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Breaking news: Ethiopian Airlines flight has crashed on way to Nairobi

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  • Originally posted by Evan View Post
    With what? Your foot? Cuz this upset scenario is a double handful...
    By the way- one hand on yoke.
    Thumb from said hand on trim switch.
    Orher hand grabs cigarette.
    Place in mouth.
    Light.
    Then ask PNF to carefully review manuals.

    And yes, it would have worked. (Note small dot)
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

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    • Originally posted by Schwartz View Post
      As widely speculated the AVHerald is now reporting the pilots may not have actually been trained on Trim runaway in MAX.
      One would expect that Ethiopian would know definitively whether the pilots had been through training or not.
      Do you mean negative training? Because that is what training for an MCAS runaway on an NG simulator amounts too. The fact is, Boeing rushed the MAX to the degree that not a single MAX sim was available at the time it went into service. The more we learn about the PHYSICAL reaction differences of these two aircraft to trim runaway, the more obvious it is that a MAX sim session is needed for safe compliance. The problem began with training pilots on an ipad and will not be solved by re-training pilots on an ipad.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by flashcrash View Post
        Clearly, 2.5 degrees is a LOT more than 0.6 degrees. FAA categorized an MCAS fault to be "hazardous" but not "catastrophic" at 0.6 degrees. Presumably that was why they gave approval for just one AoA sensor. So, who approved 2.5 degrees I wonder? And why?
        Nobody had to approve 2.5 deg. 2.5 deg is what it needed. That change was determined in actual flight testing, as is often the case. The question is: who neglected to inform the FAA of the change, and was that intentional?
        The other question is: how did Boeing engineers overlook the ramifications of that change?

        Comment


        • Originally posted by Evan View Post
          The question is: who neglected to inform the FAA of the change, and was that intentional? of course it was. market forces...
          The other question is: how did Boeing engineers overlook the ramifications of that change? nothing was overlooked. it was buried. market forces.
          evan, you are ignoring the obvious: this entire fiasco, resulting in the death of nearly 400 people, came about as a result of greed and as schwartz reported, the relaxing of regulations.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Evan View Post
            Do you mean negative training? Because that is what training for an MCAS runaway on an NG simulator amounts too. The fact is, Boeing rushed the MAX to the degree that not a single MAX sim was available at the time it went into service. The more we learn about the PHYSICAL reaction differences of these two aircraft to trim runaway, the more obvious it is that a MAX sim session is needed for safe compliance. The problem began with training pilots on an ipad and will not be solved by re-training pilots on an ipad.
            Done all the time. You don't necessarily need a full motion simulator for difference training. But then if you were anything other than a keyboard pilot you might know that!

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            • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
              Done all the time. You don't necessarily need a full motion simulator for difference training. But then if you were anything other than a keyboard pilot you might know that!
              When the differences do not alter the behavior of flight controls during an upset, I might agree with you. In this case, we're looking at two crashes and hundreds of lost lives due to the kind of naïveté you and Boeing and the FAA have exhibited. The upset sequence that has now been revealed at least once (probably twice) in a matter of months ABSOLUTELY requires recovery training in a full-motion type-correct sim. It's a violent and disorienting UPSET. There is quite a bit of MOTION involved. It involved the malfunction of a system that doesn't exist on the NG. The control inputs behave differently. Why would anybody resist that obvious reality? I know your first name is Boeing, but how does that loyalty override common sense?

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                When the differences do not alter the behavior of flight controls during an upset, I might agree with you. In this case, we're looking at two crashes and hundreds of lost lives due to the kind of naïveté you and Boeing and the FAA have exhibited. The upset sequence that has now been revealed at least once (probably twice) in a matter of months ABSOLUTELY requires recovery training in a full-motion type-correct sim. It's a violent and disorienting UPSET. There is quite a bit of MOTION involved. It involved the malfunction of a system that doesn't exist on the NG. The control inputs behave differently. Why would anybody resist that obvious reality? I know your first name is Boeing, but how does that loyalty override common sense?
                You notice that both of these accidents happened in third world countries with low time Captains. Christ, the First Officer in the Ethiopian aircraft had a whole 200 hours. How much of that was in a complex jet aircraft?

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                • "naïveté"! If anyone is naive here it is you my friend. You think by reading the crap posted all over the internet gives you the experience to make such bold and off the wall statements? It does not! When we got our 747-8's we did not have a simulator for it. We did differences training in the classroom and in a mock-up with the new electronics in it. I know what Gabe has on the bottom of every post he does but, unless you have lived the life you will never understand.

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                  • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                    You notice that both of these accidents happened in third world countries with low time Captains. Christ, the First Officer in the Ethiopian aircraft had a whole 200 hours. How much of that was in a complex jet aircraft?
                    When's the last time two NGs crashed 5 months apart in third world countries, captain know-it-all? Sorry, I meant s***hole countries.

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                    • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                      "naïveté"! If anyone is naive here it is you my friend. You think by reading the crap posted all over the internet gives you the experience to make such bold and off the wall statements? It does not! When we got our 747-8's we did not have a simulator for it. We did differences training in the classroom and in a mock-up with the new electronics in it. I know what Gabe has on the bottom of every post he does but, unless you have lived the life you will never understand.
                      Actually, you are very right. Instead of industry execs certifying their own planes, we should have experienced, professional pilots doing that.

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                      • Originally posted by Evan View Post
                        Nobody had to approve 2.5 deg. 2.5 deg is what it needed. That change was determined in actual flight testing, as is often the case. The question is: who neglected to inform the FAA of the change, and was that intentional?
                        The other question is: how did Boeing engineers overlook the ramifications of that change?
                        OK I get that this aircraft is so unstable that MCAS has to have a full 2.5 degrees of authority to limit AoA because of those giant LEAP 1B engines, but seriously, 2.5 degrees is huge. Does this not mean that with just two MCAS activations, 5 seconds apart, the elevator will be at full nose-down limit?

                        So who told the FAA it was only 0.6 degrees? And why? Wouldn't that be criminally misrepresenting the level of hazard involved (sorry TeeVee!). Did the Boeing engineers really "overlook the ramifications of that change"? Or was the information well known and understood by the engineers, but disclosure was squashed internally?

                        It's a bad analogy I know, but it seems to be a bit like selling a child's toy with a label on it saying "Hazardous to young children if ingested" when in reality all some children need to do is sniff the thing and they die. The level of risk is materially understated.

                        Initially I thought the liability that Boeing was carrying was quite low, despite the heart-breaking tragedy of the two accidents. At worst, I imagined the lawyers at Airbus might be looking at whether the FAA's decision to approve MCAS without sensor redundancy might be actionable (given the FAA's history of mandating sensor redundancy for them). I naively imagined the FAA would probably be carrying the greater liability.

                        But if Boeing really did tell the FAA it had just 0.6 degrees of authority, but they implemented it with 2.5 degrees of authority, and hid the implications ....

                        Perhaps I've oversimplified this?

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by BoeingBobby View Post
                          unless you have lived the life you will never understand.
                          Fair. I will never understand the life. However, the complaint I've read about not having -MAX sims ready was coming from PILOTS who have lived the life. Not in transitioning from a 747-400 to the 747-8. Transitioning from the 737NG to the 737-MAX. Not simply transitioning to an extended fuselage variant but transitioning from a naturally stable airframe to an airframe requiring augmented stability with different behaviors in an upset situation. Seriously, BB, how do you train for this sort of roller-coaster upset recovery on a desktop sim? You are mistaken to think that pilots can be relied upon to recognize this upset as a trim runaway and simply shut it down without an upset. You are not taking human factors into account.

                          Whatever, it's all becoming quite clear now. Boeing neglected the Y1, despite the obvious need for a new airframe to carry the PW1000G and the CFM LEAP. These engines had been in development since the early 90's! Bypass-ratio is the name of the game. The CFM56-7B has a max bypass ratio of 5.5:1 with a 61" fan maxing out the limits of the 737NG. The new LEAP would have a 78" fan and a bypass-ratio of 11:1. That would snap right on to the A320, it would never fit under the 737, so obviously, if Boeing didn't develop the Y1 in time, Airbus would rule the short/medium-haul market. So what does Boeing do? They postpone the Y1! The new engines come to market, Airbus announces the NEO and gets a major deal with American Airlines and Boeing simply REACTS by tasking their engineers with the very awkward idea of stuffing the LEAP under an NG wing. The engineers say the can extend the main gear but that will require wing mods and will trigger a new type certification. Boeing doesn't have time for a new type certification. So all they can do is raise the nose gear 8" and sacrifice 9" of fan and settle for a 9:1 ratio. That still isn't enough, so they redesign the pylons and move the engines forward and up. That does the trick but at the cost of giving the MAX dangerous handling characteristics at certain limits of the flight envelope. So they developed a software solution to give the -MAX artificial handling characteristics similar to the NG. Except, in order for this to work, they had to remove the trim disconnect function attached to the control column. So now they've removed the first instinctive recovery action to a trim runaway. And they didn't tell the pilots. And they think that's safe.

                          Naiveté or intentional negligence. Take your pick. In any case, Boeing essentially dragged their feet to prop up their short-term shareholder value and then painted themselves in a corner. The only way out was to transfer certain risks the the passengers and crew of their plan-B airframe solution.

                          But, one thing is clear to me. You cannot reliably train pilots to react to the Lion Air upset scenario in a static desktop sim like the one they provided at Everett. And you can't do it in an NG sim either.

                          If Boeing can solve this with a software fix that introduces redundancy and convince the EASA (notice I didn't say the FAA) that the chances of an erroneous MCAS activation are around one in one-billion, as Airbus did with their FBW, I will fly on it even if pilots are still lacking an accurate -MAX full-motion sim. I believe Boeing can do that by April or May.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by flashcrash View Post
                            OK I get that this aircraft is so unstable that MCAS has to have a full 2.5 degrees of authority to limit AoA because of those giant LEAP 1B engines, but seriously, 2.5 degrees is huge. Does this not mean that with just two MCAS activations, 5 seconds apart, the elevator will be at full nose-down limit?
                            It will move the stab 2.5° over ten seconds. If both10-second movements are not interrupted by a trim switch pilot response, then I believe you are right.
                            However, the Lion Air pilot repeatedly interrupted the MCAS, so it progressed downward more incrementally. I believe it was in the full AND position in the end. The great mystery lies in why the pilot stopped the counter-trim commands with the trim switch. But I'd lay my money on human factors.

                            So who told the FAA it was only 0.6 degrees? And why?
                            That was the original spec, given to the FAA prior to flight testing. In flight testing it proved to be inadequate, but this is not so unusual in flight testing.

                            But if Boeing really did tell the FAA it had just 0.6 degrees of authority, but they implemented it with 2.5 degrees of authority, and hid the implications ....
                            Key to the investigation will be determining whether the failure to provide the updated spec was simply a communications/procedural oversight or an intentional omission. Either way, something is very broken there.

                            Comment


                            • "Not transitioning to an extended fuselage variant".

                              Like I said, you have no idea what you are talking about. The difference between the 747-400 and 747-8 are not that much different than the difference between the 737 NG and the MAX And I am STILL waiting for a list of your certificates. And we are STILL waiting for a list of your pilots certificates!

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Black Ram View Post
                                When's the last time two NGs crashed 5 months apart in third world countries, captain know-it-all? Sorry, I meant s***hole countries.
                                28 September 2018 - Air Niugini Flight 73 at Chuuk International Airport

                                1 September 2018 - UTAir Flight 579 at Sochi International Airport

                                (Source: Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_o...-900)_aircraft )

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