Originally posted by Gabriel
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You handled a (senseless) stall warning situation in the 747 sim. You had no prior concern to ascribe it to (no food for confimation bias). It was in visual flight conditions. You told us that you focused your attention on the visual situation out the window and the tactile and aural stall warnings, and flew it by concentrating (tunnelling) on these aspects.
AF447 happened in turbulent IMC with no visible horizon and no tactile feedback. The PF most likely focused his attention on instrumentation (which was erroneous and misleading) and bewildering ECAM (the PNF was not communicating ECAM clearly to him). The PF was tasked with stabilizing roll turbulence as well as pitch (with some vertical acceleration from turbulence). The PF had a very strong prior concern about weather and a strong desire to climb above it, and was probably deeply affected by confimation bias at that moment. Stall AoA was about 4.5°. This situation cannot be learned in a Cassna (or a Tomahawk).
I've tried to point out to you and others here that this wasn't primarily a case of bad basic airmanship. It just falls on deaf ears.
I've tried to point out to you and others here that only a disciplined adherence to procedure can defend against the deceptions and human factors that arise in a situation like this. That just seems to bounce off you.
Fortunately, pilots do not administer aviation safety directives. The BEA and the industry regulators are not susceptible to pilot-induced-hubris, and they have made changes. The AF-447 pilots had received their only stall (avoidance, not recovery) training during type-certification year earlier, and it focused on low-altitude, high-AoA situations. None of them had high-altitude upset aircraft handling and upset recovery training. Human factors were largely ignored in the training they did have.
5 - CHANGES MADE FOLLOWING THE ACCIDENT
5.1 Air France
5.1.3 Crew training
Flight simulator training
Additional unreliable airspeed session:
Note: These elements were incorporated into the type ratings
5.1 Air France
5.1.3 Crew training
Flight simulator training
Additional unreliable airspeed session:
- Summer 2009 (A320, A330/A340).
- Session booklet and briefing: technical reminders, human factors and Threat and Error Management (TEM) aspects.
- Revision of the emergency manoeuvre, on take-off and in cruise phase.
- High altitude flight in alternate law.
- Approach to stall with triggering of STALL warning.
- Landing without airspeed indications.
- Related briefings (all flight crew):--Weather radar
--Ice crystals. - Alternate Training & Qualification Programme (ATQP) (preliminary version)
operational on Airbus A320 since March 2012.
Note: These elements were incorporated into the type ratings
This will not prevent another AF447, however, if pilots continue to resist the lessons learned from it, particularly the humility of being susceptible to deceptive human factors and the importance of following procedure for this reason alone.
Now you can go back to talking about what stellar airman you are on cable-driven low altitude aircraft at 120kts.
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