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INFOGRAPHIE - Les premières analyses des boîtes noires semblent disculper Airbus dans le scénario de l'accident de l'AF 447.
Their logic is flawed. The fact that the investigation has not released an immediate bulletin to operators may indicate that there is nothing that poses an immediate threat in the design of the A330, but it does not tell us that there are no issues with the aircraft's manageability in high altitude UAS or the issues of pilot interface, interdependent system failures and loss of flight envelope protections. That would take some time to analyze. It is too early to rule out any causative or contributing factors related to the design of the aircraft at this point.
Also, the article mentions lack of fuel as a possible factor in determining what caused them to fly straight into the storm. The interim report fuel order already dismissed this concern.
If the source of the problem is the crappy Pitot tubes they were slow in replacing, haven't they ALREADY released that guidance? I can't imagine a total replacement of the flight management systems. Have they cautioned airlines about flying through storms at the equator (as if airlines even need that guidance)? In short, I'm just wondering what more Airbus can do at this time that is within the realm of reason. Maybe long run they do need a redesign of the flight management system, but that seems like a major undertaking to me, so I don't see how they could tell airlines anything about that, either.
In short, Le Figaro (in my eyes) is making news out of non-news. They should just STFU for now. Are any other French news sources running non-stories about this?
Their logic is flawed. The fact that the investigation has not released an immediate bulletin to operators may indicate that there is nothing NEW that poses an immediate threat
Fixed. Let's remember that Airbus already issued bulletins regarding the ptitot tubes and the unreliable speed procedures. Why do it again if the balck boxes confirmed that?
Let's also remember that we know, by fact, that some systems went down.
"Failing the AP and the AT, putting a lot of flags in the screens, disabling the rudder limiter, reverting to abnormal alternate law. Stupid pilots. How could they make those mistakes?" Sure
Pilot error? Yes.
Airplane failures? Too.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
The answer is simple; because they can! They got everyone to click the button and kept the chump change, but better than no change, advertising dollars or francs rolling or trickling in.
As long as they don't lie or slander with malice they really don't have to answer to anyone do they?
Yes, I have a friend in the business and his mantra with me .. "what part of this don't you get, it doesn't matter ... you bought a paper or went on the web site ... and truth is not an issue because they don't care".
Fixed. Let's remember that Airbus already issued bulletins regarding the ptitot tubes and the unreliable speed procedures. Why do it again if the balck boxes confirmed that?
I was thinking just that. Like I have said before, we had a very good idea of what could have happened to this flight, even before the CVR/FDR and the bulk of the wreckage were found - probably an industry first. If the black boxes do really confirm that, then Le Figaro isn't that off. We could argue how it is bad/lazy/misleading journalism, and it might as well be. Yet, to us in this forum, their interpretation and not their fact presentation is what is significant. So to me, there are two main scenarios: 1) They completely made it up; 2) The CVR/FDR confirmed BEA's preliminary reports, bulletins have been issued, preventative measures have already been taken, and now it is time to look deeper into the crew's actions and the interface of the automation, in order to fully understand why things happened the way they did.
Fixed. Let's remember that Airbus already issued bulletins regarding the ptitot tubes and the unreliable speed procedures. Why do it again if the balck boxes confirmed that?
Let's also remember that we know, by fact, that some systems went down.
"Failing the AP and the AT, putting a lot of flags in the screens, disabling the rudder limiter, reverting to abnormal alternate law. Stupid pilots. How could they make those mistakes?" Sure
Pilot error? Yes.
Airplane failures? Too.
Remember that UAS alone cannot explain this crash. The pitot issue only explains why the UAS occurred (although the actual reason for failure still remains undefined) but the real defining issue is: what prevented them from dealing with it—what led to a crash? Pilot error? A cascade of systemic failures? Confusing interface? Flawed QRH procedures? Overwhelming conditions? All of the above? None of this can be deduced from a lack of response at this point.
Thales probes can fail in these conditions. Goodrich probes can fail in these conditions. UAS at cruise altitude has already reoccurred since the crash. The critical issue to resolve lies in determining what else went wrong.
True. Logically it seems like the emergency measures failed somehow. The fact that pitot tubes could stop giving reliable speed is known going in. And I suppose the procedures have been spelled out. What is not known is whether those procedures are realistic in all cases. I have to believe that even aviation preparedness only covers situations up to the last fraction of a percent. Somewhere in there is a limit past which catastrophe happens. That strikes me as something that can't be instantly known.
We don't know what the data have revealed. Depending on how bone-headed the pilot's actions were, responsibility for this accident may very well shift away from Airbus and onto other factors - see Colgan. Nor would it require much time or analysis to see where things were heading were that the case.
Airbus came out with similar statements about there being no (new) technical problems the day after the Figaro article. So if you're going to claim that Le Figaro is irresponsible, you will have to do the same for Airbus.
If - subsequent to the pitot failure - the aircraft behaved exactly as it was supposed to, it was predictable how it would behave, it is documented how it would behave, and there are procedures in place for such a contingency that would have kept it flying, and the pilot did not follow those procedures, ultimately how are you going to say Airbus - beyond the intial pitot tube problems - was the problem? You might argue that the design and logic of the systems and procedures aren't ideal in all real-world situations, but you could say the same for the Dash 8, couldn't you? Yet I don't think many people think that Colgan was the Dash-8's fault.
You, as the intelligent reader of news you keep insisting we all should be, have to weigh information. A newspaper enters a gray area when it uses an anonymous source, but we have to recognize that, and if the source is trusted, I think it's legitimate for the paper to use that tactic in some circumstances. Having said that, Le Figaro is a large newspaper. It knew what it was doing when it released the article, it knew there would be international attention, and one has to consider what further motives might have been at play.
To me, the basic message to the mass audience was that the Airbus you're flying in next week isn't going to fall from the sky because of some defect suddenly discovered in the AF investigation.
................... I have to believe that even aviation preparedness only covers situations up to the last fraction of a percent. Somewhere in there is a limit past which catastrophe happens. That strikes me as something that can't be instantly known.
You are correct - this is what the industry calls a "statistical outlier".
A good example was BA 39 flight that crash landed at LHR a few years ago. Both engines quit within 10 seconds of each due to icing. Although subsequent investigation showed icing has occurred a few times on a single engine. Once a statical outlier cause is found it is usually corrected even though the odds of it hapening again are very remote.
To me, the basic message to the mass audience was that the Airbus you're flying in next week isn't going to fall from the sky because of some defect suddenly discovered in the AF investigation.
Has anyone heard of this? Must have been scary to be on board:
Incident: Air France A332 over Atlantic on Nov 30th 2009, Mayday call due to severe turbulence
This was AF445, the newly designated AF447 route (AF447 was 'retired'). They encountered turbulence and descended normally from FL380 to FL360 without ATC contact. They used the MAYDAY call for this reason, to get everyone's attention. Unless there is more to the story that the BEA has yet to reveal, there isn't much to this, and the pax probably never detected the FL change.
Still, in the wake of AF447, with many questions still unanswered, I am wondering what led them to (a) fly directly into this kind of thing once again and (b) be at FL380 at 195+t while doing it. They don't seem to have learned anything about caution from all of this.
I'm also wondering how unnerving it would be for the TAM pilots to hear an Air France MAYDAY call coming from that location (UN866 near DEKON, about as close as you get to TASIL and AF447 LKP on that airway). That might send a shiver down my spine.
Still, in the wake of AF447, with many questions still unanswered, I am wondering what led them to (a) fly directly into this kind of thing once again and (b) be at FL380 at 190+t while doing it. They don't seem to have learned anything about caution from all of this.
I'm also wondering how unnerving it would be for the TAM pilots to hear an Air France MAYDAY call coming from that location (UN866 near DEKON, about as close as you get to TASIL and AF447 LKP on that airway). That might send a shiver down my spine.
Exactly. We know AF pilots flew into severe weather again. Also that the A330 doesn't break up in severe turbulence (which I think could have made it terrifying for the passengers, especially only half a year after 447). A big difference is this was not an unreliable airspeed event.
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