Edelweiss almost touches down again immediately after lift-off

[Evan]

I never said that I dislike a sidestick. It's the Airbus FBW style which I don't like. E.g. the A320 provides only a 15°/sec roll rate, while it's capable of delivering more than double this value (and it uses this high roll rate for corrections).
Airbus says that you should discontinue the approach if you hit the (roll) stops twice, which is a bad joke since you hit the stops quite often.
I've never experienced that in any other airliner.

I knew C* etc. pretty well before I started the A320 type rating and I even own the "Fly-by-wire for commercial aircraft: the Airbus experience" by C. FAVRE original from 1994.

The funny thing is, that most Instructors haven't even heard of C* and told me that this is useless knowledge. So much for "get pilots to be more technically savvy"

I totally agree with that. There's no reason why pilots need to understand the complexities of C* so long as they have the proper training to fly the airplane. How many 737 pilots can explain the complexities of the elevator artificial feedback system? It's much more important that they understand advanced aerodynamics and the philosophy and rules of stable approach criteria. The 15deg/sec roll rate limit is for Normal Law, but you should have 30deg/sec during critical Direct Law phases. I'm not sure what you mean by 'roll stops' but with a 33deg soft stop and a 67deg hard stop, I'm not sure what sort of maneuvering you are attempting with a passenger transport aircraft. I admit that, if you need to thread the tight mountainous approaches of rural Nepal, there are better choices for aircraft.

[Gabriel]

I don't know how many type ratings you had in your aviation career. In my case it's been quite a few, but on no type rating I heard the instructor say during the first sim session: "I'm now going to show you how the A320 will kill you". A few minutes later we were dead.
That really makes you wonder if switching to the A320 was the right choice.

I am really curious about this. Can you please elaborate? What did the instructor throw at you? Did you die because you didn't know how to handle it, or because it was an unhandable situation?
Also very curious about the fatal hydraulic logic flaw you mentioned earlier.

[bstolle]

I'm not sure what you mean by 'roll stops' but with a 33deg soft stop and a 67deg hard stop, I'm not sure what sort of maneuvering you are attempting with a passenger transport aircraft. I admit that, if you need to thread the tight mountainous approaches of rural Nepal, there are better choices for aircraft.

roll stop = full left/right side stick deflection. Due to the sluggish FBW data processing and the low roll rate, you are hitting the stops surprisingly often during normal approaches in gusty conditions. There's no pratical way to follow the 2 full roll deflections = go around Airbus recommendation.

[bstolle]

What did the instructor throw at you? Did you die because you didn't know how to handle it, or because it was an unhandable situation?

Also very curious about the fatal hydraulic logic flaw you mentioned earlier.

That was way too many years ago to remember, but we had just completed the ground training and the theoretical type rating, so we theoretically knew what to do/expect.
AFAIR, the time frame for troubleshooting and switching was too narrow to avoid the crash.

IIRC, the combination of the take off inhibit function, plus the loss of a hydraulic system and the resulting PTU operation.

[Evan]

That was way too many years ago to remember, but we had just completed the ground training and the theoretical type rating, so we theoretically knew what to do/expect.
AFAIR, the time frame for troubleshooting and switching was too narrow to avoid the crash.

IIRC, the combination of the take off inhibit function, plus the loss of a hydraulic system and the resulting PTU operation.

Dual hydraulics loss due to PTU overheat? They did fix this by altering logic with PTU automatically switching off below 1500ft.

https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/documents/archives/a320-dual-hydraulic-loss.pdf

[ATLcrew]

I don't know how many type ratings you had in your aviation career. In my case it's been quite a few, but on no type rating I heard the instructor say during the first sim session: "I'm now going to show you how the A320 will kill you".

I only have four (in reality three, because one of them is a dual rating) but I can easily show you how any of the types in question can kill you "within a few minutes".

[bstolle]

Which airplanes are you talking about?

[bstolle]

They did fix this

That's it. Thanx for the link.
It took Airbus 30 years to fix this issue?

[Evan]

That's it. Thanx for the link.
It took Airbus 30 years to fix this issue?

Did they know about it 30 years ago? I am aware that the problem most notably occurred in flight in June 2012 on a JetBlue A320, and that Airbus had been aware of other incidents prior to that and had issued SB's about the risk around 2007. I'm unclear as to when the problem actually first revealed itself.

I'm curious as to how this resulted in a sim crash however. You would still have the blue system, so loss of control doesn't add up. You would be in hand-flying in Alternate Law however, with no hard protections. You would have lost roll spoilers and the THS trim. You would lose flaps but not slats. The gear in your scenario, I assume, would still be extended (as in most cases of this scenario as the fault occurs in the gear retraction hydraulics) and if not, there's alternate gear extension. The only thing that fits my understanding would be pilot error without envelope protections. Or a runway overrun if the runway is short. While it was seriously concerning, I didn't view this scenario as 'fatal logic' because of the triplex redundancy in place.

Also, the fault on the yellow system is transient, an overheat. The JetBlue flight restored the Yellow system after 36 minutes.

[Gabriel]

I only have four (in reality three, because one of them is a dual rating) but I can easily show you how any of the types in question can kill you "within a few minutes".

Yes, I was thinking the same thing. Any plane can have catastrophic failures. A total loss of all electric systems would kill you in any modern plane. Not to mention the explosion of the center wing tank. The question is how extremely unlikely it is.

Seeing how fatal accidents where the pilots could not have saved it almost never happen, and how fatal hull losses happen at a rate of about 1 every 10 million take-offs for all types, FBW or not, Boing, Airbus or other, I think we are in the good way. In particular, the original A320 and the 737 NG are exactly equal in this metric.

Page 10 - https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/b...df/statsum.pdf

[Evan]

Yes, I was thinking the same thing. Any plane can have catastrophic failures.

True, but only Airbus planes can be the focus of ominous conspiracies in scarebus 'documentaries'.

[bstolle]

Any plane can have catastrophic failures. A total loss of all electric systems would kill you in any modern plane.

I wrote that the A320 killed us. I didn't mention any 'catastrophic failure', loss of electrics etc.
It started to violently pitch up without any way to counteract this. No ECAM messages, nothing.
If you are experiencing a catastrophic failure, e.g. loose the elevator, every plane will crash, regardless if it's a glider or an A380.

[ATLcrew]

Which airplanes are you talking about?

Does it matter?

[Evan]

I wrote that the A320 killed us. I didn't mention any 'catastrophic failure', loss of electrics etc.
It started to violently pitch up without any way to counteract this. No ECAM messages, nothing.
If you are experiencing a catastrophic failure, e.g. loose the elevator, every plane will crash, regardless if it's a glider or an A380.

That’s a SIM problem. The SIM not simming very well.

[bstolle]

Evan Sorry, but you know pretty well that this is complete nonsense.