Sukhoi Superjet missing in Indonesia

[Dmitry]

http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2...retrieved.html

That's good that the black boxes would be analyzed in Indonesia. Maybe we'll know the truth one day. Cause you know, Russian authoprities are interested in saving their one and only project, so to trust the investigation process to them is simply wrong, knowing the way they do it.

[snydersnapshots]

The crash site seems very far from Halim Perdanakusuma Airport for a request to descend to 6000 during a normal approach.

The site is not really that far. In looking at the chart I referenced earlier, I see the mileage between the HLM and CKG VOR's is 22 miles (the 22 in the box above the "A585" designator). I looked at the distance of the crash site from HLM, compared it with the distance between HLM and CKG, and took a wag (a highly technical aviation term that means "wild-assed guess" ) and I figure the distance to the crash site is in the neighborhood of 25-27 miles. A comfortable profile for a descent is 3 miles per thousand feet, so if he was 27 miles out, he should be around 9,000 feet. At 18 miles, around 6,000 feet. So if he thought he was north of the mountains, it is not unreasonable at all to be descending to 6000 feet that far out. Having said that, the 3:1 profile I talked about is a rule of thumb--quite often we'll use a steeper descent due to terrain or noise considerations.

I don't know the runway configuration or the approaches into HLM. Tomorrow night I'll try to dig the Jakarta approach plates out and take a look. That might give a clue as to what they were doing.

Also, during a demonstration flight, would they have filed a flight plan and/or be flying on designated airways?

I'm sure they probably did, especially if they were flying in the clouds.

[snydersnapshots]

Sad to see such a tragic end to such a new aircraft

Don't get me wrong--I love airplanes and it saddens me to see them destroyed. I've found pictures on here of "old friends" being slowly dismantled, like this Jetstream that I flew as a young airline pilot. That makes me sad.

Having said that, when it comes to an accident like this, where people are killed, who cares about the airplane? It's a hundred-thousand pounds of aluminum, rubber, computers, fabric, and wiring. Easily replaced--especially since it's a new production model. What breaks my heart is thinking of the people lost. The wives and kids who kissed their husband or father as he went out the door on a trip that was to last a few days, but will never see him again. How about the pretty daughters who were the flight attendants? Friendly, vivacious girls who wanted a career of excitement and adventure. And who are now mourned by moms and dads who will never get another hug from their daughter; will never share another birthday or holiday with them, will never walk them down the aisle at their wedding, will never know the joy of watching grandchildren grow up, will never get another phone call just saying "hi Mom and Dad. I love you." That, my friend, is the real tragedy. Not the loss of the airframe.

but i have to wonder how on earth they managed to get into the situation they found themselves in. The first pictures i saw of the crash site just reminded me of Japanair 123

Here you hit the nail on the head. If anything useful is to come from the loss of life, hopefully it will be the discovery of what caused the accident so that a fix can be put in place that helps prevent future loss of life...

[Evan]

I looked at the distance of the crash site from HLM, compared it with the distance between HLM and CKG, and took a wag (a highly technical aviation term that means "wild-assed guess" ) and I figure the distance to the crash site is in the neighborhood of 25-27 miles.

I think that's about right. Halim 215 AL is 9.2 miles from the runway, so I used that as a rough measure. But given the terrain issues and the actual approach paths, is it normal to make a drop from 10,000 to 6,000 so early in the approach. I'm just wondering if they were doing this to show the aircraft's ability to navigate mountainous terrain, or to give those aboard a 'memorable' experience. I also wonder if test pilots are a little less culturally programmed with passenger safety in mind, more confident and more prone to taking risks. Especially if you work for a company that had exclusively designed military aircraft.

If it is normal to go that low a bit north of the mountains, then I think your theory is compelling. Airblue 202 basically misjudged position and turned too late (compounded by a pilot error with the FCU interface). And that was a state-of-the-art A321.

I don't know the runway configuration or the approaches into HLM. Tomorrow night I'll try to dig the Jakarta approach plates out and take a look. That might give a clue as to what they were doing.

These were posted on the internet from 2009 (hopefully you have something more relevant):

[Gabriel]

You can see in both charts that the MSA south of HLM is 6900ft.
(I think that that's up to 20 NM around HLM)

[snydersnapshots]

But given the terrain issues and the actual approach paths, is it normal to make a drop from 10,000 to 6,000 so early in the approach.

No, it's not. Case in point is approaching San Francisco from the southwest, like we did yesterday. There is high terrain very close to the airport on that side, so they keep you at 10,000 feet until 10 miles or so from the airport, then let you down. They have to vector you to the east a bit before turning you in to intercept the approach for 28 L or 28R, but it works just fine to be that high that close to the airport.

I'm just wondering if they were doing this to show the aircraft's ability to navigate mountainous terrain, or to give those aboard a 'memorable' experience.

I doubt it. First of all, if they were doing that, I don't think they would do it in the clouds. It's more spectacular to do something like that in visual conditions so the observers can see exactly what is happening. We do a terrain avoidance maneuver in the simulator where we fly toward a mountain and wait until the EGPWS goes off to demonstrate how it works, and they usually leave us in visual conditions so we can see exactly how it works.

As for giving those onboard a "memorable" experience, I don't think that was the case either. Now, if it was a clear, VMC day, I could see doing a pass by the mountains so they could see, but not in IMC conditions.

I also wonder if test pilots are a little less culturally programmed with passenger safety in mind, more confident and more prone to taking risks. Especially if you work for a company that had exclusively designed military aircraft.

My initial thought when I read your paragraph was "no." That coming from my own mindset about carrying passengers. To be honest, I rarely think about passenger safety (except for turbulence and turning on the seat belt sign, etc). When it comes to navigation and airplane handling, I think about MY safety, first and foremost. The theory being that if I get there safely, so will they (my three tenets being: avoid the chief pilot's office, avoid the FAA, and avoid being seen on CNN).

But upon further reflection, especially in light of your comments about being more confident and prone to risk taking, and the fact that the company designed exclusively military aircraft, I think you may have something here. The "fighter pilot" mentality--Maverick in TOP GUN, so to speak. Do I think they intentionally went out to do something dangerous? No. I think they simply, (as Tom Wolfe so eloquently put it in "The Right Stuff"), "screwed the pooch."

One thing I'd like to see is how they conducted previous demo flights. I know there is a blogger who was on the previous demo flight and has posted stories and pictures on NYC Aviation. I'd like to know what happened on that flight and how they conducted it and themselves. I suspect their actions on the fatal flight would have been similar.

These were posted on the internet from 2009 (hopefully you have something more relevant):

Thanks for posting the charts. One thing I find interesting is the lack of minimum altitudes on the routings--unusual for that type of chart. I'll see if we have the same chart in the airplane and if it is missing the altitudes as well.

[Evan]

As for giving those onboard a "memorable" experience, I don't think that was the case either. Now, if it was a clear, VMC day, I could see doing a pass by the mountains so they could see, but not in IMC conditions.

I'm confused about the weather conditions. Again, the metar:

WIHH 090900Z 03008KT 5000 HZ FEW016 CB BKN 017 31/25 Q1009 RMK CB OVER THE FIELD

That's about 30 minutes after the crash. My original impression was that they were flying in VMC, but they encountered an isolated pocket of dense fog adjacent to the mountains just before the crash...

Weather data from Indonesia's "Badan Meteorologi, Klimatologi dan Geofisika" (Institute for Meteorology, Climate and Geophysics) do not suggest the weather was below visual meteorologic conditions, however there is possibility of local cloud at Mount Salak that may have restricted the view of the crew.

[Fear_of_Flying]

I'm confused about the weather conditions. Again, the metar:

WIHH 090900Z 03008KT 5000 HZ FEW016 CB BKN 017 31/25 Q1009 RMK CB OVER THE FIELD

That's about 30 minutes after the crash. My original impression was that they were flying in VMC, but they encountered an isolated pocket of dense fog adjacent to the mountains just before the crash...

From: http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2...hoi-crash.html

Mt. Salak was covered in dark, thick clouds when the ill-fated Sukhoi Superjet 100 disappeared from radar screens on Wednesday, the National Space and Aviation Agency (LAPAN) has revealed.Based on surveillance from MTSAT satellite, the entire volcano was covered by cloud that probably produced heavy rain, LAPAN spokeswoman Elly Kuntjahyowati said in a media release, quoting an atmosphere analysis by LAPAN’s Atmospheric Science and Technology Center.
The convection index reached 30 around Mt Salak at the time the plane disappeared – with an index of 0 being clear weather while the maximum of 50 means very heavy or extreme rain.
Based on the analysis by the Bandung-based atmospheric center, Elly said there was bad weather at Mt. Salak when the Sukhoi Superjet passed by.
The MTSAT, or Multifunctional Transport Satellite, is a series of weather and aviation-control satellites operated by the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation and the Japanese Meteorological Agency.
An analysis of available data estimated that a Cumulonimbus cloud soared some 37,000 feet. or 11.2 kilometers, with a temperature of -48C at the top of the cloud formation.

Despite the pet theory that seems to be going around some discussion forums - that the pilot was weaving between mountain tops and showing off the maneuverability of the aircraft all the while with a party going on in the cockpit and all warning systems turned off - I just don't see that as the most reasonable conclusion to draw based on the sequence of events as we know them so far.

[ErwinS]

Seems to me, looking at the charts, they just turned to soon to the right.

Indonesia's Air Traffic Control, Jakarta Branch, reported, that communication between ATC and aircraft was done in English, there was no language problem hampering communication. The aircraft had been in the area of Bogor, approximate coordinates S6.55 E106.9, about 13nm north of the peak of Mount Salak and 7nm clear of mountaineous terrain in safe flat area, when the crew requested to descend from 10,000 to 6,000 feet and to perform a right orbit. As there was no reason to decline such a clearance the flight was cleared down and for the right orbit. This was the last transmissioon from the aircraft, the aircraft could not be reached afterwards. It is unclear how the aircraft got into the area of Mount Salak and crashed afterwards, ATC services hope the black boxes will explain how the aircraft got there. All data including flight plan, radar data and ATC recordings as well as transcripts of interviews with the air traffic controller have been handed to Indonesia's NTSC.

[Evan]

Wikipedia:

In 2012 The Jakarta Post dubbed Mount Salak an "airplane graveyard". High turbulence and fast-changing weather conditions of the mountainous terrain are cited as contributing factors to multiple aviation crashes in the area. There were seven aviation crashes around Mount Salak between 2002 and 2012.

Volcanos tend to have their own microclimates, which often harbor isolated cloud formations.

And rainbows...

[snydersnapshots]

I'm confused about the weather conditions. Again, the metar:

WIHH 090900Z 03008KT 5000 HZ FEW016 CB BKN 017 31/25 Q1009 RMK CB OVER THE FIELD

That's about 30 minutes after the crash.

The METAR is really only valid within a 5 mile or so radius of the airport. Many times I've been on final approach to an airport with a METAR similar to the one above in solid instrument conditions, only to break out five or six miles out into the reported weather. Yesterday taking off from San Francisco is a prime example: We took off from runway 28L and climbed straight out. The weather at the airport was severe clear, a beautiful day with a breeze from the west. Around 6 or 7 miles west, we were over an undercast with all the hills to the north and south of us, and a large part of the city, being covered with fog. The only thing we could see was a radio tower sticking up out of the clouds off to our right (it was clear above and we were well above the height of the tower).

Quite often as terrain lifts moist air, the moisture will condense. This is especially true in tropical regions, so it doesn't surprise me at all that the mountains were covered with thick clouds.

[snydersnapshots]

In the early days of ground proximity warning systems--nearly 40 years ago--they did have a lot of false alarms. The technology and hardware have been vastly improved in the years since. I've been flying with GPWS since 1995 and EGPWS since 1999 and I have never had a false terrain warning. My dad flew in the airlines from 1968 to 1995. I'll have to ask him about false GPWS warnings in his "generation."

I just talked to Dad and he said the GPWS came out in the late 70's and early 80's. He confirmed that the early generations did have a lot of issues with false alarms, particulary in areas of rising terrain, but those problems got fixed fairly quickly.

[3WE]

At least early on, it sounds like a case of CFIT.

Something broke

OR

They were in clouds and botched their navigation

OR

They were in clouds and there was a navigation problem

OR

They were not in the clouds, but not paying attention

OR

They knew exactly what they were doing, but botched it

Until we have any hints that support any of these theories, we need to do as is said at more mature aviation forums and...

...wait for the final report.

[Evan]

The METAR is really only valid within a 5 mile or so radius of the airport. Many times I've been on final approach to an airport with a METAR similar to the one above in solid instrument conditions, only to break out five or six miles out into the reported weather. Yesterday taking off from San Francisco is a prime example: We took off from runway 28L and climbed straight out. The weather at the airport was severe clear, a beautiful day with a breeze from the west. Around 6 or 7 miles west, we were over an undercast with all the hills to the north and south of us, and a large part of the city, being covered with fog. The only thing we could see was a radio tower sticking up out of the clouds off to our right (it was clear above and we were well above the height of the tower).

Quite often as terrain lifts moist air, the moisture will condense. This is especially true in tropical regions, so it doesn't surprise me at all that the mountains were covered with thick clouds.

I was actually thinking of SF when I was referring to microclimates. I lived there for six years. You could be down in the Mission and watch that ominous opaque blanket of fog come over the ridge from Ocean Beach and slink under Sutro Tower (that 977' radio tower sticking out of the clouds) and it would be a perfect, clear day everywhere east of that. I've been on Upper Haight many times when it can be sunny and warm and two blocks away it is cold and grey. I've also been stuck in endless holding patterns because evening fog had shut down one of those two parallel runways (once having to divert to Sacramento to refuel, then back to SFO for more round and round).

I can easily image how a somewhat distracted pilot flying in VFR could suddenly find himself in a mess like that around Mt Salek. Still the question is: why the descent in the first place? Positional confusion or showboating? That's about all I can come up with. I'm hoping the CVR will reveal their intentions.

[Fear_of_Flying]

Originally Posted by A bunch of other folks offering parlour theories

Don't forget these ones (yours, I believe):

Are some of these flights trying for a great view and deliberately flying towards the mountain, and then, when the mountain is obscured, they continue, thinking that the fog will break (and technolgy will protect them)?

and

In looking at a looser photo and making some dangerous assumptions- it appears it may have hit a smaller peak to the side of a bigger one. Again, wondering if they weren't doing some great 'critical' navigation to miss the big one, but getting burned by the devil in the details.