Air France 447 - On topic only!

[guamainiac]

No luck? No "Fate the Hunter" .. let's dial in a wind down the river out of the north to "sully" the surface into a frothing chop not to mention the increased speed.

He would have turned to the north however right Evan? Of course there would have been no ferry traffic to help the evac and rescue.

Sully knows full well that the angel was on his shoulder that day and my post is certainly not meant to demean his performance. Except for the temp he could have not picked a finer moment to land on the Hudson.

Evan, have you ever been in the left or right seat on a dark night and had one of "those moments"?? I do not mean a lounge chair either.

The numbers that you live by suddenly mean nothing? That numbered and orderly world goes into a state of anomie? And it's dark, and it's bumpy.

There but for fortune go you or I.

[Deadstick]

Evan has a lot of great knowledge from doing exhaustive research, but it doesn't translate to the cockpit when he's never been there.

[ca787546]

Evan has a lot of great knowledge from doing exhaustive research, but it doesn't translate to the cockpit when he's never been there.

Evan, you've never been there? hmmmm you really should get a pilot license, I think you would find flying quite rewarding! Even if you just get your private license, it is a wonderful experience.

[EconomyClass]

Years of reading techie arguments online (1989 forward), I'm convinced that for geeks, the argument IS the goal. If any truth emerges, that's just icing on a cake among people who vastly enjoy cake the most. I'm gonna simply say, way before the final report, that flights are a chain of events. They are nearly as unique as fingerprints. You might THINK you are taking the same flight as thousands before you, but that's merely a useful illusion. A way to comfort yourself that you, too, will land happily at the other end. But for the unlucky few, their flight will vary in a fatal way. All the flaws built into the system will not be adequate to save them. Thus it was for the humans on AF447. I'm happy if the all the parties involved in safety will fix everything they can think of. But I doubt they will ever succeed in making flights identical. Ergo, planes will continue to crash. Its the essential tragedy of human perfection, and all the jargon in the world will never save a soul.

Like they say, you get out of bed, you roll the dice, and when you win, you utter a silent thank you to the heavens.

[Fear_of_Flying]

Evan was, I think, being sarcastic about Sully, as he was trying to draw a contrast between the enormity of the task Sully faced as opposed the task that was before the AF447 pilots, which was to execute a couple of memory items. But Evan then obscured his own point by adding the fact that the AF447 crisis may not have been so manageable after all, given the dangerously unpredictable nature of the Airbus systems (ah yes, responsible for so many accidents <-- sarcasm).

But there is still an underlying contradiction in Evan's position, in my opinion. Evan, you want foolproof systems, memory items that pilots will respond to without even thinking, messages that flash on the screen reminding the pilot how to fly the plane as it plunges towards the earth, backup systems that compensate for sensor errors and flight management anomolies, and protections that make the plane all but impossible to stall.

At the same time, you want and expect your pilots to understand their aircraft and to practice good airmanship, to pay attention to monitoring or flying the plane at all times, and to take control of an emergency situation when it arises, such as Sully was able to do.

But here's the problem. ca787546 told you how he would have managed the AF447 crisis, by assessing the situation and using piloting skills to keep the aircraft stable. In other words, he would have performed in the exact manner you, and I think all of us, would like to see from pilots. Yet, in order to meet your insistence upon standardized procedures (insofar as they can be standard given different situations) you would have had him abandon that piloting for the sake of reflexively carrying out memory items. While I'm all for crash-proof aircraft, in accidents in which automation plays a role, it still comes down to the lack of good piloting in almost every instance, with the systems glitches generally being a contributing factor.

The standardization should be teaching pilots good airmanship. Procedures will change over time, certainly they will not be the same on a Boeing as on an Airbus, but knowing what it takes to keep a plane, any plane in the air, is universal.

[EconomyClass]

The Other Gucci Drops

Lawyers and technical experts for the families of German crash victims suspect that a hidden software error in the automated flight control system -- specifically concerning a vital stabilizer flap on the plane's tail -- doomed to failure all pilot efforts to regain control of the plane. They are demanding that the Parisian court investigating the crash take action. "We petition that appropriate action be taken to prevent a catastrophe similar to that which befell AF 447 from happening again," reads the letter submitted to Judge Sylvie Zimmermann, which SPIEGEL has obtained.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...766148,00.html

Ha! Love it when events are this predictable.

[EconomyClass]

Watched a show recently (within the last week) showing that an airline told a congressional committee that measures were underway to address a problem. When the same committee invited the company people back, they had to admit they lied to the committee members. Needless to say, the people who had sat and listened to the lies were livid.

Anyone who assumes corporations tell the truth to anyone is the world's biggest sucker. Thing is, lying is so much a part of business and the consequences are so scant, there's absolutely NO reason to expect any truth from them. As soon as you hear something from them, the only rational thing is to start looking for how many lies they just told you.

[Evan]

Evan was being sarcastic about capt Sully, yes. Good call.

But here's the problem. ca787546 told you how he would have managed the AF447 crisis, by assessing the situation and using piloting skills to keep the aircraft stable. In other words, he would have performed in the exact manner you, and I think all of us, would like to see from pilots. Yet, in order to meet your insistence upon standardized procedures (insofar as they can be standard given different situations) you would have had him abandon that piloting for the sake of reflexively carrying out memory items. While I'm all for crash-proof aircraft, in accidents in which automation plays a role, it still comes down to the lack of good piloting in almost every instance, with the systems glitches generally being a contributing factor.

The standardization should be teaching pilots good airmanship. Procedures will change over time, certainly they will not be the same on a Boeing as on an Airbus, but knowing what it takes to keep a plane, any plane in the air, is universal.

I don't see why you can't grasp the fact the ADHERENCE TO MEMORY ITEMS IS GOOD AIRMANSHIP and anything else isn't. I can't overstress this point. I DON'T want ca787546 to follow the procedure he described UNTIL he has stabilized the aircraft with the memory items. If the PF of AF447 had first successfully executed the rather simple memory items for unreliable airspeed, this thread would not exist. It would have been another unreported incident of no importance. We must come to grips with that.

From that point on, there would have been no need for approach to stall skills, no need for stall recovery skills, no need for THS awareness, no relevant issues with the nature of the THS or ADR logic, none of these other aspects of design or airmanship. I'm not saying these aren't needed in general, as this accident has illuminated certain weaknesses, but if the memory items had been followed in this instance, there would have been no need for them here. Based on everything we know, that is fact.

The fact that there is still resistance amongst pilots to this very obvious reality makes me angry and perpetuates my fear that the lessons are not being learned even years after this crash and the potentially fatal human factor issues are still unrecognized. What will it take? What scale of tragedy will defeat this mindset?

Again, based upon what we know, this crash did not occur due to the pilot "being out of the loop" in the Airbus cockpit. That is a lark. It is the direct result of insufficient pilot training and/or that incurable stubborness and bravado that still infects pilots in the age of automation. The PF of AF447 improvised when he should have followed memorized procedure. Based upon what we know, that is what went wrong, that is what caused the crash.

[Theoddkiwi]

Since there is a cockpit commonality amongst the A330/A340 fleet (and many aspects of the A320 as well), what do you mean by different avionics? And how does this affect UAS procedure (aside from BUSS of course)? Can you explain this further?

Also, shouldn't the manufacturer (Airbus) be prescribing these procedures directly from their engineering expertise? Certainly they are the best ones to design a procedure for stabilizing airspeed. Why is this left to operators?

Every manufacturer offers options for their products, then the Airline chooses what options they wish to have.
An example is the Boeing 737 NG, comes with a Honeywell Avionic fit out or a Collins fit out. While the two manufactures equipment is largely identical in operation there are also differences mostly in physical appearance and in some cases function.
A perfect example is the NG Mode Control Panel. The Collins and Honeywell panels are physically different in appearance. But function identically. The are interchangeable too from a maintenance and operation point of view, but the correct panel needs to be fitted within a defined time period.

This is what we call in the industry "Differences". When we get new aircraft that have the latest and greatest options compared to our 10 year old aircraft, the company will issue a special notice identifying the avionic fitout and any "Differences" from the standard fit out. If the changes are more comprehensive we will do a "Differences" course to learn about the new systems and any new information needed to operate and maintain.

For maintainers and pilots alike apart from possible engine options a type rating for a particular aircraft type covers all the "Differences" provided the company trains the maintainer/pilots on those differences.

So in essence a Pilot can jump from an A330-ABC to and A330-DEF without significant retraining and probably a short course. And Airbus and Boeing both realize that commonality between different types is very important such as A330/A340/A380 or B777/B787 as having the ability for a each single pilot just needing a week long course to be able to jump from one to another is a huge bonus in terms of cost management.

I would stick my neck out to say that every airline in the world has a mixed fleet of aircraft specs even if on paper they only operate a single type.

[3WE]

...you want foolproof systems, memory items that pilots will respond to without even thinking, messages that flash on the screen reminding the pilot how to fly the plane as it plunges towards the earth, backup systems that compensate for sensor errors and flight management anomolies, and protections that make the plane all but impossible to stall.

At the same time, you want and expect your pilots to understand their aircraft and to practice good airmanship, to pay attention to monitoring or flying the plane at all times, and to take control of an emergency situation when it arises, such as Sully was able to do.

(This post is in support of your post- not contradictory)

Who remembers American 191 at ORD.

They lost an engine.

They followed procedures excellently.

They used thier best airmanship knowledge.

But, in hindsight, it was calculated that had they NOT followed procedures, and flown faster the plane was controllable.

In hindsight, it was also deterined that there was no warning light for one particular thing that the plane was doing wrong- while there was certainly no shortage of warning lights that confirmed the extremely obvious contributing factor that the engine had lost power.

Then let's talk about the Eastern L1011 that had a burnt out bulb on the landing gear indicator...

[guamainiac]

They lost the engine and not just lift but the slats on that side.

The other crew lost attention to flying the airplane.

So with 20/20 hindsight they now have a better slat design but you still need to fly the airplane. To the best of my recall there is no aircraft that will prompt you that the engine fell off.

[Evan]

• (2) In approach to stall situations (stickshaker) in RVSM, I want pilots to ALWAYS apply corrective pitch reduction and then carefully add thrust if needed. Releasing backpressure on the stick will not reduce pitch on an Airbus in Normal or Alternate Law. If the PF AF447 had done that, there would have been no need for...

I think I worded this poorly. Releasing the stick will not reduce pitch, it will maintain the last pitch command due to neutral static stability, but reducing back-pressure, i.e. moving the stick back towards neutral, will decrease to pitch rate and lower the AoA. Do I have that right?

[Evan]

They lost the engine and not just lift but the slats on that side.

And stickshaker function was lost if I recall correctly.

[guamainiac]

Number 1 engine supplied the power and the stick shaker was lost along with the engine.

Of note, with that accident stick shakers for both seats became mandatory. It was an "option" for the FO and 191 was not equipped with the option.

I have often wondered if they could have kept the wings level with the slats gone on one side?

I have had nightmares about slats.

[Evan]

I have had nightmares about slats.

I try not to think about the 737NG slat track issue that burned China Airlines Flight 120 to a crisp.