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Thread: Pitot Tube Failure

  1. #121
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Concur.
    Actually YOU don't- especially with anything ATL has to say.
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  2. #122
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    Quote Originally Posted by 3WE View Post
    Fixed.
    Actually, I don't think there is a failure to listen here, more like an unwillingness to listen, which is a clean different thing. Failure implies there was at least an attempt, however unsuccessful. I don't think that's the case here.

  3. #123
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Actually, I don't think there is a failure to listen here, more like an unwillingness to listen, which is a clean different thing. Failure implies there was at least an attempt, however unsuccessful. I don't think that's the case here.
    Also concur.

  4. #124
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 3WE View Post
    Actually YOU don't especially with anything ATL has to say.
    I agree with everything ATL had to say here except this part:

    Quote Originally Posted by ATLCrew
    Sure, it was. At least FDnH enough not to mess with. Even if you got a good amount of bumpage happening, that's still plenty FDnH not to go pitching and pulling and Krishna only knows what else. The only "memory item" should have been to leave the airplane be and methodically and deliberately go through the ECAM.
    I don't think he is taking the full scenario into consideration. The thrust setting was locked in too low. The aircraft was decelerating. The aircraft was apparently descending (due to instrumentation error). The aircraft was in considerable turbulence and in manual flight. The aircraft was in a roll excursion. Thing's DID need to be done, to establish stable flight safely within the speed envelope, without delay.

    I was mistaken about the 2006 Airbus procedure for Unreliable Airspeed, as I've already said and you have failed to hear. It was for a different phase of flight without incurring the loss of autoflight and failure cascade experienced by AF447. But it wouldn't have helped here anyway.

    Why?

    NOW LISTEN: In the case of AF447, NAV ADR DISAGREE (the first clear ECAM indication that airspeeds were in disagreement) and ADR CHECK PROC....APPLY (the first ECAM prompt to run the UAS ECAM procedure) did not occur until 2 mins and 40 secs after the loss of autoflight (although the PF acknowledged "we've lost the speeds" at 2h 10mins 16secs, there was no call for any QRH procedure and thus it was not executed). By the time the ECAM prompted for the procedure, the airplane was already fully stalled and the PF indicated that he no longer had control of the airplane. So, as you can see, relying on that procedure to prevent this scenario is a bit naive. There needs to be something to stabilize, and it needs to be a standard procedure that covers ALL the potential stealth and human factors.

    Gabriel has patiently pointed out—and I have acknowledged— that I was mistaken in assuming the 5°/CL memory items applied to the AF447 scenario. They don't. There are currently no memory items that do, as far as I now know. That leaves improvisation.

    I guess, even after all that has happened, I am the only one here concerned about that.

  5. #125
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    There needs to be something to stabilize, and it needs to be a standard procedure that covers ALL the potential stealth and human factors.
    Sounds like a drug for ALL potential diseases...

  6. #126
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post

    NOW LISTEN: In the case of AF447, NAV ADR DISAGREE (the first clear ECAM indication that airspeeds were in disagreement) and ADR CHECK PROC....APPLY (the first ECAM prompt to run the UAS ECAM procedure) did not occur until 2 mins and 40 secs after the loss of autoflight (although the PF acknowledged "we've lost the speeds" at 2h 10mins 16secs, there was no call for any QRH procedure and thus it was not executed). By the time the ECAM prompted for the procedure, the airplane was already fully stalled and the PF indicated that he no longer had control of the airplane.
    Indeed. I discussed this with you also (and, of course, you disagreed). They were both doing what only the PM should have been doing. Remember when I discussed with you the psychological implications of the words "I HAVE THE RADIOS AND THE AIRCRAFT, ECAM ACTIONS, PLEASE"? It's crewmembers parting ways. As the PF, I don't care what DOESN'T work, I care only what DOES work. So, I'm telling the PM "see all this flashing and dinging and ECAM messages? They're YOUR problem now, have fun, I'm flying the airplane. Unless you need something cross-verified, don't bother me". I look at my ADIs, do they agree? If yes, to hashmark we go. I look at my thrust, where is it? Little low? Ok, match and mash. We're in turbulence and rolling? Let's keep the wings level. It's showing a descent? No sweat, turn off track and get a little lower, into warmer temps and hopefully smoother air. If we actually weren't descending, no harm, no foul.

    None of that requires memory items (what's with the obsession with that term, btw, plenty of memory items get screwed up, too). It requires being an aviator, not a googler and not a QRH reciter. What concerns ME is that WE don't seem to be producing very many of the former anymore. But we sure produce plenty of memory item regurgitators, which I guess is what you want.

  7. #127
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Indeed. I discussed this with you also (and, of course, you disagreed). They were both doing what only the PM should have been doing. Remember when I discussed with you the psychological implications of the words "I HAVE THE RADIOS AND THE AIRCRAFT, ECAM ACTIONS, PLEASE"? It's crewmembers parting ways. As the PF, I don't care what DOESN'T work, I care only what DOES work. So, I'm telling the PM "see all this flashing and dinging and ECAM messages? They're YOUR problem now, have fun, I'm flying the airplane. Unless you need something cross-verified, don't bother me". I look at my ADIs, do they agree? If yes, to hashmark we go. I look at my thrust, where is it? Little low? Ok, match and mash. We're in turbulence and rolling? Let's keep the wings level. It's showing a descent? No sweat, turn off track and get a little lower, into warmer temps and hopefully smoother air. If we actually weren't descending, no harm, no foul.

    None of that requires memory items (what's with the obsession with that term, btw, plenty of memory items get screwed up, too). It requires being an aviator, not a googler and not a QRH reciter. What concerns ME is that WE don't seem to be producing very many of the former anymore. But we sure produce plenty of memory item regurgitators, which I guess is what you want.
    All very good ATL, but you are missing something. Your improvisational instincts seem pretty solid (albeit from a calm desktop with perfect SA and no startle factor) but what about the other pilots out there? As AF447 showed us, there are some who have a very different instinct:

    - "I HAVE THE RADIOS AND THE AIRCRAFT, ECAM ACTIONS, PLEASE"? vs "I HAVE CONTROL" and nothing more (and the first ECAM action came 2 mins and 20 secs after that).
    - 'I look at my thrust, where is it? Little low? Ok, match and mash.' vs not even thinking to look at thrust (I assume you mean the donuts because the levers are deceiving) perhaps assuming the AT was still engaged.
    - 'It's showing a descent? No sweat, turn off track and get a little lower, into warmer temps and hopefully smoother air." vs "We're in a descent! I must not descend into this storm!" and "I need to climb above it, where I wanted to climb five minutes ago'.

    So, forget everything I've said here. Just tell us how we can reliably defend against human factors and poor improvisational judgment in this situation without a trained, memorized procedure.

  8. #128
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    All very good ATL, but you are missing something. Your improvisational instincts seem pretty solid.
    That's just it, that's not improvisation (which is what you're missing), that's just being a pilot, I'm sorry you don't like it. As for your question, I don't know. I do know that if someone doesn't know how to fly an airplane, no amount of memory items will save him (I have said that, too), again, sorry you don't like it. I guess WE could develop some pilot androids maybe, I don't know.

  9. #129
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    That's just it, that's not improvisation (which is what you're missing), that's just being a pilot, I'm sorry you don't like it. As for your question, I don't know. I do know that if someone doesn't know how to fly an airplane, no amount of memory items will save him (I have said that, too)
    So did I, in this thread and elsewhere: I don't trust a pilot who, the second the AP disengaged, reacted in such an irrational way and anti-pilot-of-any-airplane way, to have the presence of mind to recognize a condition and apply memory items.

    Evan, I an really not following you. You complain that they could not have called and used the UAS QRH procedure because they got the ECAM message only 2 minutes later but want then to apply the UAS memory items?

    I guess WE could develop some pilot androids maybe, I don't know.
    The really sad part (for us pilots) is that would work. As would more automation (or automation that doesn't give up so easily).

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

  10. #130
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    [Lots of interesting stuff about where memory checklists are and are not needed]
    Just for discussion, I seem to recall a memory checklist from the 172, that with much ironing would apply to A-300 UAS. Something about aerate, apply nitrogen and cut tall...
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  11. #131
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    I do know that if someone doesn't know how to fly an airplane, no amount of memory items will save him (I have said that, too), again, sorry you don't like it.
    This is the fallacy and the sticking point. Pierre Bonin DID know how to fly an airplane. I believe he did what he did intentionally due to the imperatives in his mind which were brought about by human factors, prior concerns, misleading indications and the lack of a memorized, practiced, standardized procedure to folllow. Do you really not see the point I am making?

    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel
    Evan, I an really not following you. You complain that they could not have called and used the UAS QRH procedure because they got the ECAM message only 2 minutes later but want then to apply the UAS memory items?
    No no no. I now realize that no such procedure exists for what happened to AF447 (You see, I am learning something here). What I'm advocating is a procedure for loss of autoflight and airspeed disagree at cruise-level altitude. Bonin noticed the airspeed disagree within seconds of losing the autopilot. Essentially it would go something like: LOSS OF AUTOPILOT > CROSS CHECK AIRSPEEDS > If disagree exists, PF do this, PNF go to this procedure... Currently, there doesn't seem to be any standard procedure for this scenario. Even after AF447!

    As would more automation (or automation that doesn't give up so easily).
    Agree 100%. Automation is a tool for pilots, not a threat against to their existence. This would be a vital tool at a vital moment and I don't really see the technical impediment in mvking it happen.

  12. #132
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    This is the fallacy and the sticking point. Pierre Bonin DID know how to fly an airplane. I believe he did what he did intentionally due to the imperatives in his mind which were brought about by human factors, prior concerns, misleading indications and the lack of a memorized, practiced, standardized procedure to folllow. Do you really not see the point I am making?
    I do see your point perfectly, I just don't agree with it. Evidently he did NOT know how to fly, or at any rate wasn't very good at it. The fact that he had not killed himself previously is not in an of itself an indication of great skill.

  13. #133
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    I do see your point perfectly, I just don't agree with it. Evidently he did NOT know how to fly, or at any rate wasn't very good at it. The fact that he had not killed himself previously is not in an of itself an indication of great skill.
    And here it is! We will disagree on whether it was his flying skills or his perception and state of mind, but I think we will agree that there are pilots out there right now who have marginal skills and judgment, How do we protect against them if handling a situation as manageable as loss of autoflight and airspeeds requires perfect judgment and great skill? Isn't it better if procedures exist that only require adequate training and CRM discipline? In my experience, you can teach discipline and procedure more reliably (and universally) than judgment and skill.

    Now, that's not a slight against pilots like yourself or the great skill of most pilots. But I think greatly-skilled pilots take it that way. I understand that it seems demeaning to the art of flying and is just a generally depressing thought, but it is also the reality in the vast transport sector and the needs of the passengers have to come before the pride of the pilots. Unless you know a better way. "I don't know" is not an acceptable solution.

  14. #134
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    ***Evidently he did NOT know how to fly, or at any rate wasn't very good at it.***
    36,000 feet of mushy wallowing lost altitude along with an actual stall warning, and he says, "But I've been pulling up the whole time".

    I know, that's how a 172 works and relentless pull ups need to be considered in a type-specific manner.
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  15. #135
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    And here it is! We will disagree on whether it was his flying skills or his perception and state of mind, but I think we will agree that there are pilots out there right now who have marginal skills and judgment, How do we protect against them if handling a situation as manageable as loss of autoflight and airspeeds requires perfect judgment and great skill?
    It doesn't require "perfect" anything, it requires only not doing anything stupid. I think THAT is where we actually disagree. And again, your reliance on "trained procedures and memory items" is a bit misplaced. If the biggest memory item of all (fly the blasted airplane) somehow slipped his mind, I doubt he'd remember any other. Do you really not see the point I'm trying to make?

  16. #136
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    (fly the blasted airplane)
    Wrong. That is broadly-applicable, fundamental cowboy improvisation.

    I think it's supposed to be something like this: NAV ADR DISAGREE ECAM83% N1 alpha prot AoA RECMAX THRUST RED ALT WTF
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  17. #137
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    It doesn't require "perfect" anything, it requires only not doing anything stupid. I think THAT is where we actually disagree. And again, your reliance on "trained procedures and memory items" is a bit misplaced. If the biggest memory item of all (fly the blasted airplane) somehow slipped his mind, I doubt he'd remember any other. Do you really not see the point I'm trying to make?
    Yes, I see your point. it’s an obvious point that you and others have been making all along. I just think it’s a superficial understanding of what happened.

    I think he made the initial half-limit pull either to regain 300 feet of altitude or accidentally while still startled and dealing with roll (or a combination of those things). I think he then made the decision to climb to REC MAX, reasoning (imperfectly) that he wouldn’t overspeed in a climb and wouldn’t stall with full climb thrust (around 100% N1). I think he overcontrolled and things quickly got away from him and he was out of his depth because he had no upset training for this scenario. I think he then fought mentally between following the direction of his senior FO or trusting the flight directors, which had re-appeared. I think his judgment was flawed, he wasn’t thinking about drag or how close critical angle was at that altitude. I think he was not the pilot you are, and many probably aren’t. I don’t think enough has been done to prevent this from happening again.

  18. #138
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    I just think I think he I think he reasoning (imperfectly) that he I think he I think he I think his judgment wasn’t thinking I think he I don’t think.
    I think his actions were almost inexplicable.

    I think you are welcome to think all you want.

    Unfortunately, I think that whatever you think OR whatever I think may very likely be inaccurate because apparently the WWTPTR (What Was The Pilot Thinking Recorder) was inoperative.

    I think we agree he violated some sort of memory procedure. Whether it was item one of 1. Aviate, 2. Navigate, 3. Communicate OR NAV ADR DISAGREE ECAM83% N1 alpha prot AoA RECMAX THRUST RED ALT WTF OR The yet-to-be-written Evan checklist, I think it's most likely the first.
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    I'm not a commercial pilot. For what it's worth, if there had been the "old fashioned" conventional controls the flagrant inappropriateness of his actions would have been difficult to miss.
    Another AF447 question. Does the artificial horizon still operate from a gyroscope? If so, when instruments and computer systems are giving confusing messages would it provide an independent reference for pitch?

  20. #140
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    Quote Originally Posted by pegasus View Post
    I'm not a commercial pilot. For what it's worth, if there had been the "old fashioned" conventional controls the flagrant inappropriateness of his actions would have been difficult to miss.
    Another AF447 question. Does the artificial horizon still operate from a gyroscope? If so, when instruments and computer systems are giving confusing messages would it provide an independent reference for pitch?
    The attitude indicator is driven by a ring-laser gyroscope, so it isn't effected by air data anomalies. The two good references you still have are attitude and thrust level and you use these to establish an approximate safe airspeed and angle-of-attack.

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