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Thread: Pitot Tube Failure

  1. #181
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    I stand corrected. The correct answer is no, once stalled at about 37500 ft the stall didn't stop at any point, not even close. The plane was fully stalled stalled all the time in its way from the highest point to the lowest point achieved that day.
    Thank you.

    Seems he was RATHER relentless, including the comment that he was pulling up _____ ______ _______

    ...and that defies a lot of logic, although, I can imagine someone, short on fundamentals, thinking full power and a healthy level attitude should USUALLY give you healthy flight...
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

  2. #182
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    For the Nth time, if you want to put it as ït as the inputs, not the consequences", then I would not trust this pilot (in the mental state that he had in the moment) to follow any memory items or procedure. Because the procedure would not have been "pull the stick 1/8 back", it would be based on RESULTANT PERFORMANCE or CONSEQUENCES.
    Give them a specific target to focus on (first hash mark as ATL put it). If they overcontrol, they see that and make corrections until they get there. They don't go wondering off...

    And I don't agree with your false dilemma of you are either with me or shut up.
    That's not what I said, or meant, and frankly, I'm getting tired of having my words twisted into hostility like that. But what I did say I stand by, because Pierre Bonin, a rated A320/A330 Air France pilot and a glider pilot to boot, was certainly aware of the fundamental relationship between pitch, speed, AoA and stall.

  3. #183
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    ...because Pierre Bonin ..was certainly aware of the fundamental relationship between pitch, speed, AoA and stall.
    Pierre Bonin:

    1. Executed a hell of a speed killing and AOA increasing zoom climb. (not unlike a how to deliberately stall procedure)
    2. Which then changed to a mushy, wallowing descent (not unlike a 152).
    3. And rode it 37,000 feet into the ocean.
    And the biggie 4. Said, "But I've been pulling up the whole time"

    I question his fundamental knowledge of said relationships, along with your perceptive abilities.
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

  4. #184
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    That's not what I said, or meant, and frankly, I'm getting tired of having my words twisted into hostility like that.
    This is what you said:

    "... you can choose to try to understand this from the point of view of startle factor, deceiving indications and flawed logic (flawed judgment) driving intentional acts executed with unpracticed skills [that is, to agree with you] or you can choose to never understand it at all"

    How is this not "you are either with me or shut up"?

    This is a false dilemma here or in Mars. There are not the only 2 options in the universe.

    But what I did say I stand by, because Pierre Bonin, a rated A320/A330 Air France pilot and a glider pilot to boot, was certainly aware of the fundamental relationship between pitch, speed, AoA and stall.
    Absolutely not, not at that point in space-time. What part of the evidence you don't agree with?

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  5. #185
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    This is what you said:

    "... you can choose to try to understand this from the point of view of
    Absolutely not, not at that point in space-time. What part of the evidence you don't agree with?[startle factor, deceiving indications and flawed logic (flawed judgment) driving intentional acts executed with unpracticed skills
    [that is, to agree with you] or you can choose to never understand it at all"

    How is this not "you are either with me or shut up"?
    a) It doesn't contain the words "or shut up", and
    b) it contains words you have removed, which I think accurately sum up your position on this.

    My intent is to get you to think a bit more imaginatively, not to shut up. But I don't think that's going to happen, nor with anyone else here, so this argument will never end.

    But personally, I think I'm beginning to see what really happened here, and what (apparently) hasn't been done to address it.

    Thanks to robust improvements in pitot design, there hopefully won't be a 'told you so' end to this.

  6. #186
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Oh, I forgot.

    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Where does the danger lie in executing a memorized procedure of 'click clack pitch power (move thrust levers) ECAM QRH (DO NOT shut down ADR's) ride it out? I almost said 'minimal danger' instead of 'no danger', but then I couldn't find the minimal danger. There is, of course, the danger that the procedure will be subject to pilot error, but then that just gets us back to the problem of training and proficency. I'm simply stating that it is more reliable to teach procedure than to teach universal improvisational judgment. How can you argue with that? (note the word 'universal').
    I am not arguing with that in general (I could criticize some lesser wording there but I will not bother).

    What I am SERIOUSLY questioning is whether that would have made a difference in Air France.

    Again, if you turn right to make a left, the problem is not the lack of a left-turn procedure.

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  7. #187
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    a) It doesn't contain the words "or shut up", and
    b) it contains words you have removed, which I think accurately sum up your position on this.
    Here is the full quote:
    ...you can choose to try to understand this from the point of view of startle factor, deceiving indications and flawed logic (flawed judgment) driving intentional acts executed with unpracticed skills or you can choose to never understand it at all and just write it off as 'unthinkable acts of poor airmanship'. But only the former (along with engineering improvements) can bring about any meaningful changes to prevent it from recurring.

    What is the part that accurately sums up my position on this? Perhaps you need to explain me what is my position on this?

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
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  8. #188
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    Here is the full quote:
    ...you can choose to try to understand this from the point of view of startle factor, deceiving indications and flawed logic (flawed judgment) driving intentional acts executed with unpracticed skills or you can choose to never understand it at all and just write it off as 'unthinkable acts of poor airmanship'. But only the former (along with engineering improvements) can bring about any meaningful changes to prevent it from recurring.

    What is the part that accurately sums up my position on this? Perhaps you need to explain me what is my position on this?
    Your apparent position on this, and the position that is popular on pilot forums, is that Pierre Bonin pulled up continuously the instant the AP disconnected and did not relent until the airplane stalled because he made an unthinkable ('unbelievable crazy' are your actual words) violation of basic fundamental airmanship. The only explanation you seem to offer for this is an entirely implausible supposition that he lacked a firm grasp of the most basic aspects of airmanship, yet was type-rated by one of the world's most respected airlines on the Airbus A320/A330. In other words, you refuse to pursue a greater understanding of what might actually explain his actions in a way that isn't simply 'unbelievable crazy' and 'unthinkable'.

    Meanwhile, there is much to support the idea that this was 'thinkable' from the perspective of Pierre Bonin at that moment, and that his actions may have been the result of human factors, deceiving indications, stealth factors, pre-existing mental initiatives and low-altitude manual flight technique applied to the high-altitude environment. Meanwhile, the actual FDR does not show a 'relentless' upward-pulling command but rather a series of moderate upward and downward commands that suggest a pilot intending to maintain a steady climb attitude. (this argument concerns only the time from when the upset first occurs until the moment when SA is fatally degraded, the 45 second period preceding the second and fatal pitch increase from 6deg to 17deg occurs).

    Therefore, your apparent position is that nothing can or should be done here except to assure that all pilots demonstrate a firm grasp of basic fundamentals, something that is already a requirement for a CTPL, and hence, that nothing more (aside from engineering improvements) can or should be done.

    Whereas my position is therefore that a simple procedure can be taught and memorized and proficiently executed that provides pilots with a set of target values to follow in the critical moments when situational awareness is still unclear, to prevent erroneous improvisation as well to assure that known stealth factors are overcome.

    That is what is meant by my statement. I am not asking you to shut up. I'm asking you to think it through with a bit less prejudice and more of an open mind, with a focus on what can be done to minimize this danger. You, however, seems to be telling me to shut up because there is nothing to do here beyond teaching basic airmanship, which we are already doing.

  9. #189
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Your apparent position on this, and the position that is popular on pilot forums, is that Pierre Bonin pulled up continuously the instant the AP disconnected and did not relent until the airplane stalled because he made an unthinkable ('unbelievable crazy' are your actual words) violation of basic fundamental airmanship. The only explanation you seem to offer for this is an entirely implausible supposition that he lacked a firm grasp of the most basic aspects of airmanship, yet was type-rated by one of the world's most respected airlines on the Airbus A320/A330. In other words, you refuse to pursue a greater understanding of what might actually explain his actions in a way that isn't simply 'unbelievable crazy' and 'unthinkable'.
    You need to accept that that is a FACT. (note the dot) What he did was unbelievable crazy and unthinkable. (again, note the dot)

    You also need to accept that we all have asked ourselves what WAS he thinking.

    But the biggie that you refuse to accept is that we do not know, nor will we ever know what he was thinking.

    Thus- as much as I'd like to propose something to fix it, without knowing what he was thinking, it's kind of hard.

    To me the best "fix" is a REMINDER of Huge Ass Important All Aircraft Memory Checklist, Item 1: Fly the phugoid airplane and The All Aircraft Memory Stall Prevention Checklist: Item 2: Relentless pull ups are a good way to stall.

    Pontificate all you want on your guesses as to his thinking, and your recurrent bottom line to totally remove the pilot from the equation, there is something to be said for that argument, but we aren't going to waste time with your unrealistic analysis of exactly what Bonin was thinking when he did something crazy, unthinkable and against all logic.

    I admit, I don't KNOW that that would have fixed the problem, [repeating, what Bonin did but was crazy and unthinkable], but to me, reverting to basics is the best hope.

    Plots are taught a shit pot of very specific stuff. And I have great respect for their knowledge. We've seen them forget that an RTO is a good time for anti-skid braking systems, and we've seen them apparently forget that a hard pull up might cause a stall.

    One other highly-respected participant in this conversation once said something to the effect that despite his credentials and training, the amount of stuff he does NOT know, is staggering.
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

  10. #190
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    Quote Originally Posted by 3WE View Post
    You need to accept that that is a FACT. (note the dot) What he did was unbelievable crazy and unthinkable. (again, note the dot)

    You also need to accept that we all have asked ourselves what WAS he thinking.

    But the biggie that you refuse to accept is that we do not know, nor will we ever know what he was thinking.

    Thus- as much as I'd like to propose something to fix it, without knowing what he was thinking, it's kind of hard.

    To me the best "fix" is a REMINDER of Huge Ass Important All Aircraft Memory Checklist, Item 1: Fly the phugoid airplane and The All Aircraft Memory Stall Prevention Checklist: Item 2: Relentless pull ups are a good way to stall.

    Pontificate all you want on your guesses as to his thinking, and your recurrent bottom line to totally remove the pilot from the equation, there is something to be said for that argument, but we aren't going to waste time with your unrealistic analysis of exactly what Bonin was thinking when he did something crazy, unthinkable and against all logic.

    I admit, I don't KNOW that that would have fixed the problem, [repeating, what Bonin did but was crazy and unthinkable], but to me, reverting to basics is the best hope.

    Plots are taught a shit pot of very specific stuff. And I have great respect for their knowledge. We've seen them forget that an RTO is a good time for anti-skid braking systems, and we've seen them apparently forget that a hard pull up might cause a stall.

    One other highly-respected participant in this conversation once said something to the effect that despite his credentials and training, the amount of stuff he does NOT know, is staggering.
    It seems to me that the main reason why the question Evan keeps asking cannot be resolved at the aviation procedure level is that it's not actually an aviation question, it's a question of occupational psychology. It's a scientific issue, not a procedural one. People get doctorates in occupational psychology by studying precisely this sort of a problem, namely how a supposedly well-trained, well-prepared professional can make a fundamental error at some important point or other (a surgeon who amputates the wrong extremity, a nuclear engineer who takes a perfectly good reactor to self-destruction etc). Bonin is but one example...

  11. #191
    Senior Member TeeVee's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    It seems to me that the main reason why the question Evan keeps asking cannot be resolved at the aviation procedure level is that it's not actually an aviation question, it's a question of occupational psychology. It's a scientific issue, not a procedural one. People get doctorates in occupational psychology by studying precisely this sort of a problem, namely how a supposedly well-trained, well-prepared professional can make a fundamental error at some important point or other (a surgeon who amputates the wrong extremity, a nuclear engineer who takes a perfectly good reactor to self-destruction etc). Bonin is but one example...
    very well said.

    i suppose evan will come back with, "it's a failure of training on proper procedures and use of memory items--precisely why they call them memory items......."

  12. #192
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    Quote Originally Posted by TeeVee View Post
    very well said.

    i suppose evan will come back with, "it's a failure of training on proper procedures and use of memory items--precisely why they call them memory items......."
    Well...then I suppose the logical continuation of that would be that shouldn't EVERYTHING be a memory item? After all, this problem only crashed one airplane, so why is it so special? Why shouldn't there be memory items for, say, fuel exhaustion prevention or stabilized approaches? If that's the fix, it should be applied to everything, right? The only thing the existence of a memory item (on anything) guarantees is that people will study it for their recurrent orals. That's all. It offers no assurance whatsoever that it will be properly executed in the appropriate situation, especially if said situation is not properly recognized, as appears to be the case here. And no, I don't know how to defend against that. I'm not sure psychologists do either.

  13. #193
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Well...then I suppose the logical continuation of that would be that shouldn't EVERYTHING be a memory item? After all, this problem only crashed one airplane, so why is it so special? Why shouldn't there be memory items for, say, fuel exhaustion prevention or stabilized approaches? If that's the fix, it should be applied to everything, right? The only thing the existence of a memory item (on anything) guarantees is that people will study it for their recurrent orals. That's all. It offers no assurance whatsoever that it will be properly executed in the appropriate situation, especially if said situation is not properly recognized, as appears to be the case here. And no, I don't know how to defend against that. I'm not sure psychologists do either.
    The logical continuation... The slippery slope argument? If we let gay people marry, then soon people will want to marry their golden retrievers, etc? The slippery slope argument is rarely logical. Why can't we ever have a level-headed discussion about anything anymore? Why does it always have to be distorted and made ridiculous by hyperbole?

    What's the difference between the AF447 scenario and fuel exhaustion? Upset. The immediate need to stabilize. Human factors. Deceptive threats. Time. Why do we only have a handful of memory item procedures? Because they are scenarios where an immediate, correct action is crucial to the outcome. You know this. So why do I have to point it out? How many failure scenarios fit that description? The answer is not EVERYTHING, is it?

    The following memory procedures exist for the A320 (perhaps others?):

    1. EMERGENCY DESCENT
    2. UNRELIABLE SPEED
    3. LOSS OF BRAKING
    4. TCAS WARNINGS
    5. WINDSHEAR REACTIVE
    6. WINDSHEAR PREDICTIVE
    7. STALL WARNING AND RECOVERY
    8. EGPWS CAUTIONS
    9. EGPWS WARNINGS

    Psychologists do know how to defend against human factors. It is assured? No, but it's doing something and it is significantly effective. Compare that to doing nothing. Which is preferable? What's the harm?

    All I'm saying is that a specific version of #2 should provide for the scenario encountered by AF447 and quite a few others. Simple, memorable, defensive.

  14. #194
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Your apparent position on this, and the position that is popular on pilot forums, is that Pierre Bonin pulled up continuously the instant the AP disconnected and did not relent until the airplane stalled because he made an unthinkable ('unbelievable crazy' are your actual words) violation of basic fundamental airmanship. The only explanation you seem to offer for this is an entirely implausible supposition that he lacked a firm grasp of the most basic aspects of airmanship, yet was type-rated by one of the world's most respected airlines on the Airbus A320/A330. In other words, you refuse to pursue a greater understanding of what might actually explain his actions in a way that isn't simply 'unbelievable crazy' and 'unthinkable'.
    You are distorting, to say the least, my position. That AT THE MOMENT OF THE INCIDENT he lacked a firm grasp of the most basic airmanship is a fact. And the pull up was excessive (by way too much , hence the "crazy" and "unbelievable") since instants (I give you the 2 seconds) after the AP disconnect all the way from 35000 ft to 37500 ft and then all the way from there to 0 ft. That's a fact. Does that mean that he had the stick against the back stop all the time? No. I said it before. a quarter turn can be an excessive input in a steering wheel (even when it has a travel of 2 turns).

    And, semantics and context please. Unbelievable can be the attribute of that which cannot be believed. But that's not the only definition and obviously it is not the one I am using. There is plenty of solid objective conclusive evidence that he did move the stick in the way he did move it. I hope you don't think I am so stupid as to negate or reject to believe that he did not pull up in the way the evidence shows that he did. Unbelievable, also means incredible (again, not only in the sense that it is not-credible), extraordinary, astonishing, remarkable, impressive, surprising, inexplicable, and beyond belief. Maybe I am meaning some of those but not others?

    Therefore, your apparent position is that nothing can or should be done here except to assure that all pilots demonstrate a firm grasp of basic fundamentals
    What???? That version of my position is apparent to you and whom else?
    Better education in fundamentals, systems and etc will surely not harm.
    Practice of manual flight in all phases of flights (including cruise) is necessary. How much? As it is required to be able to hand-fly proficiently the instant that it is required (which in turn requires doing it when it is not required).
    I did say "do follow the procedures"?, which of course requires training in such procedures, which this crew did not have.
    I've already conceded to you that the procedure may have room for improvement.
    And I proposed a more robust automation that doesn't give up so easily.
    How is that "nothing"?

    Whereas my position is therefore that a simple procedure can be taught and memorized and proficiently executed that provides pilots with a set of target values to follow in the critical moments when situational awareness is still unclear, to prevent erroneous improvisation as well to assure that known stealth factors are overcome.
    I've already agreed with that. What I said is that I don't trust that a pilot that did what Bonin did would be able to follow such a procedure remotely proficiently.
    He did not just not follow a procedure. He handled the plane in a crazy, unbelievable way, even if he intended to climb. I am sure that he saw the plane climb above 30000 ft hundreds of times. I am sure that he NEVER so it doing it with a pitch of 10 degrees or close (let alone 12+) or with 7000 fpm. I am quite sue that he NEVER before pulled 1.5 Gs to transition from level flight to climb, not even at low altitude, not even during take-off. And you said before that he didn't have a G indicator. Bullshit. We all do. Roller-coasters would be not fun (or not scary) if we didn't have one. I don't know if you ever were subject to 1.5G, but it is VERY noticeable. The biggest normal acceleration due to maneuvering in a normal flight is immediately after liftoff, and it rarely exceeds 1.2G, and you can CLEARLY feel it. Now, 1.5G doesn't sound like too much more than 1.2G, except that it is 2.5 times as much (because the baseline is 1G, not 0G, there is a reason why 1G is non-accelerated flight). You can't miss it.

    Let me give you a counter example. Many years ago, an MD-80 was taking off from Detroit with flaps and slats up (unknown to the pilots). The take-off configuration warning didn't sound. The plane struggled to lift off (but did it) and then struggled even more to climb. The stick-shaker activated at about the moment of lift off and shortly later the stall aural warning also activated (a triple buzzer and Miss Douglas saying "stall"). How did the pilot react? He reduced the AoA until the aural warning stopped, then pulled back again until it started to sound, and kept repeating that, modulating the elevator around the onset of the aural stall warning, and he was very skillful at doing that and accomplishing his goal of keeping the AoA very close to the max lift AoA. They hit a light pole in a parking lot and crashed. All died except for one little girl that "unbelievably" survived, nobody understands what. The investigators believe that the pilots suspected a windshear and were flying the windshear procedure, which called to do exactly what the pilots did with one caveat: they should have done what they did around the onset of the stickshaker, not the stall aural warning. Interviewing pilots of the airline (including instructors), there was a "common knowledge" (but wrong) that, even what they knew what the procedure said, it was ok to pull up using the aural warning as the limit if needed, instead of the stickshaker. The stickshaker is a stall proximity warning, the aural warning instead is a critical AoA warning and it is intended to let the pilot know that if he doesn't lower the nose and the AoA deteriorates any further, the plane will lower it by itself (stick-pusher). The logic was that the aural warning limit would give you the maximum lift, which is only partially correct. What it will give you is the maximum lift COEFFICIENT, but if you can trade those couple of degrees between the aural and the stickhaker warnings for just 10 knots of extra speed, the increase in lift do to the higher speed (squared) will be significantly higher than the increase in lift coefficient in a part of the curve where the slope is flattening anyway. But while there is little difference in the lift coefficient between between the 2 angles of attack, the difference in drag is huge and, worse than that, it destroys you roll handling qualities: The ailerons become much less effective which requires much greater inputs to control which in turn means that the roll spoilers will have large deflections during significant portions of the flight which will, again, increase drag, and you will need to be correcting roll all the time because it will aslo kill the roll damping so it will be almost impossible to keep it level, and you will find yourself correcting to one side and the other all the time, which in turn means that the lift vector will be pointing partially sideways (instead of fully up) during good portions of the flight. The NTSB concluded that if they had used the stickshaker as their pull-up goal, they would have accelerated more, they would have not rolled (or not as much), they would not have needed to use so much aileron and roll spoiler inputs, and they would have cleared the light pole by more than 100 ft.

    Was there a problem with the fundamentals there? You bet it!!! Just read what I put above. The pilots didn't know it!!! Not even the instructors!!! And it is still a problem today. Some 5 years ago I had an instructor telling me that it was ok to have the stall warning on all the time while doing spiral descents. That the extra AoA and extra lift coefficient that it is available after the first indication of stall is usable (because you can still extract lift from there) is a myth of the same type than that you can't break a plane from aerodynamic forces when flying below Va (maneuver speed), which is a myth that the aviation community at large (me included) shared until the AA A-300 accident proved all us wrong.

    But the real point I wanted to make with this counter example is that, this could have been explained to pilots, during sim practices (where I guess they followed the correct procedure or they should have failed the checkride) it could have been reinforced what NOT to do, especially since the instructors knew about this myth (except that they didn't think it was a myth). These pilot had a performance goal in mind: full thrust, modulate the elevator around one specific target AoA, use ailerons to bring and try to keep the wings level. And they executed against this goal superbly. I am super-confident that if they had had the right goal in mind (all the same except at the stickshaker AoA instead of the aural stall AoA), they would also have executed it perfectly... and everybody would have lived (and perhaps nobody, except these 2 pilots, would have ever learned that the incident even existed).

    What was Bonin's goal again and how well did he execute against his own goal? I don't have any reason to believe that he would have executed any better had he had the right goal in mind.

    I'm asking you to think it through with a bit less prejudice and more of an open mind
    You are asking me for an open mind. Ok.

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    I respectfully request leave to present a little literary distraction. Don Quixote is by far my all-time favorite book, in fact I'm so fond of it that I am currently reading it in a fourth language, that being (finally) the original. I would like to present an excerpt from Part 2 Chapter 1, which opens with Don Quixote having been back home from his second excursion for some time and apparently more or less in his senses. Desiring to be more certain of the good hidalgo's sanity, his friends The Curate and The Barber are having a talk with him about some threats Spain is under from various enemies. During the discussion Don Quixote talks sensibly until he is asked what advice (if any) he would offer His Majesty (at the time Phillip III) on how to repel the invaders. Our ingenious knight then calmly suggests that all His Majesty need do is summon all of the knights-errant and even a half-dozen of them would easily slaughter "two hundred thousand men". Realizing that Don Quixote has fallen back into the abyss, The Barber relates this story:

    Quote Originally Posted by Don Quixote's barber

    "In the madhouse at Seville there was a man whom his relations had placed there as being out of his mind. He was a graduate of Osuna in canon law; but even if he had been of Salamanca, it was the opinion of most people that he would have been mad all the same. This graduate, after some years of confinement, took it into his head that he was sane and in his full senses, and under this impression wrote to the Archbishop, entreating him earnestly, and in very correct language, to have him released from the misery in which he was living; for by God's mercy he had now recovered his lost reason, though his relations, in order to enjoy his property, kept him there, and, in spite of the truth, would make him out to be mad until his dying day. The Archbishop, moved by repeated sensible, well-written letters, directed one of his chaplains to make inquiry of the madhouse as to the truth of the licentiate's statements, and to have an interview with the madman himself, and, if it should appear that he was in his senses, to take him out and restore him to liberty. The chaplain did so, and the governor assured him that the man was still mad, and that though he often spoke like a highly intelligent person, he would in the end break out into nonsense that in quantity and quality counterbalanced all the sensible things he had said before, as might be easily tested by talking to him. The chaplain resolved to try the experiment, and obtaining access to the madman conversed with him for an hour or more, during the whole of which time he never uttered a word that was incoherent or absurd, but, on the contrary, spoke so rationally that the chaplain was compelled to believe him to be sane. Among other things, he said the governor was against him, not to lose the presents his relations made him for reporting him still mad but with lucid intervals; and that the worst foe he had in his misfortune was his large property; for in order to enjoy it his enemies disparaged and threw doubts upon the mercy our Lord had shown him in turning him from a brute beast into a man. In short, he spoke in such a way that he cast suspicion on the governor, and made his relations appear covetous and heartless, and himself so rational that the chaplain determined to take him away with him that the Archbishop might see him, and ascertain for himself the truth of the matter. Yielding to this conviction, the worthy chaplain begged the governor to have the clothes in which the licentiate had entered the house given to him. The governor again bade him beware of what he was doing, as the licentiate was beyond a doubt still mad; but all his cautions and warnings were unavailing to dissuade the chaplain from taking him away. The governor, seeing that it was the order of the Archbishop, obeyed, and they dressed the licentiate in his own clothes, which were new and decent. He, as soon as he saw himself clothed like one in his senses, and divested of the appearance of a madman, entreated the chaplain to permit him in charity to go and take leave of his comrades the madmen. The chaplain said he would go with him to see what madmen there were in the house; so they went upstairs, and with them some of those who were present. Approaching a cage in which there was a furious madman, though just at that moment calm and quiet, the licentiate said to him, 'Brother, think if you have any commands for me, for I am going home, as God has been pleased, in his infinite goodness and mercy, without any merit of mine, to restore me my reason. I am now cured and in my senses, for with God's power nothing is impossible. Have strong hope and trust in him, for as he has restored me to my original condition, so likewise he will restore you if you trust in him. I will take care to send you some good things to eat; and be sure you eat them; for I would have you know I am convinced, as one who has gone through it, that all this madness of ours comes of having the stomach empty and the brains full of wind. Take courage! take courage! for despondency in misfortune breaks down health and brings on death.'

    "To all these words of the licentiate another madman in a cage opposite that of the furious one was listening; and raising himself up from an old mat on which he lay stark naked, he asked in a loud voice who it was that was going away cured and in his senses. The licentiate answered, 'It is I, brother, who am going; I have now no need to remain here any longer, for which I return infinite thanks to Heaven that has had so great mercy upon me.'

    "'Mind what you are saying, licentiate; don't let the devil deceive you,' replied the madman. 'Keep quiet, stay where you are, and you will save yourself the trouble of coming back.'

    "'I know I am cured,' returned the licentiate, 'and that I shall not have to go stations again.'

    "'You cured!' said the madman; 'well, we shall see; God be with you; but I swear to you by Jupiter, whose majesty I represent on earth, that for this crime alone, which Seville is committing to-day in releasing you from this house, and treating you as if you were in your senses, I shall have to inflict such a punishment on it as will be remembered for ages and ages, amen. Dost thou not know, thou miserable little licentiate, that I can do it, being, as I say, Jupiter the Thunderer, who hold in my hands the fiery bolts with which I am able and am wont to threaten and lay waste the world? But in one way only will I punish this ignorant town, and that is by not raining upon it, nor on any part of its district or territory, for three whole years, to be reckoned from the day and moment when this threat is pronounced. Thou free, thou cured, thou in thy senses! and I mad, I disordered, I bound! I will as soon think of sending rain as of hanging myself.

    "Those present stood listening to the words and exclamations of the madman; but our licentiate, turning to the chaplain and seizing him by the hands, said to him, 'Be not uneasy, senor; attach no importance to what this madman has said; for if he is Jupiter and will not send rain, I, who am Neptune, the father and god of the waters, will rain as often as it pleases me and may be needful...."
    I hope y'all enjoyed this brief literary distraction.

  16. #196
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    ...People get doctorates in occupational psychology by studying precisely this sort of a problem, namely how a supposedly well-trained, well-prepared professional can make a fundamental error at some important point or other (a surgeon who amputates the wrong extremity, a nuclear engineer who takes a perfectly good reactor to self-destruction etc). Bonin is but one example...
    Ironingly- should the list include entire teams of engineers, working extremely hard to design airplanes that are safe against [sarcasm]stupid cowboy improvising[/sarcasm] pilots and wind up making a system that in a very short time, results in two crews (one of which is credited with good adherence to procedure) unable to pull up relentlessly enough? (Again, many examples exist.)
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

  17. #197
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    I respectfully request leave to present a little literary distraction. Don Quixote is by far my all-time favorite book, in fact I'm so fond of it that I am currently reading it in a fourth language, that being (finally) the original.
    Wow, reading not only in Spanish but in medieval Spanish!!!
    Try The Cid the next time. That will be fun (or not).

    By the way, here, use it for copy-paste: ñ

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

  18. #198
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    I hope y'all enjoyed this brief literary distraction.
    All very nice ATL and impressive that you are able to read it without translation, but I am left to wonder why you are dragging Cervantes into this. Are you suggesting that Pierre Bonin suffered from covert bouts of madness? I see the resultant madness of his actions, but I also see how a rational mind, in that situation, could make those errors. I think ascribing madness to his actions is a theory of convenience, lazy theoretics, if you will. The official report, which was anything but lazy in its analysis, did not suggest that Bonin was in any way ‘mad’ prior to his actions.

    Gabriel and others have described his actions as crazy, but I see that as a stalwart refusal to consider how the sound mind can be misled into doing seemingly unsound things.

  19. #199
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Are you suggesting that Pierre Bonin suffered from covert bouts of madness?
    Not exactly.

  20. #200
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Not exactly.
    Ha! The understatement of the week.

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

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