Air France 447 - On topic only!

[Fear_of_Flying]

Gabriel. I don't believe what I'm hearing from you of all people. Nothing is more important than flying the plane, The AP or the FGMC cannot be trusted without the required levels of redundancy and we have two ADR's in disagreement. That means only IR can be trusted, and the procedures for recognizing and dealing with UAS are neither overwhelming nor unreasonably difficult if properly defined and trained. The question is, were they?

I sense a subtle change in your interpretation of events. Whereas you seemed previously to question just how manageable this situation might have been given the barrage of confusing information and harsh environment the pilots were faced with, it seems now that the training and ability of these same pilots is more at issue than ever, and that dealing with the UAS is not overwhelming after all. The pilots should have just flown the plane... shocking.

Could it be that you are being influenced by media reports - ignorant, lazy, in-over-their-heads reports - that have mentioned the possibility of inadequate training of the pilots, the fact that their displays were essentially ok, and the overriding fact that the pilots seemingly stalled the aircraft?

Not to worry, though. I also notice that suddenly others are wondering how the Qantas engine failure incident might be relevant here, in that the pilots spent forever-and-a-day sifting through error messages that were not prioritized, rather than figuring out the fastest way to get the plane on the ground.

[Darren Howie]

Its none of the big things Evan, its all of the small little things that add up.

Things like the thrust levers, sidestick - all these things subtlely remove the cues available to a pilot, and his "integration" with the machine.

Take something as simple as an engine failure.

A Boeing pilot will know about the engine failure by a few sources - engine indications, engine failure message. But the first one will probably be the control column rotating (as aileron is added by the a/p, or by himself) and the thrust levers moving forward. He will know something is wrong by the fact he is "connected" to the basic machine before any message or indication arrives.

The Airbus pilot will also know about the failure, but those two vital "aerodynamic" cues (for want of a better word) are missing. He is reliant on observing the thrust indication, or the message.

It isn't so much that he is totally out of the loop, but just that he hasn't been designed to be a part of the machine.

So, when it comes to having to, in the heat of battle, take over from the systems, it is easy to see why it would be difficult to be directly in tune.

For example - manual thrust. How many Airbus pilots have flown the aircraft around in manual thrust in cruise, and would know where the thrust levers should sit in manual? Conversely, the Boeing pilot knows approximately where they sit in normal cruise, and should be able to return them to the ballpark (which is all that is needed) very quickly.

Its not saying the Airbus is bad, its different. It makes up for these shortcomings in other ways. But it must be far harder for the pilot, when required, to assume the role of master, particularly when he does not get the experience of doing it the "old fashioned way" in normal operations.

Sorry but the info in this post is rubbish..
I'm a 320/330 Captain and been on the Bus for 8 years now..its ridiculous information like this which informs laymen of incorrect and blatently wrong information.
I cant believe you think we sit there waiting to be told we have had an engine failure..
MCM you have no idea about which you talk sorry.
And if Boeing's are so easy to hand fly please explain why two crashed in 2 years with unreliable speed issue's.
This crash had very little to do with an Airbus/Boeing thing and a lot more to do with the guys flying it there training etc.
Sorry to rain on your parade of Airbus misinformation..

[Myndee]

Myndee, I'm very glad you no longer will be a wannabe a&p person.



The article seems to confirm our main theory about the accident, which I would believe you weren't buying for some time, maybe until John Cox explained it
I don't see what it has to do with stupid or not stupid. Just to set the record straight, I'm not calling you stupid.

Your statement just seemed a little condescending and sexist, but if you say that's not what you meant then I accept that.

No, I don't have John Cox or Greg Feith on my list of contacts, but I would love Greg's number so I can ask him out. He's fine as hell. I digress. In the beginning I had another theory. It turns out it didn't make sense. I subscribed to the current theory a while back. I am a reasonable person and am willing to admit I am wrong.

Also, I no longer wish to be a wannabe A&P person either. I hope to specialize in avionics. I am going to school before I get too terribly old. It's never too late to accomplish something that you really want to do.

[Myndee]

Why not? Surely you can get some.

I can run with this one of three ways.

1. I have more balls than some men do.

2. I borrow a pair of balls whenever nature directs me to do so.

3. My husband and I are seperated so he has his back for the time being.

I'm done.

[Myndee]

It is after 11AM in France and still nothing. I am getting tired so I hope they hurry!

[Harding]

Where is the report gonna be avaliable?

[Jason]

First Official note available

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/flight.af.447.php

This shows pretty clear what happened.

[Jpmkam]

Air France Crash Probe Shows Jet Stalled, Plunged 3 1/2 Minutes to Ocean

Air France Flight 447 crashed after the Airbus A330 lost speed and stalled before beginning a three- and-a-half minute plunge into the Atlantic Ocean that killed all 228 people on board, an investigation found.

The findings, presented by the French BEA air-accident investigation bureau today, show the autopilot and auto-thrust system disengaged shortly after the pilots had alerted cabin crew of possible turbulence ahead. One of the co-pilots present in the cockpit took over, according to taped conversation from one of the flight recorders, and began edging the jet higher.

The preliminary analysis sheds more light on the final minutes before the deadliest crash in Air France’s history, with the pilots scrambling to avert disaster as the jet hurtled toward the ocean surface at a speed of 180 feet (55 meters) a second. The investigation achieved a breakthrough after the two flight recorders were recovered from 3,900 meters (12,800 feet) beneath the Atlantic and returned to Paris this month, two years after the jet disappeared into the night on June 1, 2009.

A low-speed stall occurs when an aircraft slows to the point where its wings suddenly lose lift, an incident pilots are trained to overcome. Earlier transmits from the jet had already shown that airspeed sensors, or pitot tubes, made by Thales SA (HO), had failed, presenting pilots with a sharp drop in speed readings on their displays.

All Data Recovered

The recording shows pilots had favored to climb above stormy clouds but were prevented from doing so because it wasn’t cold enough for the jet to ascend to that level. According to the BEA, all data and voice recordings from the two recorders were recovered in full, after being submersed for two years.

With the flight captain resting and the two co-pilots at the controls, the auto-pilots disengaged four hours into the flight. The pilots acknowledged that the speed sensors had failed as they responded by pulling up the nose of the aircraft, voice and data recordings show. A stall warning sounded in the cockpit, the BEA said.

According to the BEA, the co-pilots continued to increase the angle of climb, rising rapidly from 35,000 feet to 37,500 feet. When a third stall warning sounded, they continued to pull back on the controls with the engines set to full thrust and rose to about 38,000 feet, where the plane entered a stall.

Pilot Returns

Less than two minutes after the autopilot went offline, the chief pilot, Marc Dubois, returned to the cockpit, and the conversation shows he remained with his colleagues during the remainder of the flight. It’s routine for pilots to take a break away from the cockpit on long-haul flights, Air France has said.

Dubois never actually took back either his seat or the controls, according to the report. The other two pilots were 32 and 37 years old, with the younger controlling the aircraft.

With the plane’s nose still pointed up about 15 degrees, the jet began falling at about 10,000 feet a minute, rolling left and right. Almost one minute into the stall, the pilots had reduced engine thrust and tried pushing down on the controls to lower the nose.

Airspeed indications returned and the alarm sounded again as the stalled aircraft picked up some speed, though the plane continued falling until the first co-pilot commented that the aircraft was approaching an altitude of 10,000 feet. The final recordings show the aircraft had fallen back to a speed of about 123 miles per hour (198 kilometers per hour), the BEA said.

The BEA said its preliminary findings from the black-box data have not yet established any conclusions about the accident’s causes or led to any recommendations. An interim report is due in mid-July. Airbus, the world’s largest manufacturer of civil aircraft, said last week that it had no additional recommendations to operators of the A330 aircraft.

The report concluded that the aircraft remained stalled during its descent, and that the engines were operational and responded to crew commands throughout. Dubois was among the victims recovered from the ocean’s surface in the weeks after the crash, along with debris that included most of the tail fin.

[Myndee]

I'm confused. I thought that if there was a stall that the nose is to be lowered (especially with all of that altitude) to get lift going again. Why were they pulling the nose up for a minute, wasting time? Shouldn't they have lowered the nose first before they did anything else? Don't they trade altitude for airspeed?



I see that we were right on everything, except for the entire failure of the airspeed indications, I guess.

How did they allow this to happen? Surely I am overlooking something?

[3WE]

Sorry but the info in this post is rubbish..
I'm a 320/330 Captain and been on the Bus for 8 years now..its ridiculous information like this which informs laymen of incorrect and blatently wrong information.
I cant believe you think we sit there waiting to be told we have had an engine failure..
MCM you have no idea about which you talk sorry.
And if Boeing's are so easy to hand fly please explain why two crashed in 2 years with unreliable speed issue's.
This crash had very little to do with an Airbus/Boeing thing and a lot more to do with the guys flying it there training etc.
Sorry to rain on your parade of Airbus misinformation..

Naw, I don't think it's rubbish.

You are one pilot, and you are entitled to your opoinion, but I hearby proclaim that your view is one sided.

There are other airbus pilots, and they have made mention that airbus automation can sometimes be counter intuitive. One once said something like, "What's it doing now?".

And there are other pilot- sitting on the outside, looking in, saying, gosh that sure SEEMS to be counter intuitive- maybe they are wrong and you are right. But, then again, maybe there's some good logic that goes into an intuitive design. Sorry, but hearing some of the descriptions of the control systems seem to cleary make pilots into drivers and not airmen.

So my opinion (and it's just an opinion)...MCM does a good job providing information and on addresing both sides of arguments when they exist. His post is not rubbish, however your reply seems very biased.

[3WE]

I'm confused. I thought that if there was a stall that the nose is to be lowered (especially with all of that altitude) to get lift going again. Why were they pulling the nose up for a minute, wasting time? Shouldn't they have done that first?

I see that we were right on everything, except for the entire failure of the airspeed indications, I guess.

How did they allow this to happen? Surely I am overlooking something?

Ma'am. Do you read other threads on this forum? Maybe try to find some other posts in other threads from that Gabriel guy.

[Theoddkiwi]

I'm confused. I thought that if there was a stall that the nose is to be lowered (especially with all of that altitude) to get lift going again. Why were they pulling the nose up for a minute, wasting time? Shouldn't they have done that first?

I see that we were right on everything, except for the entire failure of the airspeed indications, I guess.

How did they allow this to happen? Surely I am overlooking something?

Unfortunately its history repeating itself. There have been to many aircraft lost effectively by handling errors.

[Darren Howie]

3We i have heard pilots in more aircraft than just an Airbus asking "whats it doing now"?
Generally it comes from people with knowledge on the aircraft that is deficient or confused about things like mode reversions etc.
I've done it myself when you may expect one outcome and when it doesnt happen you tend to blame the aircraft.
The Airbus is a very complicated system with multiple levels of integration that create a system which requires a good level of recurrent knowledge. If you dont maintain that knowledge it will punish you.
In the case of AF447 it will punish you severely.
Having read the report its clear immediately the crew did not follow the recall for unreliable speed. At now stage did they set pitch and thrust settings for sustained flight at cruise level.
I'm sure there is a lot of information they have not released but increasing the pitch attitude and reducing the thrust to idle is/was a recipe for disaster.
You havn't overlooked anything either.
The standard recovery of an unreliable speed scenario is to run a drill which sets a pitch and thrust setting which will safely preserve the flight envelope of the aircraft and then consult a set of tables for a pitch/thrust setting for sustained flight.
If all 3 speed indications are gone a reversion to back up speed ensues which allows you to fly angle of attack instead of speed.
At night over the ocean in the late hours of the night it really couldnt of occured at a worse time or place. However unreliable speed situations occur frequently in all aircraft and a thorough knowledge of the actions is required to me memorized by all crew.
It appears for some reason the Air France team did not at this stage appear to have followed them from the info in the report...

[Myndee]

Ma'am. Do you read other threads on this forum? Maybe try to find some other posts in other threads from that Gabriel guy.

I don't understand what you mean. No, I don't read every single thread, but I do read a lot of his posts. I'm not asking for a three hour lecture on stalls, nor do I intend to read the entire "stall" thread. I'm simply trying to get clarification so I can get this right in my head. I thought that in order to recover from a stall that the procedure is nose down, get lift, fly again. I am trying to understand why these pilots were climbing. Nothing more, nothing less. I am not a pilot, and I haven't had classes on aerodynamics yet. I know I am a dreaded female who asks questions that annoy guys who were born knowing everything. I'm only trying to understand. I am thirty-four. I know that is like super-ancient these days, and although I appreciate your intent of being respectful, there is no need to be so formal.

[Myndee]

Unfortunately its history repeating itself. There have been to many aircraft lost effectively by handling errors.

In my post I wasn't clear again. Stayed up all night waiting for the data, paying for it now. I meant to say "shouldn't they have lowered the nose first before they did anything else." Don't they trade altitude for airspeed?