This take-off was rejected not after V1, not after V2, but after V3BS (the fictional speed at which, if you reject the take-off, you can still stop the plane maybe not on the runway but in a safe zone beyond it). The plane overran the end of the runway, broke through the instrument landing system and approach lighting, the airport perimeter fence, went over a road and came to a stop on a ditch about 340 meters/1120 feet past the runway with all landing gear broken and collapsed.
The pilot rotated (or tried to) at 152 kts (that's at or past V1 already) and kept accelerating for several seconds reaching a maximum sped of 173 knots because the plane failed to pitch up. The left elevator was found jammed (although post accident the controls were verified free and correct post accident, understanding that in the MD-80 we are talking of all the linkage from the yoke to the control tabs, which in turn provide the aerodynamic force that moves the elevators).
No injuries.
Maybe, if the pilot had insisted with the take-off, the plane would have eventually and safely lifted off and flown (the right elevator was working ok and the elevator has quite more nose-up authority than nose-down authority, plus they may have added more nose-up stabilizer/trim)
I am sure that, had the airplane caught fire, and caused a few dozens deaths, we would be blaming the pilot for aborting the take-off after V1.
I am sure that, had the pilot continued trying to take-off and failed, crashing at a much higher speed and killing a few dozens, we would be blaming the pilot for not aborting the take-off shortly after Vr when the plane resulted unable to fly.
Both decisions (insist with the take off or abort at a very high speed) could have gone well or terribly bad, and the pilots had no means to judge what would be the outcome of either decision.
As a side note, both pilots were captains:
The PIC is the airline's chief pilot and was in the right seat, he was acing as PM and providing type differences training to the pilot in the right seat. 10K TT, 2.5K on type.
The PM in the left seat had 15K TT, 8.5K in the DC-9 family (of which the MD-80 is part, under the same type certificate)
So experience was not lacking there. What was the impact of that in the outcome, I don't know.
The pilot rotated (or tried to) at 152 kts (that's at or past V1 already) and kept accelerating for several seconds reaching a maximum sped of 173 knots because the plane failed to pitch up. The left elevator was found jammed (although post accident the controls were verified free and correct post accident, understanding that in the MD-80 we are talking of all the linkage from the yoke to the control tabs, which in turn provide the aerodynamic force that moves the elevators).
No injuries.
Maybe, if the pilot had insisted with the take-off, the plane would have eventually and safely lifted off and flown (the right elevator was working ok and the elevator has quite more nose-up authority than nose-down authority, plus they may have added more nose-up stabilizer/trim)
I am sure that, had the airplane caught fire, and caused a few dozens deaths, we would be blaming the pilot for aborting the take-off after V1.
I am sure that, had the pilot continued trying to take-off and failed, crashing at a much higher speed and killing a few dozens, we would be blaming the pilot for not aborting the take-off shortly after Vr when the plane resulted unable to fly.
Both decisions (insist with the take off or abort at a very high speed) could have gone well or terribly bad, and the pilots had no means to judge what would be the outcome of either decision.
As a side note, both pilots were captains:
The PIC is the airline's chief pilot and was in the right seat, he was acing as PM and providing type differences training to the pilot in the right seat. 10K TT, 2.5K on type.
The PM in the left seat had 15K TT, 8.5K in the DC-9 family (of which the MD-80 is part, under the same type certificate)
So experience was not lacking there. What was the impact of that in the outcome, I don't know.
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