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"The top pilots' union at Air France demanded on Wednesday that European airspeed monitors be replaced by US-made models across the airline's fleet after a new malfunction was reported this month..
Boy, sure was a lot of money and time WASTED changing out all those pitots. out...
So now they want to do it again?
-Not an Airbus or Boeing guy here.
-20 year veteran on the USN Lockheed P-3 Orion.
"The top pilots' union at Air France demanded on Wednesday that European airspeed monitors be replaced by US-made models across the airline's fleet after a new malfunction was reported this month.
"An Airbus 320 equipped with new speed probes made by European electronics giant Thales was flying from Rome to Paris on July 13 when the sensors, known as pitot tubes, broke down, Air France said late on Tuesday.
"The pilots' union demanded the Thales monitors be replaced by those made by US-based Goodrich, which provides pitot tubes to 70% of the world's aircraft."
Dated today's date.
OK, this is giving me a headache, so I've taken the time to try to organize all the facts and chronology I have regarding pitot tubes and Airbuses. Corrections are appreciated.
----------------------
There are three standards of pitot probes currently in service on the A330/A340 family. 1) Thales (formerly Sextant) P/N C16195AA; 2) Thales P/N C16195BA; 3) Goodrich (formerly Rosemount, formerly BF Goodrich) P/N 0851HL.
The Thales (Sextant) P/N C16195AA has been faulted in Service Bulletins and is being phased out.
The Goodrich (Rosemount) P/N 0851GR has been faulted in an AD and is phased out.
Going through all the AD's that I've found, Goodrich probes have been cited in AD's as well as Thales according to the following history:
11/1994 - Airbus issues OIT: LOSS OF AUTOPILOT AND NORMAL LAW UPON AIR DATA DISAGREEMENT" It states the following:
SEVERAL OPERATORS HAVE REPORTED A FEW CASES OF AUTOPILOT (A/P) LOSS AND A REVERSION TO ALTERNATE LAW (ALTN) OF THE ELECTRICAL FLIGHT CONTROLS (EFCS) WHEN FLYING IN ICY, STORMY AND TURBULENT CONDITIONS. THE FOLLOWING MAIN ECAM WARNINGS WERE REPORTED:
- AUTO FLT AP OFF
- F/CTL ADR DISAGREE
- F/CTL ATL LAW
It also states:
IT HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED THAT IN SOME ICING ATMOSPHERES, THE AIR DATA PARAMETERS SUCH AS TOTAL PRESSURE MAY BE TEMPORARILY BUT SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADED, DUE TO THE CONTAMINATION OF THE PITOT PROBE BY ICE CRYSTALS OR LIQUID WATER MIXED WITH ICE CRYSTALS. THIS PHENOMENA IS COVERED BY TFU 342000011.
It provides the following operational advice:
DO NOT ALLOW THE CREW TO RESET ANY FCPC IN FLIGHT. INDEED, IN THE CASE OF MISINFORMATION ORIGINATED FROM AT LEAST TWO ADR PARAMETERS, IN PARTICULAR THE ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA), SUCH RESET COULD INDUCE AN UNEXPECTED ACTIVATION OF A FLIGHT ENVELOPE PROTECTION.
And finally:
AN INVESTIGATION IS BEING LAUNCHED TO DEVELOP A NEW PITOT TUBE FEATURING IMPROVED ANTI-ICING AND DRAINAGE CHARACTERISTICS. TARGETED SCHEDULE FOR CERTIFICATION IS JULY 1996.
The OIT does not specify any pitot manufacturer or P/N.
11/2001 - CASA issues AD/A320/128 for all A319/20/21, requiring replacement of Thales P/N 50620-10 with Thales P/N C16195AA. Compliance by 9/18/2003.
A/C with BFGoodrich P/N 0851HL are not included in the AD.
7/2002 - Airbus issues OIT "ATA34 AIRSPEED DISCREPANCY WITH THALES PITOT PROBES". It warns of unreliable airspeed indications and contains the following information:
INVESTIGATIONS CARRIED OUT SHOW THAT BURRS CAN REMAIN IN THE PITOT PROBE AFTER DRILLING OF THE DRAIN HOLES. AS A CONSEQUENCE THE BURRS COULD ASSIST THE ACCUMULATION OF EXTERNAL POLLUTION AND CONSEQUENTLY COULD BLOCK THE DRAIN HOLES. SUCH A DRAIN HOLES BLOCKAGE CAN EXPLAIN THE WATER FOUND IN THE PITOT TUBE. THIS ISSUE CAN AFFECT ALL AIRCRAFT FITTED WITH THE THALES PITOT PROBES.
The probes in question are the THALES P/N C16195AA
11/2002 - DGAC issues AD 2002-586(B) regarding Thales P/N C16195AA with a serial number (S/N) lower than 4760. The directive cites manufacturing defects that can lead to drainage problems. The requirement is to inspect and repair within 700 flight hours.
12/2002 - CASA issues AD A330/1 for all A330/340, requiring replacement of all Rosemount (now Goodrich) P/N 0851GR with either BFGoodrich P/N 0851HL or Sextant (now Thales) P/N C16195AA. Compliance by 12/31/2003.
5/2004 - FAA issues AD 2004-10-02, for all Airbus a/c, requiring inspections for damage and obstruction issues with Thales pitot probes. Goodrich probes are not affected by the AD.
7/2004 - FAA issues AD 2004-03-33, for all Airbus a/c, requiring replacement as follows:
- For Model A300 B2 and A300 B4 series airplanes; Model A300 B4-600, A300 B4-600R, and A300 F4-600R (collectively called A300-600) series airplanes; and Model A310 series airplanes: Replace the Thales (formerly Sextant) pitot probes with new Rosemount (formerly BF Goodrich) pitot probes per Airbus Service Bulletin A300-34-0166.
- For Model A300 B4-600R, A310-203, and A310-304 series airplanes: Replace the Thales (formerly Sextant) pitot probes with Thales or Sextant pitot probes per Airbus Service Bulletin A300-34-6141.
- For Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes: Replace the Thales (formerly Sextant) pitot probes] with new Thales pitot probes, per the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-34-1127.
- For Model A330-301, -321, -322, -341, and -342 series airplanes: Replace the Rosemount pitot probes with new Rosemount (formerly BF Goodrich) pitot probes, per the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-34-3038.
- For Model A330-301 series airplanes: Replace the Rosemount pitot probes with new Thales (formerly Sextant) pitot probes, per Airbus Service Bulletin A330-34-3071.
- For Model A340-211, -212, -213, -311, -312, and -313 series airplanes: Replace the Rosemount pitot probes with new Rosemount (formerly BF Goodrich) pitot probes, per the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A340-34-4042.
- For Model A340-211, -212, and -311 series airplanes: Replace the Rosemount pitot probes with new Thales (formerly Sextant) pitot probes, per the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A340-34-4079.
9/2007 - Airbus releases a Service Bulletin to A330/340 operators: "NAVIGATION - SENSORS POWER SUPPLY AND SWITCHING - INSTALL THALES PITOT PROBE C16195BA"
It describes the new probe as having "improved resistance to water ingress and icing under severe conditions resulting in improved airspeed behavior". It also cites improved resistance to corrosion.
6/1/2009 - Air France AF447 crashes into the Atlantic Ocean. ACARS messages indicate unreliable airspeed data.
6/8/2009 - Air France Pilot's Union advises pilots to refuse to fly unless Thales -AA probes are replaced with -BA models.
7/2009 - Airbus sends out a Request for Information Concerning In-Flight Unreliable Airspeed to all A330/A340 operators.
7/13/2009 - AF1905, an A320 flying Rome to Paris, experiences 'brutal' unreliable airspeed data. Probes installed were reported to be Thales C16195BA.
7/19/2009 - LOT FLT LO-2, a Boeing 767, experiences unreliable airspeed out of Chicago (overspeed warning, stick shaker, EEC warnings) and descends 5000ft, diverts to Toronto. Condition returns while holding at FL10, crew are unable to hold altitude, a/c eventually lands without incident after fuel dump. According to Airframer.com, the 767 relies exclusively on Goodrich sensor probes.
7/29/2009 - Air France pilots union demands all a/c be fitted with Goodrich probes and all Thales probes be phased out.
----------------------
Thus far, it seems like the only truly reliable probe is the Goodrich P/N 0851HL. Except for that 767 incident...
You keep saying that but I think you should realise that at one point during the airplane design, you will have to make the decision as to how reliable you want your airplane to be. You will have to make a decision if you find 1 accident in 10^6 flights as an acceptable rate, or 1 in 10^8 or 1 in 10^9. You can even design your plane for 1 in 10^12.
The question is, at what costs. Are the 250 lives I might save 15 years down the line worth the 100mil of additional costs or not? There is no right or wrong but it is a question you will have to face at one point.
Your attitude of "If I can do it, I have to do it" will lead any manufacturer or airline for that matter, into bankruptcy.
There is only one problem: that good ol "1 in X" statistical reference is for the most part worthless. I am not an expert in anything, but I did take basic statistics about 400 years ago in undergrad. Of the one or three things I remember is that probabilities are not the best predictors and are far from foolproof.
If a certain widget, let's take computer hard drive, has a mean time between failures of 15,000 hours, it does not mean that the one you got in your fancy new alienware computer won't fail one week after you get it.
If an aircraft part has a 1 in 10,000,000,000,000,000 chance in failing in the first 25,000 hours of flight, it does not mean that it won't fail in the first ten minutes.
THere is no doubt that bean counters in every industry do statistical analyses to determine risk and weigh that risk against human life. Take the Ford Pinto: Ford knew about the exploding gas tank issues but refused to do a recall voluntarily because they figured it would cost less in $$$$$ to pay for a few dead people. In my mind, this is criminal.
Firestone knew it had problems with the tires that were on the Ford Explorer and possibly other vehicles, but it refused to do a recall until the press and government authorities got ahold of the facts. Again, some bean-counters clculated that the cost of settling a few lawsuits would be less than replacing tens of thousands of tires.
So for some, I guess these "calculations" are acceptable. The question is, what is the "break-even" point.
.............Thus far, it seems like the only truly reliable probe is the Goodrich P/N 0851HL. Except for that 767 incident...
Evan, thank you for all your work assembling a most informative post. It would have given me a headache too.
My synopsis would collapse what you included to this: Given your info, there were two notable pitot problems in July--an Airbus 320 on July 13, and a Boeing 767 July 19. There was also a major crash on June 1 with all aboard lost, in which an airspeed disagree and major unexplained flight data display problems apparently existed. Problems noted specifically with Thales pitots in part stemmed from a few instances of metallic burrs that remained in drilled pitot passageways of Thales pitots (a manufacturing, and not a design problem; further clarifcation not available). The only other info we have is that the newer, "improved" Thales pitots supposedly solved some problems with "drainage" or "blockage".
In addition to your info, we also have multiple but less corroborated reports that airpseed disagree problems in the recent past (possibly due to pitot malfunctions) were not uncommon with air carrier fleets, though such occurrences had not been cause of major incidents or accidents prior to (possibly) AF447 on June 1.
I think we have here several things of import:
1) Multiple pitot failures, independent of the pitot and aircraft type or model (enough that they were not "uncommon", nor were they in the two-one hundredths of one percent class).
2) Some of 'those nasty" Thales pitots had some production crud in the tubings that Thales was too cheap or inattentive to remove, and which may have infected the entire fleet, or been limited to a single pitot. In other words, we don't know if performance problems were totally design or production problems.
3) No identified design flaw or even a theory of design flaw. All potential flaws mentioned were inferred by shallow circumstance.
5) "She who must be obeyed"--, that is, the media story about the pitots (for God's sake it must be the pitots!!!!!!--yes I read Yahoo news) gets all the attention, while the interaction of the pitots, aircraft information handling system, and the pilots (y' know,. the human guys in charge of all that apparatus, the experts, the boots on the ....scene) is getting squat. No matter what ignorant media writers do to sell stories, you can't chastise one without looking at the other.
We are supposed to be AHEAD of the news harem, not cavorting with its ignorance.
So what pops up for me is not pitots specifically, (ALL of which seem to possess recognized, and probably long standing limits) but how that information is handled (or dropped) on the aircraft. Planes have been flying a loooong time with pilots that were good and pitots that weren't perfect. How did those pilots manage to do it all that long while, using all those "old, primitive" pitot designs without killing every 34th person???? How come they didn't all plummet out of the sky like sheep with visions of flying at the sight of a cb?
Pitots may well be contributory to AF447's fate, but they aren't the whole story.
Again, thank you Evan, for all your work. Good stuff, of which we need more.
Last edited by Leightman; 2009-07-30, 05:55.
Reason: typos and all around sheep herding for all the strays; harem was a typo but I liked it
So what pops up for me is not pitots specifically, (ALL of which seem to possess recognized, and probably long standing, limits, but how that information is handled (or dropped) on the aircraft. Pilots have been flying a loooong time with pilots that were good and pitots that weren't perfect. How did those pilots manage to do it all that long while, using all those "old, primitive" pitot designs without killing every 34th person???? How come they didn't all plummet out of the sky like sheep with visions of flying at the sight of a cb?
Pitots may well be contributory to AF447's fate, but they aren't the whole story.
Again, thank you Evan, for all your work. Good stuff, of which we need more.
Certainly pitot failure alone should be manageable, but experience seems to indicate that it is rarely that simple. The nature of the failure condition means that it is most likely to occur at the worst possible time, in bad weather, icing, and/or turbulence. Also, all the pilot experiences I have read (Air Cariabes, NWA A330, AF1905, LOT 767 and an A310 experience reported on Pprune, the pilots have reported being in a very dangerous degradation of control where even reading the instruments has been difficult or impossible (this is why I would like to see a mandatory installation of the Airbus Back-UP Speed Scale system). Most have remarked that if conditions were just a little less favorable (such as time of day), things might have ended tragically. I have not read one iota of pilot bravado from these incidents; the experience seems to have impressed them all to the danger.
This is from a post on Pprune:
Originally posted by Whatsalizad (Pprune)
I experienced one encounter with severe turbulence on a 767-300, and while we experience some erratic airspeed info, just like LOT, it returned to normal after the event stopped.
I will add that we were also unable to maintain altitude, and descended. All ended well without injuries. The yoke, thrust levers and flight controls behaved normally, and even though not a single digit on any instrument was readable due to the shaking, the blue above/brown below on the ADI worked just fine. I don't remember the EEC lights, nor cared to look at anything on the overhead panel during the event.
Ask yourself if we would have ended up in some other flight control law or had many more blinking lights and distracting warning bells, alerts or tones had we been in manufaturer "A"'s aircraft (I don't know)
In terms of the rate at which aircraft are falling out of the sky, that depends on how you define that. Yes, only one has met the ground in an undesirable fashion, but all have departed flight level. The LOT 767 lost 5000 ft before control could be regained. Then again, while holding at 10,000, they ascended to 10,600, causing nearby traffic to receive a TCAS warning and take evasive action. A fuel dump and diversion were necessary. I think that's dangerous enough to warrant a serious course of action in the boardrooms and the drawing boards.
As to which pitot can be considered reliable, it appears that the Goodrich -HL has been quite trouble-free. This assumes that all incidents have been reported, which is unlikely. The LOT 767 was rolled out in 1990, so it would have had older probes installed. One would hope those probes were upgraded in recent years, particularly after the CASA AD was issued in 2002, but I have little faith in bureaucracy, and, interestingly, the AD did not include Boeing aircraft. In short, we don't know if the LOT plane had Goodrich -HL probes installed.
A note on the Thales -AA probes: the burr obstruction issue was apparently eliminated during its production run, and only affected probes with S/N lower than 4760. Since the AF447 A330 was manufactured after the recall, I assume it did not have -AA probes with this deficiency. Unless the parts came from old inventory, somehow overlooked. It would be instructive to know the S/N's on those probes.
I also found this part interesting. Maybe someone can comment on it as a possible factor in AF447:
DO NOT ALLOW THE CREW TO RESET ANY FCPC IN FLIGHT. INDEED, IN THE CASE OF MISINFORMATION ORIGINATED FROM AT LEAST TWO ADR PARAMETERS, IN PARTICULAR THE ANGLE OF ATTACK (AOA), SUCH RESET COULD INDUCE AN UNEXPECTED ACTIVATION OF A FLIGHT ENVELOPE PROTECTION.
One reason pitot reliability is more critical today than in the past is certainly the dependency of complex automated flight systems on sensor performance (both Airbus and Boeing designs). Another is the critical nature of the transsonic flight envelope at or near FL400. And then there is lack of feel on FBW a/c when you have no instruments to guide you. And the lack of control law protections where they are needed to offset the lack of feel.
Seems to my simple mind that the flight management system needs physical reading turned into electrical data. Which then makes me wonder why the linking mechanisms that do the conversion are given a clean chit. Thunderstorms do a number on circuits, hence the recommendation to unplug your home computer during violent storms. Couldn't one of the circuits be acting up, leading to air-speed disagreement?
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quick resume
they are now investigating several very similar incident on 330/340 prior to that crash. One in particular is scary, flight Paris (CDG) to Antananarivo (TNR) le xx/08/2008 on A340 reg F-GNIH. Plane got very close to stalling after a series of failures and alarms very similar to AF447. Speed indication was totally wrong. Instead of following the computer info who was telling him to climb as the plane was loosing speed he decided to put it descent and avoided to stall. After a while the plane gave them the right speed again, which maybe didn't happen that quick or too late on the AF447.
Eurocockpit claims that many ASR (Air Safety Report) about pitot failure got ignored. They also claim that AF is now trying all they can to exclude the pitot to be the source of the accident.
(liberally snipped) Certainly pitot failure alone should be manageable, but ...it is rarely that simple. .... failure ....is most likely to occur at the worst possible time, in bad weather, icing, and/or turbulence. Also, all ...pilots have reported a very dangerous degradation of control where even reading the instruments has been difficult or impossible (this is why I would like to see a mandatory installation of the Airbus Back-UP Speed Scale system).
The LOT 767 lost 5000 ft before control could be regained. Then again, while holding at 10,000, they ascended to 10,600, causing traffic to receive a TCAS warning and take evasive action. A fuel dump and diversion were necessary. I think that's dangerous enough to warrant a serious course of action in the boardrooms and the drawing boards.
As to which pitot can be considered reliable, it appears that the Goodrich -HL has been quite trouble-free. This assumes that all incidents have been reported, which is unlikely. The LOT 767 was rolled out in 1990, so it would have had older probes installed. One would hope those probes were upgraded in recent years, particularly after the CASA AD was issued in 2002, but I have little faith in bureaucracy, and, interestingly, the AD did not include Boeing aircraft. In short, we don't know if the LOT plane had Goodrich -HL probes installed.
A note on the Thales -AA probes: the burr obstruction issue was apparently eliminated during its production run, and only affected probes with S/N lower than 4760. ..... Unless the parts came from old inventory, somehow overlooked. It would be instructive to know the S/N's on those probes.
One reason pitot reliability is more critical today than in the past is certainly the dependency of complex automated flight systems on sensor performance (both Airbus and Boeing designs). Another is the critical nature of the transsonic flight envelope at or near FL400. And then there is lack of feel on FBW a/c when you have no instruments to guide you. And the lack of control law protections where they are needed to offset the lack of feel.
You make a lot of good points. Though control in these events has mostly been maintained during the loss of airspeed data, the actual events are proving to be less benign than originally described, LOT 767 being a good example. Your conclusion of the Goodrich pitot may be correct, but there remains some question based on LOT. There is also the unconfirmed assumption that LOT had the older pitots which we ultimately can't take on faith. Certainly knowing what pitots were installed on the problem flights is essential info, and I am sure investigators and all interested parties are pushing that direction. Most important to me is your last paragraph where you describe a cumulative effect to more complex control systems, less tolerance for data input anomolies, and the FBW trait of less feel, though the latter would certainly differ from manufacturer to manufacturer, and plane to plane. A pilot previously posted here that despite the problems, he felt the newer control systems were better than the older ones. I'd love to see more comment from people who interact with these systems to see if that is a universally held opinion. And I totally agree on the apparent need to get a backup speed data system unencumbered by the flight data system.
A couple other things: Side sticks have been used to advantage in a number of aircraft including military, but the fact remains that less movement is required than a yoke or stick, which in some circumstances (unexpected turbulence) might encourage overcontrol. There is also the possibility that we might be seing a fundamental change in the meteorological conditions at FL 35-40, where the OAT still averages very cold, but where the sudden or momentary intrusion of warmer air and moisture is less a rarity than in the past. OAT sensors might not be capable of reacting fast enough to register such changes. Perhaps an sensor that is intended to clog up could offer warning for these conditions--the mine canary model.
Last edited by Leightman; 2009-07-30, 17:04.
Reason: Typos, again
What was it then that was so violent to bring down a proven fully certified airliner down? Pitot? Computers? Bad Weather? ...............................Human Error?
We are going in to a morass of tech talk here....
No one dares to deliberate the unthinkable though.
Perhaps an sensor that is intended to clog up could offer warning for these conditions--the mine canary model.
The problem tends to happen almost instantly, so a warning would not be of much use. But that's not a bad analogy here. Basically, you've got three canaries stuck to the side of an Airbus, when what you need is two canaries and a pigeon.
I think the immediate short term fix should be to equip every Airbus a/c with a Goodrich -HL probe feeding the ISIS (#3 position)—for two reasons: 1) a dissimilar sensor that has proven itself well in battle is better than a third canary. 2) it would reveal which design is more reliable (or it would might reveal that neither is). If the Goodrich probe consistently outperformed the Thales, then the rest of the probes would be changed over during scheduled maintenance. In the meantime, normal law and A/P would still be lost if both Thales froze up, but the ISIS would provide the needed data to maintain level flight.
BTW - I don't think FBW is a bad idea. I think it is a major leap in aviation safety. But it is only viable if it is truly fault-tolerant, end-to-end, and the current configuration isn't.
Swissair, you have made over 130 posts, mostly all with the same message, and in none of those posts have you given any evidence whatsoever to support your idea that a bomb was involved. You appear to want the cause to be a bomb. You appear to hope this is true, and that you would be happy, even ecstatic if it were true. You are either terminally paranoid and need some counselling, or you have information that you have kept secret. I suggest that if you have any real information implicating a bomb it is time you went to the authorities with it instead of trying to get others here to do your work for you. My deliberated opinion is that you have nothing to offer except provocation of an unhealthy, unhelpful nature, and you get in the way of substantive thought. If you had ever offered the slightest bit if evidence I would not be writing this, but you haven't and show no signs of changing. I therefore respectfully request of the moderators that you be banned.
Last edited by Leightman; 2009-07-30, 22:21.
Reason: typo
Swissair, you have made over 130 posts, mostly all with the same message, and in none of those posts have you given any evidence whatsoever to support your idea that a bomb was involved. You appear to want the cause to be a bomb. You appear to hope this is true, and that you would be happy, even ecstatic if it were true. You are either terminally paranoid and need some counselling, or you have information that you have kept secret. I suggest that if you have any real information implicating a bomb it is time you went to the authorities with it instead of trying to get others here to do your work for you. My deliberated opinion is that you have nothing to offer except provocation of an unhealthy, unhelpful nature, and you get in the way of substantive thought. If you had ever offered the slightest bit if evidence I would not be writing this, but you haven't and show no signs of changing. I therefore respectfully request of the moderators that you be banned.
Lightman, before I get booted, I want to clarify. I have no evidence of nothing, and if I or anyone had he probably would call on a different channel. Also, I do not want it to be just think, expressing freedom of speech, it is most likely in my personal view as an expert pointed in the same direction for in his view political reason, also pointed at by the french angecy sending over their agent for checking the passenger list etc. I think I have nothing to add here anymore, I respect all views expressed here and the impressive research performed. Hans
The European Aviation Safety Agency has ordered that some Airbus jets stop using the type of speed sensor installed on the Air France aircraft that crashed in the Atlantic in May.
The European Aviation Safety Agency has ordered that some Airbus jets stop using the type of speed sensor installed on the Air France aircraft that crashed in the Atlantic in May.
Airbus' Computers caused near-crash in March 2008 in Hamburg
An article from the German news magazine der Spiegel writes about another incident with an A320 - which might not be related to AF447 directly, but highlights the stress that Airbus' sophisticated computer control can cause pilots:
In that incident on March 1 2008, a Lufthansa A320 touched the runway with its wing tip while trying to land in a severe storm in Hamburg. The (secret) report now states that the problem was not due to the strong winds and careless pilots alone, but also caused by the computer having limited the rudder travel after switching to "ground mode" because a wheel had touched ground before. The limited rudder travel apparently didn't allow to stop the strong roll of the aircraft and thus caused the wing tip to touch the ground. Apparently it took the pilots 3 seconds to wrestle back the command from the computer and initiate a go-around. Pilots are criticizing Airbus because such a possibility is not mentioned in any handbook, and the accident report is still not publicly available.
Airbus' Computers caused near-crash in March 2008 in Hamburg
An article from the German news magazine der Spiegel writes about another incident with an A320 - which might not be related to AF447 directly, but highlights the stress that Airbus' sophisticated computer control can cause pilots:
In that incident on March 1 2008, a Lufthansa A320 touched the runway with its wing tip while trying to land in a severe storm in Hamburg. The (secret) report now states that the problem was not due to the strong winds and careless pilots alone, but also caused by the computer having limited the rudder travel after switching to "ground mode" because a wheel had touched ground before. The limited rudder travel apparently didn't allow to stop the strong roll of the aircraft and thus caused the wing tip to touch the ground. Apparently it took the pilots 3 seconds to wrestle back the command from the computer and initiate a go-around. Pilots are criticizing Airbus because such a possibility is not mentioned in any handbook, and the accident report is still not publicly available.
m.
I think that's pretty unrelated. Let's not turn this into a scarebus forum again.
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Boy, sure was a lot of money and time WASTED changing out all those pitots. out... 
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