: B-737-NG-Turkish-Crash-Amestrdam-Feb-2009-Invest report

[Gabriel]

Time to see what the Turkish policy is on stable approaches methinks.

TOGA if stabilized criteria not met by 1000ft (500ft in VFR) or is lost past that point. In fact, there were "1000ft" and "500ft" calls made by the captain (who was the pilot monitoring).

[TeeVee]

ok folks, school me here: i read the cvr transcript, and although i have no clue, it did not appear that there were so many things going on, at least verbally. i expected a lot more cross-talk between the crew, even if it was flight related.

so, not that i'm doubting you, MCM, but please tell me where the high workload and rushed approach was.

im sure i missed something...

[MCM]

High workload doesn't usually relate to talking. The workload comes from managing the aircraft configuration and speed while assessing the visual segment etc.

On a straight in ILS approach from 3000ft where everything is stable, one pilot's attention is solely on the instruments, the other will be looking outside to assess the visibility, monitoring the wind etc. Because it is stable, it is very easy to notice if anything changes or is wrong.

However, when everything is compressed, both pilots have a lot more steps to accomplish in a short time, and these do require looking away from the PFD. That isn't a problem per se, but it does reduce the amount of free brainspace you have for noticing failures etc. Things like assessing if you will be within tolerances of the approach to maintain decent, which stage of flap is being taken, flap limit speeds, etc.

Its hard to explain here, but I can assure you from personal experience that with an approach conducted as their's was (idle thrust high speed until intercept) there is a very significantly increased workload for both pilots, which is partially why the stable approach criteria have been intruduced.

Following through the sequence of events I can very much see how this occurred, and how this particular failure would be the one that could catch them.

[old timer]

High workload doesn't usually relate to talking. The workload comes from managing the aircraft configuration and speed while assessing the visual segment etc.

On a straight in ILS approach from 3000ft where everything is stable, one pilot's attention is solely on the instruments, the other will be looking outside to assess the visibility, monitoring the wind etc. Because it is stable, it is very easy to notice if anything changes or is wrong.

However, when everything is compressed, both pilots have a lot more steps to accomplish in a short time, and these do require looking away from the PFD. That isn't a problem per se, but it does reduce the amount of free brainspace you have for noticing failures etc. Things like assessing if you will be within tolerances of the approach to maintain decent, which stage of flap is being taken, flap limit speeds, etc.

Its hard to explain here, but I can assure you from personal experience that with an approach conducted as their's was (idle thrust high speed until intercept) there is a very significantly increased workload for both pilots, which is partially why the stable approach criteria have been intruduced.

Following through the sequence of events I can very much see how this occurred, and how this particular failure would be the one that could catch them.

Good explanation MCM however i am sure that you are NOT suggesting that this accident is not preventable and similar accidents could occur if the same scenario happens again ?