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Thread: Pitot Tube Failure

  1. #81
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    But how do you know which you are going to get 3WE, the intact fundamentals of the broken ones? Remember, human factors are rather awesome. Bonin was an experienced glider pilot.
    Absolutely correct.

    The best evidence that you can't know what to expect is that Bonin, the glider pilot AND EXTENISVELY TRAINED A-300 COPILOT, did not select the right NAV ADR DISAGREE" ECAM83% N1 alpha prot AoA RECMAX THRUST RED ALT WTF NOR the fundamental "let if fly" and "don't pull up relentlessly" procedures.

    So what training is a human more likely to remember when the excrement hits the blower?:

    NAV ADR DISAGREE" ECAM83% N1 alpha prot AoA RECMAX THRUST RED ALT WTF- REPEAT FROM MEMORY...

    OR

    NAV ADR DISAGREE" ECAM83% N1 alpha prot AoA RECMAX THRUST RED ALT WTF- AND remember that is basically saying, "keep flying the plane just like you were taught in 172 school, Q-400 school, CRJ school and A-300 school..."

    However; somehow, you will disagree with the sentence above.
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  2. #82
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post

    There are problems with that though. For one thing, the total loss of speeds in high-altitude turbulence results in an immediate loss of autoflight and need for manual intervention before the QRH values can be obtained. The pitch attitude prior to the disconnect could be quickly lost in that choppy, rolling transition. Therefore, it seems logical that a similar pair of broad, cruise-level-flight pitch/power targets should also be provided as a Memory Item for all weight categories above and below FL250, just to stabilize within the safe envelope for a minute or so.
    If a pilot doesn't know his airplane's typical "broad cruise pitch/power settings", no amount of memory items will save him, trust me. That guy/gal shouldn't be flying anything. I do remember sharing these with you for the 320 series (and you disagreed then, too, for some reason):

    Above FL300 2.5-3.0ANU 85% N1
    Between FL200-and FL300 2.5-3.0ANU 75% N1
    Below FL200 2.5-3.0ANU 65% N1

    2.5ANU is particularly easy because that's the first hashmark on the PFD. So, hashmark 85, hashmark 75, or hashmark 65. How much more of a memory item do you need? You will find (just like last time) that these values are within a degree or so and a few percent N1 of QRH values. Again, you're paying me to know my airplane, not my QRH.

  3. #83
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    Again, you're paying me to know my airplane, not my QRH.
    I want to apologize for pondering if anything could be done differently for AF- but it's what we do. Not taking off, probably would have prevented this.

    Aside from that, I find myself concluding there isn't much. The dude was trained, the dude probably wasn't a total idiot, the dude was screened, the dude was periodically reviewed. It sucks. We will never know why he did what he did.

    I have no special love for the theory that he wanted the automation to give him a safe, slow airspeed (and maybe climb on top) via the full pull up...I would agree that this was inappropriate improvisation, if true. It just seems like the best? SLIGHTLY plausible explanation for his 'inexplicable' actions.

    It's also possible that Gabby and I would not have crashed (Important disclaimer: At least not crashed in the manner in which he crashed.).

    I think it's highly possible that I would have passed him from an HR standpoint (not that I have ANY expertise). Evan knows he would be able to screen the guy out as a bad apple for some memory/procedural/somethingorother. But would AA, Delta, WN have failed him because of something magical they do that AF does not?

    The world is a complicated place and not everyone can be ATLcrew, unfortunately.
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  4. #84
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by ATLcrew View Post
    If a pilot doesn't know his airplane's typical "broad cruise pitch/power settings", no amount of memory items will save him, trust me. That guy/gal shouldn't be flying anything. I do remember sharing these with you for the 320 series (and you disagreed then, too, for some reason):

    Above FL300 2.5-3.0ANU 85% N1
    Between FL200-and FL300 2.5-3.0ANU 75% N1
    Below FL200 2.5-3.0ANU 65% N1

    2.5ANU is particularly easy because that's the first hashmark on the PFD. So, hashmark 85, hashmark 75, or hashmark 65. How much more of a memory item do you need? You will find (just like last time) that these values are within a degree or so and a few percent N1 of QRH values. Again, you're paying me to know my airplane, not my QRH.
    I might have misunderstood those for A330 settings, but anyway... I'm not suggesting that any pilot doesn't know his/her aircraft's typical "broad cruise pitch/power settings". I'm suggesting that, in this scenario, the pilot needs to be trained to react by following a procedure, and that procedure consists of shutting down the AT and the FD's and setting pitch and power. It does not involve maintaining the current altitude, which is what I think Bonin was trying to do, and which I can understand might be the goal of a pilot in 'leveling off' to troubleshoot. The altimeter and the VSI will also be prompting you to do so, because they are affected by the erroneous mach data. Nor does it involve climbing above the weather system, which is also what I think Bonin was doing, with improvised pitch and power, even if the REC MAX gives you room to do so. This is the point I can't seem to get across. This is about the combination of human factors and the deceptions and stealth factors that are created by the loss of airspeeds. I want the initial, focused task to be pitch and power, using safe values known by memory. That generally is best done by training and practice on a memorized procedure for a specific failure condition, not 'do what you normally do in level flight'. If that means 'set the power at 85% and fly the first hashmark', fine, as long as that's the focus (I've already memorized that just writing this sentence). But just don't do anything else with the pitch and power until you get into the QRH. Don't improvise until you have better situational awareness, have run the written procedures and have fully gathered your wits. Don't be deceived. Don't depart level flight. Why would anyone disagree with that?

    Bear in mind that AF447, while flying level, would have been apparently sinking (due to instrumentation error), would have been decelerating (for real) and would have been intermittently providing deadly flight guidance (which the pilot seems to have followed, perhaps trusting the flight directors over the commands of his senior FO).

    Again, you're paying me to know my airplane, not my QRH.
    I have to respectfully disagree with that. You are paid to safely convey passengers from point a to point b (mostly through managing automation), and to take the correct and necessary actions when things go wrong. That means knowing both normal and abnormal procedures. As I said before, I think pilots who take the responsibility seriously would study the FCOM, the QRH, accident reports, aerodynamics, meteorology and all kinds of industry literature on their own time. Just like serious professionals in other jobs do. (And I think you do this).

  5. #85
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 3WE View Post
    I want to apologize for pondering if anything could be done differently for AF- but it's what we do. Not taking off, probably would have prevented this.

    Aside from that, I find myself concluding there isn't much. The dude was trained, the dude probably wasn't a total idiot, the dude was screened, the dude was periodically reviewed. It sucks. We will never know why he did what he did.
    Are you kidding me? None of the pilots were adequately trained to handle this emergency. Read the report. That's what was so shocking about it.

  6. #86
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Are you kidding me? None of the pilots were adequately trained to handle this emergency. Read the report. That's what was so shocking about it.
    Boom- that would be the crux of the matter, and I am absolutely not_kidding you.

    You see, Mister Gabieeeeeee, might just claim that he (himself) was more than adequately trained to not crash an aerodynamically perfect aeroplanie in a FDnH configuration, with disabled pitot tubes...let's ask him.

    "That, to me, is whats so shocking about it"

    (I'd tell you that I claim that I (Mr. full of bologna/talk-from-my-rear 3BS) was more than adequately trained not to crash an aerodynamically perfect airplane, back in 172 school, by a procedure not all that different from what ATL described, but you would not belive me).

    Gabieeeee: What say you? (And when did you learn this awesome skill: during Native-American-Battle-Tool-named aeroplanie training, or from reading the Book of Acronyms on www.internet.com? + much practice in MSFS?)
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    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    I said it before: In aviation it is almost forbidden to say "it will never happen to me".
    But I am pretty confident that I would not have crashed AF, or Colgan, or Pinnacle.... Not in the way they did it at least. And I think that I more or less "proved" it with BB's unforgettable present.

    As to where I learned it? For sure basic PPL training was a big part. Was it all? I don't think so. It SHOULD be all that it takes, but I don't think that PL training was nearly as good as it SHOULD have been.
    But yes, PPL training taught me pulling up hard is a good way way to stall at any speed and attitude, and that step banks and slow speeds are usually correlated with pulling up.

    But I feel that things like reading accident reports and reflecting a lot on the subject were a good complement. That's how the stall thread came to be. I don;t think it would have existed (not in the way it did) if all the knowledge I had came from the PPL training or at least from the version of the PPL training I had (both theoretical and practical). I said it before, back there in the AF thread, that for something like AF or Colgan to happen it looked to me that there had to be something wrong with their BASIC flight training. Which on the other hand would not be surprising in an era of puppy-mills. And for whatever my 1-datapoint sample is worth, I know that MY PPL training was not perfect or close,

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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    for something like AF or Colgan to happen it looked to me that there had to be something wrong with their BASIC flight training.
    Definitely thought-provoking, for me anyway. I see that AF claims it significantly changed its flight training program after the report on 447 was published. But to your point, just how much BASIC flight training is there in a commercial pilot program? In this era of pilot shortages, are some commercial pilots still going through a form of puppy-mill training (to use your term), and all that's changed is that the curriculum and simulator schedules have been enhanced so that they spend additional time on issues like loss of airspeed data due to pitot tube failure/disagreement. I know it's a pejorative question, but would the tragic events associated with pitot failure still have occurred if the PF had real recent tangible experience of (say) flying a 172 out of a stall in a solo test flight, feeling how the aircraft responded, listening to the pitch of the engines, feeling the change in G forces.

    Colgan seems rather different. It's not really relevant to this thread, but perhaps we have to remind ourselves that no matter how skilled we might be in basic airmanship, fatigue is very powerful at messing up memory and decision making.

  9. #89
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Adjective games:

    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    ***MY PPL training was not perfect or close***
    Thus my use of the word 'adequate'...and yeah, I actually said, "more than adequate"...thinking it was fairly accurate.
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    Quote Originally Posted by flashcrash View Post
    Colgan is not really relevant to this thread, blah, blah, blah, fatigue, blah, blah, blah.
    Neither is Pinnacle- they had no problem with stall recovery. They DID have a problem with engine restarting due to some very type-specific engine issues that were not part of private pilot training- and with the issue that stalls can cause flame outs in some jet engines.

    On the other hand, it is still tough to hear "dude, look at the deck angle", and "our airspeed is decaying"- (DUH- we're heading towards a stall)...I have since come to believe that they simply hoped against hope to maintain altitude as ordered by ATC just for another few minutes and not generate an emergency descent and potential questions.

    "Blah blah blah": I generally agree that fatigue may be THE factor to blame with Colgan (along with the tail-stall-training theory). These all seem to defy logic.
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  11. #91
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    I said it before: In aviation it is almost forbidden to say "it will never happen to me".
    And why do you think that is? Because it's almost certainly naive hubris?

    You handled a (senseless) stall warning situation in the 747 sim. You had no prior concern to ascribe it to (no food for confimation bias). It was in visual flight conditions. You told us that you focused your attention on the visual situation out the window and the tactile and aural stall warnings, and flew it by concentrating (tunnelling) on these aspects.

    AF447 happened in turbulent IMC with no visible horizon and no tactile feedback. The PF most likely focused his attention on instrumentation (which was erroneous and misleading) and bewildering ECAM (the PNF was not communicating ECAM clearly to him). The PF was tasked with stabilizing roll turbulence as well as pitch (with some vertical acceleration from turbulence). The PF had a very strong prior concern about weather and a strong desire to climb above it, and was probably deeply affected by confimation bias at that moment. Stall AoA was about 4.5°. This situation cannot be learned in a Cassna (or a Tomahawk).

    I've tried to point out to you and others here that this wasn't primarily a case of bad basic airmanship. It just falls on deaf ears.
    I've tried to point out to you and others here that only a disciplined adherence to procedure can defend against the deceptions and human factors that arise in a situation like this. That just seems to bounce off you.

    Fortunately, pilots do not administer aviation safety directives. The BEA and the industry regulators are not susceptible to pilot-induced-hubris, and they have made changes. The AF-447 pilots had received their only stall (avoidance, not recovery) training during type-certification year earlier, and it focused on low-altitude, high-AoA situations. None of them had high-altitude upset aircraft handling and upset recovery training. Human factors were largely ignored in the training they did have.

    5 - CHANGES MADE FOLLOWING THE ACCIDENT
    5.1 Air France
    5.1.3 Crew training
    Flight simulator training
    Additional unreliable airspeed session:
    • Summer 2009 (A320, A330/A340).
    • Session booklet and briefing: technical reminders, human factors and Threat and Error Management (TEM) aspects.
    • Revision of the emergency manoeuvre, on take-off and in cruise phase.
    • High altitude flight in alternate law.
    • Approach to stall with triggering of STALL warning.
    • Landing without airspeed indications.
    • Related briefings (all flight crew):
      --Weather radar
      --Ice crystals.
    • Alternate Training & Qualification Programme (ATQP) (preliminary version)
      operational on Airbus A320 since March 2012.

    Note: These elements were incorporated into the type ratings

    This will not prevent another AF447, however, if pilots continue to resist the lessons learned from it, particularly the humility of being susceptible to deceptive human factors and the importance of following procedure for this reason alone.

    Now you can go back to talking about what stellar airman you are on cable-driven low altitude aircraft at 120kts.

  12. #92
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    And why do you think that is? Because it's almost certainly naive hubris?
    Yes, most of the time. You will never hear me say "I will never run out of gas" or "I will never be caught VFR in IMC" or "I will never lose situational awareness and CFIT". Not even "I will never (unintentionally) stall a plane".
    I surely sound pedantic and I may be wrong, but I honestly think that I would have never crashed AF447 (or Colgan fatigue and all, on Pinnacle, or Austral, or Spanair) in the way they did.

    You handled a (senseless) stall warning situation in the 747 sim. You had no prior concern to ascribe it to (no food for confimation bias). It was in visual flight conditions. You told us that you focused your attention on the visual situation out the window and the tactile and aural stall warnings, and flew it by concentrating (tunnelling) on these aspects.
    Everything is situational. My main focus was the stickshaker, reducing the AoA as little as possible to silence it which initially produced a descent so I pulled up again. I was taking off, "safe conduct of the flight" was in question and, while never told me that and I had not read the stall procedure for the take-off stall in the 747-200, I knew that I had to find the balance to ensure not stalling while at the same time, if possible, not descending. Yes, the view out out of the window was a big part of that, to judge if the plane was going up or down or if there were obstacles, but at the same time it was the ONLY thing that mattered that I had to look with my eyes. Call it tunnel vision if you want, but the airspeed was meaningless (I had rotated at the prescribed speed and was above V2 by then, so this should not have been happening if it was for the speed, another pilot more focused on procedures and numbers may have been more focused on keeping V2 which, again, was meaningless), attitude I could tell from the real horizon, FD was meaningless (it most likely was telling me to pitch up), altimeter is not sensitive enough when you are skimming a few feet over the runway, and for the stickshaker I didn't need my eyes. Focusing in what matters is not tunneling. And did I say that it happened during the lift-off? Had I been at altitude I am pretty confident that I would have lowered the nose much more liberally and looked at things like the attitude and speed. Context.

    AF447 happened in turbulent IMC with no visible horizon and no tactile feedback. The PF most likely focused his attention on instrumentation (which was erroneous and misleading) and bewildering ECAM (the PNF was not communicating ECAM clearly to him). The PF was tasked with stabilizing roll turbulence as well as pitch (with some vertical acceleration from turbulence). The PF had a very strong prior concern about weather and a strong desire to climb above it, and was probably deeply affected by confimation bias at that moment. Stall AoA was about 4.5°. This situation cannot be learned in a Cassna (or a Tomahawk).
    Really? Do you think that doing basically NOTHING like I initially did in the Tomahawk would not have worked initially?

    I've tried to point out to you and others here that this wasn't primarily a case of bad basic airmanship. It just falls on deaf ears.
    I've tried to point out to you and others here that only a disciplined adherence to procedure can defend against the deceptions and human factors that arise in a situation like this. That just seems to bounce off you.
    Ok, a couple of comments here.
    1- By all means DO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES. I said that a gazillion times already.
    2- There is a big range between NOT FOLLOWING THE PROCEDURES and pull up a 1.5, 7000 fpm, 2500 feet climb from FL350 ISA+20 and, once leveled of at the top of the climb, when the speed (that is already working again) goes down after your unsustainable climb and the stall warning comes out, pull up hard back and keep "pulling back all the time" until you hit the ocean. The stall warning was sounding (and I mean a cricket sound and an aural STALL STALL) uninterruptedly for 30 seconds (then intermittently) with 3 good (by then) airspeed indicators showing a too low speed but more importantly 3 good attitude indicators showing more than 10 degrees ANU coupled with 3 good altimeters unwinding at a ridiculous speed and 2 good vertical speed indicators showing many thousands of feet per minutes down.
    There are other ways of not following the procedure that, while not advisable, would have had a much different outcome. THIS way was totally ineffective but also totally unnatural for a pilot. Why did it happen? I don't know. You claim that strict adherence to procedures would have prevented it. But that is a tautology: Yes, not crashing would have prevented the crash. If the pilot would have tried to do something remotely reasonable from a cowboy pilot point of view (like trying a reasonable climb) I would agree. But the pilot was pulling up hard immediately after the AP disconnected. Why? Startle? Panic? How wold this startle or panic that prevented the pilot to keep a reasonable climb (if that was what he was trying to do, according to your version, which I very much doubt) would have allowed him to invoke the procedures and keep a steady 5 deg and CLB? (which was the WRONG thing to do anyway, which bring us to...)
    3- Ok. I got it and I've already said a million times that I agree: Strict adherence to procedure. Which procedure? Because the last time I checked the procedure applicable to that situation was at the time of the AF accident, and still is today, for a high altitude cruise and already leveled-off flight, do NOTHING initially and then follow the prescribed technique to fly with no airspeed using the pitch and power table in the QRH as a ballpark reference. How is that so different from what you would do in a Tomahawk (except that you don''t have the QRH table)? Or from what I, 3we and, most importantly, ATL are saying? (acknowledged, he should have turned off the FD)

    This will not prevent another AF447, however, if pilots continue to resist the lessons learned from it, particularly the humility of being susceptible to deceptive human factors and the importance of following procedure for this reason alone.
    Do you know any pilot in that category? Here it goes again: DO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES.

    Now you can go back to talking about what stellar airman you are on cable-driven low altitude aircraft at 120kts.
    I am not a stellar pilot at all. I am not even a very good one. In the same thread where I described how well I managed the stall in the 747 sim I also described how crappy I was trying to control airspeed and altitude and how many miles I was flying behind the airplane. Sorry if I sound pedantic, but I feel that I am particularly good at AoA awareness (compared to other thing at which I am not so god, NOT compared to other pilots).

    If you are driving a car and the street makes a left turn but instead you turn right and end up in a stonewall, then "not following the left turn procedure" is not a good enough explanation.
    Both 3we and I said it: We feel confident that we wold not have crashed AF 447 IN THAT WAY (but possibly yes in other ways, I would likely had lost control in IMC).

    This pilot didn't just fail to follow the procedure. What he did made no sense whatsoever no matter what was his goal or what he attempted to do, unless he attempted to stall and crash, which I am sure it was not the case.

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  13. #93
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    Everything is situational. My main focus was the stickshaker, reducing the AoA as little as possible to silence it which initially produced a descent so I pulled up again. I was taking off, "safe conduct of the flight" was in question and, while never told me that and I had not read the stall procedure for the take-off stall in the 747-200, I knew that I had to find the balance to ensure not stalling while at the same time, if possible, not descending. Yes, the view out out of the window was a big part of that, to judge if the plane was going up or down or if there were obstacles, but at the same time it was the ONLY thing that mattered that I had to look with my eyes. Call it tunnel vision if you want, but the airspeed was meaningless (I had rotated at the prescribed speed and was above V2 by then, so this should not have been happening if it was for the speed, another pilot more focused on procedures and numbers may have been more focused on keeping V2 which, again, was meaningless), attitude I could tell from the real horizon, FD was meaningless (it most likely was telling me to pitch up), altimeter is not sensitive enough when you are skimming a few feet over the runway, and for the stickshaker I didn't need my eyes. Focusing in what matters is not tunneling. And did I say that it happened during the lift-off? Had I been at altitude I am pretty confident that I would have lowered the nose much more liberally and looked at things like the attitude and speed. Context.
    You missed my point. i"m not criticizing your actions in the sim (I think you aced it). I'm pointing out that there was nothing deceiving you there. There was no 'food' for confirmation bias. I'm pointing out the things you are not considering in comparing it to AF447. I listed them there, so I'm not going to list them again, but they affect perception, situational awareness, human judgment and human performance. You can't compare, or even understand, that situation without considering these things. Context.

    Really? Do you think that doing basically NOTHING like I initially did in the Tomahawk would not have worked initially?
    Doing nothing would have worked, yes. But improvising does not mean 'doing nothing', and, as I pointed out, the instruments were urging the pilot to do something wrong. If he had a procedure to follow involving ONLY pitch and power (along with the obvious roll control), he could have essentially done nothing, or at least done nothing dangerous. I think this point is quite clear but you still don't seem to acknowledge it. And, yes, I'm now aware that there isn't a specific memorized procedure for stabilizing UAS at cruise, which troubles me. As I said to ATL, I would rest easier if the procedure simply called for '95% N1 and fly the first hashmark' or even 'use typical pitch and power for the current phase of flight' but the procedure must prevent the pilot from doing anything else before getting clear situational awareness and CRM underway (including running through the QRH procedure). And it must remove the automation and the flight directors. That's what I'm saying.

    Pierre Bonin probably noticed the declining altitude and the negative vertical speed, and he probably didn't want to descend into the CB monster that was effing up his airplane and he probably wanted to climb higher above it, but the instruments were lying to him. Did he fly it by pitch or by altimeter/VSI? Pitch would be safe. Instruments would be a potential mess. Flight directors (when available) would be a disaster.

    Do you know any pilot in that category? Here it goes again: DO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURES.
    Ok, then, you and 3WE can argue that point. If I'm not mistaken, he may have spent some driving a Cessna.

  14. #94
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    [Follow Procedures]

    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    Ok, then, you and 3WE can argue that point. If I'm not mistaken, he may have spent some driving a Cessna.
    Gabriel and I will not be arguing that procedures should have been followed, in fact we'll largely agree. In particular, the procedure described by ATL-the-Airbus-Captain to not_invoke memory items, but instead to keep things stable, forget memory checklists and carefully diagnose what is going on. Gabriel and I will note how that is pretty much the same as the Cessna rule of "First, and foremost, Aviate".

    We will also discuss how interesting it is that 65, 75 or 85% power (sort of like N1) and a nose-level attitude will give you FDnH flight. Again, we will revel at the similarity to A-320 numbers- as well as the ~2.5 degree divergence. We will state that we don't need to look it up in the 172 Book of Acronyms because, like ATL-the-Airbus-Captain, we felt it important to know such basic stuff for our incredibly average aircraft operation.

    While Gabriel and I have a nice discussion, you can discuss how "Aviate" must not be spoken as a broad solution as it is improvisational. Instead NAV ADR DISAGREE" ECAM83% N1 alpha prot AoA RECMAX THRUST RED ALT WTF is the correct way to handle an A-300 that has gone Y2K.

    I just don't know who you will discuss that with.
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  15. #95
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 3WE View Post
    We will also discuss how interesting it is that 65, 75 or 85% power (sort of like N1) and a nose-level attitude will give you FDnH flight.
    Hopefully, this will help that discussion:

    Quote Originally Posted by BEA Final Report: AF447
    In addition, the thrust value of 84% N1 was lower than the thrust necessary for level flight (95% N1) due to the reduced mach ordered a few seconds before the autopilot disconnection, then the change to “Thrust Lock” mode at 2 h 10 min10.
    You might also discuss how the A320/330/340 lacks longitudinal stability in alternate law, and where all this might lead.

    Quote Originally Posted by BEA Final Report: AF447
    When there are no protections left, the aeroplane no longer possesses positive longitudinal static stability even on approach to stall.
    I don't think this is true of the 172, but what do I know.

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    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    And these, IMHO, are design issues. We discussed them at lengths in the AF thread.

    That said, the way the AF crashed was unrelated to that. If you pull up all the time you are going to crash a 737-200 or a 172 too.

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  17. #97
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    And these, IMHO, are design issues. We discussed them at lengths in the AF thread.

    That said, the way the AF crashed was unrelated to that. If you pull up all the time you are going to crash a 737-200 or a 172 too.
    No these things did not cause the AF447 crash but perhaps they will cause the next one. Can we at least stop calling this condition FDnH? The aircraft Bonin took over was not in stable flight xnd required CORRECT pilot action.

    But please respond to my more central point about procedure guiding pilots to use pitch and power rather than altitude, VSI and flight directors, because that may have been the thing that set the AF447 crash in motion and it is the reason I don't want pilots improvising here. Procedural discipline to prevent deception.

  18. #98
    Senior Member Gabriel's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Evan View Post
    No these things did not cause the AF447 crash but perhaps they will cause the next one. Can we at least stop calling this condition 100% FDnH? The aircraft Bonin took over was not in stable flight xnd required CORRECT pilot action.
    Not unless we agree on the highlighted modifier. What do you think would have happened if they did NOTHING AT ALL and kept doing NOTHING AT ALL for a good period of time until they identified and called UAS and calmly pulled the QRH?

    But please respond to my more central point about procedure guiding pilots to use pitch and power rather than altitude, VSI and flight directors,
    Initially? Yes. Who ever said something different? Subsequently? At some point you will have to revert to altitude and hence VSI, that's what the "flight technique"in the QRH is for. Fight directors? Forget those, the first action in the QRH with or without memory items is kill the FD. And the 172 and Tomahawk don't have an FD (correction, the new 172 with the G1000 has a FD and all sort of automation).

    because that may have been the thing that set the AF447 crash in motion and it is the reason I don't want pilots improvising here. Procedural discipline to prevent deception.
    How? I really fail to see it. Address my point 2 in my previous previous post.

    --- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
    --- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---

  19. #99
    Senior Member 3WE's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    Address my point 2 in my previous previous post.
    ...
    Quote Originally Posted by 3BS visiting with Gabriel
    I read something on the internet about the A-300 being longitudinally unstable around stall in some flight modes. However, my GUESS is that it might work OK to look at the Attitude indicator (just like is done on piston singles) and maintain your pitch and would GUESS that (with a familiar FDnH configuration) would be extremely effective and preventing stalls. It seems so useful to remember broad, fundamental concepts- so that you can focus on type specific stuff that deviates from broad fundamental concepts.

    If I were to ever become an A-300 pilot, I would certainly want to study up on that. And, I hope I'd never be startled so much that I'd forget the basic rule to first and foremost Aviate...of course, you never know, it seems to repeat on rare occasion, even with the ATP types.

    I suppose there is that argument that NAV ADR DISAGREE" ECAM83% N1 alpha prot AoA RECMAX THRUST RED ALT WTF is the correct way to handle an A-300 that has gone Y2K.
    Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.

  20. #100
    Senior Member Evan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gabriel View Post
    Not unless we agree on the highlighted modifier. What do you think would have happened if they did NOTHING AT ALL and kept doing NOTHING AT ALL for a good period of time until they identified and called UAS and calmly pulled the QRH?
    The way I see it, FDnH is not something you can modify. It either is or it isn't.
    And I already said doing nothing is not the problem. The problem is improvising, which is not 'doing nothing'.

    Initially? Yes. Who ever said something different?
    It's not that you are disgreeing with flying pitch and power, it's that you seem to fail to see the trap, the deception, in not having a procedure to follow that eliminates using the unreliable instruments instead: a procedure that prevents pilots from improvising with those instruments. Do you see that?

    How? I really fail to see it. Address my point 2 in my previous previous post.
    Have you read this?

    https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=...aop1yjOliNkSWv

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