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Thread: Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

  1. #1041
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by TeeVee View Post
    i guess you missed the rather large, although grey, text above the article title which says, "Opinion". eh, not so important right?
    Right, I missed that. Even then, when substantiating one's opinion, it is a good practice to do it in a neutral way, i.e not cherry-picking the pieces of information and their interpretation.

    "Jim Hall was chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board from 1994 to 2001. Peter Goelz was managing director of the board from 1996 to 2000"

    i guess they are just two "fake news" makers, so we should ignore what they say.
    Well, then maybe not intentional. We are all subject to falling in the trap of confirmation bias.

    i will admit that parts of the article are not well written, including the part quoted by Gabe. It is missing info about 7 generations of the model, and that, to the uninformed person, might be important or not. It's pretty unimaginable that there is anyone reading the NYT today that would believe that the max was a single direct upgrade from the 1st gen 737 from the 60's.
    That's not the point. The article seems to suggest that a pilot can jump from a 1969 737-100 to a Max with nothing more than reading a pamphlet and, in particular, no specific flight taring in the Max (or in a sim of the Max). This is misleading. A 737-100 pilot would not be able to start the engine in the Max, let alone fly the plane. On the other hand, a 737 NG (which is barely shorter and carries barely fewer pax than the Max) would be able to fly the Max with no problem and no training beyond a couple-hours-iPad differences training, as long as the MCAS doesn't kick in. And even if the MCAS does kick in... I will probably never understand why the pilots of the 2 accident flights stopped using the thumb switch as they had been doing to correct for the MCAS inputs.

    If you ask me if anything more than a computer-based differences training should be required to a 737-NG pilot to fly the Max, I would start looking at how different they behave (i.e. the reason for the existence of the MCAS in the first place) rather than the MCAS itself. And I would seriously look into the trim wheel lock issue, but that is beyond the scope of the Max and it has been a mostly hidden issue since the -100 and it still is with the Max. Perhaps a -100 or a -200 pilot, who had the roller-coaster maneuver in their training manuals, were better prepared than an NG pilot to deal with a trim wheel lock situation (derived from an MCAS issue or not).

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  2. #1042
    Senior Member TeeVee's Avatar
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    i'm gonna give them the benefit of the doubt and go with: editorial error. maybe, an uninformed editor did some chop work and left the offending section somewhat nonsensical

  3. #1043
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    That is misleading to say the least and it is redacted in a way not to be plain lie but to fit a position. The position can be justified with accurate information.
    A better and more focused article perhaps (and not an opinion piece):

    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/b...l?action=click

    One quotation: "The safety review in their [FAA] files didnít mention that the system could aggressively push down the nose of the plane and trigger repeatedly"

  4. #1044
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by flashcrash View Post
    A better and more focused article perhaps (and not an opinion piece):

    https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/27/b...l?action=click

    One quotation: "The safety review in their [FAA] files didn’t mention that the system could aggressively push down the nose of the plane and trigger repeatedly"
    Yup, I red that one yesterday. I like this article.

    The article further explains why that happened.
    It says "paraphrasing" that in the beginning the MCAS has a limited functionality for high-speed high-G maneuvers and the authority was limited to a fraction of 1 degree (0.6 degree IIRC). Boeing presented to the FAA a safety evaluation of that MCAS. Then, later in the development, they expanded the function to work at slow speeds which increase its maximum deflection to 2.5 degrees... AT A TIME (with possible repetitions) but considered the change minor and not involving increased risks so they didn't present a new safety evaluation to the FAA. Incredible.

    It also discusses other instances of the development where the FAA engineers questioned safety aspects of the 737 and the FAA management sided with Boeing using time and budgets constrains (that is, Boeing's bottom line) as a factor in the decision.

    And many other things in the behavior of the FAA, both internally and in their relationship with Boeing.

    I cannot vouch for the accuracy, objectivity and overall "truth" of that article, but I didn't find anything obvious and it is worth reading.

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  5. #1045
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    Yup, I red that one yesterday. I like this article.

    The article further explains why that happened.
    It says "paraphrasing" that in the beginning the MCAS has a limited functionality for high-speed high-G maneuvers and the authority was limited to a fraction of 1 degree (0.6 degree IIRC). Boeing presented to the FAA a safety evaluation of that MCAS. Then, later in the development, they expanded the function to work at slow speeds which increase its maximum deflection to 2.5 degrees... AT A TIME (with possible repetitions) but considered the change minor and not involving increased risks so they didn't present a new safety evaluation to the FAA. Incredible.
    Or was it that Boeing didn't want to risk triggering a new type certification (or a significant delay in time-to-market) and thus decided not to present the changes? Boeing knew a type-certication or delay would doom them in this segment of the market. Management led them into that corner.

  6. #1046
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Or was it that Boeing didn't want to risk triggering a new type certification (or a significant delay in time-to-market) and thus decided not to present the changes? Boeing knew a type-certication or delay would doom them in this segment of the market. Management led them into that corner.
    I don't think that a new type certification was at stake. But extra cost, a delay in launch, and perhaps more importantly, a more extensive training requirement for the pilots (which would have added extra cost and transition time for the airlines and breached Boeing's promises to them) was.

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  7. #1047
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    https://www.theglobeandmail.com/busi...7-max-crashes/

    Notable:

    The recommendations will include that Boeing change aspects of its organizational structure, calling for the creation of new groups focused on safety and encouraging the company to consider making changes to the cockpits of future airplanes to accommodate a new generation of pilots, some of whom may have less training.

    ...

    One of the report’s most significant findings concerns the reporting structure for engineers at the company. At Boeing, top engineers report primarily to the business leaders for each airplane model, and secondarily to the company’s chief engineer.

    Under this model, engineers who identify problems that might slow a jet’s development could face resistance from executives whose jobs revolve around meeting production deadlines. The committee recommends flipping the reporting lines, so that top engineers report primarily to Boeing’s chief engineer, and secondarily to business unit leaders.

    ...

    Boeing has more than 100,000 employees and, like many large companies, at times struggles with information flow. In particular, there has been inadequate communication within the engineering department, and from Boeing’s commercial airplanes division, based in the Seattle area, to Boeing corporate offices in Chicago.

    The new safety group will work to ensure that the company’s various efforts have adequate independence and are working together and sharing information effectively. The new group will report to senior Boeing leadership, as well as to a new permanent committee on the board focused on aerospace safety.

    ...

    The board committee is expected to recommend that Boeing re-examine cockpit design and operation to ensure that new Boeing planes are accessible for the next generation of pilots, including those with less training.

    Boeing’s chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, established the committee in April, calling on it to review “companywide policies and processes for the design and development of the airplanes we build.” The group included four Boeing directors familiar with complex industrial systems, as well as highly regulated industries.

    Adm. Edmund Giambastiani Jr., a former nuclear submarine officer and the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the committee chairman. The other members were Lynn Good, the chief executive of Duke Energy and a board member of the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations; Edward Liddy, the former chief executive of the insurance company Allstate; and Robert Bradway, the chief executive of Amgen, a pharmaceuticals company.

    To conduct its review, the committee interviewed dozens of Boeing employees about their work. The committee also hired independent safety experts who had experience with industrial accidents including the Deepwater Horizon explosion, the Columbia space shuttle disaster and the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident. Among the experts was Sean O’Keefe, the former NASA administrator.

    ...

    The FAA and international regulators are similarly frustrated with Boeing, a sentiment that became apparent at a meeting last month.

    In August, Boeing met with officials from the FAA and other global aviation agencies to brief them on its efforts to complete fixes on the Max. Regulators asked detailed questions about adjustments to the Max’s flight control computers, which the Boeing representatives there were not prepared to answer.

    Instead, the company representatives began to display a PowerPoint presentation on their efforts, according to people briefed on the meeting who spoke on the condition of anonymity because it was not public.

    At that point, the regulators ended the meeting. Weeks later, Boeing has still not answered all their questions.

  8. #1048
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schwartz View Post
    Dilatory tactics. At some point, it will become impossible to ignore the fact that Boeing's senior executive management is the core problem and that will hopefully result in a purge that restores the company's public trust.

  9. #1049
    Senior Member TeeVee's Avatar
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    total horseshit. a committee run by executives who themselves have nothing but PROFIT as their main concern and a former admiral who was hired by boeing "In a statement, Boeing chairman and chief executive Jim McNerney indicated that the addition of Giambastiani, who was the second-highest ranking officer in the U.S. military, is intended to bolster strategic thinking on the defense side of the company and to boost Boeing's influence with the Pentagon." (http://old.seattletimes.com/html/bus...ngboard08.html)

  10. #1050
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Dilatory tactics. At some point, it will become impossible to ignore the fact that Boeing's senior executive management is the core problem and that will hopefully result in a purge that restores the company's public trust.
    Quote Originally Posted by TeeVee View Post
    total horseshit. a committee run by executives who themselves have nothing but PROFIT as their main concern and a former admiral who was hired by boeing "In a statement, Boeing chairman and chief executive Jim McNerney indicated that the addition of Giambastiani, who was the second-highest ranking officer in the U.S. military, is intended to bolster strategic thinking on the defense side of the company and to boost Boeing's influence with the Pentagon." (http://old.seattletimes.com/html/bus...ngboard08.html)
    This is funny, do you both not see that at this point, safety does align with profitability? Before it did not. Now it does only because a bunch of people died. Money drives safety when it matters, and now it matters.

    When did governments actually address health concerns with smoking? When they started to lose lawsuits associated with safe workplaces. Then they sued all the tobacco companies. Sometimes, money and health, or money and public safety align, and now we are in an era (we'll see how long it lasts) where they align in the aircraft industry.

  11. #1051
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schwartz View Post
    This is funny, do you both not see that at this point, safety does align with profitability? Before it did not. Now it does only because a bunch of people died. Money drives safety when it matters, and now it matters.

    When did governments actually address health concerns with smoking? When they started to lose lawsuits associated with safe workplaces. Then they sued all the tobacco companies. Sometimes, money and health, or money and public safety align, and now we are in an era (we'll see how long it lasts) where they align in the aircraft industry.
    I think we have to distinguish between safety and safety theatre, but the steps suggested in flipping the order of reports is a step in the right direction. The elephant in the room is, however, the B737, which doesn't belong in the 21st century. The decision to crutch it along, which is a much higher-level strategic decision by senior management tied with the decision to postpone the replacement airframe, is where all this began. That decision wasn't profitability driving safety. It was profitability impeding progress.

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