Originally posted by Evan
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Originally posted by ATLcrew View PostActually, I don't think there is a failure to listen here, more like an unwillingness to listen, which is a clean different thing. Failure implies there was at least an attempt, however unsuccessful. I don't think that's the case here.
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Originally posted by 3WE View PostActually YOU don't especially with anything ATL has to say.
Originally posted by ATLCrewSure, it was. At least FDnH enough not to mess with. Even if you got a good amount of bumpage happening, that's still plenty FDnH not to go pitching and pulling and Krishna only knows what else. The only "memory item" should have been to leave the airplane be and methodically and deliberately go through the ECAM.
I was mistaken about the 2006 Airbus procedure for Unreliable Airspeed, as I've already said and you have failed to hear. It was for a different phase of flight without incurring the loss of autoflight and failure cascade experienced by AF447. But it wouldn't have helped here anyway.
Why?
NOW LISTEN: In the case of AF447, NAV ADR DISAGREE (the first clear ECAM indication that airspeeds were in disagreement) and ADR CHECK PROC....APPLY (the first ECAM prompt to run the UAS ECAM procedure) did not occur until 2 mins and 40 secs after the loss of autoflight (although the PF acknowledged "we've lost the speeds" at 2h 10mins 16secs, there was no call for any QRH procedure and thus it was not executed). By the time the ECAM prompted for the procedure, the airplane was already fully stalled and the PF indicated that he no longer had control of the airplane. So, as you can see, relying on that procedure to prevent this scenario is a bit naive. There needs to be something to stabilize, and it needs to be a standard procedure that covers ALL the potential stealth and human factors.
Gabriel has patiently pointed out—and I have acknowledged— that I was mistaken in assuming the 5°/CL memory items applied to the AF447 scenario. They don't. There are currently no memory items that do, as far as I now know. That leaves improvisation.
I guess, even after all that has happened, I am the only one here concerned about that.
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Originally posted by Evan View Post
NOW LISTEN: In the case of AF447, NAV ADR DISAGREE (the first clear ECAM indication that airspeeds were in disagreement) and ADR CHECK PROC....APPLY (the first ECAM prompt to run the UAS ECAM procedure) did not occur until 2 mins and 40 secs after the loss of autoflight (although the PF acknowledged "we've lost the speeds" at 2h 10mins 16secs, there was no call for any QRH procedure and thus it was not executed). By the time the ECAM prompted for the procedure, the airplane was already fully stalled and the PF indicated that he no longer had control of the airplane.
None of that requires memory items (what's with the obsession with that term, btw, plenty of memory items get screwed up, too). It requires being an aviator, not a googler and not a QRH reciter. What concerns ME is that WE don't seem to be producing very many of the former anymore. But we sure produce plenty of memory item regurgitators, which I guess is what you want.
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Originally posted by ATLcrew View PostIndeed. I discussed this with you also (and, of course, you disagreed). They were both doing what only the PM should have been doing. Remember when I discussed with you the psychological implications of the words "I HAVE THE RADIOS AND THE AIRCRAFT, ECAM ACTIONS, PLEASE"? It's crewmembers parting ways. As the PF, I don't care what DOESN'T work, I care only what DOES work. So, I'm telling the PM "see all this flashing and dinging and ECAM messages? They're YOUR problem now, have fun, I'm flying the airplane. Unless you need something cross-verified, don't bother me". I look at my ADIs, do they agree? If yes, to hashmark we go. I look at my thrust, where is it? Little low? Ok, match and mash. We're in turbulence and rolling? Let's keep the wings level. It's showing a descent? No sweat, turn off track and get a little lower, into warmer temps and hopefully smoother air. If we actually weren't descending, no harm, no foul.
None of that requires memory items (what's with the obsession with that term, btw, plenty of memory items get screwed up, too). It requires being an aviator, not a googler and not a QRH reciter. What concerns ME is that WE don't seem to be producing very many of the former anymore. But we sure produce plenty of memory item regurgitators, which I guess is what you want.
- "I HAVE THE RADIOS AND THE AIRCRAFT, ECAM ACTIONS, PLEASE"? vs "I HAVE CONTROL" and nothing more (and the first ECAM action came 2 mins and 20 secs after that).
- 'I look at my thrust, where is it? Little low? Ok, match and mash.' vs not even thinking to look at thrust (I assume you mean the donuts because the levers are deceiving) perhaps assuming the AT was still engaged.
- 'It's showing a descent? No sweat, turn off track and get a little lower, into warmer temps and hopefully smoother air." vs "We're in a descent! I must not descend into this storm!" and "I need to climb above it, where I wanted to climb five minutes ago'.
So, forget everything I've said here. Just tell us how we can reliably defend against human factors and poor improvisational judgment in this situation without a trained, memorized procedure.
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Originally posted by Evan View PostAll very good ATL, but you are missing something. Your improvisational instincts seem pretty solid.
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Originally posted by ATLcrew View PostThat's just it, that's not improvisation (which is what you're missing), that's just being a pilot, I'm sorry you don't like it. As for your question, I don't know. I do know that if someone doesn't know how to fly an airplane, no amount of memory items will save him (I have said that, too)
Evan, I an really not following you. You complain that they could not have called and used the UAS QRH procedure because they got the ECAM message only 2 minutes later but want then to apply the UAS memory items?
I guess WE could develop some pilot androids maybe, I don't know.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post[Lots of interesting stuff about where memory checklists are and are not needed]Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by ATLcrew View PostI do know that if someone doesn't know how to fly an airplane, no amount of memory items will save him (I have said that, too), again, sorry you don't like it.
Originally posted by GabrielEvan, I an really not following you. You complain that they could not have called and used the UAS QRH procedure because they got the ECAM message only 2 minutes later but want then to apply the UAS memory items?
As would more automation (or automation that doesn't give up so easily).
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Originally posted by Evan View PostThis is the fallacy and the sticking point. Pierre Bonin DID know how to fly an airplane. I believe he did what he did intentionally due to the imperatives in his mind which were brought about by human factors, prior concerns, misleading indications and the lack of a memorized, practiced, standardized procedure to folllow. Do you really not see the point I am making?
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Originally posted by ATLcrew View PostI do see your point perfectly, I just don't agree with it. Evidently he did NOT know how to fly, or at any rate wasn't very good at it. The fact that he had not killed himself previously is not in an of itself an indication of great skill.
Now, that's not a slight against pilots like yourself or the great skill of most pilots. But I think greatly-skilled pilots take it that way. I understand that it seems demeaning to the art of flying and is just a generally depressing thought, but it is also the reality in the vast transport sector and the needs of the passengers have to come before the pride of the pilots. Unless you know a better way. "I don't know" is not an acceptable solution.
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Originally posted by ATLcrew View Post***Evidently he did NOT know how to fly, or at any rate wasn't very good at it.***
I know, that's how a 172 works and relentless pull ups need to be considered in a type-specific manner.Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by Evan View PostAnd here it is! We will disagree on whether it was his flying skills or his perception and state of mind, but I think we will agree that there are pilots out there right now who have marginal skills and judgment, How do we protect against them if handling a situation as manageable as loss of autoflight and airspeeds requires perfect judgment and great skill?
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