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Note: this is purely for FOQA monitored data. Normally any noteworthy events would be reported by the crew.
Well, history has proved that this isn't always being done. It doesn't seem like a reliable idea to leave the decision as to what is noteworthy up to the pilots. We learned in the aftermath of AF447 that other cruise alt UAS incidents went unreported, with the crews taking a sort of 'all's well that ends well' view of the incidents, and not seeming to recognize the latent potential for disaster there.
So, this gatekeeper thing sounds like a needed program. Thanks for the explanation.
Originally Posted by [B]Joe H[/B] [URL="http://forums.jetphotos.net/showthread.php?p=577558#post577558"][IMG]http://forums.jetphotos.net/images/buttons/viewpost.gif[/IMG][/URL]
[I]Most ariline pilots these days are the result of a Zero to Hero course... Look at the Colgan FO transcripts, she was in no way ready to be promoted. let alone fly second fiddle, the pilot was also of dubious 'management' ability. But, that is part of the cycle, if a country pays someone to serve big macs more than a pilot in charge of a jet airliner, then there is something wrong.[/I]
(EVAN) -
While that may have been true of the Colgan crash, the Air France pilots aboard AF447 were very well experienced and capable, though not necessarily prepared for what they encountered. I don't think what you say is true of most airline pilots, but is undoubtedly true of certain pilots and operators.
I hope Evan et al, you now agree that the 'pilots' - and I use the term loosely - were totally imcompetent. ALL of them -
Again, I say, the sooner we take the human out of the loop the better -
I hope they really do sue the ass's off of AF - they made the kind of mistakes a non pilot would make - let alone X thousand hours of watching monitors and NEVER actually flying . THEY are NOT 'pilots' - they are box managers - and poor ones - and were NOT 'very well experienced' as you said . simply complete and utter Muppets - sorry, but -
We do have the technology now to replace them, hopefully, this will encourage that to happen, at the moment, the public may not want the 'hero(s) in the 'front'' to be replaced - but it MUST happen - the sooner the better -
10,000 hours 'experience' could be 10 hours repeated 1000 times - it means nothing -
Yes, definitely, there are problems to be addressed with the airbus feedback - visual and physical etc - but that is so often influenced by so called 'pilots' and public opinion, a dichotomy -
They - the 'pilots' were NOT acting on info received or not - they were acting against the laws of physics - Bonin was the real culprit - but they must all be tarred with the same brush - they are really, when it boils down to it, by public opinion, only there in the first place to 'take over' when the 'shit hits the fan' - they were not capable of even the most basic control -
I'd like to know how US Air 1549 ends in your world without pilots.
I am no pilot, nor do I have any official experience in the subject matter. I do however have a passion for aircraft safety and do research anything I can find that deals with aircraft safety.
I recently came across a write up about the crash of West-Caribbean Airways Flight 708. The circumstances under which this aircraft crashed are chillingly similar to that of AF447.
The pilot became fixated on what he thought was an engine problem and did not realise he was dealing with a deep stall situation.
It worries me when such things get repeated.
Yes there were subtle differences in the two flights, yet the execution of the problem solving procedure seemed to follow the same dreadful fate. Failure to understand and interpret the full situation, which results in loss of situational awareness, coupled with improper CRM procedures, allowed the real danger to slip through their fingers.
However, due to the notoriety of the AF447 incident, I hope that CRM procedures become more and more important and integral in training of pilots.
I am no pilot, nor do I have any official experience in the subject matter. I do however have a passion for aircraft safety and do research anything I can find that deals with aircraft safety.
I recently came across a write up about the crash of West-Caribbean Airways Flight 708. The circumstances under which this aircraft crashed are chillingly similar to that of AF447.
The pilot became fixated on what he thought was an engine problem and did not realise he was dealing with a deep stall situation.
It worries me when such things get repeated.
Yes there were subtle differences in the two flights, yet the execution of the problem solving procedure seemed to follow the same dreadful fate. Failure to understand and interpret the full situation, which results in loss of situational awareness, coupled with improper CRM procedures, allowed the real danger to slip through their fingers.
However, due to the notoriety of the AF447 incident, I hope that CRM procedures become more and more important and integral in training of pilots.
I don't remember if that particular crash was discussed on this thread or not, but looking it up, I agree, there are some striking similarities. In the first place, you just don't see many jetliners enter a stall during cruise, and in neither case did the pilot realize what was happening. In both cases, the pilot did the exact wrong thing, and pulled up. As you say, there was little communication in the cockpit, and in the West-Caribbean crash, that proved even more critical, since the copilot stated that they had stalled, but did not follow through on his assertion. Note that the UAS memory items would not have helped in the West-Caribbean crash, but the more general knowledge of how to recognize and manage a stall at altitude would have helped in both cases. So yes, it is sad when a plane crashes, and the one consolation we have is that an invaluable lesson will be learned, yet so often it is not.
The Airbus A330 has one of the most sophisticated automated piloting systems in the airline industry, but the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447 has some experts saying that the pilots weren't adequately trained to handle the plane in an emergency situation.
Absolutely no new bit of information or even new opinion in that news article.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
As far as T.O.G.A.'s referenced article goes, I think it's a succinct recap of events as we get ready to hear the final report in another month for someone less attuned to what's going on.
It is sad that rumors of an on board dalliance during the captains break makes the news when more likely he was in the lav taking a dump.
The only thing would be if in fact he was distracted from due diligence by the person in question. i.e. He didn't wait around for the thunderstorm; he was tardy responding to the emergency call; he didn't follow procedure in assigning responsibilities to the younger crew, etc. We already know that the CVR transcripts we have seen have been edited, removing for example the last words because they were of a personal nature and therefore did not contribute to our understanding of the crash (although I think a case could be made that those words reinforce the state of confusion the pilots were in), so for all we know there was quite a bit of off-topic banter going on that might indicate that the captain's mind was elsewhere.
I'm not sure what policies exist concerning a pilot's conduct during rest breaks, but I imagine such policies exist?
This sort of reporting is usually sneered at as conjecture and sensationalism - and for the most part, I agree - but there may be a legitimate question here, and if the media don't address it, and it's all left at the investigators' discretion to decide what is relevant and what is personal, then we may not get the full truth.
Unless when the Captain enters back in the cockpit he says something like "Why do you bother me? I was lying with the flight attendant!", nobody will ever know what happened during the rest. So any speculation on that is a dead-end road.
For the investigative poit of view, why he took "one full minute" to return to the cockpit (it doesn't look like that much really) might be that he was responding the call of nature (sex or other), that he was putting his shoes back on, or whatever. Nobody will know period.
--- Judge what is said by the merits of what is said, not by the credentials of who said it. ---
--- Defend what you say with arguments, not by imposing your credentials ---
really is not that long when you consider the posibility he may have been sound asleep or in the bathroom. It would be a tough sell to accuse the captain of anything but unfortunate.
Unless when the Captain enters back in the cockpit he says something like "Why do you bother me? I was lying with the flight attendant!"....
Well, something like that anyway. It's not out of the realm of possibility that there was some kabitzing amongst the pilots about Captain being hooked up with the little lady tonight. It all depends on how discrete he may have been about such a thing. And I do think that even the rumor brings out a couple of issues:
The CVR transcript. We can debate whether or not the transcript should even be made public, but I do think that it should be one way or the other: either release it in its entirety, or not at all. We shouldn't be given an edited version depending on what investigators claim is relevant, sifting out anything that could cause embarrassment. Once they start making those decisions, too many subjective motives come into play. And personally I do think the transcript needs to be released if we are to gain an accurate understanding of what happened.
Rest break protocol. It's easy to say that what the pilot does during his off-duty time is no one's damn business but his own, but I'm not sure a rest break is exactly the same as free time to do whatever.
A minute does not seem like a long time. However, the pilots are calling you for help and you - along with 200 other people - are potentially hurtling towards the ocean at 500 mph. I don't care if you're sitting on the can or sound asleep, from the moment your brain registers there's a problem, the only time that should elapse is the time it takes you to jump out of your bed and get to the cockpit. If you're doing something that slows that response time, maybe it's not in the best interests of safety.
I'm being the devil's advocate here, but come on, should the pilot of an airliner really be humping off-duty personnel as the plane heads into the ITCZ?
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