, and then it's a few memory items per emergency. You are required and should execute 1, not 2.

      Now, don't remember 1? Do at least 2.
      Colgan and AF not only didn't do 1, but they did the absolute opposite to 2.

      And my eternal discussion with Evan: We both agree that both fundamentals and type specifics are important. But I think that fundamentals go first. We cannot trust the type specifics to pilots that don't master the fundamentals (from both a practical and intellectual point of view). Not until we reach the point where we really need just a system operator in the cockpit, not a pilot. But then I don't want to hear that the system gives up at the worse moment and transfer manual control to the system operator in a mode that is degraded. The memory items were something very easy to program into the Airbus computer. And "I will not let the plane slow down to stick shaker" was easy to program in the Q400 autopilot.

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

      Comment


      • #78
        Originally posted by 3WE View Post
        When 3 happens, what is easier to remember for the entire spectrum of pilots? 1 or 2?
        #1, absolutely,

        The problem (that you choose to ignore) is that the entire spectrum of pilots includes pilots with flawed judgment (see: AF447) (see also: A number of UAS incidents where UAS procedure wasn't followed and upset resulted)

        Instant recall procedures are designed to be easy to remember. They are not complicated. If you do them: A-300-load of people Alive and Well. Every time,

        Instant-recall procedures take into account type-specific stealth factors that many pilots would not consider when using only the super broad, basic knowledge that you learned on day 1,

        I think Gabriel and I agree of the following:

        1. Master super broad, basic knowledge that you learned on day 1.

        2. Master the handful of type-specific memory procedures to obtain type-rating.

        2A. Master, and respect the hell out of, CRM.

        3. When applicable, perform the appropriate memory procedure as the first action following situational awareness.

        4. When no procedure applies, no procedure comes to mind or the existing procedure is detrimental for some clear reason, rely on the super broad, basic knowledge that they learned on day 1.

        5. Under stress and surprise, human judgment is subject to error.

        6. Under calm, methodical engineering conditions using research and extensive testing, human judgment is sound and reliable.

        7. The beauty of instant-recall procedures is that you can provide the benefits of #6 to pilots in the grip of #5. Every time.

        Comment


        • #79
          Originally posted by Evan View Post
          #1, absolutely,

          The problem (that you choose to ignore) is that the entire spectrum of pilots includes pilots with flawed judgment (see: AF447) (see also: A number of UAS incidents where UAS procedure wasn't followed and upset resulted)

          Instant recall procedures are designed to be easy to remember. They are not complicated. If you do them: A-300-load of people Alive and Well. Every time,

          Instant-recall procedures take into account type-specific steath factors that many pilots would not consider when using only the super broad, basic knowledge that you learned on day 1,

          I think Gabriel and I agree of the following:

          1. Master super broad, basic knowledge that you learned on day 1.

          2. Master the handful of type-specific memory procedures to obtain type-rating.

          2A. Master, and respect the hell out of, CRM.

          3. When applicable, perform the appropriate memory procedure as the first action following situational awareness.

          4. When no procedure applys, no procedure comes to mind or the existing procedure is detrimental for some clear reason, rely on the super broad, basic knowledge that they learned on day 1.

          5. Under stress and surprise, human judgment is subject to error.

          6. Under calm, methodical engineering conditions using research and extensive testing, human judgment is sound and reliable.

          7. The beauty of instant-recall procedures is that you can provide the benefits of #6 to pilots in the grip of #5. Every time.
          The bold part in 7 is false, because:

          “Sometimes (such a sudden) effect sparks primal instinctive reaction, instant and inadequate motor responses. These basic reflexes may prove to be incorrect and difficult to correct under time pressure and may affect the pilot’s decision-making ability. The surprise effect typically occurs when there is a difference between the mental representation that the pilot has of the aeroplane’s behaviour and its real behaviour (instrument failures, trajectory upset) or when an unexpected event occurs. Its intensity depends on the severity, frequency and predictability of the event, as well as the previous experience of the crew. In some cases the surprise effect may lead to:

          - Disturbance of memorisation mechanisms
          - Reduction or loss of situational awareness
          - Forgetting procedures

          --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
          --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

          Comment


          • #80
            Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
            [I think]***fundamentals go first.***[but I like both] (No intent to misquote you, but I'm sure you'll take issue)
            Originally posted by Evan
            absolutely[not]
            Both of you- don't forget it's late on a stormy night and numerous warnings go off.

            Maybe the pitot is plugged up, maybe it's the infamous blue screen of death, (or the HAL version where FBW becomes self aware and needs to eradicate the carbon units), maybe a little bomb went off next to the hydraulic lines and you lost numerous systems, or some crazy rudder reversal glitch (or 100 other things) that the scientific engineers missed or SOMETIMES, STUFF SIMPLY MALFUNCTIONS... It's a BUNCH of dang warnings, and it looks like we might die.

            Which one is it?


            Yeah, it's nice to spend 3 seconds, determine it's UAS and do it exactly according to procedure.

            BUT given the startle factor and numerous possible problems, quit worrying about THE EXEPLETIVE EVAN PROCEDURE and "keep the plane flat dumb and happy" just like you learned in 172 school...and spend 20 seconds (or two minutes) figuring out it's UAS.

            But hey, let's get confused and mentally lock up and do a 38,000 ft stall using the "how to stall a 172" procedure (Even though you are in an A-300, the 172 version apparently works well).
            Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

            Comment


            • #81
              9 seconds. That's what it took them to figure the speed issue out. They were already skyrocketing by then.

              An alarm sounds for 2.2 seconds, indicating that the autopilot is disconnecting. The cause is the fact that the plane's pitot tubes, externally mounted sensors that determine air speed, have iced over, so the human pilots will now have to fly the plane by hand. Aside from the loss of airspeed indication, everything is working fine. Neither Bonin nor Roberts has ever received training in how to deal with an unreliable airspeed indicator at cruise altitude, or in flying the airplane by hand under such conditions.

              02:10:06 (Bonin) I have the controls.
              02:10:07 (Robert) Okay.

              Perhaps spooked by everything that has unfolded over the past few minutes—the turbulence, the strange electrical phenomena, his colleague's failure to route around the potentially dangerous storm—Bonin reacts irrationally. He pulls back on the side stick to put the airplane into a steep climb. Almost as soon as Bonin pulls up into a climb, the plane's computer reacts. A warning chime alerts the cockpit to the fact that they are leaving their programmed altitude. Then the stall warning sounds. This is a synthesized human voice that repeatedly calls out, "Stall!" in English, followed by a loud and intentionally annoying sound called a "cricket."]

              02:10:07 (Robert) What’s this?
              02:10:15 (Bonin) There’s no good… there’s no good speed indication.
              02:10:16 (Robert) We’ve lost the, the, the speeds, then?

              The plane is soon climbing at a blistering rate of 7000 feet per minute.

              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

              Comment


              • #82
                Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                Both of you- don't forget it's late on a stormy night and numerous warnings go off.

                Maybe the pitot is plugged up, maybe it's the infamous blue screen of death, (or the HAL version where FBW becomes self aware and needs to eradicate the carbon units), maybe a little bomb went off next to the hydraulic lines and you lost numerous systems, or some crazy rudder reversal glitch (or 100 other things) that the scientific engineers missed or SOMETIMES, STUFF SIMPLY MALFUNCTIONS... It's a BUNCH of dang warnings, and it looks like we might die.

                Which one is it?


                Yeah, it's nice to spend 3 seconds, determine it's UAS and do it exactly according to procedure.

                BUT given the startle factor and numerous possible problems, quit worrying about THE EXEPLETIVE EVAN PROCEDURE and "keep the plane flat dumb and happy" just like you learned in 172 school...and spend 20 seconds (or two minutes) figuring out it's UAS.

                But hey, let's get confused and mentally lock up and do a 38,000 ft stall using the "how to stall a 172" procedure (Even though you are in an A-300, the 172 version apparently works well).
                Now, notice that, in my post above, #3 contains the words "following situational awareness". If you are PF and the autoflight disconnects, the very first thing you do is stabilize (and ONLY stabilize unless something solid appears in front of you) with your fundamental airmanship skills.

                Next, I have to point out what you don't always have when tooling around in your 172: A fellow pilot with whom you can share tasks through a (hopefully) practiced discipline known as Cockpit Resource Management. Another thing you don't have is ECAM, which was developed to overcome the loss of the flight engineer. So lets use these things.

                As you stabilize, your PNF glances down at the ECAM. It tells him some very specific things about what is going wrong and some of those things are color coded as action items. Once you do them they disappear. It also prioritizes these things so the most urgent ones remain at the top. In this case, it was immediately clear that airspeed data was unreliable (confirmed by a quick cross-check of the airspeed indicators). So PNF calls out UAS. Now you have that much situational awareness and you can execute the instant-recall procedure for that situation. It really isn't the total chaos that you imagine in your post-Kubrickian fantasy about 'intelligent' avionics. You peg the attitude at 5° ANU, you switch off the FD's and you move the thrust levers out of the CL detent and them put them back there again. Soooo simple. Next your PNF, after a quick further study of the ECAM messages to ascertain that nothing is more urgent, brings out the QRH and gives you the full procedure for your given weight and altitude. Now you are established safely in the envelope and stablized until the speeds come back. And you're done. Sure, your bad judgment screamed CLIMB! and you really wanted to do so, but your CRM discipline saved you from doing that.

                Admittedly. there are some caveats. for instance, if the cockpit is too turbulent, it might be difficult to read the ECAM. As I said in #4, if you can't gather situational awareness enough to know what procedure is called for, you continue with your basic airmanship (which opens you up to your flawed judgment), but in this case it appears that the ECAM was quite readable.

                Of course in the 172, with no specific procedure and no ECAM, you just have to do what comes to mind. If your mind is right and your judgment is sound, everything goes smoothly. If your minded is confused or your judgment shady, you end up in a hole (or an ocean if it's an ETOPS 172). That's fine for GA, but airlines passengers didn't bet their lives on the roll of a dice.

                Comment


                • #83
                  Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                  The bold part in 7 is false, because:
                  Yes, I meant 'every time' as in 'consistently' and used the word 'can' rather than 'will'. Recall procedures are not infallible, I never said they were, but they are less universally fallible than improvisation, and if you are disoriented enough to forget them, you are not oriented enough to reliably improvise either.

                  Comment


                  • #84
                    Evan, I am pretty sure I have asked before, and excuse me if I have, and don't get all spun-up on me, but are you rated in any aircraft at all and if so what ratings do you have?

                    Comment


                    • #85
                      Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                      9 seconds. That's what it took them to figure the speed issue out. They were already skyrocketing by then.
                      I have toyed with the wimpy little joystick being soooo easy to pull back that he didn't really realize he was asking for full nose-up input...

                      But then he says that phrase you and I despise so much...
                      Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                      Comment


                      • #86
                        Originally posted by Plagiarizing BoeingBobby View Post
                        Bobby, I am pretty sure I have asked before, and excuse me if I have, and don't get all spun-up on me, but are you enjoying your popcorn, and if so how many bowls have you eaten?


                        By the way, none of this really concerns you. I am moderately confident that had you been seated behind the controls of Colgan or AirFrance that several things would have gone differently- we are just figuring out how to change your business for those folks who seem to want to do relentless pull ups.
                        Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                        Comment


                        • #87
                          Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                          Evan, I am pretty sure I have asked before, and excuse me if I have, and don't get all spun-up on me, but are you rated in any aircraft at all and if so what ratings do you have?
                          Everything I post here, factual or opinion, that is not rendered in blue font, is based upon extensive research into accident reports, aviation media and publications such as Airbus' Safety First and FAST publications and Boeing's AERO publication. All of these sources are either coming from rated pilots, operations engineers or professional investigators. I'm not claiming to be an authority on all of these things, but I'm getting much of my information from genuine authority. If I were an airline pilot, I would consider this required reading.

                          This thread is about what certain actual pilots don't seem to know, about their aircraft and about their own limitations. My point is that this ignorance often comes from blind over-confidence and a lack of interest in learning beyond the minimum requirement, and that has to change, somehow, probably by decree. Human limitations seem to be the hardest sell. Colgan was a recipe that needed startle factor to occur, and the event that startled the pilot was very avoidable through better technical awareness. Air France 447 was a example of poor procedural aptitude and discipline combined with startle factor and a complete lack of manual flight practice** at high altitude and high mach numbers. These are all things I am aware of as a result of my reading and research. No, I'm not actually familiar with the handling characteristics of a large aircraft at cruise level flight, but neither are most airline pilots, since it is forbidden in RVSM and cannot be replicated in the simulator. I know there are factors you can only learn by experience, which I welcome you to share with me, but many of the essential lessons learned from so many accidents and incidents require 0 hours of flight time to understand and appreciate.

                          So I guess I'm asking you, why does it matter?



                          **BTW; 'manual flight' does not mean simply following the flight directors with the A/P off and the A/T engaged. I suspect very few contemporary line pilots have ever flown in true manual flight above FL300.

                          Comment


                          • #88
                            Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                            Evan, I am pretty sure I have asked before, and excuse me if I have, and don't get all spun-up on me, but are you rated in any aircraft at all and if so what ratings do you have?
                            No, he isn't. Or let's say that he isn't (I suspect he isn't but I don't know for sure either).

                            So what? I am wondering what's in your mind:
                            1- "This guy has zero experience, what can he say about this".
                            2- "Wow, this guy has no experience and yet he makes some very interesting remarks".
                            3- Something else?

                            For the record, I stand by my signature, and I operate accordingly.

                            --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                            --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                            Comment


                            • #89
                              Originally posted by Evan View Post
                              Now, notice that, in my post above, #3 contains the words "following situational awareness". If you are PF and the autoflight disconnects, the very first thing you do is stabilize (and ONLY stabilize unless something solid appears in front of you) with your fundamental airmanship skills.

                              Next, I have to point out what you don't always have when tooling around in your 172: A fellow pilot with whom you can share tasks through a (hopefully) practiced discipline known as Cockpit Resource Management. Another thing you don't have is ECAM, which was developed to overcome the loss of the flight engineer. So lets use these things.

                              As you stabilize, your PNF glances down at the ECAM. It tells him some very specific things about what is going wrong and some of those things are color coded as action items. Once you do them they disappear. It also prioritizes these things so the most urgent ones remain at the top. In this case, it was immediately clear that airspeed data was unreliable (confirmed by a quick cross-check of the airspeed indicators). So PNF calls out UAS. Now you have that much situational awareness and you can execute the instant-recall procedure for that situation. It really isn't the total chaos that you imagine in your post-Kubrickian fantasy about 'intelligent' avionics. You peg the attitude at 5° ANU, you switch off the FD's and you move the thrust levers out of the CL detent and them put them back there again. Soooo simple. Next your PNF, after a quick further study of the ECAM messages to ascertain that nothing is more urgent, brings out the QRH and gives you the full procedure for your given weight and altitude. Now you are established safely in the envelope and stablized until the speeds come back. And you're done. Sure, your bad judgment screamed CLIMB! and you really wanted to do so, but your CRM discipline saved you from doing that.

                              Admittedly. there are some caveats. for instance, if the cockpit is too turbulent, it might be difficult to read the ECAM. As I said in #4, if you can't gather situational awareness enough to know what procedure is called for, you continue with your basic airmanship (which opens you up to your flawed judgment), but in this case it appears that the ECAM was quite readable.

                              Of course in the 172, with no specific procedure and no ECAM, you just have to do what comes to mind. If your mind is right and your judgment is sound, everything goes smoothly. If your minded is confused or your judgment shady, you end up in a hole (or an ocean if it's an ETOPS 172). That's fine for GA, but airlines passengers didn't bet their lives on the roll of a dice.
                              Wow, Evan, so we actually agree quite a bit here!!! More than I thought actually.

                              Now, do you realize that the first and probably main failure in AF447 was in what I marked above in red rather than the green?

                              Th AP disconnected and the PF immediately pulled up like crazy. It took 9 seconds for the PNF to detect and call UAS (sort of, he said that they lost all the speeds). By then the stall warning had activated twice, they were 12 degrees nose up (up from 2), they were climbing 4500 fpm and still with 1.4Gs so the climb rate still increased quite a bit more.

                              --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                              --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                              Comment


                              • #90
                                Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                                So what? I am wondering what's in your mind:
                                1- "This guy has zero experience, what can he say about this".
                                2- "Wow, this guy has no experience and yet he makes some very interesting remarks".
                                3- Something else?
                                Actually doing something brings some new levels of understanding that you don't have as an outsider looking in and "this guy" often displays this "lack of understanding" in a very strong way.

                                Anyone curious why it's important to throw fertilizer on a persons back patio?

                                In particular, "this guy", when discussing normal human performance, where he has some unrealistic and overly-perfect expectations. I have often asked if he has tried riding a bicycle or driving a car or a Mattel big wheel...

                                I know I have a few 'incidents' with two of those three things- too old for the big wheel- but I did crash a tricycle.

                                I do enjoy discussing and dissecting what professional pilots might have done- and have been guilty of over-extending my 'supposed outsider understanding'. And, yeah, there's quite the tendency for the insiders to not share their secrets with us as much as the we-know-but-we're-not-telling.

                                Such is life- and a little questioning is sometimes valid.
                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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