Polish President and wife killed in Tu-154 crash

[Northwester]

Are you basing this on the time that the signal is recieved and is flashing the light, or on the time it becomes audible for hearing on a CVR? They are quite different things.

Are you basing this on the aircraft perfectly flying over the centre of the beacon, or slightly to one side? Are you accounting for the ground wave component which would presumably occur when you are that low?

Once again - can you please provide your reasons (other than personal preference) as to why the russian version of the FDR/CVR is not correct? The fact the Polish one disagrees is a reason to question, not to declare it is wrong. Why do you think the Polish one is more accurate?

The other reason you know already, but I will restate it here. If you look at the Russian version of the CVR data synched with the flight data, you will see that TAWS is still firing "PULL UP" alerts after the plane started climbing again (point A). That is not possible.

[MCM]

Can you please explain, with reference to the actual GPWS documents, why it is not possible for the "PULL UP" alert to continue after the aircraft starts climbing again?

The GPWS system that I am familiar with is more than capable of continuing PULL UP alerts while terrain clearance is increasing.

[Northwester]

Can you please explain, with reference to the actual GPWS documents, why it is not possible for the "PULL UP" alert to continue after the aircraft starts climbing again?

The GPWS system that I am familiar with is more than capable of continuing PULL UP alerts while terrain clearance is increasing.

The TAWS system on board of Tu-154 was working in Mode 2. That means that the ground proximity would generate a "Terrain Ahead" caution alert, and the excessive ground closure rate would generate a "Pull Up" warning alert. These alerts have to stop as soon as the conditions that triger them cease to exist. The TAWS system has to update the conditions and alerts AT LEAST once a second.

If you look at the Polish CVR data synched with the flight data, you will see that the alerts stop immediately at the point A where the ground closure rate reverses and the plane starts to climb.

[Northwester]

One more indication of the CVR manipulation. Listen carefully to the CVR around the time mark 10:30:00 (few seconds before and after) and look at the wave form.

http://youtu.be/ucfMbPt8xRw

[Northwester]

I have just found something strange. A Russian Smolensk forum where the first message about a crash landed Polish plane shows at 10:25.

Link to the site:

http://www.smolensk-auto.ru/forum/index.php?showtopic=16192. 0 0

And a screen shot below.

[MCM]

You're quoting a minimum performance standards FAA document, NOT the actual GPWS operations document.

The alert must be removed once the situation is resolved. What does resolved mean? Do you know when the particular model involved starts and then considers resolved a situation? It does NOT necessarily mean a small increase in terrain clearance, nor does it necessarily mean that the trigger condition has been removed - some GPWS units require more than that.

I'm not saying that it is necessarily wrong - I'm saying that your assertion about the GPWS reaction is not strong enough to place preference on one version over the other.

Is there anything else in the russian plot that doesn't make sense to you?

[Northwester]

You're quoting a minimum performance standards FAA document, NOT the actual GPWS operations document.

The alert must be removed once the situation is resolved. What does resolved mean? Do you know when the particular model involved starts and then considers resolved a situation? It does NOT necessarily mean a small increase in terrain clearance, nor does it necessarily mean that the trigger condition has been removed - some GPWS units require more than that.

I'm not saying that it is necessarily wrong - I'm saying that your assertion about the GPWS reaction is not strong enough to place preference on one version over the other.

Is there anything else in the russian plot that doesn't make sense to you?

I am not sure I agree with you. Since the equipment was manufactured in the US, the FAA specifications fully apply. The longest it can take for the alert to go away, once the condition changes, is one second. Please notice that the Mode 2 description says "excessive closure rate to terrain". So even if the closure rate changed to normal, the alert would go away and change into "Terrain Ahead" caution alert. The change from excessive descent to level flight to climb was so fast that it deactivated the alert altogether.

[Northwester]

You're quoting a minimum performance standards FAA document, NOT the actual GPWS operations document.

The alert must be removed once the situation is resolved. What does resolved mean? Do you know when the particular model involved starts and then considers resolved a situation? It does NOT necessarily mean a small increase in terrain clearance, nor does it necessarily mean that the trigger condition has been removed - some GPWS units require more than that.

I'm not saying that it is necessarily wrong - I'm saying that your assertion about the GPWS reaction is not strong enough to place preference on one version over the other.

Is there anything else in the russian plot that doesn't make sense to you?

Of course the fact that the plane could not fly at the alt of 11m above the Middle Marker as shown in the Russian version of the CVR/FDR data is the strongest evidence. The Polish version of the CVR does not even show the MM signal. I left it in the plot in the same place for no other place was suggested yet.

[Northwester]

Another strange thing about the time of the crash. In this clip from Polish TV Wiktor Bater says:
"I received the first news about the crash at 10:40 local time, so virtually 4 minutes after the crash"

http://youtu.be/_96X6s2eRvI

[guamainiac]

Not speaking Polish (me that is), if this fellow is on site and waiting to cover this is that surprising?

There were lot of journalists waiting and the AC landing just ahead of it was a press plane. The rumble of the crash while they were on the tarmac of the other air craft monitoring the communications?

Gee, could one of the folks on the aircraft not turned off the cell phone and was yacking with someone at the airport, caused an electrical glitch that caused the incident?

They always have you turn off all devices?

[justLOT787]

Like I said before this was not just a normal accident it's just some thing more and as soon as people realize that then the truth will come out fast and that it really was a assassination on Polish President.

[guamainiac]

The truth is a bitter pill to swallow but I prefer that to lies. I am already in trouble and the Antanov/Saab camp have circled wagons for me just questioning his past. I never even got to mention that his father was cut down (but lived), in a hail of bullets.

They are not nice folks and more than willing to play mean. A cousin warns me my friend will be found dead in a Moscow hotel if he goes to deal some years back?

However the truth versus supposition? I am not convinced that this is an assassination. Had a senior crew been switched out and a sacrificial crew put in, well perhaps.

What facility is at the end of the fence by the crash site?

[guamainiac]

Contrast this crew with other crews and the Air France incident may be a good example.

The AF Captain had 10,000+ hours with 6,528 as Captain and 1,347 time in type.

The FO had 6,547 hours with 4,470 time in type.

The Polish crew had scant hours by comparison. They would never live up to the standards of many airlines would they? My friend with Pan Am had over 11,000 hours.

Captain .. 3,400 with 1,663 time in type ........ the fellow with the high work load and only one who could communicate in Russian
First Officer .. 1,700 with 198 time in type
Navigator .. not provided but some Yak time
Engineer .. not provided but he was an airframes specialist

Now, Even in the days of the 707 and 727 this does not sound like the folks I knew. Even the engineers were pilot rated (old or then quota hires from military jobs), from "post-Nam" B-52 or C-130 types. This is not necessarily the kind of crew that I would hand pick for a job flying the Polish President.

If for instance, the Captain became unable to perform the functions, the FO was not fluent in Russian to communicate and the engineer/navs not approved as pilots so the work load would be on one man since they could not man the right seat could they? I will try to figure out what certs they hold but it seems sketchy.

According to the Russians, even the PIC did not log the past months flights of 17 hours 7 minutes PIC time. That to me sounds very odd. Even my son's logs that have a total of 1.0 hours have the first page as Commercial ___ ATP ___ etc.

[Northwester]

Contrast this crew with other crews and the Air France incident may be a good example.

The AF Captain had 10,000+ hours with 6,528 as Captain and 1,347 time in type.

The FO had 6,547 hours with 4,470 time in type.

The Polish crew had scant hours by comparison. They would never live up to the standards of many airlines would they? My friend with Pan Am had over 11,000 hours.

Captain .. 3,400 with 1,663 time in type ........ the fellow with the high work load and only one who could communicate in Russian
First Officer .. 1,700 with 198 time in type
Navigator .. not licensed as a pilot he had what sounds to be flight theory
Engineer .. not licensed as a pilot, he was an airframes specialist

Now, Even in the days of the 707 and 727 this does not sound like the folks I knew. Even the engineers were pilot rated (old or then quota hires from military jobs), from "post-Nam" B-52 or C-130 types. This is not necessarily the kind of crew that I would hand pick for a job flying the Polish President.

If for instance, the Captain became unable to perform the functions, the FO was not fluent in Russian to communicate and the engineer/navs not licensed as pilots so the work load would be on one man since they could not man the right seat could they?

Not that this would change much, but to be accurate:
PIC - 3531 hours, 2906 in type
FO - 1909 hours, 475 in type
NAV - 1074, 302 as FO
ENG - 330, 330 in type

I don't think you can compare military pilots to commercial pilots in total number of hours. More accurate would be number of take-offs and landings. Military flights are frequently much shorter than commercial flights.

[guamainiac]

Note: Sorry, I failed to read the full Russian report. The nav may have had a pilot rating as may the engineer.

The Russians claim the Polish never turned records over.

I find it odd that things were not in the logs of the PIC, for hours flown that month.