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Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

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  • Originally posted by Evan View Post

    Oh wait, I mean...
    Diesel/NOx kills yes, but people ain't afraid of dying from Diesel particles 20 years from now.

    People are, on the other hand, very much afraid of flying. People fear dying in an explosive decompression or in a huge fireball at the end of the runway.

    My point is as much about the fact that things has to change and how it will make life more difficult for Boeing.

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    • Originally posted by Evan View Post
      Indeed. That's how it went down with now-defunct VW.

      Oh, wait, I meant record 2018 sales VW.

      People don't really care as long as the powers that be keep them happy and entertained. They tell them regulation will take all that away, so people decry regulation. Like socialism, somehow it's become a threat.

      Boeing might face a congressional hearing. They might have to issue a mea culpa and do some very public soul-searching via an expensive public-relations campaign.

      They might end up like now-defunct Facebook.

      Oh wait, I mean...
      right, so basically we are all fucked by our own complacency for the last who knows how many decades.

      getting to back to my earlier post...

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Brainsys View Post
        Careful there. It is predicted that far more will die in my own city from the added pollution of dieselgate from VW and its dodgy competitors. Just not so spectacularly as those in air crashes. That's why VW diesels were not 'grounded' and won't be properly fixed and will continue to kill.

        The good news (if I dare use that phrase) is air crashes concentrate both the public and the aeronautical mind into getting faults diagnosed and fixed fast and grounding until they are. Boeing will never get away with what VW did.
        Sorry, VW + every other diesel manufacturer out there. The only reason VW took the big hit is because they were German (i.e. not American) and they were the most brazen which is why they were the first to get caught.

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        • Originally posted by HansPeter View Post
          Thanks for the link. Scary reading.

          Apparently Seattle Times was working on this story before the Ethiopian crash.



          Clearly Boeing needs a regulator to save it from them itself. Sadly Boeing have been lobbying to pull all teeth out of the FAA and now they have a rubber-stamp FAA. The FAA should never approve anything just because Boeing is behind schedule.

          Sometimes I don't understand America. It is as if American business and politicians are living in a bubble and don't understand or are blind to the fact that lousy decisions regarding government oversight will not go down well with the rest of the world.

          Boeing is dependent on international business but it is as if they believe a "Made in America"-sticker is a universal sign of quality. Where I live it is usually a sign that you better check that every screw and plastic part is properly fastened.

          Just a matter of time before the worlds other aviation safety authorities will want a more direct oversight over Boeing. If the U.S. can't or won't perform proper oversight, certification and supervision someone else will have to do so, that is bad for business and Boeing is in the business of business.

          A couple of plane crashes won't bring down Boeing. Erosion of trust will.
          Please. This behaviour is hardly the dominion of the Americans alone. The EU does the exact same for Airbus and the politicians are equally adept at corruption and allowing their companies to skirt rules in favour of profit.

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          • The limit of the system’s authority to move the tail applies each time MCAS is triggered. And it can be triggered multiple times, as it was on the Lion Air flight.
            One current FAA safety engineer said that every time the pilots on the Lion Air flight reset the switches on their control columns to pull the nose back up, MCAS would have kicked in again and “allowed new increments of 2.5 degrees.”
            Peter Lemme, a former Boeing flight controls engineer who is now an avionics and satellite-communications consultant, said that because MCAS reset each time it was used, “it effectively has unlimited authority.”
            “It had full authority to move the stabilizer the full amount,” Lemme said. “There was no need for that. Nobody should have agreed to giving it unlimited authority.”


            The black box data released in the preliminary investigation report shows that after this cycle repeated 21 times, the plane’s captain ceded control to the first officer. As MCAS pushed the nose down two or three times more, the first officer responded with only two short flicks of the thumb switches.

            At a limit of 2.5 degrees, two cycles of MCAS without correction would have been enough to reach the maximum nose-down effect.

            Like all 737s, the MAX actually has two of the sensors, one on each side of the fuselage near the cockpit. But the MCAS was designed to take a reading from only one of them.

            Lemme said Boeing could have designed the system to compare the readings from the two vanes, which would have indicated if one of them was way off.
            Alternatively, the system could have been designed to check that the angle-of-attack reading was accurate while the plane was taxiing on the ground before takeoff, when the angle of attack should read zero.

            “They could have designed a two-channel system. Or they could have tested the value of angle of attack on the ground,” said Lemme. “I don’t know why they didn’t.”

            The black box data provided in the preliminary investigation report shows that readings from the two sensors differed by some 20 degrees not only throughout the flight but also while the airplane taxied on the ground before takeoff.


            According to a detailed FAA briefing to legislators, Boeing will change the MCAS software to give the system input from both angle-of-attack sensors.
            It will also limit how much MCAS can move the horizontal tail in response to an erroneous signal. And when activated, the system will kick in only for one cycle, rather than multiple times.

            The company said it will change the MCAS software to give the system input from more than one AOA sensor. It will limit how much MCAS can move the horizontal tail in response to an erroneous AOA signal. And when activated, the system will kick in only for one cycle, rather than multiple times.
            a bug leading to death....every good programmer would not program so miserable or even if, how can nobody check this bug, is only 1 person coding ? hire me i won't let this bugs happen

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            • Originally posted by shinoby View Post
              a bug leading to death....every good programmer would not program so miserable or even if, how can nobody check this bug, is only 1 person coding ? hire me i won't let this bugs happen
              yes, the mcas was designed to get aoa reading from one sensor only even there are 2 sensors on the plane. what's the point of installing 2 aoa sensors then?

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              • Originally posted by Black Ram View Post
                Some disturbing info here


                After the Lion Air Flight 610 crash, Boeing for the first time provided to airlines details about MCAS. Boeing’s bulletin to the airlines stated that the limit of MCAS’s command was 2.5 degrees.

                That number was new to FAA engineers who had seen 0.6 degrees in the safety assessment.


                “The FAA believed the airplane was designed to the 0.6 limit, and that’s what the foreign regulatory authorities thought, too,” said an FAA engineer. “It makes a difference in your assessment of the hazard involved.
                *** Social bullshit warning ***

                I think they are confusing rotation limit (degrees) with rotation speed (degrees/second).

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                • These two switches have been in every Boeing commercial jet aircraft since the 707. Right in front of the First Officers left knee. Click image for larger version

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                  • That picture is a 737 MAX 8 pedestal. Turn the switches off, no more electric trim, no more MCAS. Evan, you are going to love this! Training, training and more training.

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                    • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                      That picture is a 737 MAX 8 pedestal. Turn the switches off, no more electric trim, no more MCAS. Evan, you are going to love this! Training, training and more training.
                      its astonishing pilots are still not aware of this switch to cut off the mcas even after the lion airline accident. or the switch failed to function on the ethiopian airplane?

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                      • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                        That picture is a 737 MAX 8 pedestal. Turn the switches off, no more electric trim, no more MCAS. Evan, you are going to love this! Training, training and more training.
                        Yes, but do you think that being unable to connect the AP while having an unreliable airspeed indication and a saltshaker together with the MCAS kicking in as an "unusual" trim runway fashion (in the sense that it would stop every time you press the thumb trim switch but come alive again 5 seconds after you release the trim switch, every time) may confuse the pilot? (especially the Lion Air one, since the Ethiopian one should have been very well aware of all this after the Lion Air accident).

                        --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
                        --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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                        • I guess the question is (and I understand the answer depends on context), how confusing is it?

                          If your toaster starts doing weird things, turn it off. If your lawnmower starts doing weird things, turn it off. If your electric trim system starts doing weird things, turn it off.
                          Be alert! America needs more lerts.

                          Eric Law

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                          • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                            Yes, but do you think that being unable to connect the AP while having an unreliable airspeed indication and a saltshaker together with the MCAS kicking in as an "unusual" trim runway fashion (in the sense that it would stop every time you press the thumb trim switch but come alive again 5 seconds after you release the trim switch, every time) may confuse the pilot? (especially the Lion Air one, since the Ethiopian one should have been very well aware of all this after the Lion Air accident).
                            ?? these are critical parameters. -> increase power and disable stuff. Something else is going on here... No pilot would be that dumb. The whole MCAS thing is a red herring and we should instead prioritize what happened with Atlas.

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                            • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                              That picture is a 737 MAX 8 pedestal. Turn the switches off, no more electric trim, no more MCAS. Evan, you are going to love this! Training, training and more training.
                              BB, you can't use the switches if your mind doesn't tell you too. If you get a stickshaker at rotation, and then, very suddenly at flap retraction, you get an airspeed disagree, an altitude disagree, a FEEL DIFF PRESS indication and a sudden, uncommanded downward pitch, and when you pull back it CONTINUES to pull against you, this is VERY unlike a trim runaway in the NG. So, you OF COURSE would instantly grasp the nature of the problem and use the trim cutout switches, as would every pilot who has commented about the scenario, but certainly some pilots wouldn't (the success rate for known or suspected incidents stands at around 50%). Is that safe enough?

                              Actually, the best thing to do here is put some flap back out and make a return. The moment flaps were re-extended on the Lion air flight, the problem stopped (the stickshaker remained). This way, you still have the electric pitch trim and no more upsets from the MCAS, as it is inhibited by flap deployment. The flaps lever is the on/off switch for MCAS.

                              So why doesn't the AD list this as the emergency procedure?

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                              • Originally posted by Gabriel View Post
                                Yes, but do you think that being unable to connect the AP while having an unreliable airspeed indication and a saltshaker together with the MCAS kicking in as an "unusual" trim runway fashion (in the sense that it would stop every time you press the thumb trim switch but come alive again 5 seconds after you release the trim switch, every time) may confuse the pilot? (especially the Lion Air one, since the Ethiopian one should have been very well aware of all this after the Lion Air accident).
                                Yes, and was the pepper mill active also?

                                Comment

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