Originally posted by Evan
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--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostThe stick shaker should be a big eye-opener, though. I am convinced (in the technical meaning of the word, not as a creed) that had they TOGAed it as soon as the stickshaker went off and managed the AoA to keep it as high as needed but not beyond the onset of the stickshaker, the flight would have been saved.
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Originally posted by Evan View Post***it's an issue of awareness when there is still time to avoid bending anything***
As much as I appreciate brain fog/'done it a million times':
There's still some pretty fair visual cues you are running long.
AND
If your pre-takeoff calculations show things as tight then there are less good excuses for being relaxed and trusting on takeoff and not scrutinizing the acceleration/takeoff roll.
This may not solve all cases, but I still argue it would solve many of them.
As to our 727 cargo guys who did some off-roading and roofing activities...maybe they had less of a chance- based on a long history of tight, familiar takeoffs where they didn't come up a few hundred feet short.
And...I'm still pretty intrigued by the BB/ATL no-acronym-nor-autmoation acceleration-check procedure. The more I think about it, it sounds pretty robust, and a shame that we only want to add type-specific automation to our checklists and procedures and not add a mandatory, quick, manual speed/distance check.Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by Evan View PostWait, I thought we we're still talking about the topic of this thread. (I should know better than that by now). Yeah, once in the air, I think it should be plainly obvious, but remember, we don't want to just "firewall" the thrust levers if that prevents us from managing pitch. I think the SOP of today is "apply thrust smoothly". And as you've told us a thousand times, the first, most effective action is to reduce pitch.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostThe SOP today makes a big warning against adding thrust for airplanes with engines under the wing. I think it is totally unwarranted.
In a very low altitude stall or approach to stall you need to lower AoA as in any stall or approach to stall but, unlike what happens at higher altitudes (and a few hundred feet may well qualify as higher altitude), you are eager for energy and you don't have any to give away. Adding thrust NOW becomes about as important as managing AoA, else you may end up not stalling but still crashing.
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Originally posted by Evan View PostI think it's warranted because the combination of thrust-pitch coupling and a nose high trim condition CAN make it impossible to recover with pitch alone, and the trim condition is always a stealth factor, especially when the stall occurs following an autopilot disconnect. By impressing upon pilots the need to apply thrust cautiously, they will probably be able to recover even when they fail to address the trim. It's a good line of defense against a human error that is often a factor in stall-related incidents.
In the Air Florida case, in particular, the trim was not set very nose-up (it was a normal take-off trim) and the engines were making plenty of thrust already. I don;t for a second think that the thrust increment that was left to TOGA would be enough to beat nose-down elevator without need to trim down for help.
Yes, "about as" but it is still of secondary importance to pitch, no? If you have no altitiude to give, what's the difference between stalling and crashing and not stalling and crashing? Better to crash wings-level?
I explained it n times: you can increase climb rate, increse climb slope, increase deck angle, AND reduce AoA at the same time (not always, but it is not impossible). The "old" approach to stall recovery procedure of "firewall and pitch 10deg" was based on that, except that, as I said, it doesn't ALWAYS work.
Air Florida was climbing (if barely) for a good part of the sequence. Add more thrust you can tend to climb more and trade all or part of that additional climb with a reduction of the AoA.
And firewaling the throttles and reducing the AoA don't need to come in sequence. You have 2 hands, one for the yoke and one for the throttles, and they can move at the same time. So "which one must be done first" is not a sensible question. Do both!!! (in a daring condition where ground contact is imminent)
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by Gabriel View Post***The "old" approach to stall recovery procedure of "firewall and pitch 10deg" was based on that, except that, as I said, it doesn't ALWAYS work.***
1. The procedure is usually really damn effective as long as you aren't a black and white thinker like Evan, and refuse to consider 172 methodology while blindly following the type-specific procedure.
2. A long takeoff and Air Florida are two examples where full power and a healthy climb attitude and a little stall awareness (just like I practiced in a 172) would probably work wonderfully.
(Or perhaps that's sort of what you are saying?)Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostI believe that that is a training issue. Train the pilots to use trim if needed (and make scenarios where it IS needed) and it will come as natural as lowering the nose (on the other hand.......)
In the Air Florida case, in particular, the trim was not set very nose-up (it was a normal take-off trim) and the engines were making plenty of thrust already. I don;t for a second think that the thrust increment that was left to TOGA would be enough to beat nose-down elevator without need to trim down for help.
Yes, but not-crashing is better. You don't always need to give up altitude to recover from a stall or approach to stall. It is a very popular lie but still a lie.
I explained it n times: you can increase climb rate, increse climb slope, increase deck angle, AND reduce AoA at the same time (not always, but it is not impossible). The "old" approach to stall recovery procedure of "firewall and pitch 10deg" was based on that, except that, as I said, it doesn't ALWAYS work.
Air Florida was climbing (if barely) for a good part of the sequence. Add more thrust you can tend to climb more and trade all or part of that additional climb with a reduction of the AoA.
And firewaling the throttles and reducing the AoA don't need to come in sequence. You have 2 hands, one for the yoke and one for the throttles, and they can move at the same time. So "which one must be done first" is not a sensible question. Do both!!! (in a daring condition where ground contact is imminent)
The same goes for "which must be done first". Ideally you can train a pilot to do both simultaneously, but if the pilot has to think about it, you cannot have two thoughts at the same time and the first though should be to apply pitch, then power.
I still think sometimes you don't fully appreciate the human factors and how they can contradict even the most dedicated training.
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Originally posted by 3WE View Post(Or perhaps that's sort of what you are saying?)
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by Evan View Postok but now lets talk about non-Gabrielesque non-super beings. You can train pilots to a very high standard and still, with a certain fraction of them, confusion will erode everthing in an instant. If the training involves both a concentration on trim AND a concentration on moderating thrust, you can place your faith in at least one of those aspects survivng that moment of confusion. Do you follow me?
The same goes for "which must be done first". Ideally you can train a pilot to do both simultaneously, but if the pilot has to think about it, you cannot have two thoughts at the same time and the first though should be to apply pitch, then power.
I still think sometimes you don't fully appreciate the human factors and how they can contradict even the most dedicated training.
I do appreciate the human factors. Things that the pilot is frequently exposed too, practices regularly, and on top of that deeply understands, are more likely to be performed correctly under stress. That said, a person my freak out under stress and do nothing or do everything wrong, including the single most basic action (whatever it is) and there is no absolute protection against that other than automatic protections. Again, practice and knowledge reduce the chances of that happening.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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Originally posted by Evan View Post***Ideally you can train a pilot to do both simultaneously, but if the pilot has to think about it, you cannot have two thoughts at the same time.***
Me 100 hour private pilot.
Me pretty stupid (Just ask Gabriel and ATL Crew).
Me know how advance power and control attitude at same time. Left hand hold yoke, right hand hold power control...unless tricky situation and sit in right seat...then left hand work power, right hand work yoke...
Require some split brain muscle training, but easier than play piano.
Me also know second part of procedure...if beeping sound happen and plane fall, maybe not pull up so much. Maybe even push over a little in extreme situation.
Sometimes, me make stupid mistake, but me not need fancy Evan training. Me learn concept at about 10 hours into training (Gabriel smart, he learn in 5 hours).
Maybe me freeze and be stupid if bad thing happen, but pretty sure further delay while remember what do first, not good idea.Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by Gabriel View PostIn the Air Florida case, in particular, the trim was not set very nose-up (it was a normal take-off trim) and the engines were making plenty of thrust already. I don;t for a second think that the thrust increment that was left to TOGA would be enough to beat nose-down elevator without need to trim down for help.
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Originally posted by 3WE View PostMe 3BS.
(etc)
As I think you guys know I'm a proud rider of the human-factors bandwagon. But this particular issue is hella basic. What makes an airplane fly? Power. What do you need when your airplane won't fly? More power.
I completely get that people panic, get flustered/distracted/confused/etc but the relationship between power and the plane getting/staying airborne is so basic, so simple, and so immutable it's hard to understand why pilots don't add power as soon as they realize the airplane isn't flying as much as they want it to. Of course that only works if the pilot *recognizes* the plane isn't flying!
I guess the one exception would be if the pilot believes that too much power would cause the plane to pitch up and stall. I'd think any decently-designed plane would have enough elevator authority to overcome that even with the trim grossly off, but maybe not?Be alert! America needs more lerts.
Eric Law
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Originally posted by BoeingBobby View PostAnd you were how old when Palm 90 happened? I knew and used to fly DC-3's with the Captain of that flight, and had just come back from a trip to South America in the 707 the same day. Be VERY careful here Gabe!
Do you want to say that the captain was an extremely competent, well trained, highly-experienced, safety-conscious pilot? I don't doubt it. Airline pilots generally are.
Now, how does that contribute to the fact that they did not 'promptly' firewall the throttles? I acknowledge that it's very easy to see that at 0 kts and 0 ft AGL. But in all seriousness- they should have done that and they didn't.
I confess- I can see myself doing the exact same thing they did...well actually I did something a somewhat similar and continued a genuine short field takeoff with the carburetor heat left on. Pretty scary incident as my highly trained experience (all 30 hours of it) CORRECTLY told me that I would make it with a minimum safety buffer. I do not claim to be SMARTER than them.
Any thoughts on what could have been done differently that day to help those great humans from making human errors? (And by the way there was more than one significant contributing factor thing cited in the NTSB report?)- Or do you just want to brag about all of your hours? We respect your hours and all, but there was a good dose of hours in command of Air Florida, and here today, 35 years later, we discuss and dissect related failures in new close calls and new crashes.Les règles de l'aviation de base découragent de longues périodes de dur tirer vers le haut.
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Originally posted by BoeingBobby View PostAnd you were how old when Palm 90 happened?
I knew and used to fly DC-3's with the Captain of that flight, and had just come back from a trip to South America in the 707 the same day. Be VERY careful here Gabe!
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
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