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They were banking a lot and also there were oscillations pitch.
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A few ~ facts ~ that seem to be ignored over at hallowed PPrune:THS the stall
Lazerdog, quote:
"Would full forward side-stick have caused immediate stall recovery, or would the PF have to wait until the THS auto-trim caught up with nose-down trim?"
Quote:
Short answer is: don't know. But I think we can expect that the AoA would have started to reduce immediately. Unless the THS motor stalled, which would be unlikely at such a low airspeed (low loading), the THS would have started moving immediately.
- The THS (auto-trim function) is driven by three electrical motors, not one. Each is driven by a separate PRIM. If one stalled (failed to provide expected results), another would take over, and then another...
- The maximum nose down deflection of the THS is only 2°. Elevator deflection max is 15°.
- "the THS auto-trim caught up with nose-down trim" makes no sense to me.Comment
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Do you agree that, as soon as the pilot makes a nose-down input (that will be interpreted as a nose-down pitch rate or a below-1G load factor demand), the FCCs will command nose-down elevator as needed to achieve that demand and nose-down THS to neutralize the elevator while keeping that demand (i.e. to make said "as needed" = 0)?Originally posted by Evan View Post
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---Comment
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Looks like we can dismiss yet another possible theory in our own investigation.
I actually believe it was pilot error, judging by the BEA's handling of things.
It's only logical that if they recovered 100% of the CVR, given the accident event lasted 4 minutes, the crew would have said something to indicate they were having difficulty with systems or controls.Comment
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BEA to do press release this Friday, July 25th.
The third BEA Interim Report will be published on Friday 29 July 2011. This report will present the exact circumstances of the accident with an initial analysis and some new findings based on the data recovered from the flight recorders.
At the same time, a press briefing will be organised at the BEA at 14 h 30.Comment
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I knew it wouldn't be long before we heard something else.
I wonder how much will change?I do work for a domestic US airline, and it should be noted that I do not represent such airline, or any airline. My opinions are mine alone, and aren't reflective of anything but my own knowledge, or what I am trying to learn. At no time will I discuss my specific airline, internal policies, or any such info.Comment
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Interesting discussion that runs many pages. And not from the point of view of Air France, BEA, or Airbus, which is very valuable.
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener...covery&next=20
I'll bet close to 100 percent of commercial pilots would agree with this paragraph:
"All of this, including training, policies and procedures has to be part of an operator's organizational culture," Dismukes says. "If we just say the pilots screwed up, then we're not going to learn anything and we're not going to prevent future accidents."Comment
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I do agree 100%. But I don't qualify for your survey.Originally posted by EconomyClass View Post
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---Comment
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Air France has released an 'executive summary' in advance of its press conference today. It reveals that nothing, aside from the pitot failure, malfunctioned on the aircraft. There was no anomalous THS issue. The crash was entirely the result of pilot error and bad CRM.
Key points:
- The copilots had received no high altitude training for the "Unreliable IAS" procedure and manual aircraft handling
- There is no CRM training for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief Captain
- The speed displayed on the left PFD remained invalid for 29 seconds
This pretty much says it all. This is very, very damning for Air France, the BEA and the industry in general. It is also pretty much exculpatory for Airbus. The aircraft responded as designed throughout the sequence. I'm sure the scarebus theorists will be disappointed. However, I expect that there will be a lot of changes made with regard to training of basic airmanship and contingency procedures.Comment
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Human failure
A Belgian newspaper just announced that human failure and unreliable instrumentation are the cause for this crash. Complete bulletin from BEA is announced for this evening.Comment
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Unreliable instrumentation was not the cause of this crash.Originally posted by Cuberubix View Post
The report recommends that AoA indications be included in the cockpit. No Boeing or Airbus aircraft certification currently requires them. They have recently been offered as an add-on option on the 737NG.Comment
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Ok, I read the report. Kind of disappointing. I thought there were to be new revelations, but I don't see many. Really, is that all they said in the cockpit the whole time?
The report did mention that the THS and elevator movements were consistent with pilot's inputs, if that puts to rest some earlier discussion on this thread, though it's too bad in a way the controls did what they were supposed to - where are those protections when you need them?
For an agency that's all about standardization, why is it no two reports have the same format? I feel like they put this out because they said there would be something by the end of July, and so here it is... something by the end of July - let's see if we can get away with it.Comment
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