Air France 447 - On topic only!

[Gabriel]

Evan,

You are starting to feel frustration for an industry-wide lack of knowledge based on an equally industry-wide lack of proper education and training (and why not, screening).

In other words, you are starting to feel very much like l felt in the "Stall" thread.

Welcome to the club.

[KurtMc]

Gents:
Peace

[Highkeas]

............... Were explosive bolts really necessary during the Gemini program? .............

Excuse the thread diversion here but I wondered why you made this statement.

Every explosive device on the Gemini program performed as expected. And yes, they were really necessary otherwise lower cost options would have been employed. And remember Gemini had ejection seats for emergency escape. (I worked Gemini B).

Maybe you are thinking of Mercury-4 where the hatch was opened prematurly causing the capsule to sink; this would most likely have happened had the hatch been opened prematurely with a mechanical latching system considering the sea conditions. There was no conclusive cause assigned to this incident (lots of finger pointing though).

[KurtMc]

Maybe you are thinking of Mercury-4 where the hatch was opened prematurly causing the capsule to sink

I was mistaken. My regards.

[Evan]

Gents: Last night I put up a link to a video I thought was relevant to at least partial understanding of the 447 event. Got a couple PM's from a couple respected folks and one of my biggest questions was answered. Feeling like we got some of the talking done, even if my impetus/theories have been proven wrong.

So, in the spirit of a pilots meeting, are there any take aways from this couple of days? I know there were some for me. Please don't let your momentum against me cloud your willingness to examine all possibilities.

Peace

Kurt, that Discovery Channel 'documentary' is worthless sensationalism. Even the Nova report on AF447 was full of flawed theories. The mainstream simply can't get their facts straight about aviation technology, and there is no shortage of misinformed industry 'experts' out there ready and willing to feed them nonsense.

I think it's fair to say that we have been very open-minded for a long time and, collectively, examined every possibility and a large number of impossibilities as well. More importantly, the BEA investigation has extensively examined this crash, and thanks to the recovery of both flight recorders, it is now quite apparent that this was a case of egregious pilot error, and that no part of aircraft's computer flight control caused the crash.

Nevertheless, there is a certain part of the population, those who cannot resist their need for conspiracy and their fear of technology and anything complex and bewildering, who will never accept this reality. I guess for these people, it's all just entertainment.

But I hope at least you see the light now.

[Evan]

Welcome to the club.

I guess I join that club every time I step onboard a flight and wonder if the pilots are the Lufthansa 'one hander' types or if they take any real interest in the monitoring part of the job.

[Evan]

Tough and Competent

Sheesh, I can't even get my metaphors right.

I actually meant Apollo 1. My apologies.

Which brings to mind Gene Krantz's landmark 'Tough and Competent' speech given after the many NASA safety shortcomings were exposed by the investigation following the Apollo One fire:

From this day forward, Flight Control will be known by two words: 'Tough' and 'Competent.' Tough means we are forever accountable for what we do or what we fail to do. We will never again compromise our responsibilities... Competent means we will never take anything for granted... Mission Control will be perfect. When you leave this meeting today you will go to your office and the first thing you will do there is to write 'Tough and Competent' on your blackboards. It will never be erased. Each day when you enter the room, these words will remind you of the price paid by Grissom, White, and Chaffee. These words are the price of admission to the ranks of Mission Control.

****

The words should also be the price of admission to any passenger aircraft cockpit or airline boardroom. They obviously aren't.

[KurtMc]

Peace

[Highkeas]

Sheesh, I can't even get my metaphors right.

I actually meant Apollo 1. My apologies.

No apology required - there is a lot of history to remember for the US manned space program (wow next year will be the 50th aniversary of the first US manned spaceflight).

The Apollo 1 did not use explosives for the hatch (according to your reference)
"North American had originally suggested the hatch open outward and use explosive bolts to blow the hatch in case of emergency, as had been done in Project Mercury. NASA didn't agree, arguing the hatch could accidentally open, as it had on Grissom's Liberty Bell 7 flight, so the inward-opening hatch was selected early in the Block I design"

I'm not familier with the original hatch design but I worked with the engineer who designed the replacement hatch release mechanism.

All the numerous other explosive devices on Apollo (and the Space Shuttle) performed as required.

[KurtMc]

Highkeas -- thanks.

[3WE]

No. Wrong! He didn't chose low power.

The argument isn't about what the AF pilot chose, it's about YOUR totally wrong comment that using known power settings, (not throttle position- I do believe this plane had working power indicators), attitudes and VS (and the 100-kt stall-to-overspeed range) is likely to cause a crash.

Where's the reference?,

Maybe Gabriel can explain that using power settings (not lever settings), attitudes and VS that are used in normal flight (without an ASI) are likely to result in normal flight with slightly sloppy speed control.

Using low power settings, and doing steep climbs at altitude are likely to cause a crash.

[Gabriel]

Maybe Gabriel can explain...

Yes, I can. Wait, I did.

[Evan]

that are used in normal flight[/B] (without an ASI) are likely to result in normal flight with slightly sloppy speed control.

I don't disagree with that. I never disagreed with that. I don't like the word 'likely' there, especially when we have procedures that are proven to result in flight within the safe envelope. Long, long ago, when this argument (?) began, you (wasn't it you?) proposed some ridiculously low power setting as 'normal' and I pointed out that it was 'likely' to lead you to a stall. I thought it proved my point that assumptions of 'normal' settings could be off the mark. I guess it didn't. To be perfectly honest, I'm not even sure of what we are debating here.

What is your point, exactly? That the memory procedures are unnecessary. Ok, agreed. A talented pilot with perfect situational awareness doesn't need them. Do all pilots in this disorientating situation fit that description? No. Do most. Who knows. Does the one flying your plane? No way of telling.

Here what we do then. We require all pilots to know and perform these procedures, by heart, both the ones that need them and the ones that are far too good for them.

Then everyone lives, every time. Now, what do you have against that outcome?

[Gabriel]

I don't disagree with that. I never disagreed with that. I don't like the word 'likely' there, especially when we have procedures that are proven to result in flight within the safe envelope.

Evan, airplanes fly with a reliable airspeed indication with typical cruise attitudes and typical cruise power settings every day and that mostly result in normal flight. So I'd say that yes, using these same typical settings with an unreliable speed indication will likely lead to the same normal flight. The wings don't know if the airspeed indicator is good or not.

Whether the pilots are likely to use these typical settings in the event of an UAS event is another story (or at least another chapter).

Long, long ago, when this argument (?) began, you (wasn't it you?) proposed some ridiculously low power setting as 'normal' and I pointed out that it was 'likely' to lead you to a stall. I thought it proved my point that assumptions of 'normal' settings could be off the mark. I guess it didn't.

No. IIRC, you pointed out that, if the pilot attempted to hold the altitude (despite a ridiculously steep NON NORMAL nose up attitude), it was likely to lead to a stall.

In fact first you pointed out what you've said, then I said that I bet that holding 5º of ANU pitch even with idle thrust would not lead to a stall, and then you replied that you've meant holding the altitude by increasing the pitch as the speed went down. Please note that that is exactly the opposite to what 3we is saying.

Holding any of the typical cruise power settings and attitudes for any typical cruise weight and any typical cruise altitude, despite of the actual cruise weight and altitude (as long as they are within "typical") will very (yes, I'm adding "very") likely lead to controlled flight within the envelope, except for the altitude. And please note that the memory items do the same, they keep the lane within the safe envelope but they disregard altitude control.

What is your point, exactly?

I don't know what's 3we's point, but my point on this has always been that the failure of these pilots to keep the plane under control went well beyond not following a memory item. The memory item is the best situation: proven, reliable and approved. Much less than that would have kept this plane flying.

Here what we do then. We require all pilots to know and perform these procedures, by heart, both the ones that need them and the ones that are far too good for them.

I agree with the intent of that. But I don't trust pilots that did what these pilots do to correctly follow a memory item.
I'd restate the above like this:
No pilot "needing" the memory items will be allowed. Those not needing them will still learn, practice, and follow the memory items.

Then everyone lives, every time. Now, what do you have against that outcome?

Don't make me laugh.

Competent pilots correctly identifying the problem and applying the correct memory items correctly will lead to close to that outcome.
Competent pilots flying typical attitudes and powers will likely lead to that outcome, most of the times.
Poor pilots that had been taught this procedures by hart and are required to (but will correctly?) follow them by hart might lead to that outcome sometimes.
Poor pilots doing neither one nor the other will die and kill.

That's why you need BOTH the right pilot AND the right procedure. And, as I've said some time ago, if I really was forced to choose between either the right pilot or the right procedure, I don't need to think about it for a second. I take the pilot everyday.

[Evan]

Evan, airplanes fly with a reliable airspeed indication with typical cruise attitudes and typical cruise power settings every day and that mostly result in normal flight. So I'd say that yes, using these same typical settings with an unreliable speed indication will likely lead to the same normal flight. The wings don't know if the airspeed indicator is good or not.

Yes, of course, unless there is an unrecognized variable in the equation. I put that in red because it has not seemed to get across yet in black.

Here's what I mean (again): AF447 was not in a stable flight condition when the event occurred. It was decelerating. It was five seconds into a selected speed transition. Continuing with these settings as they were at that moment would lead to a dangerously low energy status. Application of thrust was necessary. Now, you can argue that the competent pilot would notice the situation and correct it as part of applying 'typical settings', but really, how sure do you feel about that? We have both agreed that there is a dangerous degree of stealth involved in an A/T design that does not incorporate servo-driven levers. What the procedures do are the following:

• 1) ensure that the A/P is disconnected (check);
• 2) ensure that the FD's are manually disengaged to prevent erroneous flight guidance (not done by the crew of AF447);
• 3) ensure that the thrust levers are moved to assure maximum climb power, thereby removing the threat of stall at normal pitch attitude (not done by the crew of AF447);
• 4) ensure that the pitch angle is sufficient to prevent overspeed at maximum cruise power.

By following the procedures, the pilots have eliminated a number of potentially dangerous conditions that can trip a pilot who has a degraded sense of situational awareness and/or mental process.

No. IIRC, you pointed out that, if the pilot attempted to hold the altitude (despite a ridiculously steep NON NORMAL nose up attitude), it was likely to lead to a stall.

In fact first you pointed out what you've said, then I said that I bet that holding 5º of ANU pitch even with idle thrust would not lead to a stall, and then you replied that you've meant holding the altitude by increasing the pitch as the speed went down. Please note that that is exactly the opposite to what 3we is saying.

Please note that it isn't:

Scenario 2: Gee, there's a stall warning and instead of continuing to pull up in a fairly steep climb, let me go to zero degrees nose up and 75% power and zero rate of climb where I normally cruise.

That means level flight in a 205t A330 at FL350 at 75%N1 . Ok, maybe you could coast on that for a very short time, and maybe airspeeds would return before you ran out of available AoA and got back on automation, or maybe you would see the pitch getting too high and go to the thrust levers... maybe... maybe... maybe... but this IS a recipe for stall if you handled it wrong, and my point was, and is, why get there in the first place?! There is no such danger if the procedures are followed.

Don't make me laugh.

Competent pilots correctly identifying the problem and applying the correct memory items correctly will lead to close to that outcome.
Competent pilots flying typical attitudes and powers will likely lead to that outcome, most of the times.
Poor pilots that had been taught this procedures by hart and are required to (but will correctly?) follow them by hart might lead to that outcome sometimes.
Poor pilots doing neither one nor the other will die and kill.

That's why you need BOTH the right pilot AND the right procedure. And, as I've said some time ago, if I really was forced to choose between either the right pilot or the right procedure, I don't need to think about it for a second. I take the pilot everyday.

Well Gabriel, I hate to break it to you, but you don't get to choose the pilot. But you can choose the airline that has complied with the requirement to teach and train for the procedures, and I will take that airline everyday, because even the biggest twat in the skies can't stall or overspeed over the brief duration of UAS if he follows the procedures and checklists (or if you disagree with that, please explain how).