777 Crash and Fire at SFO

[Gabriel]

Is there a flight computer 'mode' wherein on a 777, manually advancing the thrust levers forward would -not- result in response from the engines, assuming mechanically everything is AOK?

Yes. This mode is called "off"

In any other case, I think that the 777 will honor your manual thrust inputs giving them priority over what any computer may think about it (except the FADEC, which is the computer controlling the engines).

[AVION1]

This is EXACTLY the kind of statement I was talking about.

Not to coin a phrase, but did you also stay at a Holiday Inn Express last night?

OK folks !.....show your pilot's licenses or BoeingBobby is going to keep insulting and offending everyone the whole night !

[Gabriel]

BoeingBobby,

I didn't feel offended or insulted.
I did got upset by your frequent request for qualifications when you didn't agree with what other said, even if you were sure that what the other said was completely wrong. I felt it was disruptive rather than constructive, and that it could motivate others to shut up to avoid a reprimand instead of risking a stupid question or comment. I am all for stupid questions and comments. People who, in aviation, are good gardeners, are also entitles their thoughts, opinions, questions and comments in aviation, no matter how stupid (the comment or the commentator).

In such cases I propose the following course of action (here "you" is anyone, not specifically YOU):
- Say "I don't agree", "that's not the case", or even plain "wrong".
- Add after that "because..." (and no, "because you are not qualified and I am" doesn't qualify).
- Then you may add "In fact it's like that, because..."

You don't need to be always so politically correct. Humor, sarcasm, etc are often welcomed in this forum. But, I acknowledge, when you asked for other's qualifications in about 10 of your last 5 posts (sarcasm, see?), I felt upset.

You can have a legitimate curiosity for the qualification of others. That's an important piece of information to gauge the reliability of what the other person says. But it would be more appropriate, in my opinion, to ask it separately (via PM, in another post) and not as the introduction to your dissent.

I think people like you have a lot to give in a forum like this, but people is more open to receive it when you give it kindly.

IMHO.

[James Bond]

Official NTSB Photographs







This photo taken by one of the passengers post-crash

http://durangoherald.com/storyimage/DU/20130709/NEWS03/130709548/AR/0/AR-130709548.jpg

Other photo (NTSB?) of the landing gear

http://mediad.publicbroadcasting.net/p/shared/npr/201307/200474614.jpg

[BoeingBobby]

You remain pompous. I second your motion to leave.

"But my friend's husband is a pilot and he told me and that makes me qualified."

YHGTBKM!

[BoeingBobby]

This was sent out to a bunch of us by one of our check airman a few minutes ago. Take it for what it is worth:


Low-down on Korean pilots



After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-200 we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

Tom

[Schwartz]

From CNN:

Sitting beside him during Saturday's flight from Seoul to San Francisco was the instructor pilot. The trip across the Pacific was the first time he had been an instructor pilot and the first time he'd traveled with the flying pilot, according to Hersman.

That seemingly uneventful, more than 10-hour flight ended in a few chaotic, panicked minutes of fury, after which two people were dead and 182 others were transported to local hospitals.

"Sections of the cabin ... are found very early in the debris field," said Hersman, who had walked a few hundred feet from the seawall where the plane's landing gear and then tail first slammed into the seawall to where it mercifully came to a rest. "You can see aircraft parts, gallery materials, newspapers, magazines and flooring."

According to the pilots' accounts, the tensions started before the plane touched ground.

The three pilots in the cockpit -- another was in the cabin -- told investigators they set the "auto throttle" speed to 137 knots (157 mph), which is the speed it should have been going. Akin to cruise control, auto throttles are used to maintain a plane's speed.

At 200 feet above ground, the instructor pilot said he noted precision approach path indicator lights indicated the giant jet was too low.

It was then "he recognized that the auto throttles were not maintaining speed, and he established a go-around attitude," said the NTSB chief. "He went to push the throttles forward, but he stated that the other pilot had already (done so)."

...

The "flying pilot" and "instructor pilot" who were in the front seat of the cockpit were not among the injured, according to Hersman.

Asiana hired the flying pilot in 1994, after which he reported amassing nearly 10,000 hours of total flight time. That experience included time piloting 737, 747 and A-320 aircraft, and he was a ground school and simulator instructor for the latter model.

The instructor pilot, a South Korean air force veteran with about 13,000 hours of flight experience, recalled Flight 214 being "slightly high when they passed 4,000 feet (and) they set vertical speed mode at about 1,500 feet per minute," explained Hersman.

But they ended up coming in low. The third pilot in the cockpit told investigators that, with "the nose ... pitched up, ... he could not see the runway," said the NTSB chief.

In the last few hundred feet before touchdown, the crew was making both lateral and vertical adjustments -- meaning they were both trying to move sideways to get toward the runway and adjust their height.

When the aircraft hit, it spun 360 degrees. An oil tank ruptured and leaked fuel onto the plane's right engine, starting a fire.

Eventually, evacuation chutes deployed, and at least seven of the aircraft's eight doors were opened. (An eighth was found on the ground, Hersman explained.)

Very soon after the plane stopped, tending to the wounded and the investigation began.

That probe will continue for months, though authorities have released significant details so far. So much information, in fact, the Air Line Pilots Association, for a second straight day on Tuesday, criticized what it called the "NTSB's release of incomplete, out-of-context information" that "has fueled rampant speculation about the cause of the accident."

The union further questioned whether some tools were available to the crew, claiming, for instance, that the "Instrument Landing System, a critical aid to pilots, (was) out of service."

http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/09/us/asiana-airlines-crash/index.html?hpt=hp_t2

[seahawk]

I would buy into the cultural problem. Aircraft like other machinery are often designed by a western cultural background when installing safety systems, which do not fit Asian cultural preference. I have a friend who is working for a firm building heavy machines for metal stamping. They usually supply a production line, where every workstation has an emergency stop button as well as the supervisor over seeing the whole line. In Europe or the US the vast majority of documented emergency shut downs are initiated by the workers at the machine. In Asia 95% are initiated by the supervisor.

[snydersnapshots]

...and now, to be politically incorrect...

Any chance of this including Oriental CRM with the captain at the controls?

There have been a few crashes where the PNF knew things were bad, but was not culturally wired to say "YOU ARE ROYALLY SCREWING UP MISTER SENIOR SUPERIOR OFFICER, GO AROUND NOW!"

...and to be politically correct, it's happened in more than one culture!

I've been out on a trip and had to leave my computer at home, so I haven't had a chance to read through all the posts, but I think you've hit the nail on the head here. I think this is going to be a big eye-opener for some folks. I've flown with several people who have worked for various asian airlines and let's just say that the CRM we're used to in the US is not their strongest point...

But you are correct in saying that this issue is not limited to the asian cultures--the KLM/PAA accident at Tenerife was caused by a captain who was very much in charge discounting the second officer's concerns that Pan Am was not clear of the runway. That was one of the landmark accidents that lead to the CRM culture we have in this country (and most European countries) today. Hopefully this will serve as an eye-opener and bring some focus back on the subject.

[EconomyClass]

My insomnia has left me conscious, with my mind churning about this plane crash in San Francisco.

Each time one of these things happen, it provides a glimpse into how planes are flown while posing new mysteries.

Airliners measure speed with pitot tubes. A non-engineering mind gets only as far as getting that the tubes are sensors that feed some environmental data into the flight management system which cranks through a mathematical formula and produces an air speed.

In the case of several major crashes, air speed seems to be a theme that repeats. AF447, the Buffalo crash of Colgan Air, and the Asiana crash in San Francisco. Air speed changed, pilots took action, it was wrong, the plane crashed.

Here’s my mystery: When engineers design a plane, they know what they want it to do, and they know the dimensions of the parts needed to achieve the performance. What I’m wondering is whether air speed should matter at all. If it messes up what flight crews do in response, maybe their computers should go back to the characteristics designed into the plane and calculate other things. I’m thinking that thrust and attitude determine where the plane will go. So maybe pilots should focus on those things and ignore air speed which seems to get them in trouble, ESPECIALLY when sensors give them no info or false info. I’ve heard that there’s a two part formula of attitude and percentage of maximum thrust that will keep a plane flying. Maybe KISS is the solution when things get complicated, such as when autopilot shuts off in emergency situations.

Or maybe engineers are the only people whose brains can cope with all this (which they get in place of social aptitude?)

[Evan]

Why the pilot flying was so intent on putting it down on the “first brick” of the runway is totally beyond me.

I've thought of this too. Do you think a senior pilot like this making his first hand-flown approach to SFO might want to impress his senior colleagues by greasing it down on the numbers? Consider the culture.

[Leftseat86]

This was sent out to a bunch of us by one of our check airman a few minutes ago. Take it for what it is worth:


Low-down on Korean pilots



After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-200 we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

Tom

Great read, thank you. Still waiting on more info from the NTSB and an official report, but there seems to be less and less mystery to this crash each day. The pilot's assertion today that they thought the A/T was holding their speed and failed is extremely telling. We are dealing with people who are just not good at flying airplanes when they have to do it themselves...

[BoeingBobby]

I've thought of this too. Do you think a senior pilot like this making his first hand-flown approach to SFO might want to impress his senior colleagues by greasing it down on the numbers? Consider the culture.

Your guess is as good as any! Not even taking into consideration the displaced threshold, he should have been aiming 1000' down the runway.

[TheKiecker]

Your guess is as good as any! Not even taking into consideration the displaced threshold, he should have been aiming 1000' down the runway.

Who are YOU to say he wasnt ?

Who are you to say something so OBVIOUS that even a child could point that out.

You have ZERO credibility as a poster . You said you were leaving and then you did not.

ASS

[Spectator]

This thread is beginning to feel like a AF447: Everybody fighting over the controls while the thread crashes into a sticky mess.

Chill out and look out the windows, folk.