Sukhoi Superjet missing in Indonesia

[Evan]

What is bravado?

It is the opposite of climbing when the the warning says TERRAIN. It's the "ignore that idiotic thing, I know what I'm doing" mentality. Who knows why, but just look at AirBlue 202. Total bravado by a very experienced captain got them into a very dangerous situation. Then, a simple error was all it took to doom them.

[TeeVee]

once again, evan jumps to blame the human. friggin amazing! all anyone here knows is 1/2 a smidge of a statement by an INTERESTED party that the GPWS was working. without knowing if ANY other system was functioning, you blame the pilot.

talk about bias?

[Gabriel]

Hmmm, teevee, in this case, whatever happened, odds are that it was the pilot.

Loss of situational awareness, spacial disorientation, bravado, continued VFR into IMC, poor planning, poor judgement, distraction, poor CRM...

It's very unlikely that the pilot requested a descent to 6000ft, turned to the wrong side, and just at that moment there was an unsolvable technical problem that sent the plane towards the mountain.

(Note: I mean the pilot as the direct link. Then we need to see if there were procedures for demonstration flights, what was the safety culture of the management, the training, etc...)

[TeeVee]

not buying into that just yet. here you have a new, presumably modern and well built aircraft, albeit one with no track record. russians are not well known for the quality of the manufacturing techniques. this was the first new commercial aircraft produced by them in over two decades. corner cutting?

then there is the pilot, tons of experience. but yes, he was demo'ing the plane so maybe he got sloppy or lane stupid.

but we know practically nothing at this point so, i'm not gonna jump on any particular aspect and start casting aspersions. y'all can if you want to...

[Gabriel]

If I were asked about the probable causes of the next accident, I'd say that the pilots performance will be a causal link, if only because it typically is. It's a matter of probabilities.

In this particular accident, it smells like CFIT from the beginning, and as time goes by that smell just increases. Reports (unconfirmed, unreliable, whatever) indicate that the CVR showed that the EGPWS was working and that there is no evidence of airplane problems.

And we do know that the pilot made a controlled maneuver (descent and turn) that put the plane in a trajectory consistent with the impact.

I don't discard other possibilities at all. But odds are for a CFIT, and because of the "controlled" part in that acronym, the pilot is always causal in these events.

I am not "blaming" the pilot. Read the final note in my previous post.

And I tend to think against a bravado or "ridge-scratching" show-off theories, because you would not do them in clouds (and now we know the impact zone was in clouds).

Here is an example of a possible accident scenario based on whatever is known so far, and that doesn't include "macho" or "stupidly negligent" behaviours. I am not judging its accuracy. The author himself rates it as a "objective speculation"

http://gerryairways.blogspot.com.ar/2012/05/ssj-100-descent-innocent-but-deadly_17.html

(thanks reubee)

[Black Ram]

Interesting link, Gabriel. Can we make any assumptions regarding the path they took and their attitude upon impact into the mountain by analyzing this picture?

http://www.globalsim.web.id/publicservice/Accidents/RA97004/97004-site2a.jpg

[Evan]

And I tend to think against a bravado or "ridge-scratching" show-off theories, because you would not do them in clouds (and now we know the impact zone was in clouds).

I think you misunderstand my presumption Gabriel. By 'bravado', I don't mean some reckless and foolhardy stunt (though I wouldn't rule that out either). I mean the response to the EGPWS. I assume the pilot heard the warning but felt superior to it, as has happened umteen times before, and felt that he still had an accurate positional awareness and plenty of terrain clearance. Perhaps I should just say 'arrogance' or 'stubborn task-oriented denial and persistence'. Whatever you prefer, it comes from the same place: lack of discipline and poor safety culture.

We are told that the pilots requested descent below terrain clearance, and the turn was intentional. The most sensible theory to me thus far is a confused positional awareness, which is exactly what the EGPWS is supposed to defend against. If the EGPWS was issuing alerts, pilot arrogance seems to have played a major role here.

Again, see AirBlue 202...

[Evan]

http://gerryairways.blogspot.com.ar/2012/05/ssj-100-descent-innocent-but-deadly_17.html

(thanks reubee)

That's very interesting information. Especially this part:

Andy, told me that he heard the discussions that the next flight would be required to be done to/from Runway 06. The reason for this is, as he recalls, is to keep the aircraft away from conflict from traffic to/from the main international airport, Soekarno Hatta (CGK/WIII) to the north east as they expect the runway in use to be 07L/R. The change to runway 06 for Halim would ensure that traffic inbound to Halim Airport would stay away from the departure flows from CGK, and below the incoming flow to CGK.

His theory that the impact was due to a crew lacking terrain awareness continuing on their previous heading after completing the orbit while awaiting ATC clearance to turn is compelling, but two things seem to contradict this:

- Mount Salek is a notorious hazard, having claimed many victims before. I find it hard to believe that the crew would not have been briefed on that particular hazard.

- See the plots on the attached image borrowed from AVHerald. The last radar contact was beyond and to the right of his proposed flight path. I don't see how that could occur if they were approaching from the 200° outbound course and turning right (unless those plots are inaccurate).

[Gabriel]

At this point we should be not maiking assumptions regarding the take-off and landing runway, plane track, if they were flying VFR or IFR, etc. Things like the flight plan and the radar plot have to be available and clear by now, and surely they are.

It's interesting how the investigators are managing to keep this level of reserve. Even the CVR was listened a few days ago and there was no leak (other than the EGPWS worked).

[Evan]

At this point we should be not maiking assumptions regarding the take-off and landing runway, plane track, if they were flying VFR or IFR, etc. Things like the flight plan and the radar plot have to be available and clear by now, and surely they are.

This was what he wrote in the second part. Could be wrong of course...

This is hugely different from what was written in my previous article, but this is based on Andy D's story, which I view as reasonably accurate. We also know that the second flight, took off from runway 06.

If that is right, and the departure was from RWY 06, then there is your vector of confusion, so to speak, the last-minute change or unprepared-for thing that often sets up pilot error.

It's interesting how the investigators are managing to keep this level of reserve. Even the CVR was listened a few days ago and there was no leak (other than the EGPWS worked).

It's interesting that the only thing leaked absolves a key component of the aircraft.

[Gabriel]

It's interesting that the only thing leaked absolves a key component of the aircraft.

Fabricated? Tampered with? Mental rays?

[Fear_of_Flying]

It's interesting that the only thing leaked absolves a key component of the aircraft.

The GPWS was singled out as having functioned properly, but the leak was a little more general than that, claiming that no systems failures were discovered. This might mean that, along with the GPWS working properly, nothing was said by the crew about a malfunction, and no unusual sounds were heard that may have indicated a malfunction. It might also mean that the crew's conversation revealed a fairly obvious sequence of events that would have led to CFIT, thus ruling out to a large extent systems failures as a probable cause, at least up to this point.

This is similar to the first leaks after the AF447 black boxes were retrieved and Airbus was quick to point out that its aircraft functioned as it was intended to. That turned out to be essentially correct, though some might question how effective those systems turned out to be.

Today, a spate of reports came out claiming that U.S. sabotage may have been responsible for the crash. This, too, is similar to AF447, where reports were put out there for the sole purpose of putting pressure on investigators to release what they knew. I'm pretty sure no one really thinks the U.S. was behind this crash, but it's such a shameless rumor that it needs to be dispelled quickly. Whereas some people would put these reports down to tabloid journalism, I think the intent is probably more strategic than that, and I wouldn't be surprised if we hear some more information quite soon.

At least the BEA, despised though they are, had the professionalism to have a single spokesperson for the investigation who held press conferences where everyone heard the same information at the same time. That didn't prevent leaks, but at least there was some semblance of control over the flow of information.

Gabriel, that link was a great read. May or may not be correct, but seems completely plausible and not loaded with any blame, rhetoric, or wild presumptions.

EDIT: This morning, reading the Christian Science Monitor article on the sabotage theory, I noticed this sentence: The investigation has so far turned up the plane's "black box" cockpit voice recorder, which shows that no system-failure alarms went off during the plane's final minutes, nor did the crew take any audible emergency action.

[Gabriel]

Gabriel, that link was a great read.

Not my merit. I didn't write that piece. I didn't even found the info. I just copied-pasted the link from AD.info

[snydersnapshots]

...I assume the pilot heard the warning but felt superior to it, as has happened umpteen times before, and felt that he still had an accurate positional awareness and plenty of terrain clearance.

Perhaps I should just say 'arrogance' or 'stubborn task-oriented denial and persistence'. Whatever you prefer, it comes from the same place: lack of discipline and poor safety culture.

We are told that the pilots requested descent below terrain clearance, and the turn was intentional. The most sensible theory to me thus far is a confused positional awareness, which is exactly what the EGPWS is supposed to defend against. If the EGPWS was issuing alerts, pilot arrogance seems to have played a major role here.

Evan, I'm going to agree and disagree with you here. I've highlighted and italicized two key points. The first is that he felt he still had terrain clearance:

In a CRM class I took, a situational awareness diagram we used had two circles, one labeled "Reality" and one labeled "Perceived Reality." The Perfect situational awareness is when the circles overlap completely. No SA is when the circles don't touch--i.e. the pilot's perception of reality doesn't match reality at all. I think that is what happened here. They guy THOUGHT he was clear of terrain. Unfortunately his Perceived reality circle didn't line up with the actual reality circle.

Taking this a step further, now the EGPWS starts hollering "terrain." Since he "knows" he's clear of terrain (at least in his mind he is) his first thought is a bit of denial: "Why is that going off if I'm clear of the terrain?" We have to remember--the guy is a test pilot for a company that, up until now, had only produced fighter aircraft. He's not a line pilot for an airline. A line pilot is trained to react immediately to a GPWS warning unless it is daylight and we can clearly see the terrain and know for sure that it's a false warning. A test pilot is trained to analyze what is happening with the aircraft and why. Two completely different reactions.

So I disagree with your statement that "arrogance" played a role. I think a bit of denial (thinking he was clear of terrain) which lead him down the path that the system must be malfunctioning, which resulted in him taking the wrong course of action.

[Evan]

So I disagree with your statement that "arrogance" played a role. I think a bit of denial (thinking he was clear of terrain) which lead him down the path that the system must be malfunctioning, which resulted in him taking the wrong course of action.

Call it what you will. It's still second-guessing the system in IMC. If you want to do that, because you feel certain that it is wrong, then climb out, verify your position, bring up the charts, be very certain of both, and then try it again. If you are in IMC and that warning goes off, and you maintain your flight path, you are nothing but arrogant. That's how I see it.

If there isn't a checklist procedure for a suspected false EGPWS alert in IMC, there definitely should be one, and item #1 should be CLIMB until the warning ceases.