Air France 447 - On topic only!

[EconomyClass]

Hi EconomyClass,
There is plenty of reading on the Tenerife Crash of 1977. The blame has been clearly assigned - meaning, that there were multile factors leading to the accident.
Try to get hold of a copy of Stanley Stewart "Air Disasters". In my opinion it's one of the best accounts. Non-sensationalist and written by a 747 pilot. In the meantime, the Wikipedia article should help you out: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenerife_airport_disaster
Hope this helps

Although the Dutch authorities were initially reluctant to blame Captain Veldhuyzen van Zanten and his crew,^[2][34] the airline ultimately accepted responsibility for the accident. KLM paid the victims or their families compensation ranging between $58,000 and $600,000.^[3] As reported in a March 25, 1980, Washington Post article, the sum of settlements for property and damages was $110 million (an average of $189,000 per victim,^{[citation needed]} due to limitations imposed by European Compensation Conventions in effect at the time).

Just shows me that experience and air worthiness can be defeated by a set of circumstances. I don't know how eager senior pilots are to take off into a fogbank. It still bugs me that somehow breaking a rule about pilot hours would be so compelling. What happens when an airline breaks that rule? A fine?

[starchyme]

Seriously, guys, we are discussing how the smart plane should kill the stupid pilot....

The idea in the posts I made is that the system should make the pilots more AWARE and ASSIST where it POSSIBLY can see the pilot can "PROBABLY" improve. There is no prejudice intended towards boeing planes. Their planes have different mechanics to handle stalls (eg column vs side stick, different computer software). So boeing vs airbus ideals is not being discussed here as it has no direct relevance to what happened with AF447.

So whole idea is exactly what you mentioned, to make the airbus more pilot-friendly, in the approach of making suggestions to the pilots which it calculates are missing in events, but never pilot-less. no no. Electronic checklist displays are available. Maybe someone can elaborate whether there is an option to acknowledge every step in an event by pilots, or is it just a read and confirm scenario? The suggestion is for the AP to maybe enforce some of these checklist items, since it can, and the pilots are not doing it. And yes, there are problems to that approach, but it does not mean some suggestions in that direction is not possible.

[Black Ram]

Are you drunk or just Jeff Skiles?

I wish I was.

What I am saying is actually very simple. Maybe I made it sound confusing.
Basically, just because one is a great pilot, that doesn't mean they are also a great accident investigator. Or even a good psychologist. Or a good cockpit designer. Sully is trying to be all of those things, but he also made mistakes during his Hudson landing. Ok, it wasn't a frantic pull-up, but it was the usual wrong, instinctive pull-up, which the airbus system is designed to override.
And it did. But you will never hear Sully talk about that.
And once again, he was part of the pilot's union, and you will never hear one nice word about airbus from there.
Bottom line is, Sully is being dishonest and is acting out of his own believes and interests. Some pilots probably don't like the sidestick, and I'm sure many do. I don't see how Sully could not have opt to flt a Boeing with all his credentials and experience.
So what I'm saying is (without taking away from Sully's AND Skiles's accomplishment), let's look at the facts and not go for legends, heroes, and such. Lance Armstrong used steroids.

[Black Ram]

Leaving the "frantically" adjective at a side, the above is true.

Sure. However, I'm not sure Sully's pulling up was a calculated move, takign into account the stall protection. It really sounds more like it was a stres--induced, impulsive, tunnel-vision moment. Sully had said the airbus flight control system had "prevented him" from doing what he wanted, which he implied would have been better...You know?
Surely, relying on your flight envelope protections is forgivable, and Sully still did his part right (with some mistakes), which the plane is not designed to do.
HOWEVER, I have not heard ONE nice thing about the airbus flight control system from Sully, only bitching. Hi has been very stubborn, saying he would have done the same with a Boeing. I would have acted differently - whether I like my plane or not, I would have acknowledged its part - in this case autotrim and alpha protection, and I think also superior lateral control, when they needed it most. That's in the NTSB report, but you will never hear it from Sully. That's why I have no trust in his "analysis" of his flight, AF447, or any flight eh might pick on. In fact, (and I have posted this HERE in summer 2011), the pilot union people (of which Sully was part of) said publicly they HOPED the NTSB report of the US1549 would show major problems with the airbus fbw system! I mean, I don't know, this really seems like what you get in a conflict of interests situation

[Black Ram]

The idea in the posts I made is that the system should make the pilots more AWARE and ASSIST where it POSSIBLY can see the pilot can "PROBABLY" improve.

I agree. I still think that pilot training is the underlining condition, and I hope it has been addressed. But a system can always improver. Maybe, for starters, the plane can tell pilots to carry out the UAS procedure, like it tells them to move the throttles, but with more priority and a voice-over. The human factors people can look into such situations, where pilots can still get confused, because it does happen, unfortunately. The TAM A320 crash is a good example. But without proper pilot training and adequate CRM, this will be almost pointless.

[3WE]

I'd call near total bullcrap on Sully "ignorantly" pulling up.

You spend your whole career landing with your airspeed healthily above stall.

Suddenly, you need to fly the plane to the brink of stall and settle gently into the water.

Your brain and muscles have had no recent practice on the subtle inputs that comes into play...while the plane becomes wallowy and mushy (like a wet sponge to quote Zero Hour!) So, maybe your final moments in holding the plane off may not be as pretty as your best landings with higher airspeeds on a runway.

By the way- Look at this link below...there's two things....1) I think you could make an argument that the pilot gave the yoke "an overly strong pull" in response to sinking and trying to touch down softly. And I bet he didn't plan that so does that make it "desperate"? 2) Note the comment, "a landing that had never been done before". (Can you say analogy?)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NV4tgjSPgks

Actually, Gabriel defines Sully's performance really well- his "stick and rudder" performance was probably average compared to your typical airliner pilot...but his true, ballsy moment of brilliance was, when faced with a really strong chance of dying, he makes the split-second decision to ditch and to not try to glide to an airport.

...that he gave a final, big pull on the stick when he's flying it to the limit and getting slow and a sink develops???, yeah, pilots do that sometimes when trying to do a minium-speed landing.

[Black Ram]

I'd call near total bullcrap on Sully "ignorantly" pulling up.

I didn't say or imply "ignorantly", I said it was "instinctive". Human beings will be human beings. Like I said, it was ok it happened that way. But Mr Sully has been vehemently denying the plane was a factor. The facts are he (actually they, the crew) had autotrim, which reduced their workload, and the plane overrode Sully in the final seconds, engaging alpha protection mode.

Your brain and muscles have had no recent practice on the subtle inputs that comes into play...while the plane becomes wallowy and mushy (like a wet sponge to quote Zero Hour!) So, maybe your final moments in holding the plane off may not be as pretty as your best landings...

I don't think it became wallowy and mushy, I think it was very controlled. The NTSB said that, as did the first eyewitness accounts. FBW?

By the way- Look at this link below...Can you say analogy...

Cool, that's your "stick and rudder" skills. However, that's not what happened on the Hudson and thank God, because it would not have been pretty. Therefore, for me this isn't exactly an analogy. That United DC10 that had an uncontained No2 engine failure is also without an analogy. Whatever you think of it, that was something extreme, never done before (and hopefully never will be again), and it was all pilot skills. But it would have never worked on water. Despite the major loss of life, one can consider their landing on the runway a success, miracle, and so on, given the circumstances. And all crew members have been very honest and humble in their accounts, which one cannot exactly say about Sully.

Actually, Gabriel defines Sully's performance really well- his "stick and rudder" performance was probably average compared to your typical airliner pilot...but his true, ballsy moment of brilliance was, when faced with a really strong chance of dying, he makes the split-second decision to ditch and to not try to glide to an airport

I'm not in position to grade Sully's "stick and rudder" skills. I'm just using the facts, released by the profession analysts. Gabriel is giving a good account, but like I have said, 1) we don't know if Sully's pull-up was intentional, relying on the protections, 2) he never gave credit to the airplane, which is twisting the account of the accident. Therefore, I am not willing to take his analysis on AF447 seriously (also given other facts, like his involvement with the pilots' union, which in many ways constitutes a conflict of interests in this 'stick n rudder' vs sidestick debate).
Btw, I completely agree Sully did his part as a captain, making the decision to ditch and not attempt to reach an airport. That's what I meant by "making a decision that the plane cannot". He also cleverly turned the APU on. Now, there were some errors - not engaging the ditch switch, maybe selecting flaps 3 would have also been beneficial. I'm not going to be cynical and claim they messed up by not going for the right airport right away, which simulations showed they could have done. To me, this is an accident which shows the right interaction of crew and technology, almost a perfect synergy. However, according to Sully, it was all him?

...that he gave a final, big pull on the stick when he's flying it to the limit and getting slow and a sink develops???, yeah, pilots do that sometimes when trying to do a minium-speed landing.

But how often is alpha protection engaged, overriding the pilots' command? I can think only of the AF A320 airshow crash. But that;s why I think Sully is a hypocrite and not a trustworthy source for such analysis - he himself pulled back past what is safe and relied on computers, protections, sidestick, autotrim....again, nothing wrong, I even thinks it's good, but his words don't really match his actions during the Hudson landing.
And while there is nothing wrong with a former pilot becoming an air safety consultant, it really depends on the situation. John Cox is also a former US Airways pilot, but as far as I know, he has been into air safety research for a long time and has company dedicated to the field.

[Gabriel]

However, the "analysis" made by Sully is quite obvious, it doesn't take a lot of accident investigation experience or knowledge:

With a small sidestick on the opposite side that has a full travel of about 1 inch and whose movement is not duplicated by the sidestick on your side, a full pull up by the other pilot is not as obvious as your yoke crushing your stomach as the other pilot makes the pull in his yoke.

Regardless of any bias on the side of Sully (if any), this is more a matter of fact than of opinion and analysis.

[Black Ram]

So now it is the sidestick's fault - at least that's one would think when an American hero appears on primetime tv and pretty much says so. But those two pilots did so many things wrong, including, on more than one occasion, playing with the joystick together, at the same time, even though there's a voice-over warning of "dual input". Did either of the two pilots ever put the sidestick down, all the way, for more than two seconds? When Bonin acknowledged he should "go down", what did he do? When Robert said "according to all three you're going up", did he follow through, or did he give up monitoring? Things really point to them having enough information to have prevented this. Sure, put an indicator for the sidestick position, put whatever you want. If your crew is incompetent, the result is likely to be bad once in a while. Stalls have happened with yokes as well. And in single-seaters - more F117s have been lost during night training, due to loss of situational awareness, than in action.
So now we are entering a discussion about sidesticks and whether they are good, bad or dangerous. I personally don't remember seeing them in the "recommendations" section. And Sully's analysis is beyond biased, it's hypocritical. It's also on the level of tabloids like "The Telegraph". It is/was bound to cause more unnecessary A vs B fiction, now that the theory of the stabilizer detaching, as well as that of french computers going crazy were proven false. This quote sums it up for me:

"To blame the accident on the side stick design of modern Airbuses seems way too facile in view of everything else that has come to light concerning the conduct of AF447, and the outstandingly safe operation of these designs across thousands of jets and hundreds of airlines operating world wide."

[Deadstick]

Black Ram dude, you really don't like Sullenberger do you?

[3WE]

"727 at Meigs is analagous to Sully"

...Cool, that's your "stick and rudder" skills. However, that's not what happened on the Hudson..

Hmmm...with the 727 you are slowing up...extra slow...and having to adjust pitch inputs to manage your descent rate for a landing, and you do a hard, last second pull up...and that has no relevance to Sully pulling up in the final stages of his water landing.

Okay...

[Black Ram]

Black Ram dude, you really don't like Sullenberger do you?

Even if I didn't like him, that would be irrelevant. I just don't like what he is doing, and I tried to lay out my arguments why I think he isn't being fair. I am kinda disappointed, but people do that.

[3WE]

So now it is the sidestick's fault - at least that's one would think when an American hero appears on primetime tv and pretty much says so. But those two pilots did so many things wrong...

Yeah, usually when a plane crashes it's because many things go wrong. Then that leads to the discussion of all the things that added up just right to cause the crash...and then, most logical folks go to the "what ifs"

Like, what if the side sticks weren't independent?

...and just because someone discusses that "what if" does not mean the the entire blame goes to that what if...even if that "what if" might have prevented the crash (just as much as a number of other "what ifs".

I know, it's a complicated concept...

[Black Ram]

"Hmmm...with the 727 you are slowing up...extra slow...and having to adjust pitch inputs to manage your descent rate for a landing, and you do a hard, last second pull up...and that has no relevance to Sully pulling up in the final stages of his water landing

That pull-up is more like an extreme flare to me. It was very controlled and calculated, though rough. Of course, lateral control is worse here, because it's all manual flight control, on the edge.
As for Sully's, I think I read alpha protection engaged at 150 ft RA and his nose-up inputs were more or less attenuated by the flight control system. I don't see how this relates to the 727, where what happens is exactly what the pilot commands, manipulating control surfaces directly. How do you know that recreating Sully's control inputs on this 727 would not have resulted in a disaster, even on the runway?
Then you can make the argument he would not have done this in Boeing, but I can say 1) how do we know 2) the landing, even the approach would not have been the same, no matter what the outcome, 3) the sidestick and flight control assisted him in the mechanical aspect of flight control, no matter what he is saying.

[Gabriel]

So now it is the sidestick's fault - at least that's one would think when an American hero appears on primetime tv and pretty much says so.

Who said so?

The closer I've hard from Sully is that what the other pilot is doing with the control is hard to note with a sidestick but quite obvious with linked yokes (that's hard to dispute).

But those two pilots did so many things wrong, including, on more than one occasion, playing with the joystick together, at the same time, even though there's a voice-over warning of "dual input".

I think that nobody doubt that this was a case mainly of pilot error (several gross errors, indeed). But "pilot error" can never be a root cause because you can't directly eliminate pilot error. You have to improve training, the safety culture, the policies and procedures, the pilot selection and performance monitoring, the systems interface, etc... Then, those factors are the root cause.

There is a second level analysis that is not what caused the accident, but what else could have prevented it. Enormous safety improvements came from this approach, including GPWS and TCAS.

But one had to admit that the MP might have not noted what the PF was doing with the sidestick, and that he might have noted if it was a linked yoke, and that he might have taken a corrective action then. There is no guarantee though, as the Colgan crash perfectly shows.

Did either of the two pilots ever put the sidestick down, all the way, for more than two seconds?

Well, I don't know if for more than 2 seconds. But who until then had been the MP pushed down at a time. And guess what? The nose went down and the AoA diminished. But the stall warning (that was silent until then) started sounding, and when he pulled up again the stall warning stopped sounding again. And it did so by design.

When Bonin acknowledged he should "go down", what did he do? When Robert said "according to all three you're going up", did he follow through, or did he give up monitoring?

Well, at the beginning of the event the PM said that and the PF made nose-down stick inputs that led to the nose going down and the climb speed reducing from 7000fpm to 700fpm. Unfortunately they were past the ceiling by then, so the only way out was to descend, and adding thrust would have helped too. But no. They stayed up there bleeding speed and increasing pitch and AoA until the stall warning sounded, and then they pulled up hard again and kept doing so (mainly) until the ocean stopped them.

Things really point to them having enough information to have prevented this.

Nobody doubts that. 13 other planes and crews survived UAS events in the A330/A340

Sure, put an indicator for the sidestick position, put whatever you want. If your crew is incompetent, the result is likely to be bad once in a while. Stalls have happened with yokes as well.

Again, no doubts about that either. However, more awareness = more chances of detecting what's wrong and fixing it. Still, there are no guarantees and with an incompetent crew the result will still be bad once in a while. Just maybe not as often. Just maybe not in the AF case.

This quote sums it up for me:

"To blame the accident on the side stick design of modern Airbuses seems way too facile in view of everything else that has come to light concerning the conduct of AF447, and the outstandingly safe operation of these designs across thousands of jets and hundreds of airlines operating world wide."

Source? (I agree with it anyway)