Air France 447 - On topic only!

[Evan]

This is getting confusing, because control changed several times. By the PIC, you mean the more experienced copilot - the one who had control during the final moments? Or the junior F/O?

By PIC, I mean the senior F/O, who I assume was left seat. Considering the gap in experience between the two and the hours on type (the senior F/O had more than the captain if I recall correctly), I feel certain the cockpit gradient favored him as PIC.

By the way, when there are two first officers, why isn't one called the second officer? Or maybe the 'bosun'?

Actually, the junior F/O seems to have had the control priority at the end, but both were making stick inputs so the computers would be combining them algebraically. I don't think it made much difference who was flying at that point, because no one was flying.

[Black Ram]

By PIC, I mean the senior F/O, who I assume was left seat. Considering the gap in experience between the two and the hours on type (the senior F/O had more than the captain if I recall correctly), I feel certain the cockpit gradient favored him as PIC.

By the way, when there are two first officers, why isn't one called the second officer? Or maybe the 'bosun'?

Actually, the junior F/O seems to have had the control priority at the end, but both were making stick inputs so the computers would be combining them algebraically. I don't think it made much difference who was flying at that point, because no one was flying.

I was left with the impression the junior F/O - Pierre Cedric Bonin was left at the controls and formally had control until the final minute of flight. I thought he was the PIC. But it seems he was indeed sitting on the right.

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2020136/Pierre-Cedric-Bonin-David-Robert-blamed-Atlantic-Ocean-Air-France-crash-killed-228.html

[Black Ram]

New note from BEA:

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/pressrelease03august2011.en.php

The English version of the interim report is promised for Thursday.

[guamainiac]

This little bit of chop is now referred to as a tropical storm with which the junior pilots did not have the ability to cope with?

The rolling motion as too much for this .... this is in "The Mail" but read between the lines on this perhaps. It is easy to blame the pilots in this case.

Did they screw up? Certainly there were mistakes made including the 11,000 hour pilots failure to come promptly to their assistance. But now we need an 11k pilot to handle routine chop?

[Gabriel]

New note from BEA:

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/pressrelease03august2011.en.php

The English version of the interim report is promised for Thursday.

It's available now:

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e3.en/pdf/f-cp090601e3.en.pdf

[Evan]

Air France plane crash probe controversy continues

Here, Gabriel, you'll especially like this:

By David Pearson
PARIS (MarketWatch) -- A controversy surrounding an investigation into the causes of a 2009 crash of an Air France Airbus A330 jet continued Wednesday amid suspicion that the French body investigating the accident omitted a recommendation in its latest report calling for a review of the electronic system that warns when a plane doesn't have enough speed to stay in the air.

The controversy flared up again following a French press article that the BEA had omitted a recommendation contained in an earlier confidential draft report about the stall warning system. Evidence recovered from the plane's data recorders show the crew received conflicting stall warnings caused by wrong air-speed indications.

The BEA confirmed in a statement that the planned recommendation had been removed from the report made public on July 29, saying it considered that making the recommendation would be "premature at this stage of the investigation."

It said the stall warning issue will be studied by a separate commission that it has set up to look into aircraft systems, as well as another group that's studying man-machine interface issues.

Meanwhile, the SNPL, the main Air France pilots' union, said it is suspending its participation in the crash investigation. In a statement, the SNPL said it is "worried about these serious revelations," in the press, adding: "Its confidence in the BEA is seriously eroded."

Yves Deshayes, president of the union, told Dow Jones Newswires in an interview that the union "is not at all convinced by the BEA's explanation."

The SNPL wants to know why the BEA chose to omit the stall warning recommendation from last week's report, and wondered if there have been other significant modifications to the report.

"Pilots aren't fleeing from their responsibility, but they won't accept that this investigation turns into a simple indictment of the flight crew," the SNPL said. "Our goal isn't to pin the blame on someone. There are probably causes originating with the pilots. But we don't want all the other possible factors to do with the plane or with the airline to be pushed aside, and that's the impression that the report and the BEA is giving."

----

The BEA report issued last week noted that the stall warning alarm had stopped sounding when the plane's indicated air speed was 60 knots, insufficient to keep it in the air. "The stall warning disconnected because it thought the plane was on the ground," Deshayes said. That's because the engineers who designed the stall warning thought it wasn't necessary to sound an alarm when a plane was travelling so slowly, as it would be on the ground, he said.

The way I see it, if the plane is not on the ground below 60kts actual airspeed, you have a serious piloting problem that no aircraft can be expected to deal with. I completely understand why the system no longer considers the airspeed valid at that point. I think the Air France pilot's union does as well.

Denial is a awesome thing to behold.

[Fear_of_Flying]

It's available now:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en.pdf

The CVR transcript is shocking. No one could possibly read that and come away thinking there isn't a drastic problem that needs to be addressed immediately, using whatever measures, at whatever cost, necessary.

The pilots were clueless. They sounded like I would have had I been in the cockpit. They didn't know if they were falling or climbing, who was flying, who should be flying, which controls they should be using, whether they were going too fast or too slow, if the pitch was correct. They were just kind of hoping the captain might show up, and when he did, he was just as lost as they were. I see nothing there to suggest they even knew they were stalled.

I have to say at this point, forget basic airmanship skills as a short-term solution, unless we plan to ground every plane on the planet. I don't like the idea, but the memory items are the only thing that could have saved these pilots from themselves, although I'm not convinced they could have pulled that off either.

[Fear_of_Flying]

I have to say, I was mortified by the Colgan transcript. But eventually I was persuaded that this was the product of puppy mill pilot schools, cheap regional airlines, grueling schedules and sleep deprivation. But now to see this, a world class airline, and pilots just as inept... I'm speechless.

[Evan]

It's available now:
http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en.pdf

It really is surreal. From their comments, I get the impression the HSI displays weren't available, and they were trying to gauge that from the VSI and the altitude, but nothing in the report findings indicates this, and I see no reason why it would be so.

(and yet the Capt directs attention to the standby horizon... why?)

The Captain seems to know that they must avoid pitching up, but he's not very assertive about it. Both F/O's are making pitch inputs in the wrong direction. It's clearly a loss of situational awareness, but why?

In other news, the OAT was around -40F and there was no ice detection, so I think we can rule out the supercooled water theory. It seems more likely an ice crystal ingestion issue.

[Gabriel]

Here, Gabriel, you'll especially like this:

The way I see it, if the plane is not on the ground below 60kts actual airspeed, you have a serious piloting problem that no aircraft can be expected to deal with. I completely understand why the system no longer considers the airspeed valid at that point. I think the Air France pilot's union does as well.

Denial is a awesome thing to behold.

Actually, I sort of agree with the union. The stall warning issue should be fixed, IMHO.

The pilot blockage could have resulted in an airspeed data below 60kts right away, thus leaving the plane with no stall warning even in the early stages of the UAS incident. A UAS even is a know expectable abnormal situation that could trigger speed readings below 60 knots thus rendering the stall warning INOP when you need it most because you have just lost the airspeed information AND you've also lost all slow speed and stall protections AND you are still in a pitch rate or load factor demand mode that lacks AoA or speed stability. Certainly a terrible time to loose the stall warning.

There are several things that I don't like about the Airbus systems, and we've discussed them at lenghts before: The non-feedback stick and throttles, the "thrust lock" function, the alternate law that keeps load factor or pitch demand but with no speed stability or stall/low speed protection (save for the stall warning), the stall as warning goin INOP below 60 kts, and others.

BUT , while I see that these weaknesses can contribute to an accident, in this specific case I think they had nothing to do with it, or almost.

In this accident, it's not that the plane slowed down because of lack of speed stability while it was trying to keep the flight path or pitch with no pilot input. The pilot activelyy pulled up: 1.4Gs, 7000 fpm, 11° pitch, and 2500ft. The lack of throttle levers feedback and the thrust lock function might have made the pilot think that he was actually at climb thrust when he wasn't. But even if CLB thrust was had been applied, such a climb at that altitude was not sustainable (hell, it was not sustainable at any altitude and any thrust setting), so the most that would have been gained is a few seconds more to reach the stall point. And finally, when the stall warning did activate, they pulled up hard, effectivelly and activelly stalling the plane. And the stall warning kept shouting STALL STALL in a clear voice for almost one full minute after it triggered. ONE MINUTE; FOR GOD'S SAKE!

At that point, after all the pilot did to approach a stall (aggresive climb), ensure that the stall was comleted (pull up upon stall warning), and one minute of failing to lower the nose to recover from the stall, I very much doubt that the stall warning staying on or going INOP would make any difference.

To be honest, I really don't care the littlest bit about the FDR plots, the CVT transcripts, or the stall warning (or anything else) after the first 2, maybe 5, at most 10 seconds of continuos stall warning with no recovery attempt. There was no hope after that and not because of the plane or the curious stall warning behaviours, but because there was noone in that cockpit with the aptitude to effect a recovery, no matter how perfect the systems.

To understand this accident we should focus in the history starting from the first hour of student pilot of each flight crewmwmber to the first seconds of continous stall warning. Anything after that is worthless to understand THIS ACCIDENT.

BUT , again, an accident investigation should address all the findings, including those that had no contribution to this accident but are considered potential factor that could contribute to an accident or serious incidet in anotehr event. So with that viw, I hope that these points are addressed in the final report.

[Gabriel]

From their comments, I get the impression the HSI displays weren't available

The HSI? Horizontal Situation Indicator?

[Black Ram]

This little bit of chop is now referred to as a tropical storm with which the junior pilots did not have the ability to cope with?

The rolling motion as too much for this .... this is in "The Mail" but read between the lines on this perhaps. It is easy to blame the pilots in this case.

Right, but I still linked to this article, because it identifies the pilots more clearly.

Reading some of the English BEA report, it is indeed the junior F/O who has control most of the time, and he is sitting on the right side.

[guamainiac]

I thought it was a good link that will develop. Right now the meteorological information is being played down but there are hints that things were playing out.

Early on they mention wanting to be higher but can't because of the the temps inhibit climb.

Then they are turning to avoid.

I do not want a Boeing scrap going on but it may be that the Airbus was playing where, if the numbers come together wrong things can go very bad.

Ask yourself why can't they climb if they planned to? They indicate this, not me.

[Black Ram]

I think they couldn't climb because it was unwise to do so, given the much warmer air, combined with their heavy weight. They could have climbed to FL370, which they eventually passed, but I assume they have to have some safety margin. I think this is something that would affect any aircraft, including, say a 777, which to me is very similar to the A330, except its size, and the power that goes with it. AF447 was flying through a massive tropical storm. It's just that the level of turbulence they happened to experience was not as severe as initially thought. And even at 38,000ft, the only reason things went "very bad" was because of their incompetence and persistent wrong control input.

[guamainiac]

Of course it will effect any plane but the warmer air limits what? The had projected a course and then could not climb to where they wanted to be. But even if it is not a raging storm up there, the temps give them instrument and problems with the envelope. That is what the safety margins are all about.