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Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

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  • Originally posted by brianw999 View Post
    There’s one thing that I’m starting to miss when being flown around the world. I’m missing being flown by highly experienced, highly trained ex military pilots, preferably who at some time in their career had someone shooting at them. The kind of pilots who don’t f**k about with a keyboard when something unusual happens but who just instinctively know what to set the controls to to maintain a reasonable semblance of level flight and thus gain them some more time to work out what is happening.
    I have to tell you, though, that those pilots tended to crash a lot (relatively) due to over-confidence, complacency, weak adherence to procedures and rules, and poor CRM.

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

    Comment


    • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
      Ok...two very new airplanes descended into the ground, probably against the pilot's wishes...and there's a new, not-so-redundant, slightly relentless push over system...maybe we should park the airplanes and check on things.

      I'm very much with you on the lack of hard proof...but I dunno- we've grounded "fleets" before for the sake of caution...
      I do not remember having a fleet grounded by something like this (one accident for a true vulnerability that can be easily mitigated with the application of simple and long-established procedures, plus a second accident that we don't know much about including whether it was related with the previous one or not). If this second accident was due to the MCAS too, maybe. But I am still resisting that idea. I so much want that to be NOT the case.

      But, if this second accident was related to a MCAS malfunction that could and should have been controlled with the trim runaway procedure, we better start figuring a way to identify and ban airlines and pilots rather than planes. No, I mean an EFFECTIVE way.

      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

      Comment


      • Originally posted by LH-B744 View Post
        ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
        I don't know if it is healthy to change an enormously successful a/c family like the B737 family so often.
        Also with the knowledge that the 738 and the 737 Max 8 have exactly the same length, down to 1 centimeter,
        39,47 m.
        As an engineer who worked in the aerospace industry for 45 years I can tell you that aircraft configurations change constantly due to airline demands (add more seats, add more range), parts availability (suppliers going out of business, ownership changes, parts obsolescence), material issues (a biggy happened in the 70s when 7075-T6 Al Alloy was found to be cracking), and then new government mandated rules come into effect (lead free solder). When replacing aircraft parts one had to know the serial number of an aircraft, its parts, and its build history.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Highkeas View Post
          As an engineer who worked in the aerospace industry for 45 years I can tell you that aircraft configurations change constantly due to airline demands (add more seats, add more range), parts availability (suppliers going out of business, ownership changes, parts obsolescence), material issues (a biggy happened in the 70s when 7075-T6 Al Alloy was found to be cracking), and then new government mandated rules come into effect (lead free solder). When replacing aircraft parts one had to know the serial number of an aircraft, its parts, and its build history.
          Wow. I knew that 'Our' jetphotos platform is good for men between, you better don't ask me, but some Junior members are not older than 14, aren't they... and 41. But you say you worked for aviation for 45 years, so..
          Do you know who Lufthansa General Mayrhuber was? He joined Lufthansa in the year 1970 as an engineer for jet engines (dt:Triebwerkentwicklung und -instandsetzung). And he left his company after almost 48 years, on September 24th 2017, as Lufthansa General (dt.: Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender der LH Group AG, und Chef von Spohr).

          I knew that here at jetphotos we have good benchmarks. But until now I didn't know that one of General Mayrhubers counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic still is active here. General W.M. will always be a prototype for me, 48 years for LH. That's one of the things which are impossible for me. Unfortunately W.M. died, not 18 months after he left his company (1947-2018_).

          Thus, I have a rough guess concerning your dob. Always a good thing to have experienced men on board!

          PS: LH Winter Schedule January 2010 is just on my table. That must've been one of the last months when type LH-B744 was flown to Indonesia,
          WIII Soekarno Hatta.
          LH #778, not nonstop, via WSSS Changi, dep EDDF, but 1 stop is not so bad, for 6942 nautical miles (dt: Seemeilen).
          50 years in the air with 737 and 747.

          In remembrance of the 181 passengers, and 8 crew, who died in October 2018.
          The German long haul is alive, 65 years and still kicking.
          The Gold Member in the 747 club, 50 years since the first LH 747.
          And constantly advanced, 744 and 748 /w upper and lower EICAS.
          This is Lohausen International airport speaking, echo delta delta lima.

          Comment


          • Before I complete this 10 hour nonstop operation.. Never in my life I've read so much about the B737, never with this nickname.. and never before I joined this brilliant platform.
            This topic is one of the best reasons to read all about the 737 what we can.

            There is at least 1 advantage for the 737 Max 8, compared to the 738.

            The 737 max 8 cracks the 6000 km benchmark nonstop, which are exactly 3240 nautical miles.
            The 738 doesn't do that.

            6000 km.. During the last Millenium, 737 pilots were proud with 4400 km (2400 nmi, as in the 735).
            Times change..
            Back then in 1999, you called 1 type when you needed more, type 747.

            Or a Condor.
            The German long haul is alive, 65 years and still kicking.
            The Gold Member in the 747 club, 50 years since the first LH 747.
            And constantly advanced, 744 and 748 /w upper and lower EICAS.
            This is Lohausen International airport speaking, echo delta delta lima.

            Comment


            • I just read (or heard on TV) that Germany can't review the Max black boxes because they are a new type and they do not have read-out equipment.

              Originally posted by flashcrash View Post
              Section 3 para 2 under "Basis For Order" makes for very interesting reading.
              "Based on the initial investigations and the reliable and credible evidence" refers to the 13 years old kid (or dick?) which 2 hours after reading the news about the crash typed on his phone "I'm sure it crashed for same reason of previous one" ?

              I can't imagine any other explanation, taking into account that none in the world had yet a chance to look at blackboxes data.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Highkeas View Post
                I have flown on the 737Max several times via Southwest Airlines and would not hesitate to fly it again.
                SW and AA are big users of the 737Max; does anyone know the total number of take-offs by these 2 airlines, and if any problems were encountered in flight?

                Update: Minutes after posting my questions this story popped up on my PC: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/pi...cid=spartandhp

                Hi, I'm not an expert or a pilot. I was wondering since you and Boeing seem confused by the apparent problem, if perhaps a "hacking" scenario was taken into consideration? For example, suppose that the Lion accident was a real technical problem; but then exploited by hackers to bring down another plane under the aegis of the same cause? In this unlikely scenario, the Atlas crash could have been a "test" of the hackers. I was wondering if hacking a plane is also technically possible? Could the older Atlas aircraft even be capable of this in my hypothesis?

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                  I do not remember having a fleet grounded by something like this (one accident for a true vulnerability that can be easily mitigated with the application of simple and long-established procedures, plus a second accident that we don't know much about including whether it was related with the previous one or not). If this second accident was due to the MCAS too, maybe. But I am still resisting that idea. I so much want that to be NOT the case.

                  But, if this second accident was related to a MCAS malfunction that could and should have been controlled with the trim runaway procedure, we better start figuring a way to identify and ban airlines and pilots rather than planes. No, I mean an EFFECTIVE way.
                  Possibly more important than this crash are ~4 incidents of pilots reporting undesirable nose overs...(at least for now)...Yes, there also seems to be the modern social media click count effect from this crash. But don't hang the grounding solely on the speculation on this crash.
                  Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                  Comment


                  • From the above linked reported:

                    In one report, an airline captain said that immediately after putting the plane on autopilot, the co-pilot called out "Descending," followed by an audio cockpit warning, "Don't sink, don't sink!"

                    [...]

                    On another flight, the co-pilot said that seconds after engaging the autopilot, the nose pitched downward and the plane began descending at 1,200 to 1,500 feet (365 to 460 meters) per minute. As in the other flight, the plane's low-altitude-warning system issued an audio warning. The captain disconnected autopilot, and the plane began to climb.

                    [...]
                    However, that anti-stall system — called MCAS for its acronym — only activates if the autopilot is turned off, according to documents Boeing has shared with airlines and the FAA.
                    So who is to blame? MCAS or autpilot? I guess they will soon become "social synonyms" and turn into "maneuvering characteristics autopilot system"

                    Anyway, being this thread 95% opinions and 5% updates, I'd suggest adding an [UPDATE] tag to posts providing updates on investigation, for those interested just on updates.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by 3WE View Post
                      Possibly more important than this crash are ~4 incidents of pilots reporting undesirable nose overs...(at least for now)....
                      Of which at least the 2 I have information about did NOT happen due to the MCAS since they happened when activating the AP and activating the AP inhibits the MCAS and the issue was fixed by disconnecting the AP. So maybe this Ethiopian crash was due to the AP and not the MCAS.

                      EDIT: Or what jumpjack said

                      --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                      --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                        I do not remember having a fleet grounded by something like this (one accident for a true vulnerability that can be easily mitigated with the application of simple and long-established procedures, plus a second accident that we don't know much about including whether it was related with the previous one or not).
                        I do not remember a fleet ever being grounded because two brand new aircraft of a brand new type crashed within six months due to reported flight-control issues that led to a complete loss of control, killing all on board. I agree, this is unprecedented.


                        But, if this second accident was related to a MCAS malfunction that could and should have been controlled with the trim runaway procedure, we better start figuring a way to identify and ban airlines and pilots rather than planes. No, I mean an EFFECTIVE way.
                        This assumes that certain airlines and pilots are ABSOLUTELY immune from falling into the same trap. That's uh... pretty black and white...

                        A better solution might be to focus more on training pilots to deal with their own human limitations. Strategies to gather and retain situational awareness. Learned and practiced CRM and procedure over improvisation wherever possible (including that trim runaway procedure). Awareness and defenses against tunnelling, confirmation bias, startle factor and somatogravic illusion. Confidence building for switching off automation and taking manual flight control during upsets. Sound decision making and a pronounced bias toward caution over task-completion.

                        The first phase of flight training should be purely psychological. If you pass that, you get to proceed to the basic airmanship part. We took far more such precautions vetting Apollo astronauts when only three lives were at stake.

                        And then, because humans have limitations that can never be overcome, we have to absolutely ensure that aircraft do not create upsets by design.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                          Of which at least the 2 I have information about did NOT happen due to the MCAS since they happened when activating the AP and activating the AP inhibits the MCAS and the issue was fixed by disconnecting the AP. So maybe this Ethiopian crash was due to the AP and not the MCAS.

                          EDIT: Or what jumpjack said
                          Ok two crashes and 4 incidents of an airplane making unwanted nose-overs...a brand new airplane (but not_specifically MCAS) with some redesigned systems that Evan doesn't like (Actually, I agree that some of it seems like bad logic)…

                          Too much social media...sure...valid suspicions...suspicions that would probably be the same on obscure aviation discussion fora in the good ole days...I think so.

                          Sure, we have no proof it's MCAS, but it's the airplane that's acting up and the airplane that's been grounded.
                          Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                          Comment


                          • " A better solution might be to focus more on training pilots to deal with their own human limitations. Strategies to gather and retain situational awareness. Learned and practiced CRM and procedure over improvisation wherever possible (including that trim runaway procedure). Awareness and defenses against tunnelling, confirmation bias, startle factor and somatogravic illusion. Confidence building for switching off automation and taking manual flight control during upsets. Sound decision making and a pronounced bias toward caution over task-completion".
                            And you don't think that the major airlines are doing this?

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                              And you don't think that the major airlines are doing this?
                              I think many are. Air France certainly wasn't doing enough before the AF-447 crash (and subsequent incidents revealed an ongoing deficit). But we still see hard landings and runway excursions from major airline pilots due to some of these factors.

                              But I don't believe these things are being sufficiently addressed by most operators. Elsewhere I suggested that perhaps manufacturers and leasing companies should be held liable for providing (not to mention aggressively selling) aircraft to operators with poor or marginal safety cultures. After all, displaying the Boeing 787-MAX brand or the Airbus A320NEO brand implies safety to consumers, and that is largely because of the manufacturers institutional marketing and PR efforts. When given a choice between an airline flying decades-old 737-classics or even older NG's and an airline flying brand new B737-MAX's, Most consumers are going to naturally assume the latter is the safer choice.

                              Radical idea, yes, but perhaps the problem is that we are not being radical enough.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                                And you don't think that the major airlines are doing this?
                                If you have not spoken to your 737-driving friend, can you ask how fast this MCAS thing can nose-over the airplane...

                                I know it's total parlour talk, but I'd like to think that one pilot is extremely focused on the airplane being pointed in the right direction...sure, click on the autopilot at 400 feet, but I would like to think that ordinary human pilots are paying close attention and not going to let HAL have his way for anything more than a fraction of a second...even IF MCAS kicked in on this crash...

                                I don't know all those fancy terms Evan is spouting, but is he trying to say that crews should focus on flying the GD airplane?
                                Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

                                Comment

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