Originally posted by 3WE
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Although... the report does say:
Unaware that they had penetrated the first part of the microburst, the captain commanded the first officer to execute a standard missed approach instead of a windshear escape procedure.
It has to fit this:
18:42:16 - (CPT) USAir 1016's on the go. [decision to go-around]
18:42:17.7 - (CPT) Max power [we would prefer 'TOGA' here].
18:42:18.5 - (F/O) Yeah, max power? [He does not advance power to TOGA however. EPR rises to 1.82]
18:42:19.4 - (F/O) Flaps to 15.
Thus far, the crew is executing a go-around. There is no stall warning yet.
18:42:22 - (CPT) Down, push it down.
This is where I believe the crew is focused on go-around and not onset of windshear recovery. This looks nothing like windshear recovery.
They are climbing through 1000ft. Pitch is 15deg up. Pitch is reduced for the next critical 10 seconds to -5deg down. At that point upward pitch is briefly commanded, but then reduced again to neutral before the GPWS warning and the final desperate full aft pull up.
18:42:25.5 (F/O RADIO) Up to three we're taking a right turn by captain here. [The F/O does not appear to be aware of the developing situation either]
18:42:28.4 Whoop whoop whoop
18:42:32.7 Stickshaker [first stall warning]
18:42:35.6 Crunch
Which is sad considering that the report also concluded that they would have successfully recovered if they had maintained the 15 ANU pitch and had applied maximum power.
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