Polish President and wife killed in Tu-154 crash

[Northwester]

The Russians might have done a lot of things wrong.

- The Russians might have instructed the plane to descend to 100m. But the Polish crew went below that.
- The Russians might have given the pilot wrong weather information (and even could have made up the fog). But the Polish crew could not see the runway when they reached the minimums and still continued descending.
- The Russians might have taken one hour to respond with the rescue. But the people on the plane was all dead 0.1 seconds after the final impact.

Unless the CVR and FDR are fake, nothing that the Russians could have done wrong will change that the pilot busted minimums and that he did it in a horrible way. I mean, busting minimums is always very wrong, but one thing is leveling off at the minimum an then slowly get down a 10 or 20 meters more, and another thing is to ignore the minimum and continue with a descent at 2 / 3 times the vertical speed of a typical approach and 35km/h over the approach speed and keep doing that until 20m or lower.

The biggest mistake of the crew was (if this is confirmed, of course - I will wait for the results of Polish investigation) for the navigator to start using radalt from the 300m alt on. That gave the pilots an impression of flying at 100m alt when in reality they were descending. Once they realized something was not right, they immediately initiated "go around" procedure. There was no intention to continue descending. I do not buy the argument that the co-pilot did not know what force to apply to overpower the AP. Both the PIC and co-pilot called for go around. PIC did it before the co-pilot, so it must have been around the time when the navigator called 90. At that time they had still enough altitude to recover. Why it did not work - I don't know. Hopefully there is some information somewhere that will shed some light on it.

[guamainiac]

How could they give the pilots bad information on the fog and then say they couldn't see the runway? Clouds are "low fog" so??

It the base was decommissioned do you think a fire and rescue crew on a foggy day might have trouble locating a crash site especially if they were sent "TDY" and did not have sufficient local area familiarity? Heck they might not have even had the key to unlock the back gate once they found it.

Now, how could you not find a crash of that magnitude. Simple, a crash would just sound like a big bump and bang ... but wait, there was no fog.

But wait, wouldn't the pilots say something on the CVR like "fog, what fog, I can see my house from here" but wait, weren't all of the Polish journalists that were waiting for the plane and had their cameras confiscated seeing the fog that .... but wait there may have been fog machines.

Come to think of it and I have a bit of experience with this, you could mistake a searchlight for a fog or snow making machine. Really, you could that proves that a snow making machine could look like something that could make fog except that.

[guamainiac]

Peter, on a serious note, there was some mention that under the military protocol that ATC did have the authority to deny the permission to land. This was at or about the same time that the "Chicago agreement" was first mentioned. That was when I first asked that question.

[Evan]

(if this is confirmed, of course - I will wait for the results of Polish investigation)

Ok.

There was no intention to continue descending.

Whoa! I thought we were waiting. Northwester, I can understand how you want to refute the obvious conclusions of the Russian report. But, unless the CVR, DFR and quick access module transcriptions are fakes, there is no way around the fact that this is pure pilot error, albeit with exacerbating circumstances.

There was no intention to continue descending.

According to the DFR, they never stopped descending. The reason we hear multiple callouts for 100m is because they are reading radalt and the terrain is briefly descending as the plane is descending. There is no control input to level off at any time before 60m RA, which is 10-15m QFE.

It's hard to say what the biggest mistake was, since there are so many. Here are a few:

- failure to properly plan the flight and coordinate with the field operations;
- decision to make a "trial approach" in conditions that were clearly below minima;
- failure to properly brief the approach with the crew and the controllers;
- failure to go-around early when the approach speed was too high and above glidepath;
- failure to disengage autopilot during the non-precision approach;
- failure to understand the limitations of the Tu 154M automation, notably the autothrottle limitations;
- failure to monitor both barometric and radar altimeters, and to call go-around at 100m QFE;
- failure to maintain proper altimeter calibration (it appears that the PIC's baro was reset during final, possibly to silence the TAWS warnings;
- failure to accept a Russian navigator familiar with the field when offered;
- failure to respect sterile cockpit rules;
- failure to apply sufficient breakout force at 60m;
- failure to apply pitch, TOGA thrust and retract gear/flaps at 100m;
- failure to apply TOGA thrust and retract gear/flaps at 60m;
- failure to respect TAWS warnings
- failure to respect ATC warnings
- failure to respect warnings from colleagues on the ground.
- and so forth...

Your only hope of spinning this one is to prove that the report is an outright, intentional fabrication. That would be a criminal act on the part of the Russians, and is a very serious accusation. The Polish investigation should either make that accusation, publicly, or concede to the reality of the facts as they are.

Short of that, you are just fighting a battle that is already lost. I'm sorry this one has thus far not turned out the way you wanted it. It is shocking and hard to accept, even without patriotic bias.

[Northwester]

Well, now, that's a good question. Maybe it was so the 98% of the world who aren't Polish or blinded by anti-Russian venom could actually learn how the plane crashed. For the rest of you, I can't think of a single reason.

So why do you think the current Polish government that is considered PRO-RUSSIAN is thinking about resorting to international arbitration?

[Northwester]

Ok.



Whoa! I thought we were waiting. Northwester, I can understand how you want to refute the obvious conclusions of the Russian report. But, unless the CVR, DFR and quick access module transcriptions are fakes, there is no way around the fact that this is pure pilot error, albeit with exacerbating circumstances.



According to the DFR, they never stopped descending. The reason we hear multiple callouts for 100m is because they are reading radalt and the terrain is briefly descending as the plane is descending. There is no control input to level off at any time before 60m RA, which is 10-15m QFE.

It's hard to say what the biggest mistake was, since there are so many. Here are a few:

- failure to properly plan the flight and coordinate with the field operations;
- decision to make a "trial approach" in conditions that were clearly below minima;
- failure to properly brief the approach with the crew and the controllers;
- failure to go-around early when the approach speed was too high and above glidepath;
- failure to disengage autopilot during the non-precision approach;
- failure to understand the limitations of the Tu 154M automation, notably the autothrottle limitations;
- failure to monitor both barometric and radar altimeters, and to call go-around at 100m QFE;
- failure to maintain proper altimeter calibration (it appears that the PIC's baro was reset during final, possibly to silence the TAWS warnings;
- failure to accept a Russian navigator familiar with the field when offered;
- failure to respect sterile cockpit rules;
- failure to apply sufficient breakout force at 60m;
- failure to apply pitch, TOGA thrust and retract gear/flaps at 100m;
- failure to apply TOGA thrust and retract gear/flaps at 60m;
- failure to respect TAWS warnings
- failure to respect ATC warnings
- failure to respect warnings from colleagues on the ground.
- and so forth...

Your only hope of spinning this one is to prove that the report is an outright, intentional fabrication. That would be a criminal act on the part of the Russians, and is a very serious accusation. The Polish investigation should either make that accusation, publicly, or concede to the reality of the facts as they are.

Short of that, you are just fighting a battle that is already lost. I'm sorry this one has thus far not turned out the way you wanted it. It is shocking and hard to accept, even without patriotic bias.

Could you make a list of improper actions on the Russian side?

[Northwester]

I still insist there was not intention to descend below 100m. When both PIC and co-pilot call for go around and there is a record of attempts to overpower AP, there can be no other conclusion. I don't know why they did not succeed - this is still a mystery.

You cannot condemn anyone without listening to both sides, the prosecutor and the defendant. The Russians attached Polish comments to their report, but conveniently forgot to translate it to English, as they did with their report. We need to wait for the Polish report before judging any actions. Some of the accusations provided by the Russians and used on this forum will be proven outright false.

[Evan]

Could you make a list of improper actions on the Russian side?

What would that change? It was a non-precision approach. It required visual flight below 100m QFE.

I still insist there was not intention to descend below 100m. When both PIC and co-pilot call for go around and there is a record of attempts to overpower AP, there can be no other conclusion. I don't know why they did not succeed - this is still a mystery.

It's quite simple. If this is a go-around attempt, it is a botched go-around for the following reasons.

-There is an attempt to apply pitch to 5° ANU but there is no other action such as adding TOGA thrust or cleaning configuration (pilot error).

- It occurs at 10-15m QFE (failure to monitor) and 60m RA (failure to respect the MDA)

- The autopilot is still engaged in the pitch channel without guidance (failure to adhere to FCOM procedure, or basic airmanship).

- The attempt to raise pitch fails because the column is not pulled back enough to override the autopilot. and the autopilot simply trims the elevators back to their previous position (failure to understand the aircraft automation)

Whatever their intentions. it's pilot error. And those errors are due to bad piloting, including a failure to monitor. And all of this is likely due to improper pressures from VIP officials and the resulting stress this creates.

Final analysis: flawed safety culture leading to pilot error.

-OR-

All the data is fabricated, in which case the Polish government needs to make an outright accusation against the Russians that the data is fabricated, not misinterpreted. This constitutes an enormous international crime and therefore before they make such an accusation they must be able to back it up with hard evidence, and, of course, motive.

Is there a comment on the Polish version stating that the DFDR (from the quick access module) plots are inaccurate? If not, game over.

[Gabriel]

What would that change? It was a non-precision approach. It required visual flight below 100m QFE.

Wrong. Runway in sight is required to descend below 100m
If you see the ground due to downwards visibility and some forward visibility but not enough to have the runway in sight, you canot descend below 100m.

I want to add that, unlike the precision approach that have a DECSION altitude (DA), in a non precision approach you are not supposed do keep descending thrugh the MINIMUM DESCENT altitude (MDA) and at that point start the go-around. You are supposed to start the level off a bit earlier as to have the airplane fully leveled off not below the MDA.

[kris]

Right, except when the horizontal visibility is 200 - 400m, the controller cannot be sure that there are no obstacles on the RWY and has to interrupt the approach.

Planes land (legally) in worse conditions. ATC can never be 100% sure there is nothing on the runway.

After examining the CVR recording, Polish side determined that PIC first issued "go around" command, then co-pilot repeated it. That part was not included in the Russian version.

Source please?

The biggest mistake of the crew was (if this is confirmed, of course - I will wait for the results of Polish investigation) for the navigator to start using radalt from the 300m alt on.

I believe their biggest "mistake" was going below 100m, radalt or otherwise.
Another was not using the pressure altimeter. Or perhaps the PIC was using it after someone (NAV?) reset it to standard pressure?

BTW I believe the Polish team has the original QAR data, confirming the FDR plots. Do you think Russians fabricated this as well?

However if it were a military flight Russian ATC would have that unquestioned authority to wave the PIC off.

Or maybe: "However if it were a Russian military flight ATC would have that unquestioned authority to wave the PIC off"?

Was there a meeting to establish a "chain of command" for this flight?

I'd be really surprised if the Russian ATC was considered being in command of Polish Presidential aircraft, esp. after Poland left the Eastern Bloc.

- The attempt to raise pitch fails because the column is not pulled back enough to override the autopilot. and the autopilot simply trims the elevators back to their previous position (failure to understand the aircraft automation)

Actually, the "attempt" failed because they didn't disconnect the AP manually. Did they forget they were using it?

[Peter_K]

The Russian report does make mention of this:



The FDR plots confirm this. There is a moment of abrupt column back-pressure to 5° ANU at 60m RA. It is held there until the second attempt. There is no thrust lever movement. It does seem to suggest that an attempt to arrest sink-rate was initiated at least by the co-pilot. The AP should never have been engaged at this point, and the PF should have known the aircraft well enough to apply proper breakout force.

And this was done at 60m RA / 10-15m QFE. So I don't see how this information could begin to exonerate the pilots.

I don't remember if it was mentioned here before but the auto-thrust in AP mode did not work without the ILS signal. I did not read the report but would imagine that the power was eventually applied. The aircraft was climbing. They hit the the first bushes in the raven about 2 meters AGL. The tree that clipped the wing was struck at much higher elevation. In fact if it wasn't for it, they would have likely made it.

[Peter_K]

Well, now, that's a good question. Maybe it was so the 98% of the world who aren't Polish or blinded by anti-Russian venom could actually learn how the plane crashed. For the rest of you, I can't think of a single reason.

And you arrived at the conclusion that most of the Polish people are blinded by anti-Russian venom after reading few comments on this forum?

[Peter_K]

Peter, on a serious note, there was some mention that under the military protocol that ATC did have the authority to deny the permission to land. This was at or about the same time that the "Chicago agreement" was first mentioned. That was when I first asked that question.

I recall something to that effect as well, but I must admit that I'm starting to suffer from information overload as well.
According to some unofficial sources the controller very firmly instructed Yak to go around only to see him few seconds later pop out from the low overcast with the reveres already deployed and bring the aircraft to a greased touchdown. The controller apparently exclaimed "мoлoдец!", which in a rough translation means something like "what a guy!"

[Evan]

Wrong. Runway in sight is required to descend below 100m. If you see the ground due to downwards visibility and some forward visibility but not enough to have the runway in sight, you canot descend below 100m.

Of course not, why would you? I'm sorry, I meant visual contact with the runway, with the emphasis on barometric altitude, but point taken. According to the reported conditions, there is no way they had visual contact with even the ground below at 100m QFE.

Actually, the "attempt" failed because they didn't disconnect the AP manually. Did they forget they were using it?

The autopilot in pitch mode will automatically disengage when the column is brought back more than 50mm from trimmed. The PF obviously either was not aware of this requirement, or chose to continue the descent. But you are right, the autopilot should have been manually disengaged before this point. That alone might have saved them. They were aware they were using it because there was no control force on the column at this point, so either intentional AP or look Mom, no hands.

I don't remember if it was mentioned here before but the auto-thrust in AP mode did not work without the ILS signal. I did not read the report but would imagine that the power was eventually applied. The aircraft was climbing. They hit the the first bushes in the raven about 2 meters AGL. The tree that clipped the wing was struck at much higher elevation. In fact if it wasn't for it, they would have likely made it.

The thrust levers were advanced to go-around thrust when the first ground strike occurred. Too late of course. The autothrottle requires an ILS glideslope to go-around (unless the aircraft has mods we aren't aware of):

AT 10:32:56, while approaching the base turn the PIC took the following decision: "We'll make an approach. In case of failure, we'll go around in autoflight mode". In compliance with that decision at 10:34:20, after establishing on the circle altitude of 500m, the crew engaged the autothrottle. By taking this decision the crew demonstrated low knowledge of the aircraft equipment. In fact, the Tu-154M does not allow going around in autoflight mode. The appropriate procedures are written in Section 8.8.2 (4) of the FCOM.

The PIC must make sure that:

- the ROLL and PITCH switches are on;

- the GLIDE SLOPE light on autopilot control panel is on,

and then press the GO AROUND button,

The mentioned procedure assumes that a mandatory condition for arming the autoflight go-around is active glideslope mode used for autoflight or flight director approach in combination with Approach mode. It was not possible to use this mode when landing at Smolensk Airdrome due to the absence of appropriate ground-based navaids (ILS).

[Northwester]

Planes land (legally) in worse conditions. ATC can never be 100% sure there is nothing on the runway.

That does not change the fact the the ATC had RIGHT and INTENTION to interrupt the approach and divert the plane but was ordered otherwise. If he was left alone to exercise his best judgement, without outside interference, the plane would have landed safely in Moscow.
Sure planes land in worse conditions, but on different airdromes with different landing systems.

Source please?

Page 143 of Polish comments: "According to the CVR recording, read by Polish side, the PIC announced, after crossing 100m alt, that he is doing go around. The co-pilot cofirmed it.

I believe their biggest "mistake" was going below 100m, radalt or otherwise.
Another was not using the pressure altimeter. Or perhaps the PIC was using it after someone (NAV?) reset it to standard pressure?

Agree. About the PIC electronic baro alt. According to Polish side, navigator could not have done it where he was strapped in his seat.

BTW I believe the Polish team has the original QAR data, confirming the FDR plots. Do you think Russians fabricated this as well?

None of that can be confirmed till Poland gets the ORIGINAL equipment including FDRs and FMS. Now that the official investigation is over one would expect that the original equipment is sent to Poland. Let's see if that's going to happen.