Air France 447 - On topic only!

[Black Ram]

Oh yeah, I know, thanks. I just want to hear the original audio. I also want to see an animation of the accident based on the FDR. NTSB does it, the Russians do it sometimes, so hopefully so will BEA.
I agree on the documentary. The idea is great, but they have missed on some parts. Also, their cockpit recreation doesn't have the turbulence and roll oscillations, like NOVA/BBC's Mystery of AF447 documentary. I get pissed off when they talk about the "plummeting temperature causing the pitots to ice". Even these pilots knew the weather was WARM and talked about it. They also knew about losing the speeds. Again, can't figure out if they had false altitude readings and a failed VS, this seems to be coming from an Air France pilot. One of the most important part from the CVR they should have included is Robert's "according to this you're climbing, according to all three you're climbing". So I can't figure the whole point of the documentary, though the conclusions at the end are right. I guess we'll have to wait for Mayday's take, it should be coming out in a few months.
So basically you feel Bonin was trying to fly over a turbulent part of the storm?

[Horatio]

Air France Crash: Pilot Marc Dubois Reportedly Was Sleep Deprived

Air France Crash: Pilot Marc Dubois Reportedly Was Sleep Deprived

On May 31, 2009, an Air France plane carrying 228 people from Brazil to France crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing everyone on board. It was one of the deadliest accidents in aviation history, and according to a recently disclosed judicial report, the pilot had only one hour of sleep.

"I didn't sleep enough last night. One hour -- it's not enough," the pilot, Marc Dubois, is recorded as saying one hour into the flight, reports the the French news magazine Le Point. Dubois was taking a scheduled nap when the plane was whipped by a tropical storm, and he reportedly took more than minute to respond to his co-pilot's calls for help.

Fatigue is no isolated issue in the aviation industry, where pilots frequently have long and irregular shifts and short rest periods, in addition to crossing time zones. Last year, a National Sleep Foundation survey of transportation workers found that 1 in 5 pilots said that they'd made a "serious" error due to sleep deprivation. That figure has cropped up before; more than 1 in 5 pilots raised the issue of fatigue to NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System.

The veteran JetBlue pilot who famously had a "meltdown" on a flight between New York and Las Vegas last May was found not guilty by reason of insanity after testimony that he was sleep deprived. The problem isn't just limited to long-haul flights. A 2006 survey of 162 short-haul commercial pilots in the United Kingdom found that three-quarters reported severe fatigue, and the vast majority said that the problem of fatigue was worse than two years before.

After a regional airline flight from Newark, N.J., to Buffalo, N.Y., crashed in 2009, the Federal Aviation Administration decided to change its policy based on the latest fatigue science. The new regulations, which will take effect next year, expand a pilot's minimum rest period between shifts from 8 hours to 10, and require pilots to have at least 30 consecutive hours off, once a week. All pilots must also affirmatively state whether they are fit for duty before takeoff.

"This is a major safety achievement," U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood said at the time.

http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2013/03/18/deadly-air-france-crash-pilot-marc-dubois-was-sleep-deprived-r/?test=latestnews&ncid=txtlnkusaolp00000058

[3WE]

Air France Crash: Pilot Marc Dubois Reportedly Was Sleep Deprived...

Yeah, that's bad...but...

Nose up
Slow speed
Descent
Crummy, wallowing roll control
and a STALL WARNING
Maybe...just maybe...
...for a brief moment...
...consider...possibly...
lowering the nose in something akin to a Cessna 150 stall recovery procedure.

...just think about it...

...even though big powerful airliners can almost always power out of a stall.

...And I think maybe with the flight time the other crew members had...maybe they had read about stalls and AOA and all that maybe just once and that any airspeed and attitude rule and maybe practiced in 20 or so times during initial flight training in light aircraft.

Of course, I did give some credence to the theory that they figured that HAL was engauged and thinking, "I'm sorry Dave, further nose up attitude is not available".

[brianw999]

.........expand a pilot's minimum rest period between shifts from 8 hours to 10, and require pilots to have at least 30 consecutive hours off, once a week.

Very interesting. As a paramedic working in the UK and responsible for peoples lives in a similar way to a pilots responsibilities, the European Working Time Directive, which is enshrined in law so my employer can be prosecuted under criminal proceedings if they ignore it, states that I MUST have a minimum 11 hours off duty time between shifts and that I MUST have uninterrupted rest periods of 35 hours per week or, if that is not possible 70 hrs per fortnight where that measured fortnight consists of two consecutive weeks. If I am finishing a period of night work then I MUST have at least two clear off duty days after that period of night shifts before recommencing work.
These regulations were brought in to prevent unscrupulous employers from making me work unacceptable shift patterns. It's high time that the airline industry was made to comply in a similar manner. If doing so means that the cost of my ticket goes up a bit then that's fine with me providing I get a properly rested pilot.

[TeeVee]

the problem is simple: greed. yes we all KNOW that airlines are corporations who's goal is to make MONEY. yes we all KNOW that the industry works on a fine financial line as it is. but the costs of them making money are sometimes too high. hell, the RISK of them making money is too high.

more sleep hours=more pilots=more expenses=less profit. maybe the answer is to force the executives to keep the same schedule as the pilots...

[SYDCBRWOD]

In many ways irrelevant. There were two fully qualified pilots strapped into the seats - they should have been able to handle the aircraft without Marc Dubois.

If they could not, they should not have been in the seats, they are not just seat warmers for the captain..

[Peter Kesternich]

In many ways irrelevant. There were two fully qualified pilots strapped into the seats - they should have been able to handle the aircraft without Marc Dubois.

If they could not, they should not have been in the seats, they are not just seat warmers for the captain..

Amen to that.

[Horatio]

In many ways irrelevant. There were two fully qualified pilots strapped into the seats - they should have been able to handle the aircraft without Marc Dubois.

If they could not, they should not have been in the seats, they are not just seat warmers for the captain..

Apparently the other two pilots were little more than oxygen thieves. What we don't know is whether or not the other two carbon-based units (the "pilots") were sleep-deprived too. Although I don't think anything can be an excuse for a pilot panicking and keeping his hand on the stick so the nose points down...with no indicator in the cockpit alerting the other pilot.

[3WE]

In many ways irrelevant. There were two fully qualified pilots strapped into the seats - they should have been able to handle the aircraft without Marc Dubois.

If they could not, they should not have been in the seats, they are not just seat warmers for the captain..

It's really sad to debate this.

I agree that it's possible that the experienced, awake captain might have perceived nose high, going slow, desending rapidly, wallowing roll control and a stall warning and concluded there was a stall, and informed the less-experienced, flying pilots and saved the day.

To be clear, I'm generally in the other camp that anyone with more than 10 hours of flight time should be able to see nose high, going slow, desending rapidly, wallowing roll control and a stall warning, conclude there was a stall and save the day.

But I think the real clincher is that the captain DID make it to the flight deck and in spite of a couple of minutes of experienceing nose high, going slow, desending rapidly, wallowing roll control and a stall warning, did not conclude there was a stall and did not save the day.

I guess that makes it triple sad that [paraphrase Syd] THREE fully qualified pilots [deletion and substitution] were not able to handle the aircraft.

[Gabriel]

On the other hand, by when the Captain reached the cockpit:
- It would have been hard for the Captain to see what control inputs the other pilots were making.
- The airplane was already at a ridiculously high AoA of some 40°.
- That AoA is outside any engineering scenario, so nobody knows if the airplane was recoverable from that (even with the correct stall recovery technique).
- In fact, the AoA was so high that, even when the Pitot tubes had cleared, the air was hitting them quite diagonally so that the speed was erroneously low.
- So erroneously low that the AoA system said "I can't give a reliable AoA indication if I have about no air flowing through my AoA vanes", and quit reporting AoA data.
- Because of that, the stall warning had just stopped working just before the Captain arrived at the cockpit. (Yes, the stall warning was not sounding when he arrived).
- And, even worse, when the until-then-monitoring pilot took control and pushed down, the nose started to go down, the AoA decreased, the air started hitting the Pitot tubes more head-on, the error in the airspeed indication diminished, so the airspeed reading increased and the AoA system said "now I have enough airflow, I can report the AoA now, and we are stalling" (stall warning on).
- And when they pulled up again, the opposite happened, the AoA system quit again and the stall warning stopped again (Holly plot, Batman!).

So even if I think that (but nobody knows if) the plane was technically recoverable by when the Captain reached the cockpit, there is no reason to believe that the two pilots that during 2 minutes had actively taken the airplane into a stall and then had done the opposite than needed to recover from it would have been suddenly "see the light" and recover, or that the Captain was in any position to understand what the hell was going on.

During two minutes you have two pilots that (flying or monitoring), starting from a smooth straight and level flight at nearly the max ceiling:
- Pulled up into a 1.5G, 7000fpm, 12° nose up, 2000ft climb until they managed to make the plane stall,
- And when the stall aural warning started shouting "Stall Stall Stall", they pulled up again hard and kept doing that during one full minute with the stall warning shouting "Stall" all the time.
- Whatever happened after that is irrelevant. There was nobody in that plane in conditions to recover it, IF it was recoverable.

[Leftseat86]

On the other hand, by when the Captain reached the cockpit:
- It would have been hard for the Captain to see what control inputs the other pilots were making.
- The airplane was already at a ridiculously high AoA of some 40°.
- That AoA is outside any engineering scenario, so nobody knows if the airplane was recoverable from that (even with the correct stall recovery technique).
- In fact, the AoA was so high that, even when the Pitot tubes had cleared, the air was hitting them quite diagonally so that the speed was erroneously low.
- So erroneously low that the AoA system said "I can't give a reliable AoA indication if I have about no air flowing through my AoA vanes", and quit reporting AoA data.
- Because of that, the stall warning had just stopped working just before the Captain arrived at the cockpit. (Yes, the stall warning was not sounding when he arrived).
- And, even worse, when the until-then-monitoring pilot took control and pushed down, the nose started to go down, the AoA decreased, the air started hitting the Pitot tubes more head-on, the error in the airspeed indication diminished, so the airspeed reading increased and the AoA system said "now I have enough airflow, I can report the AoA now, and we are stalling" (stall warning on).
- And when they pulled up again, the opposite happened, the AoA system quit again and the stall warning stopped again (Holly plot, Batman!).

So even if I think that (but nobody knows if) the plane was technically recoverable by when the Captain reached the cockpit, there is no reason to believe that the two pilots that during 2 minutes had actively taken the airplane into a stall and then had done the opposite than needed to recover from it would have been suddenly "see the light" and recover, or that the Captain was in any position to understand what the hell was going on.

During two minutes you have two pilots that (flying or monitoring), starting from a smooth straight and level flight at nearly the max ceiling:
- Pulled up into a 1.5G, 7000fpm, 12° nose up, 2000ft climb until they managed to make the plane stall,
- And when the stall aural warning started shouting "Stall Stall Stall", they pulled up again hard and kept doing that during one full minute with the stall warning shouting "Stall" all the time.
- Whatever happened after that is irrelevant. There was nobody in that plane in conditions to recover it, IF it was recoverable.

This.

Although you should replace "they" with "Bonin", who basically had control of the airplane for the majority of the upset.

[TheKiecker]

I dont know if I'm buying the whole " one pilot cant see the other pilots joystick " , BUT if that is in fact the case ( foolish Airbus), then there should be a HUD of both joysticks positions plain as day right in front , dead center of the cockpit. If this was the case the other pilots would have seen what this dope was doing , and immediately bitch-slapped him and then corrected his actions. I think everybody including numb-nuts couldnt believe what was going on, and the cause of the situation. It would have been a simple , "What the hell are you doing? " and then a correction.

[EconomyClass]

Sorta lost my interest in aviation safety in recent years. But I'm just amazed at the longevity of this topic. We're swinging around to 4 years later. Maybe there will always be footnotes to this crash, though I think the two planes colliding on the ground in the Canary Islands is still the worst crash ever, right? Yet who debates about that crash? I guess it must have been stormy back when it happened. Who really screwed up to make that happen? Or has it long been settled where the real blame was assigned?

[Peter Kesternich]

(...) I think the two planes colliding on the ground in the Canary Islands is still the worst crash ever, right? Yet who debates about that crash? I guess it must have been stormy back when it happened. Who really screwed up to make that happen? Or has it long been settled where the real blame was assigned?

Hi EconomyClass,
There is plenty of reading on the Tenerife Crash of 1977. The blame has been clearly assigned - meaning, that there were multile factors leading to the accident.
Try to get hold of a copy of Stanley Stewart "Air Disasters". In my opinion it's one of the best accounts. Non-sensationalist and written by a 747 pilot. In the meantime, the Wikipedia article should help you out: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenerife_airport_disaster
Hope this helps

[starchyme]

Stall warning

Maybe a possible solution to help disorientated pilots is to include a 2nd line on the stall warning lights that says "Push nose forward", or an audible alarm with stall alarm that says "Stall! Push nose forward". Yes may will not apply in all situations. but since the plane failry knows what condition it is in, some checklist features can be auto inserted to start trouble shooting of and get the pilots into recovery mode quicker. just a thought.