Polish President and wife killed in Tu-154 crash

[Northwester]

In fairness to Northwester, FoF, he is not the first person to do what you're describing around these parts and I highly doubt he'll be the last. I imagine that for anyone with any tangible connection to Poland and the Poles this accident itself and the crew's actions must be a very difficult pill to swallow even to the extent of suggesting that ATC can somehow force a pilot to land in unacceptable conditons, which I suspect is what Northwester is really suggesting.

As of now, ATC errors are:
- not closing the airdrome after 2 almost catastrophic approaches of IL-76
- not informing the pilots that the plane is off course and off path, all along the approach path
- issuing "level off" command too late, when the plane was about 10m above RWY elev. 1.5km away from RWY

Did their actions cause the accident? - NO
Were their actions a factor? - yes

[kris]

Let's say they push the button at 10:40:48 when the Nav. says 100m, right after the warning calls. I suppose 1 second passes while they expect something to happen. Nothing happens so F/O looks at the instruments and says "something normal". That takes them to 1.6 seconds after pushing the button. A moment of disbelief and a realization that things are not going the right way. At 10:40:51 force is applied the the control column. All that happens in 3 seconds. Try to imagine yourself in a situation like this, and count to 3.

Come on, what 3 seconds are you talking about? Your own words:

I has been just officially confirmed that the PIC issued go-around command 8 seconds before the co-pilot. That is at 10:40:41, after the first 100m call.

And going around isn't only the control column, it's e.g. the throttle as well. See the plots and you'll instantly know when they started GA. Your 3 seconds now become 15, and the idea they needed 15 seconds to start GA is BS.
As a side note, the report states they hadn't pressed the GA button. Not that it matters.
Had they initiated GA at 10:40:51, we wouldn't have this thread here.

[Peter_K]

Polish investigators have been complaining about the flow of information from the very beginning. (...)

One again, this is not true. Problems started after the publication of the CVR transcript.

[Northwester]

And going around isn't only the control column, it's e.g. the throttle as well. See the plots and you'll instantly know when they started GA. Your 3 seconds now become 15, and the idea they needed 15 seconds to start GA is BS.
As a side note, the report states they hadn't pressed the GA button. Not that it matters.
Had they initiated GA at 10:40:51, we wouldn't have this thread here.

Would there be a FDR record of pushing the GA button if there were flying without ILS? Don't know just asking.

If they did not push the button, why would they have both said "go-around"?

If the button was pressed, without registering somewhere, we would not know when. I assumed somewhere after the PIC says "go-around". But the exact time would be a speculation.

The first attempt to execute GA happened at 10:40:51. I did not say it was successful.

[Northwester]

One again, this is not true. Problems started after the publication of the CVR transcript.

Not true. First denied requests for documents and information are shown in Polish official comments with the date of April 19th, 2010.

[Peter_K]

Time for a self quote

You seem to have a basic command of the Polish language so perhaps you could provide a link because to my knowledge the crash site documentation was passed on sometime in August.

Any news on the link?

Not true. First denied requests for documents and information are shown in Polish official comments with the date of April 19th, 2010.

And a second request for a link. I would like to know what documents were denied 9 days after the accident at the very beginning of the investigation.

[Northwester]

And a second request for a link. I would like to know what documents were denied 9 days after the accident at the very beginning of the investigation.

The Polish comments are available on MAK site in Polish. There are about 20 pages that show all requests from Polish investigators. Out of 230 requests 170 were denied or ignored. The first requests are dated April 19th, 2010. As far as I know some of the documents were given to Polish side in stages. There was no time when a "complete documentation" of the investigation as such was delivered.

Some of the items requested but not delivered on April 19th are:

- documents describing SOP of Smolensk airdrome
- documents with current data of Smolensk airdrome
- documents specifing minima for Smolensk airdrome
- statements of the crew of IL-76
- records from the ATC tower (video)
- description of ATC personell standard duties
- copies of recordings of ATC tapes # 5 and 9 (Polish side already had makeshift copies of these recordings, they were requesting official copies)
- copies of all photographs and video recordings from the crash site
- schematic of the crash site

The next date in the comments is April 20th, then May 2nd, then May 14th and it goes till October 7th.

[Northwester]

And a second request for a link. I would like to know what documents were denied 9 days after the accident at the very beginning of the investigation.

Here's the link, if you need it:

http://www.mak.ru/russian/investigations/2010/files/tu154m_101/comment_polsk.pdf

[BoeingKing77]

This is harsh and unnecessary. I will respond to this in due time. You are an angry person, in case you did not know it.

Just one question: if a member of your family perished in an accident, would you accept as OK if the investigating agency published FULL autopsy report on the internet for everyone to see just to prove that there was alcohol in the blood?

Jr. Mr. ATFS_Crash

I predict it is only a matter of time before you produce "proof" that the whole report is a conspiracy, thus adding you to a long list of trolls on this forum whose posts serve only to advance a personal agenda.

Like ATFS


BTW how is this forum still alive?? this happened months ago

[Evan]

The first attempt to execute GA happened at 10:40:51. I did not say it was successful.

It might have been a flawed GA attempt. The PF might have pulled back on the yoke and pressed the go-around button, but nothing would have happened. The go-around button wasn't armed.

It wasn't armed because it needs the APPROACH and GLIDESLOPE modes engaged to function, and this would not be the case without ILS. It is entirely possible that the button was pressed by a pilot without proper knowledge of the Tu-154 systems. (The Russians have postulated this as a possible factor).

So maybe they did call off the approach, but if they did, they didn't know the aircraft and were neither trained not experienced enough to be flying the nation's most important Tu-154. As I have said numerous times here, I think the fault for this tragedy lies at the highest levels of the Polish government.

Would there be a FDR record of pushing the GA button if there were flying without ILS? Don't know just asking.

Yes.

The FDR would have recorded relative on/off signals (autopilot modes): APPROACH, GLIDESLOPE and GO-AROUND. It didn't.

Again, I implore you to study pages 149-152 of the report. You will then have the education to see this for yourself.

[Northwester]

Good night guys.

[Jonathan_Creek]

On January 18, representatives of the polish government delivered presentation on the situation at the Smolensk airport on the day of the TU-154 crash.

Video can be watched here http://vimeo.com/18936689 (only polish version available).
During that presentation the government released transcripts of conversations of TU-154 crew as well as ATC. Transcript published by Newsweek is available here (polish version only): goo.gl/TCre3 .

Last spring, I translated the first version of the transcript that Poland received from Russia. Now, I added to it the above mentioned transcript prepared by the polish side.
There are some more conversations that were transcribed and some differences with the first version so I encourage you to check it out. Here is a link to google document http://goo.gl/Uunk7. Transcript in English is in a second tab. New stuff is in column D, highlighted in orange.

Note that there is 4 to 6 seconds difference between the two transcripts.

[Gabriel]

Ok, so based on the Polish version of the CVR, they didn't want to bust mnimums.

The previous transcript showed that the captain intended to do one try, that he thought that nothing would come from it, and that they'd go around at 100m

The new transcript reinforces that with the captain calling go-around simultaneously with the 100m call from the navigator, and the second pilot aknowledging the go-around immediately after.

They failed at the go-around.

I have to say that I feel much more comfortable with this explanation that with the intentional violation of the minimums, not only for the violation of the minimums itself (which is pretty bad already) but for the way it was done. I'd say already that if you want to bust a red light (which is pretty bad already) you won't do it at night, at 100MPH without slowing down and while driving wrong way.

There is still the question of what went wrong, and I've identified several potential causes / contributory factors:

Direct:
- They were descending too steeply and fast, which made the vertical speed much greater than what should have been, which then gave much less time to react and to correct any problem. In short, the margin of the MDA of 100m (which is not much to begin with) got pretty reduced by the much faster.than-normla descent.
- The navigator was relying the altitude based on AGL (radio altimeter) instead of QFE (altitude above the runway). By when the navigtor called 100m they were crossing a ditch whihc was below the runway elevation, which made the altitude above the runway less than the prescribed 100m.
- They had briefed to do the go-around on autopilot, something apparently impossible. By when they noted that the autopilot was not responding and attempting manual control it was too late. The margins were severely eroded due to the lower altitude (AGL instead of QFE) and higher descent rate.

Indirect:
The list here is infinite. Most significantly:
- Flying under stress to accomplish the landing, with a President with antecedents of getting mad on cases like this.
- Flagrant viloation of the sterile cockpit. Not only there were persons that should have not been there but also they were talking all the time, distracting and iterrupting the crew in the most critical stage of flight that one could think (a non-precision approach to minimums).
- Unstabilized approach continued: The plane was flying faster than Vref and descending at a too high descent rate. Parameters for a stabilized approach were not met and it should have been aborted much earlier than the minimums (at 1000ft / 300m by most airline's SOPs).
- Very bad training: They did not know the automation, they were making the final Vnav on RADALT, they were not trained for a crew of four... and the list goes...

Not cause:
Russian ATC. The Polish transcript of the CVR exhonerates them from any responisiblity. The ATC said them visibility was too low, the crew asked the meteo, ATC repeated with the visibility, the crew insisted with pressure and temperature, ATC gave them the info but insisted that the conditions were not suitable to attempt a landing, and suggested to go to an alternate (I almost was waiting to read "Didn't you hear that visibility is too low? Why do you want to know more? You can't land here!"). The crew insisted that they would still try once and then go for an alternate. The ATC reminded them that the minimum was 100m. ATC even checked with the crew if they would had enough fuel to go to an alternate after the failed approach. What else do you want? Tht they shot them down to prevent the landing? They went beyond their duties by suggesting not to land. At the end, it's the captain call.

[Evan]

I have to say that I feel much more comfortable with this explanation that with the intentional violation of the minimums, not only for the violation of the minimums itself (which is pretty bad already) but for the way it was done.

Really Gabriel? Is it better that the crew didn't know the aircraft system limitations or the FCOM? Is it better that they continued an unstabilized approach down to MDA in the first place? Is it better that they failed to disengage the autopilot on a non-precision approach?

I think it is all about equally nauseating. The fault lies with at the senior level of Polish government for A) allowing a culture of reckless bravado to develop, and B) selecting under-qualified pilots based upon their acquiescence to VIP demands. I'll bet after the Tbilisi affair there were plenty of experienced pilots who wouldn't touch this job to save their lives.

But do they learn. Oh no. Thanks to the miracle of blind patriotism, they never do.

Here's the punchline to the entire thing: Tbilisi has honored the late President Lech Kaczyński by naming a street after him.

"We should not forget the actions the late president took for Georgia," Samadashvili said. "By naming one of the streets in Tbilisi after Kaczynski, we want to commemorate and express our respect for him."

Maybe it's a dead-end street.

[Gabriel]

Really Gabriel? Is it better that... Is it better that... Is it better that...

Better? Please re-read my post (and several of my previous posts)
I'm not judging the "goodness" the chain if events. I'm judging the plausibility of the explanation.

The fault lies with at the senior level of Polish government for A) allowing a culture of reckless bravado to develop, and B) selecting under-qualified pilots based upon their acquiescence to VIP demands.

I pretty much agree with that, but you knew that already if you read the rest of my previous post.