How to crash a 737 using your solid stick and rudder skills

[3WE]

True. The current 172, vs the ones I've ever flown (or the 152 or the Tomahawks that I've ever flown for the matter), come with IO-xxx engines, the I meaning injection, no carburetor, so carburetor heat is neither available nor possible in the new 172.

So give me a call when we have an accident because a pilot trained in a new 172 fails to use the carb heat in an older 172 because of lack of type-specific procedure training.

As you might guess, my memory landing checklist includes carb heat, even if I'm in a 172N or a 172P...

Blatant disregard for the specific POH as one might expect from a cowboy

[Gabriel]

As you might guess, my memory landing checklist includes carb heat, even if I'm in a 172N or a 172P...

Blatant disregard for the specific POH as one might expect from a cowboy

On the other hand, I found myself several times landing with the carb heat on. I was not good at procedures discipline. Part of the problem with the basic training that I mentioned before. Reading checklist was not enforced. We made a weight-and-balance only once to practice for the test, (and I'm sure that we were slightly overweight a few times), and the training was of the demonstration, do with help, and do alone type. And then practice it to polis the skill. Like teaching someone to ride a bicycle. Very very little fundamentals behind the technique.

I started to fly at 18 and didn't know back then what I know now. My current mental status has caused me social problems in flight schools and flying schools, and that's the reason why I didn't fly in 2013/2014 what I was determined to resume the activity. Example:
- I'm going to XYZ in the Archer with X, Y and Z. Will you help me fuel it up?
- Sure. How much fuel?
- Let's make it about 3/4 in each wing.
- Did you do a W&B?
- No, but I know that this is ok.
- Are you sure? I mean, because I'm almost sure that you'll be overweight. Let's check the handbook, ok?
- No, no, we are ok.

A following day, after doing my research:
- Look, I've been doing the W&B with data I found in the internet. If this plane has a similar empty weight, I think you were overweight.
- Well, you are from Buenos Aires, so I understand your concerns. But here (well South, much colder place) the situation is different. First of all we have a very long runway. Second the weather here is much cooler, so the engine has more power and the air is thicker, and lastly we yesterday we had a strong wind that gives a better dynamic control over the plane.
- [What I thought] Oh, you mean that the manual says that here the MTOW is higher here than in Buenos Aires? Did you know that in Buenos Aires we also have some long runways and that that doesn't change the MTOW? And yesterday it was not so cold here (summer), we have colder winter days in Buenos Aires. And while the thicker air can help give more power, it will NOT help in that you'll have a higher stall speed than that marked in the airspeed indicator, and you'll have a reduced margin with the load factor because the plane is designed for X Gs at the MTOW, not at the MOTW+X, and... it's illegal!!! And please explain me again what is the dynamic control and how the wind helps improve it?
- [What I said] Ok.

The pilot in question? One of the authorities of the flight club. The principal instructor, who was also one of the authorities of the flight school, was there and was looking with an ugly face at one of us. Guess which one?

Same flight club / flight school:
- A new PPL with some instrument training but no rating flying on instruments, with knowledge of said instructor.
- In a Piper Lance: Take off, build speed skimming the runway, then bank +60° and pull up into a zoom climb. The pilot? Another the same guy of the W&B.

Bottom line: They didn't accept my application to become a member of the flight club/school.

[Evan]

Here I disagree.
Airmanship can work without procedures, but is not reliable.
And procedures need some airmanship, but sometimes very little.

As an example, the AF crew could have followed the procedure of disconnecting the AP and AT, disconnecting the FD, moving the TLs to cancel the "thrust lock" function, set CLB thrust, adjust pitch for 5° nose-up, and then go look-up the pitch/thrust table in function of weight/altitude. The only airmanship required is the discipline to apply the procedure, know what buttons to push, be able to move the thrust levers off and back to the CLB detent, and have the skill to hold 5° nose-up pitch. Extremely basic[*]

Or... the pilots could be completely ignorant of the procedure and, knowing that the plane doesn't need an airspeed indicator and that the plane's performance is defined by the pitch and power (also known as P+P=P) keep a pitch and thrust that are about normal for cruise. Note that this requires a level of airmanship that, while still quite basid, goes way beyond that required to enforce the procedure.

So procedures require at least a very basic level of airmanship, and airmanship alone can work (not as reliably) in many cases with complete ignorance of the specific procedure.

How many cases of UAS at flight level were reported before AF447? I think 12... In those instances basic airmanship got them through; procedures were ignored. But this was an accident waiting to happen because nobody seemed alarmed by the indifference to procedure.

Now we know that AF447 crashed due to bad airmanship. We also know that adherance to procedure would have saved them from their own bad airmanship. It would have done this in two ways:

- it would have eliminated the improvisational reaction of the PF
- It would have provided the CRM needed to keep situational awareness intact.

There were also stealth factors that the procedures are there to address, like thrust lock (AF447 climbed into a stall at 75% N1) and the erroneous flight director prompts. These things do not appear to be significant to the crash but they could still be in a future one.

But procedures are there because airmanship isn't always there. Part of that can be addressed in pilot screening and training and part of that is hard to predict due to human factors such as stress, startle factor and fatigue. The simple fact is this:

- 13 flights ignored procedure and only one crashed. Is this acceptable? No.
- If all 13 flights followed procedures all 13 would not have crashed.

The number could be 1,000,000 with only 1 crash and it is still unacceptable in an industry operating many flights a day with each one representing so many lives. Is the chance of bad airmanship under stress and fatigue better than 1,000,000 to 1? I seriously doubt it. So the best solution is for everyone to follow procedure.

I think the thing good pilots might not understand is that, while they may feel they don't need the procedures, by ignoring them they are allowing the bad pilots to ignore them as well, while by adhering to them they are protecting us from the bad pilots.

And by bad pilots I mean both bad to begin with and bad in heat of one particular moment, which can be almost any pilot.

[3WE]

I think the thing good pilots might not understand is that, while they may feel they don't need the procedures, by ignoring them they are allowing the bad pilots to ignore them as well, while by adhering to them they are protecting us from the bad pilots.

You are seriously delusional, man.

Good pilots do not think that they don't need procedures. Maybe there's an individual somewhere that thinks that, but you really seem to believe that this is a widely held belief.

It requires a little bit higher level thinking, but some people DO think this:

1) Some training programs have emphasized procedures and how to pass the test to the detriment of fundamentals.

2) Some pilots have crashed with what appears to be extremely bad knowledge of fundamentals.

3) Some pilots have crashed while messing with less critical or the wrong procedural stuff while seeming to ignore or be ignorant of major fundamentals.

4) There is a certain mental challenge to remember everything- so as you cram a pilot's head full of lots of valid procedures, some things can be forgotten. While these are generally excellent, there are those curricula like #1 and some pilots who aren't the brightest of the bunch- and you see the gross ignorance of fundamentals...stuff from your first 10, 20, 40 hours of flight training that could have saved the day, but didn't seem to be understood.

5) The realization that this may all be interwoven with some pilots having weak fundamentals that lead to crashes.

If you learn how to recover from a stall in your first 10 hours in a 150, and maybe your recurrent training at least mentions/quizzes the fundamentals of AOA management, along with the differences in a -200 vs. a -236A, and the memory checklist for a V-1 engine cut, maybe we'd have fewer guys "pulling up the whole time" and guys sitting there screwing with the autopilot while flying through bad ass wind shear.

Where I've bolded "along with" you usually seem to object.

Indeed there are "good pilots" who worry that some pilot's don't know fundamentals...

BUT

...that does not make them "good pilots" who feel procedures are unnecessary.

Please...keep reciting that until it becomes a memory item.

[Gabriel]

How many cases of UAS at flight level were reported before AF447? I think 12... In those instances basic airmanship got them through; procedures were ignored. But this was an accident waiting to happen because nobody seemed alarmed by the indifference to procedure.

Concur.

Now we know that AF447 crashed due to bad airmanship. We also know that adherance to procedure would have saved them from their own bad airmanship.

Sort of concur.

It would have done this in two ways:

- it would have eliminated the improvisational reaction of the PF
- It would have provided the CRM needed to keep situational awareness intact.

Again here.

You are supposing that the fact that the pilots knew the procedures would mean that they attempt to apply it first and that they do correctly so then.

I cannot believe that this pilot said "hey let's climb 7000 fpm" and enforced the plane to comply with his wishes. I still don't understand the climb. But whatever reason it was, I suspect it would have also been useful to explain why the pilot didn't follow the UAS procedure that had been so diligently trained by the airline (if it had). Call it startle, panic, freezing, brain fart, whatever.

Of course, the pilot pulled up because he didn't follow the procedure. But that's a tautology. The procedure doesn't call for a pull up, so doing so is not following the procedure. Anything the pilot had done except what the procedure required would have been not following the procedure. We could also say that the pilot didn't follow the emergency descent procedure. That would be equally true and useless. I'm quite sure that the pilot didn't follow even what he attempted to follow, that is, if he attempted something specific at all.

There were also stealth factors that the procedures are there to address, like thrust lock (AF447 climbed into a stall at 75% N1) and the erroneous flight director prompts. These things do not appear to be significant to the crash but they could still be in a future one.

Totally agree and that's why "stick-and-rudder" type of airmanship alone is not enough. That said, I'm quite sure that had the pilot kept a typical cruise attitude with 75% power (anything between 0° and 5°, let's say) the plane would have not stalled or, at minimum, it would have given the pilots an immense span of time to better asses the situation, and to the pitots to clear off (as they did one by one starting even before the stall).

But procedures are there because airmanship isn't always there.

Here I disagree. Procedures are there so pilots can use their airmanship to reliably get most of from the plane on a given situation.

Part of that can be addressed in pilot screening and training and part of that is hard to predict due to human factors such as stress, startle factor and fatigue.

I agree. You will never know how one given person will react at one given distressful moment.

The simple fact is this:

- 13 flights ignored procedure and only one crashed. Is this acceptable? No.
- If all 13 flights followed procedures all 13 would not have crashed.

Except by the tautological meaning, here I disagree. You will never know how one given person will react at one given distressful moment.

Do you understand that between IGNORING the procedures and CORRECTLY APPLYING the procedures there is a big gap in the middle?

I think the thing good pilots might not understand is that, while they may feel they don't need the procedures, by ignoring them they are...

BAD PILOTS!!!!! That's what they are. Are you kidding?
Good pilots thinking that they they don't need procedures and ignoring them?
What about good drivers running twice the speed limit wrong way and drunk?

Now, if your only hope for safety is that the pilots just blindly follow procedures because airmanship cannot be a given, then please, replace the pilots by a computer, NOW! They don't startle, panic or fatigue, they are very disciplined and follow the procedures exactly how they were told, and while not infallible are much more reliable than a human. How hard can this be?

10 GET speedA : GET speedB : GET speedC
20 IF speedA <> speedB <> speedC THEN Pitch = 5° : Thrust = CLB
30 GOTO 10

[Evan]

You are supposing that the fact that the pilots knew the procedures would mean that they attempt to apply it first and that they do correctly so then.

I cannot believe that this pilot said "hey let's climb 7000 fpm" and enforced the plane to comply with his wishes. I still don't understand the climb. But whatever reason it was, I suspect it would have also been useful to explain why the pilot didn't follow the UAS procedure that had been so diligently trained by the airline (if it had). Call it startle, panic, freezing, brain fart, whatever.

It hadn't! That's been established. Air France was NOT diligently training these pilots. Of course, nobody has been able to establish the reason for the climb. I suspect it had to do with the PF's focus being distracted by his concern for engine flameout (as I posted on the AF447 thread) or perhaps his psychological reaction was to climb above the danger and panic exaggerated his motor skills and degraded his judgment. There really is no procedure to defend against bad flying skills, just bad judgement. But the memory procedure tells them to maintain X pitch and X power and you can't climb into a stall that way.

But more importantly, the procedure tells each pilot what to focus on. The PM should have been on the ECAM while the PF should have been mainly on the PFD. Without procedure, it was ad-lib anarchy. As you say...

Of course, the pilot pulled up because he didn't follow the procedure. But that's a tautology. The procedure doesn't call for a pull up, so doing so is not following the procedure. Anything the pilot had done except what the procedure required would have been not following the procedure. We could also say that the pilot didn't follow the emergency descent procedure. That would be equally true and useless. I'm quite sure that the pilot didn't follow even what he attempted to follow, that is, if he attempted something specific at all.

I don't think for one minute that the pilot had a procedure in his head.

Totally agree and that's why "stick-and-rudder" type of airmanship alone is not enough. That said, I'm quite sure that had the pilot kept a typical cruise attitude with 75% power (anything between 0° and 5°, let's say) the plane would have not stalled or, at minimum, it would have given the pilots an immense span of time to better asses the situation, and to the pitots to clear off (as they did one by one starting even before the stall)

Yes, in 12 out of 13 instances, where "stick-and-rudder" type of airmanship alone was enough. But what about CRM? What about situational awareness. Procedures not only tell you what to do, they divide the tasks and help preserve situational awareness. I recall one of the earlier UAS pilots testifying to the disorientation and difficulty they experienced and how it could have ended badly (his report was dismissed out-of-hand by the operator).

Here I disagree. Procedures are there so pilots can use their airmanship to reliably get most of from the plane on a given situation.

If all pilots could be trusted to use their airmanship and CRM to reliably get most of from the plane on a given situation, we wouldn't need these procedures. But there again is the human factor...

I agree. You will never know how one given person will react at one given distressful moment.

Do you understand that between IGNORING the procedures and CORRECTLY APPLYING the procedures there is a big gap in the middle?

Yes! That is why I stress the importance of rehearsing these procedures and USING the QRH, which is designed, graphically, to be used under stress.

BAD PILOTS!!!!! That's what they are. Are you kidding?
Good pilots thinking that they they don't need procedures and ignoring them?

Well, 3WE has said that you don't need procedures with UAS and ignoring them can be a good thing. SO is he a BAD PILOT?

I actually think he is probably a good pilot, and I think a lot of good pilots think procedures are for the birds. I base that on the unending cases of high-hour pilots pranging perfectly good airplanes by failing to apply procedures.

Now, if your only hope for safety is that the pilots just blindly follow procedures because airmanship cannot be a given, then please, replace the pilots by a computer, NOW! They don't startle, panic or fatigue, they are very disciplined and follow the procedures exactly how they were told, and while not infallible are much more reliable than a human. How hard can this be?

Now, remember the thread where we discussed 'black and white' thinking with MCM? Certainly there are situations where a computer might be safer (I put forth the idea of an autopilot mode for UAS, monitored by pilots of course). But for every situation where procedures exist and other factors don't override them, there are so many 'grey area' situations that require creativity and improvisation. A computer can't think that way. And of course, computers also have their failure rates and operating limitations. The winning combination of a disciplined and well-trained crew and a panic-proof computer is what works best. To make this work, PF, PM and computer have to all know their roles to play in a given situation. That IS what procedures provide.

Gabriel, you know all this and I wish you at least would understand that I am not that naive to think everything can be reduced to a formula. Advocating procedural proficiency has nothing to do with that.

[Evan]

3) Some pilots have crashed while messing with less critical or the wrong procedural stuff while seeming to ignore or be ignorant of major fundamentals.

3WE, have you ever even seen a QRH procedure. They are divided into PF and PNF (PM) columns and nothing in the PF column interferes with his ability to stabilize and fly the plane. Nothing detracts from his fundamental airmanship.

It's like 'HAL' and 'cheap crackerbox composites'. You head is full of false ideas about the things we are discussing. Now tell me who is delusional.

[3WE]

3WE has said that you don't need procedures with UAS and ignoring them can be a good thing. SO is he a BAD PILOT?

I am a bad pilot.

I'm not current.

I know very little on how to operate an Airbus nor models of 737s.

I don't know how to use light plane autopilots.

I find the following to be quite challenging:

-Maintaining heading and altitude while looking up an approach plate.

-Keeping a plane on the ILS below 500 feet.

-Making good, accurate holds and ADF approaches, along with good, accurate step down approaches.

I'm not 100% sure how to start a 172P vs a 172N.

But, right or wrong, I don't think I'd have crashed the Colgan plane nor the AF plane-at least not the way those pilots crashed them.

But, I do make it a point to keep quiet on the Professional Pilots Rumour Forum.

And yes, the procedure for UAS is nice to know...but that doesn't make it need to know (unless you want to pass a test or if you want to claim to be a good pilot)

Like you and Gabe, I don't know what procedure they were trying to follow. For the sake of the passengers, basic P+P=P from their first lessons and most of their hours in the plane would have been almost as good as specific FCOMQRHPOH checklist #27 for when the plane gives you multiple warnings and conflicting information and sure beats the hell out of the procedure they did do.

[Evan]

I am a bad pilot.

I wasn't suggesting that.

I actually think he is probably a good pilot

I think, like a lot of pilots with strong fundamental airmanship, you think scripted procedure is only for pilots with weak airmanship...

And yes, the procedure for UAS is nice to know...but that doesn't make it need to know (unless you want to pass a test or if you want to claim to be a good pilot)

...because you fail to understand the reasons for it. Procedures are vital if we want to prevent these disorientation/0 CRM accidents.

[3WE]

...because you fail to understand the reasons for it. Procedures are vital if we want to prevent these disorientation/0 CRM accidents.

It doesn't matter that I fail to understand that.

It does matter that they apparently didn't have a clue that relentless pull ups might cause a stall and that the P+P that is used every day might result in a fat, dumb, happy, HOURS LONG flight.

[3WE]

I think, like a lot of pilots with strong fundamental airmanship, you think scripted procedure is only for pilots with weak airmanship.

I know.

You think wrong a lot.

[Evan]

It does matter that, due to startle factor, panic, disorientation or fatigue they might not have a clue that relentless pull ups will cause a stall and that the P+P that is used every day is the core of the memory procedure and refinement of that is the core of the QRH procedure.

Fact checked.

[3WE]

Fact checked.

Gotcha...

Due to startle factor, panic, disorientation or fatigue...

You may not remember the very basic rules that relentless pull ups can cause stalls...

BUT

...but because it comes from a snazzy acronym you will remember the correct QRH memory checklist from the 30, 40 or 50 other memory checklists- and you better hope it's not a -236A.

[Gabriel]

Gotcha...

Due to startle factor, panic, disorientation or fatigue...

You may not remember the very basic rules that relentless pull ups can cause stalls...

BUT

...but because it comes from a snazzy acronym you will remember the correct QRH memory checklist from the 30, 40 or 50 other memory checklists- and you better hope it's not a -236A.

I think that you nailed it.

If after a UAS a pilot not only can't avoid a stall, but also manipulates the controls as if he wanted to prove that an Airbus can be stalled indeed (because of startle or whatever), then I don't trust this same pilot to be able to follow the procedure (because of startle or whatever).

[Evan]

I think that you nailed it.

If after a UAS a pilot not only can't avoid a stall, but also manipulates the controls as if he wanted to prove that an Airbus can be stalled indeed (because of startle or whatever), then I don't trust this same pilot to be able to follow the procedure (because of startle or whatever).

I think you nailed it.

If a pilot doesn't follow procedure, and instead climbs towards a stall, the procedure will make this obvious to the pilot not flying, who can then remind the pilot flying of the procedure (especially if the junior pilot is flying). This is CRM. Procedures are the script for CRM.

WIth AF447, neither pilot had the procedure memorized and the PNF did not look to the QRH.