Air France 447 - On topic only!

[ca787546]

As soon as any stall indication (could be aural warning, buffet...) is recognized, apply the immediate actions :
- NOSE DOWN PITCH CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . APPLY
This will reduce angle of attack
Note: In case of lack of pitch down authority, reducing thrust may be necessary

Nose down pitch control... hmmmm I listed all the ways we have to control the pitch, and one of those included the trim. That is why airbus didn't write "SIDESTICK FORWARD PRESSURE........APPLY" Remember what I wrote, there are a lot of people that team up to write this manuals. I'm not a lawyer, but I think their choice of words was deliberate.

[Evan]

Evan, have you flown airbus in the FBW family as well, or have flown FBW aircraft? I have about 5000+ hours on the A319, A320, and A330-200/-300 combined. I am aware that the THS is not controlled by the pilot in normal law, I was simply explaining it layman terms since some of the people here have zero flying experience while others have several thousand hours flight time, or aviation engineering experience of some kind.

Sorry, didn't mean to insinuate that someone with your stick time would not be aware of THS controls. I just think it is important to anyone reading these posts to understand that point, as what you wrote there in putting things into laymans terms was misleading, and it is a critical aspect to the sequence of events here.

I have to say, I have encountered Unreliable Indication situations in the A330 in climb, and I have accounts from several colleagues that have encountered it in cruise at heavy weights around thunderstorms. The common denominators in all these UAS cases was that although they were short-lived (from a few seconds to less than a minute), taking the time to examine the situation (wait a minute, we know we're NOT doing 60 knots on a climb, or in cruise all of a sudden!), evaluate the factors (altitude, speed, thrust condition, weather conditions, attitude) and not simply react like a robot (power to climb, 5 degrees nose up! right away!) ended up in a successful outcome.

Yes, and forgoing memory items resulted in a successful outcome in all the other reported and investigated instances of UAS. And then disaster struck, because it was a disaster waiting to happen. ca787546, please respond to the scenario I proposed for you, as I think it might be close to the one that occurred here.

Also, you must be aware of the flying qualities of modern jets when near their maximum performance ceiling, I didn't ever say I was at 41000 feet with 205T, you added that weight out of your own imagination.

Actually, no, I added the weight from the interim report estimates for AF447, which was maintaining FL350 instead of its planned FL370, and definitely not FL410.

I recommend you read the following information, go to the stall section. I just finished reading it a few minutes ago, it's good reading.

http://www.ukfsc.co.uk/files/Safety%...ary%202011.pdf

First of all, I am dismayed that Airbus finds it necessary to publish such an article (on basic stall procedure) in a magazine geared for current Airbus pilots. That in itself speaks volumes about the state of affairs in pilot training standards. Secondly, I believe it fails to mention THS issues or the issues associated with ABNORMAL ATTITUDE LAWS.

[Evan]

Nose down pitch control... hmmmm I listed all the ways we have to control the pitch, and one of those included the trim. That is why airbus didn't write "SIDESTICK FORWARD PRESSURE........APPLY" Remember what I wrote, there are a lot of people that team up to write this manuals. I'm not a lawyer, but I think their choice of words was deliberate.

Ambiguity = liability here.

[guamainiac]

ca787546, what do you attribute, if anything to the directional situation.

The AC descends in a "one turn right spiral", are they trying to turn out of a problem or perhaps just with a confused and busy environment the initial direction of flight went by the wayside while trying to just fly the airplane?

What a harrowing environment in which to sort out the real from the false. Like the "Sirens" there are things (instincts), calling.

How much sensory input can you have ... "seat of the pants" ... probably none and no visual cues. Almost when combined with the weather and it's own nuances that night.

Yet we insist on flying the margins in what is almost the fringe of space where the ships almost cant fly because of the ...

[guamainiac]

Before this Memorial Day fades, allow me to at least lift a toast of remembrance to several of those pilots and crews who did not return from south east Asia.

[Fear_of_Flying]

Sorry, didn't mean to insinuate that someone with your stick time would not be aware of THS controls. I just think it is important to anyone reading these posts to understand that point, as what you wrote there in putting things into laymans terms was misleading, and it is a critical aspect to the sequence of events here.



Yes, and forgoing memory items resulted in a successful outcome in all the other reported and investigated instances of UAS. And then disaster struck, because it was a disaster waiting to happen. ca787546, please respond to the scenario I proposed for you, as I think it might be close to the one that occurred here.



Actually, no, I added the weight from the interim report estimates for AF447, which was maintaining FL350 instead of its planned FL370, and definitely not FL410.



First of all, I am dismayed that Airbus finds it necessary to publish such an article (on basic stall procedure) in a magazine geared for current Airbus pilots. That in itself speaks volumes about the state of affairs in pilot training standards. Secondly, I believe it fails to mention THS issues or the issues associated with ABNORMAL ATTITUDE LAWS.

I think ca787546 has already answered your question, Evan. His basic point is that you take a moment to assess the situation. This accident may very well have happened precisely because the pilot reacted first without ascertaining what was taking place and how to manage the situation. You want the pilots to have an almost autonomic response to certain emergencies. Well, this pilot did, only it was the wrong one. Better to have had no instantaneous response whatsoever, just in case, as may have happened here, your training and instincts come in conflict in the heat of the moment. I would hope that in your scenario, the dynamic situation of the aircraft would quickly be identified and corrected.

I would also point out that so far today you have taken to task Airbus for having "vague" procedures (which ca787546 has tried to explain are general instructions for which there different means to the end), Airbus pilots for having troubling "common perceptions" which you deem inappropriate, Airbus pilots for taking the time to keep instilling the basics of airmanship - the very basics you claim are lacking - by reading trade magazines, and the magazine article itself for not being comprehensive enough. Is there anything beyond your reproach?

[Evan]

You want the pilots to have an almost autonomic response to certain emergencies.

In a very limited number of situations, this is what is needed. As a passenger, it angers me that Airbus pilots might still be resisting the memory items for this set of circumstances. If the PF of AF447 had stuck to CL thrust and 5° pitch memory items, this thread wouldn't exist. If this AF447 isn't an object lesson in the need for uniform, instinctive response training, I don't know what is.

I would also point out that so far today you have taken to task Airbus for having "vague" procedures (which ca787546 has tried to explain are general instructions for which there different means to the end), Airbus pilots for having troubling "common perceptions" which you deem inappropriate, Airbus pilots for taking the time to keep instilling the basics of airmanship - the very basics you claim are lacking - by reading trade magazines, and the magazine article itself for not being comprehensive enough. Is there anything beyond your reproach?

Let me be clear; here's what I am taking to task:

- The current standard of pilot training.
- The current depth requirement of Airbus pilot systems knowledge and awareness.
- The current ambiguities of Airbus publications, directives and procedures.
- Pitfalls and safety oversights in the Airbus architecture.
- A general lapse of imagination on the part of those responsible for all of the above.

I believe these are all factors that led to the crash of AF447.

[ca787546]

In a very limited number of situations, this is what is needed. As a passenger, it angers me that Airbus pilots might still be resisting the memory items for this set of circumstances. If the PF of AF447 had stuck to CL thrust and 5° pitch memory items, this thread wouldn't exist. If this AF447 isn't an object lesson in the need for uniform, instinctive response training, I don't know what is.



Let me be clear; here's what I am taking to task:

- The current standard of pilot training.
- The current depth requirement of Airbus pilot systems knowledge and awareness.
- The current ambiguities of Airbus publications, directives and procedures.
- Pitfalls and safety oversights in the Airbus architecture.
- A general lapse of imagination on the part of those responsible for all of the above.

I believe these are all factors that led to the crash of AF447.

Hey Evan, here's the link you need. Tell them you've cracked the case:

http://www.bea.aero/en/contacter-le-bea/contactquestion.php

No, seriously, I see your concern as a passenger. I understand that the complexity of machines such as aircraft can be daunting to some, and at the sight of such a tragedy such as the ones we see when there's an aviation accident, it poses many questions in the minds of passengers, pilots, and everyone involved in aviation in some way or another. Trust me when I tell you that as a pilot, I am very much dedicated to obtain as much system knowledge and awareness as possible.
As many of my friends and colleagues are involved in training either by being instructors, or in some part of the training departments of airlines, and having briefly had some time involved with instruction myself, I also can speak for them and tell you that they are dedicated, passionate individuals that try to keep the highest standards possible within their means (remember, this is a business, we could arrange every pilot to go through 1000 hours of sim time before touching the real aircraft, but then be prepared to pay a LOT more for your airfare next time you travel, or trust your life to the hands of a professional bus driver or a professional train conductor, those are other options, or of course, you can always take a cruise across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, I've heard they're memorable experiences).
About the ambiguities of airbus manuals, I don't actually work for airbus, but I am aware that they also have a website you can send information to if you wish, although they'll likely want some strong educational background if you're wanting to give them tips on how to write their manuals and procedures. Same apply to the airbus arquitecture. While you're at it, you should not just focus on airbus, but also contemplate helping out Boeing, Antonov, Tupolev, Bombardier, etc.

Finally, as an airbus pilot, I am NOT resisting the memory items. I am simply reading the procedure. I have the responsibility (which I DO NOT TAKE LIGHTLY) for the safety of the flight. Most importantly even, I have a wife and 2 children whom I wish to come home to after every single flight of my life, so NO, I'm not resisting the memory items, I'm simply evaluating the conditions before taking the decision to execute them. Unreliable speed indication, whether in an airbus, a boeing, or a cessna should NOT be the time to panic and REACT, but the time to be carefully and ACT smartly and continue to fly the aircraft. If this means following the memory items to maintain the safety of the flight, I will do it!. If it means that the safety of the flight is not being affected, and I may be better off not increasing the angle of attack closer to the Critical AOA by pitching up and creating a nose up pitching moment by increasing thrust unnecessarily, then I will not do them. I believe I've made my point fairly clear on the matter.

Here's a copy of the beginning of the Unreliable Airspeed Indication section of the current QRH (I'm now operating the A320 family aircraft, but I am certain it is similar to the information on the A330 QRH).

[Deadstick]

Most importantly even, I have a wife and 2 children whom I wish to come home to after every single flight of my life, so NO, I'm not resisting the memory items, I'm simply evaluating the conditions before taking the decision to execute them.

I have always told a nervous passenger that I'm far more concerned about my own life than theirs, so be assured I have no intention of doing anything that would threaten yours.

[guamainiac]

A general lapse of imagination on the part responsible for all of the above.

Interesting

[Gabriel]

First of all, I am dismayed that Airbus finds it necessary to publish such an article (on basic stall procedure) in a magazine geared for current Airbus pilots.

I am not.

The industry is changing the way it trains for stalls.
This article in this magazine describes the changes in these concepts, and the reasons for these changes.
It's absolutely aligned to what has been lately discussed in the "Stall" thread (and to what I have been proclaiming for years).

I am convinced that this new approach to dealing with stalls (which is in fact the old approach learnt in the private pilot course) will save lives.

Secondly, I believe it fails to mention THS issues or the issues associated with ABNORMAL ATTITUDE LAWS.

It mentions both things. Not all what you'd want, but it does.

[ca787546]

I am not.

The industry is changing the way it trains for stalls.
This article in this magazine describes the changes in these concepts, and the reasons for these changes.
It's absolutely aligned to what has been lately discussed in the "Stall" thread (and to what I have been proclaiming for years).

I am convinced that this new approach to dealing with stalls (which is in fact the old approach learnt in the private pilot course) will save lives.


It mentions both things. Not all what you'd want, but it does.

If this was facebook, I'd "like" your post.

[Evan]

If this means following the memory items to maintain the safety of the flight, I will do it!. If it means that the safety of the flight is not being affected, and I may be better off not increasing the angle of attack closer to the Critical AOA by pitching up and creating a nose up pitching moment by increasing thrust unnecessarily, then I will not do them. I believe I've made my point fairly clear on the matter.

You have, but please, once again, respond to the scenario I proposed to you. In this scenario, the situation would seem to not endanger the flight, but in fact involves hidden pitfalls which would result in stall if the PF was not completely focused on the instruments. I'm hoping that I've made my point as well, which is that, due to human factors, I don't want you making the assessment of whether or not the safety of the flight is being affected. The safety of the flight IS being affected. UAS is always endangering the flight at these flight levels and the #1 task should be to establish a thrust/drag combination that will leave the a/c stabilized in the airspeed envelope long enough for you to make a more detailed assessment. No panic, just standardized, instinctive procedures followed by all the professional situational awareness you can offer. Engineered process followed by expert improvisation.

The exception would be if you are at the very limit of the flight envelope where no safe climb gradient exists, and why you would find yourself there in this kind of environment is another issue altogether.

[EconomyClass]

unless there was a dual hydraulic servo failure, which is extremely unlikely, and there is no indication of that).

"No indication"? What is an indication to you? A piece of data in the data recorder? What insure the data is accurate? As I mentioned, the 737 pilots were doing what all pilots knew to do and were getting the opposite result for the rudder. It took years of puzzling and innovation in the lab to finally find the explanation. And that, too, was a case where pilots flew in what seemed equivalent situations. But my belief is that they discovered there was a critical difference that caused the servo to do the opposite of what the pilot was trying to do. I don't have any idea what the final conclusion will be by safety authorities. But even with my relatively modest knowledge of past aircraft malfunctions raises questions for me. That makes me think a lot of people seem to find judgment urgent.

One thing I do feel really confient about. Lawyers are going to force all parties to consider things that discussions here try to gloss over. They are going to comb and comb and hire experts to raise the questions. I don't need really to get anything settled because at very least, the corporations will pony up enough to get records sealed so that future passengers don't get to see everything that might have been wrong.

But my personal desire is to see all necessary holes punched in the walls they might want to throw up. Monetary settlements in no way are justice for the dead passengers.

[Evan]

I am not.

The non-hatcheted version of that quote is:

First of all, I am dismayed that Airbus finds it necessary to publish such an article (on basic stall procedure) in a magazine geared for current Airbus pilots. That in itself speaks volumes about the state of affairs in pilot training standards.

I see the value in publishing the article due to the unfortunate realities of pilot training standards, but no pilot entering commercial revenue service should not have these concepts already well-established by pilot training. No revenue pilot should require Stall 101 refresher courses after receiving certification. This is foundation aerodynamics. It is concept, not memorization. Yet Airbus saw the need to 'remind' pilots of a foundation that was not adequately given to them in training. That is really telling.

Raising AoA generates lift. Aft center of gravity: lift generates pitch, which decreases airspeed and raises AoA. Cycle of death. Therefore push carefully, manage ANU pitch (in approach to stall), sacrifice altitude if necessary and add power carefully (don't go TOGA if you have altitude to spare). If forward sidestick doesn't get the nose down, go to manual pitch trim. If an A330 pilot (or any aft CoG pilot) doesn't already know that, something is really wrong here.