Air France plane missing?

[IntheShade]

Seriously?!! Thats insane!

Indeed and it is the primary reason that I choose not to fly AirBus aircraft (so now you know).

The problem has been solved but it is one of the craziest things I have ever wittnessed.............

Other than AirBus publicy stating that they would not support five A-340 traded in by Delta Airlines to BOEING (I think they were the airline) for BOEING 777

Even competing airlines have a system in place to give each other spare parts in the interest of public safety. They compete economically but not on safety.

When AirBus publically announced they would not support these five aircraft either operationally or parts this was the second reason I refuse to fly AirBus aircraft (so now you know the other reason I don't check out on AirBus aircraft).

Of course the backlash of these statements made AirBus retract them but I think both cases show the real intent and attitude of corporate AirBus.

[wannabe_A&P_girl]

New photos of debris released by BAF:

http://www.fab.mil.br/portal/voo447/FOTOS/dia0606/avistamento03.jpg

http://www.fab.mil.br/portal/voo447/FOTOS/dia0606/060609_aproximacao_de_destrocos2.jpg

http://www.fab.mil.br/portal/voo447/FOTOS/dia0606/060609_aproximacao_de_destrocos5.jpg

http://www.fab.mil.br/portal/voo447/FOTOS/dia0606/060609_aproximacao_de_destrocos1.jpg

http://www.fab.mil.br/portal/voo447/...destrocos3.jpg

I hope I am reading this correctly...these were taken on 6/6/09 and there is still a fire?

Also, on the second photo, if you look closely while it is loading, it appears as though there is a shark (or some other large fish) just under the water's surface. That's what it looks like to me, anyway. It might just be too early and I haven't had enough caffiene.

[retox]

I hope I am reading this correctly...these were taken on 6/6/09 and there is still a fire?

Also, on the second photo, if you look closely while it is loading, it appears as though there is a shark (or some other large fish) just under the water's surface. That's what it looks like to me, anyway. It might just be too early and I haven't had enough caffiene.

That's not fire. It's smoke from a flare - they are dealing with a VERY large expanse of ocean - the flare helps an air response crew find the boat that found the debris.

[wannabe_A&P_girl]

Here is an edit of the picture. Kind of off-topic, but if that is what it looks like, obviously we can really see the dangers the searchers have to deal with:

[Gabriel]

That's not fire. It's smoke from a flare - they are dealing with a VERY large expanse of ocean - the flare helps an air response crew find the boat that found the debris.

I think it's the other way around. Air crew drops high visibility smoke cans next to de debris for the boats to find them easier. With all probability the air search find things faster but can't retrive them. Coodrinates would become wrong quickly with the debris drifting. The smoke can would drift with the debris.

[wannabe_A&P_girl]

That's not fire. It's smoke from a flare - they are dealing with a VERY large expanse of ocean - the flare helps an air response crew find the boat that found the debris.

Oops! Thanks for clearing that up for me. -embarrassed-

[Evan]

But if you switch the ADIRSs off won't you loose a lot of other functions (some very critical) other than the normal law? Things air data 8airspeed, altitude, vertical speed) in both PFDs, among other things like FMS navigation?

Wouldn't you be left basically with the standby instruments (the ISIS)?

As far as I know, the control law cannot be removed from Normal unless there are multiple failures of redundant systems. This would be the only way I can think of to manually create that situation.

This is from the 'Nose Down Order" AD:

In order to prevent the ADR from providing erroneous data to other aircraft systems, EASA [Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E [dated November 19, 2008] was issued to require, in case faulty Inertial Reference (IR) is detected, to isolate both the IR and ADR by accomplishment of a modified Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) operational procedure.
Since that AD [EASA AD 2008-0203-E, dated November 19, 2008] was issued, it has been reported that the "OFF'' light did not illuminate in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF. Investigation has determined that the ADIRU was indeed sometimes affected by another failure control.
To prevent such a failure, the operational procedure has been updated to instruct the flight crew to de-energize the ADIRU if the "OFF'' light is not illuminated after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF. Consequently, [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0225-E [dated December 18, 2008], which superseded [EASA Emergency] AD 2008-0203-E [dated November 19, 2008], requires accomplishment of the updated AFM operational procedure.
Since this second AD was issued [EASA Emergency AD 2008-0225-E, dated December 18, 2008], a new service event has been reported highlighting that, in some failure cases, even though the "OFF'' light illuminates in the cockpit after setting the IR and ADR pushbuttons to OFF, the IR could keep providing erroneous data to other systems.
In order to address all identified failure cases, de-energizing the affected ADIRU must be done by setting the IR mode rotary selector to OFF. Consequently, this AD, which supersedes AD 2008- 0225-E [dated December 18, 2008], requires accomplishment of the updated AFM operational procedure.

BTW, the issue with Qantas 72 was not really ADIRU failure, the A330 is designed to be fault tolerant of course. It was the failure of the primary computer to rule out the single faulty ADIRU and favor the remaining two, which continued to function normally. The system of redundancy broke down right there. The Airbus AD response was to kill the ADIRU that might be providing faulty internal reference, something the computer is supposed to be doing.

I haven't seen an AD directed to the computer fault itself.

[Evan]

Edited to ask if alternate law is the same thing as manual control, or if it is only partial manual control. Sorry!

I asked this earlier and don't remember seeing a reply, so please don't get angry for me asking again.
Am I understanding it correctly that the Airbus computers will not allow the flight crew to assume complete manual control of the aircraft? The computer still requires data to be put in for it to analyze, even though critical systems may be malfunctioning? There has to be a way to turn it off, yes?
If the above is true, please excuse the reference, but that seems a little like K.A.R.R., K.I.T.T.'s evil twin.

If you haven't discovered it already, this page gives a clear explanation of the four flight control 'laws' governing the Airbus FBW system. There is a fully mechanical control level (with hydraulics), but it's nothing you ever want to wrestle with.

http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm

[retox]

There are now two competing theories in the media (#2 being more prevalent)

#1. Flight Crew slowed down too much into the storm and simply stalled.
#2. Pitot tubes iced and clogged. This would start a chain reaction as follows:
• Pitot tube clog begins
• Airspeed indicators falsely display a somewhat slower than actual speed
• Thrust is slightly increased
• Actual airspeed increases
• Clog worsens (displayed speed decreases)
• AC is put into a nose down attitude to help regain speed
• AC gains speed due to nose down attitude
• Pitot tube clog continues to worsen (displayed speed decreases)
• Airspeed indicators show a progressively lower speed in relation to actual speed
• Flight crew adds thrust and continues a nose-down attitude
• AC finally reaches VMO during turbulence and structural failure begins which causes flight data errors, electrical failures, and eventual decompression

Would that overlay properly with the actual chain of events (as reported to ACARS). Keep in mind, there have been reports that the timeline below MAY NOT BE EXACT (It may be only one or two minutes worth of activity rather than a full four minutes due to inherent delays).

02:10Z:
Autothrust off
Autopilot off
FBW alternate law
Rudder Travel Limiter Fault (air speed fluctuations exceed compensation ability of the RTL)
TCAS fault due to antenna fault (auto-switch to TA due to stall or wind shear)
Flight Envelope Computation warning
All pitot static ports lost

02:11Z:
Failure of all three ADIRUs
Failure of gyros of ISIS (attitude information lost)

02:12Z:
ADIRUs Air Data disagree

02:13Z:
Flight Management, Guidance and Envelope Computer fault
PRIM 1 fault
SEC 1 fault

02:14Z:
Cabin Pressure Controller fault (cabin vertical speed)

[Evan]

There are now two competing theories in the media (#2 being more prevalent)

#1. Flight Crew slowed down too much into the storm and simply stalled.

Theory #1 is that they didn't maintain a safe margin over Vs1 for sudden wind shear. That's a bit different from simply stalling the a/c, which would be impossible under normal conditions in Normal Law.

[wannabe_A&P_girl]

Sorry if this is yet another redundant question, but as I understand it, aren't the pitot tubes heated? Is that the malfunction that is stated in the AD warranting replacement?
I'll "get" all of this someday. Promise.

[Cargo Runner]

Sorry if this is yet another redundant question, but as I understand it, aren't the pitot tubes heated? Is that the malfunction that is stated in the AD warranting replacement?
I'll "get" all of this someday. Promise.

Don't know about the 'bus but on the L1011 they are just an alloy pipe that comes out of the front of the a/c, lower front side.... no wiring attached to the ones I have but as I said don't know about the airbus models.

[wannabe_A&P_girl]

I just read something on another forum that states that the last four minutes of the FDR were uploaded via satelite link and the investigators already have the critical info. Of course it is impossible to know if this report is accurate. I didn't even know that it was possible?

Although the flight recorders lie about 12,000ft below the ocean surface, the BEA has data on the last four minutes of Flight 447, transmitted automatically by satellite to Air France's base at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article6430398.ece

[paulomario77]

Evan,

Are you absolutely sure the A330 has a fully mechanical "backup"? The webpage you provided a link to seems to be somewhat generic, and not specific to the A330.

If you haven't discovered it already, this page gives a clear explanation of the four flight control 'laws' governing the Airbus FBW system. There is a fully mechanical control level (with hydraulics), but it's nothing you ever want to wrestle with.

http://www.airbusdriver.net/airbus_fltlaws.htm

[retox]

Sorry if this is yet another redundant question, but as I understand it, aren't the pitot tubes heated? Is that the malfunction that is stated in the AD warranting replacement?
I'll "get" all of this someday. Promise.

Yes, all AC rated for IFR must have heated pitot tubes.