Air France plane missing?

[Leightman]

****** http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">****** name="ProgId" content="Word.Document">****** name="Generator" content="Microsoft Word 10">****** name="Originator" content="Microsoft Word 10">ffice:smarttags" name="time">ffice:smarttags" name="City">ffice:smarttags" name="place"> Lots of posts due to Der Speigel’s flimsy article. Pent up demand, eh?
> >
I won’t touch the many route/fuel/law arguments except to note: 1) as SYDCBRWOD wrote, the storm line at the time of route planning was more or less continual; 2) any single weather image we have now was a snapshot in time, and the storm line was very active with tops above the route altitude (compare the various images); 3) route deviations would be on relatively short notice and derive from what the pilots could see ahead; 4) there are a number of limitations to the wx radar the pilots had, as noted in much more detail perhaps 1500 posts ago; 5) at least one of the other flights proximal to 447 DID deviate, and somewhat at the last minute (I think it had the same type of radar as 447); 6) just because you manage not to bore through the center of a cb doesn’t necessarily mean you are safe from the upsets of turbulence, especially if instrument failure is in the mix.
> >
mfeldt: Your list of the article's major points is a list of suggestions, speculations, and assertions that the author and Speigel both wished to be taken by readers as Truth. Bear in mind the writer is writing to get paid for his article. Your abbreviated list:

• Take-off weight: 232.757 metric tons, only 243 Kg below the max allowed weight
• Due to weight limitations, only 70 metric tons of Kerosene are in the tanks—Suggestive: “Only” 70 tons….
• This is not sufficient to fly to lace>Parislace> (with) sufficient reserves; Captain quotes (alternate) destination of the flight and uses the reserve to reach lace>Parislace>. Suggestive.
• This is also not sufficient to fly large detours around thunderstorms. Assertion.
• In order to save fuel, FL 350 is the minimum required altitude according to Cpt. Dubois' calculations. Assertion.
• Apparently, Cpt. Dubois went to sleep, two Co-pilots fly the aircraft. HIGHLY speculative, based on captain “not wearing seatbelt”; asks reader to believe the captain would not either resume command or fasten his seat belt after 30 minute of moderate+ turbulence.
• 3 Hours ten Minutes into the flight, heavy turbulence sets in. Speculative, probably true, but turbulence alone was not the cause of the accident.
• 3:40 - outside temperature apparently climbs by 11 degrees C due to icing on the sensor. Speculative: there is no info that suggests icing causes temp probe readings to increase.
• Pitot tubes ice as well, computers go off-line. First phrase speculation, but quite possibly; Suggestive. Second phrase proven, but causal link to previous phrase unproven.
• The crew realizes that all three air speed sensors read different values. Duh, but still Assumed. Other possibilities exist.
• In order to save the flight, the non-flying co-pilot has to look-up the appropriate angle of attack and thrust values in a kind of emergency manual. Presumption. Other possibilities exist.
• Probably, turbulence was so strong that it was even impossible to actually read any manual. Presumption but very possible.
• The aircraft went out of control and into a flat free fall, falling at 2500 metres per minute. No preparations for any emergency are obvious in the cabin. VERY HIGHLY speculative based on an AVERAGE descent rate, ie assuming/suggesting a uniform descent rate, for which no info exists and probability is low. Also suggestive (Oh My God flat Spin/deep stall/monsters/aliens)
• The pilots are still trying to re-start the flight computers, resulting in the F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT. and: F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT. Messages. Assumption. No corroboration given.
• From the analysis of the tail fin, the aircraft impacted the water flat, resulting in an acceleration of 36g. Additional analyses were made from human bones that were split in length, and corpses that were cut in two pieces by the seat belts. Speculative: Consensus at present only regards Attitude. No similar published consensus on forward speed. 36 G’s sounds within possibility for vertical, but high forward speed is debatable due to large (not V fin) debris pieces recovered, and the pilot’s body (assumed to be in the forward lounge or cockpit)
• Apparently, Airbus is offering a software to replace the emergency manuals. This software ("BUSS") displays immediately after a pitot failure the necessary angle of attack and thrust values. However, it comes at a price of 300,000€ per aircraft ... and is not installed on any AF aircraft! Suggestive. This has been covered. It is an option. Until 447 no one thought it imperative to install.

Net: the article was clearly intended to be suggestive rather than informative.

The article contained only two purported new pieces of information for which absolutely no corroboration was given, in the article or previously: 1) the OAT rose suddenly several degrees; 2) the last ACARS message was an audio ‘Terrain! Terrain! Pull Up!’ sounded (#2 is really a double conjecture, probably based on some tv show). The article is also chock full of suggestions: a moonlit night suggesting unlimited visibility, a fatal clerical or judgment error before takeoff (hate dying for those, don’t you?); major deviation not possible.
I agree with MCM and others on the flight/fuel planning. The fuel issue is most probably a red herring. The only probable relevancy is the amount of pressure in the acting pilot's mind as to his possible exposure to stated or unstated company policies to minimize route deviations. But in the teeth of a storm this argument becomes flaccid. More relevant is that we do have other experience in the same weather system and time frame that at least one other aircraft made a last minute deviation because they saw something they wanted to avoid, only at the last minute. Perhaps the only difference between them and AF447 is that AF447 had a 50% chance of turning the correct direction to avoid the worst and it was the wrong choice. And, too, there is always the possibility that there could have been no good direction.
> >
The writer primed the audience with “"We know pretty well why the accident happened," says union boss Arnoux.” But actually we don’t , and the writer doesn’t either.
> >
TeeVee: Lawyers would be the first to describe weather as completely predictable to a reasonable person in court, and the pilot or carrier as being the cause. I hark back to your earlier post: Law isn't fair or just. It's just law.>>

[Leightman]

I don't know where all the href and green faces came from in my last post, but the edit text is even more confusing and I won't even try. Sorry.

[Evan]

Do you REALLY understad the implications of this?

OUR PAGES AND DAYS OF DISCUSSION REGARDING UNADVERTISED POTENTIAL FUEL STOPS AND HOW THAT AFFECTED THE SAFETY AND THE SERVICE WAS POINTLESS (regarding this case at least).

Now, how did we start this discussion from a non-issue in the first place? What triggered us to analyze this?

We began this when Mfelt posted the key points of the Der Spiegel article. As you recall, I suspected it was crap and MCM was certain that it was. Unfortunately, I needed to know this for sure and no one could point out the simple error in their reporting, nor accurately define the flight plan information for me.

I arrived at some early conclusions of my own based on the introduction in the BEA report (as I suspect the writer did) and they seemed to corroborate the story, so I raised a flag. I neglected to read the appendices carefully enough, so that's my bad.

Here's the key information that was missing:

1) an RIF flight plan is NOT as earlier described to me. It is not a flight legally planned for a stopover in Bordeaux, that would fly to Paris as an alternate (refiled to Paris in flight) if fuel permitted. It is a flight filed for the non-stop destination to Paris, with a safe contingency to refile to Bordeaux if necessary. That's a huge difference. Therefore, none of these flight plans violate the trust of the customer in that sense: the flight was always filed for Paris.

2) The flight was NOT taking on added freight at the expense of fuel as suggested by the article, even though there were two alternate flight plans to allow for the possibility. The flight was taking less freight, and therefore more fuel, than estimated in all the flight plans, and...

3) The flight therefore HAD adequate reserves for a reasonable deviation around threatening weather (there were local opportunities for this). The decision not to deviate could not have been motivated by lack of fuel or flight planning.

Therefore, the article is, in fact, crap, and I see no longer see any danger in the flight planning or fuel planning of AF447.

(I still have reservations about in-flight refile as SOP from a safety aspect. I can still see how that might infect a safe decision to divert in grey area decision making when reserves are minimized).

As I said way back, when things begin to appear too obvious to me, I know I'm missing something. I wish this something had been made clear to me without all the noise of the past few pages, but sometimes this is what it takes. Kudos to Peter for pointing me to the error of my ways. And MCM and Gabriel for their patience.

Now, the last part of the mystery remains unsolved:

What is ETF? Enroute... Trip Fuel... Technical... File... I could guess all day.

Estimated Trip Fuel?

[Peter Kesternich]

Well - Evan - and let me take this opportunity to thank you for your contributions and your patience with us and for keeping us on our toes. I really enjoy the forum sparring with you and I hope you take nothing personal here.

I look forward to more. Makes me rethink a lot of what I take for granted.

P.S. I haven't found out what ETF means either. Maybe we should send an email to the French BEA?

[Gabriel]

Evan, don't beat you so hard. We were all in the same vicious loop, and certainly your own patience was not an inch shorter than that of others.

Now two comments:

1) an RIF flight plan is NOT as earlier described to me. It is not a flight legally planned for a stopover in Bordeaux, that would fly to Paris as an alternate (refiled to Paris in flight) if fuel permitted. It is a flight filed for the non-stop destination to Paris, with a safe contingency to refile to Bordeaux if necessary. That's a huge difference. Therefore, none of these flight plans violate the trust of the customer in that sense: the flight was always filed for Paris.

Ok, so Der Spiegel lead uis into this mess. But where did the "Paris was the alternate to Bordeaux" thing came from?

I don't think it was from the Der Spiegel article.

And as early as Feb 25, it's mfeldt who in this post who quotes the BEA report including:

Given the estimated load of 37.8 t,
the dossier included a main flight plan at a standard Mach of M 0.82 with
an ETF at Bordeaux Mérignac with alternate at Toulouse Blagnac

Maybe the mistake was because the same paragraph starts with:

The flight was prepared between 15 h 28 and 18 h 59. Paris Orly was given
as the alternate airport at destination

but here clearly Orly is the alternate for CDG, not Bordeaux.

Having seen that "people" (you and Peter) started to talk about filing for Bordeaux with CDG as alternate with the real intention of going to the alternate, I tried to clarify that (making my own errors in the way) in this post of Feb 28 (note the emphasys in NOT):

Apparently, there wasn't even a filed destination, but two flight plans (one with Bordeaux as first destination with an alternate that was NOT Paris, and one with Paris as destination with don't know what alternate), and the plane was filed with a decision point where they would say "we go for this plan".

While I didn't understand the RIF part back then, it was clear to me that Paris was NOT the alternate for Bordeaux but failed at making a point of that.

Now, assuming that Paris can't be legally filed as destination due to lack of legal reserves, I'd say that between:

a) legally filing for Bordeaux with the "educated hope" that the now illegal Paris becomes legal short of Bordeaux (due to using less than all the reserves), or

b) filing for Paris with a contingency plan of refuling at Bordeaux becuase Paris is not legal without that contingency plan,

the difference is just scemantics and of zero practical impact.

I don't think that one honors the trust of the customer while the other violates it.

(I still have reservations about in-flight refile as SOP from a safety aspect. I can still see how that might infect a safe decision to divert in grey area decision making when reserves are minimized).

For the last time, I don't agree at all.

Not that this could not happen, but then the problem is NOT the RIF strategy. It's like saying thet the seat belt can be a safety problem because drivers would feel more safe and hence speed up with the net result of lowering the overal safety. This can happen, but the problem is NOT the safety belt. (yea, I know, not a great analogy).

Hope for the best but prepare for the worse. Fly approach as if it woukld end in a missed approach, fly every take-off as if an engine was to fail at V1, and fly to Bordeaux as if you were going to land there for fuel. Chances are that you'll don't have to miss the approach, that the engine will not fail at V1, and that you won't need to do the fuel stop. But still.

If you don't do that, don't blame the RIF. Blame something else, because by removing the RIF you are just changing the way in which the accident will happen by taking shortcuts elsewhere.

It's much easier for me to accept our different opinions regarding the service aspect of the RIF than the safety aspect of it. But I promise I won't insist on this again.

Now, the last part of the mystery remains unsolved:

What is ETF? Enroute... Trip Fuel... Technical... File... I could guess all day.

Estimated Trip Fuel?

Yea, even all mighty Google was of noe help for me.
Doesn't the BEA report have a footnote, or in the definitions and abreviations at the beginning, or something? I have to check...

[Evan]

Ok, so Der Spiegel lead uis into this mess. But where did the "Paris was the alternate to Bordeaux" thing came from?

I don't want to belabor the point, but, briefly, this is what happened:

First, I asked the question:

I expect that the story is total crap as well. For one thing, I can't imagine them filing a flight plan for Bordeaux when the service is scheduled for Paris. That's kind of an obvious infraction. Please assure me that this is not allowed.

Then MCM offer this:

Sorry to disappoint you, but it most certainly is allowed, and is a relatively common thing on longhaul flights. Most operators call it "inflight refile" or something along those lines. It is usually done when the weather is not particularly favourable at the planned destination, but on these longhaul flights, the forecast may change considerably over the course of the flight.

But he didn't correct my error about flight plan destination, so I pressed on:

Ok, hang on a sec. This is a new revelation for me so bear with me.

If I buy a non-stop ticket from Rio to Paris, I don't want to be landing in Bordeaux because the crew stashed a little more revenue in the cargo hold at the expense of fuel. If the flight is to Paris, the flight plan should be for Paris and the fuel load should be for Paris.

Am I not understanding this correctly?

Than you gave us this (underlines are mine):

So you take-off bound for Bordeaux (say a 10 hours flight) with enough fuel to get there, then to get to an alternate say 30 minute apart, then 30 minutes more, and then 10% more (say another hour). You have 12 hours of fuel.

After about 9:30 of flight you are about to start the descent to Bordeaux, where you would be arriving in another 30 minutes. At this time, you still have 2:30 of fuel. But you could be landing in Paris in about 1 hour, with 1:30 of fuel still in the tanks. At this point, 1 hour from Paris, you really don't need 10% of the full flight from Rio to Paris as reserves, because most of the uncertanties have already been left behind: the headwind was not stronger than forecasted, and maybe even a bit less, the weather detours were minimum, and you have a very good picture of what the weather will be at Paris at your eventual soon arrival and several hours later, and it'll be much better than marginal. And you still have fuel to go to Paris, return to Bordeaux if needd (very unlikely) and land with 1 hour of fuel in the tanks, more than what's required (twice as much)

Would you say at that point "No, I filed Bordeaux, I sick with it"? No way!!! Why would you do that? Safet is not compromised if AT THAT POINT you decide to go to Paris. SO you cancel your flight plan to Bordeaux and refile to Paris.

And from that point I (and others) were reacting to this inaccurate description of inflight reclearance. When I realized that Bordeaux was only the refiled destination in a worst case scenario and Paris was always the primary filed destination, I saw this in the correct light.

Now, assuming that Paris can't be legally filed as destination due to lack of legal reserves, I'd say that between:

a) legally filing for Bordeaux with the "educated hope" that the now illegal Paris becomes legal short of Bordeaux (due to using less than all the reserves), or

b) filing for Paris with a contingency plan of refuling at Bordeaux becuase Paris is not legal without that contingency plan,

the difference is just scemantics and of zero practical impact.

There is a big difference in intent there. In (a) Paris is the contingency plan for a best case scenario, and in (b) Bordeaux is the contingency for a worst case scenario. Flying to advertised destination with a contingency for worst case scenario is what I expect when I say customer commitment.

[Evan]

For the last time, I don't agree at all.

Not that this could not happen, but then the problem is NOT the RIF strategy. It's like saying thet the seat belt can be a safety problem because drivers would feel more safe and hence speed up with the net result of lowering the overal safety. This can happen, but the problem is NOT the safety belt. (yea, I know, not a great analogy).

Just sent you a PM.

[CockpitCat]

As to the meaning of ETF: I used www.google.fr to search for "etf bea" and found it referenced inside this report:

www.bea.aero/docspa/2004/g-xe041025/pdf/g-xe041025.pdf

Seems to be an abbreviation for "Escale Technique Facultative". According to:

http://babylon.com/definition/OPTIONAL_TECHNICAL_STOP/French

it means "Optional Technical Stop" in English.

[mfeldt]

Sorry when some of you may think that time here was spent on a useless discussion - but I would regard being able to get background information to a sloppy-written newspaper article as a proof of excenllency for this forum.

ETF: French: Escale Technique Facultative - facultative technical stop-over ....

To me, it is actually still not clear, which flight-plan was actually filed to ATC, but apparently the actual fuel reserve was more than eniough. I'll try to contact the Berlin professor who was quoted in the arcticle saying that longer diversions would not have been easily possible...

m.

[Evan]

Seems to be an abbreviation for "Escale Technique Facultative". According to:

http://babylon.com/definition/OPTIONAL_TECHNICAL_STOP/French

it means "Optional Technical Stop" in English.

Français! J'aurais dû le savoir! Fie on my wretched English tongue.

Congratulations CockpitCat. You win the Toyota Camry.

[Myndee]

Soooooo...

Has anyone heard anything about the supposed February searches?

[mfeldt]

If I remember correctly, ships are going to set sail from the port of Recife on the 12th of March.

m.

[mfeldt]

Hey,

I got a reply from Gerhard Huettig, the Berlin Professor and Airbus pilot quoted in the "SPIEGEL" article. As it is a private message, I'm not going to post it here, but the bottom line is:

• he's not very happy with the way the SPIEGEL put his quote into context. There was clearly no dangerous shortage of fuel
• A legal landing at CDG would have required 4.1t of reserve fuel. If it had appeared en route that this amount could not be maintained, a technical stop would have become unavoidable
• Thus the additional reserve to circumvent weather while keeping the 4.1t, was only 2.4t, around 20 minutes of flight time according to Huettig.
• According to the ATC flight plan, the flight was planned to climb to FL370 at SALPU, later-on to FL390 and FL400. Since there was no more contact after INTOL, it is unclear whether the flight actually climbed any higher than FL350.
• If they maintained FL350 because of heavy turbulence, an additional fuel consumption of 1.5t would have resulted, bringing down the extra reserve to circumvent weather (while stiill making it legally to Paris) to 0.9t, or under 8 minutes of flight-time.
• So Huettig's commentary was not that there was an actual shortage of fuel, but simply that due to the usage of the re-clearance procedure the crew was forced to balance their decisions with fuel consumption in mind in order not to jeopardize a punctual landing at CDG already at that stage of the flight. The point being, as was discussed here, that no immediate danger would have resulted, but a delay would have been more or less certain.
• An additional point he's making is that a B747 or A340 wouldn't have had that kind of problem on this route.

m.

[Evan]

[*]If they maintained FL350 because of heavy turbulence, an additional fuel consumption of 1.5t would have resulted, bringing down the extra reserve to circumvent weather (while stiill making it legally to Paris) to 0.9t, or under 8 minutes of flight-time.

What puzzles me is that the filed DCT flight plan (not flown) required only 69.5t fuel to convey 37.5 t of load + fuel and reserves necessary to legally arrive at Paris. The actual flight was under this weight by 1.1t and carried .9t of extra fuel. So if the reserve to circumvent weather was this thin in reality, how much thinner would it have been if flown with those numbers?

DCT M 0.82: load 37.5 t / TOF 69.5 t
----------------- ----------------- ---------------
REAL: load 36.4t / TOF 70.4 t

 Regulatory fuel:
The regulatory fuel necessary to perform a flight is determined at brake release before takeoff, thus 69.5 t in this case.

Based on what Prof. Huettig is saying, the regulatory fuel requirement doesn't seem adequate to me in the DCT plan. Remember that under the DCT plan, a fuel stopover would have required a fuel emergency declaration.

[Gabriel]

Remember that under the DCT plan, a fuel stopover would have required a fuel emergency declaration.

I don't think that that's correct.

a) No pilot in command may allow a flight to continue toward any airport to which it has been dispatched or released if, in the opinion of the pilot in command, the flight cannot be completed safely; unless, in the opinion of the pilot in command, there is no safer procedure. In that event, continuation toward that airport is an emergency situation as set forth in Sec. 121.557.

I don't know exactly how that works for fuel, but I think you are required to land with 30 minutes of fuel or declare an emergency.

So if you see that you are going to arrive with less than that, you have to request a diversion for a fuel stop. If you are not granted the diversion for example due to trafic, you should declare a fuel emergency and announce that you are going to divert. If a diversion is not available of less safe that landing at the destination with less than 30 minutes of fuel, you must declare a fuel emergency and go for the destination. And note that the emergency must be declared not when you have 30 minutes of fuel, but when you note that you will be landing with less than that.