Originally posted by 3WE
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That way we prevent this—the only way—is to prevent situations whereby expectations are so wrong.
You think type ratings cover these things (and they should) but the evidence is contrary in these cases. I'm sure type ratings cover the standard profiles, but in each of these cases there was a deviation from the standard profile. In the case of Asiana, they got behind in the final, high on the slope and opted to use a supplemental vertical mode that they didn't understand in a phase of flight where it was completely inappropriate. They may have done this because it is appropriate to use that mode at higher altitudes to rapidly lose height but only with a safe level-off or transition altitude factored in. But they weren't sufficiently trained to know this, or to set the FCU altitude safely and to understand the interaction of the AP and the AT when using that mode.
And yes, fly the GD plane means monitor. We've got to impress upon these pilots that the nature of the job under automation is to fly the automation using the instruments. Not to take a break on final.
So we have ignorance on supplemental modes and complacent trust in automation. Then it's just: what the... (this is not supposed to happen!) TOGA... seawall... panic.. pull up relentlessly... prang!
The "this is not supposed to happen" part is where the fundamental stuff turns to smoke.
If this veteran 747 pilot had decided to handfly the approach, I'm sure the worst thing that would have come out of it is a go-around. Because his expectations would have been more-or-less correct.
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