Air France 447 - On topic only!

[Evan]

in 4 weeks i fly with an AF Airbus into the crash area and i am not bothered by fear because i dont blame an manufacturer or airline nor crew and things that can happen HAPPEN.

Greets Haendli

Haendi, you have little to fear because AF pilots are now very aware of UAS procedure, as well as the latent danger of icing in these weather systems. Nothing needed to be altered on the aircraft to avoid a recurrence of this crash. Properly trained pilots should be able to manage a complete failure of pitots, any pitots, on any aircraft, without losing control of the aircraft. Things that can happen WON'T HAPPEN if people are trained to prevent them from happening.

Over the past decade we have heard the term 'blame game' used moronically and repeatedly as a defensive soundbite to avoid accepting responsibility. It has come to the point where certain people consider directing blame to be contrary to finding solutions. The fact is that assessing blame is an important first step in finding solutions. Air France is primarily to blame here for providing insufficient training to its pilots. The BEA is largely to blame here for not requiring and overseeing this training. The pilots (and the pilot's union) are marginally responsible for not demanding this training.

As for Airbus, you should take note of the fact that I said I feel sorry for the Airbus engineers, not necessarily Airbus management. The reason for this is that I suspect that Airbus, having sold themselves on fully redundant, always-dependable automation, might not be stressing enough the need for back-up manual flight training to their customers (although this is just a theory on my part). A procedure for Unreliable Airspeed is clearly provided in the QRH however, and is not unreasonably complicated. Most UAS events clear up in about a minute, so the primary task is to stabilize the aircraft within a safe flight envelope until air data returns. Some pilots have testified that it is difficult to perform this procedure in turbulent conditions (although the BEA study has shown that NONE of the pilots surveyed in the study actually performed the procedure at all), and I hope that the procedure has been examined since the accident. In any case, it is NOT unreasonably difficult to manage thrust and pitch around the envelope, nor is it difficult to recover from a stall warning and avoid an actual stall, IF the pilot has practiced skills on type for manual flight at cruise levels.

But again, I wouldn't worry on your upcoming flight. This event has become legendary among Airbus pilots and every pilot not living under a rock must have memorized the correct (simple) procedures by now.

[TeeVee]

Maybe you're anger should be directed at Air France for not training the pilots to handle this situation

funny thing, and i'm sure the few real commercial pilots here will agree, the manufacturer of the aircraft has PRIMARY responsibility for developing the training program for any given aircraft. after all, who knows it better than they? whatever the french equivalent of the FAA bears some liability as does AF.

aside from pointing fingers at them, as my friend--a commercial pilot of various types for over 20 years-- said, "they lacked BASIC airmanship skills or forgot their training when faced with a relatively simple problem. they caused the stall and couldn't recover. why? who knows. stall recovery even on an airbus is not that difficult. just do the OPPOSITE of what these three guys did."

look, obviously i'm not a pilot. and while i think i understand what makes an aircraft fly, i wouldn't want to take a test of any sort. even with my extremely limited knowledge i would have dropped the nose and reduced thrust to avoid overspeed. as i understand it, most stalls in large aircraft self-correct if you point down a tad and let gravity help a bit.

anyway, these guys must have been monumentally stupid or stoned. cause unless they are cutting out huge portions of the CVR, one would think that they would have exhibited just a bit of concern as they realized they were plummeting to their certain deaths--i mean jeeze! they barely talked at all. and the pilot? he just stood there????? WTF????

[Fear_of_Flying]

The report is difficult to understand. Were the pilots frozen in terror, clueless or oblivious to what was happening, or is there still some discussion to be released? It's not that unusual in these situations for pilots to be so locked into what they're doing that they don't issue distress calls, contact the cabin crew and so forth, but what seems to be missing here is basic communication or standard call outs identifying the problem, the selected course of action, or the job each pilot is taking on. Not to mention the lack of an acknowledgement of the sheer gravity of the situation laced with appropriate expletives.

One thing that makes it hard to figure out who bears the greatest burden of responsibility in this accident is not knowing if this crew was uniquely unprepared for what happened, or if many other pilots would have done the same thing. In either case, the training and ongoing assessment need to be examined, but in one case, there is a basic gap in skills being taught, and in the other, it was more the failure of these individuals that led to the crash, individuals whose liabilities in the cockpit were not identified.

[Evan]

What's really strange is that there is no cockpit communication regarding all the ECAM messages they got. Aside from alternate law, there are no acknowledgements, no call outs for checklist procedures, no diagnostic conversation, nothing. Unless the CVR transcript is being edited for our convenience...

[Jpmkam]

What's really strange is that there is no cockpit communication regarding all the ECAM messages they got. Aside from alternate law, there are no acknowledgements, no call outs for checklist procedures, no diagnostic conversation, nothing. Unless the CVR transcript is being edited for our convenience...

What was released so far must not be the full transcript. How can there be no mention whatsoever of the stall condition. Couple that with the near silence by the Captain once he returned to the cockpit and you have a very preplexing situation.

[Gabriel]

I am absolutely puzzled with this accident.

Those who know me know that I am a believer of training, and that my opinion is that training is not as good as it could and should. But I don't buy the lack of high altitude UAS training, high altitude manual flight, and high altitude upset recovery.

That could have explained why the pilots pushed down too much to recover from the stall, and ended up overspeeding. That could have also explained why the pilots attempted to climb over weather and ended up exceeding their service ceiling. Or that the pilots could not recover from a spiral dive and ended up loosing control of the plane.

But that's not what happened. They climbed with a pitch-up attitude that is never ever used at cruise, and with a vertical speed that is never seen even after a low weight take-off, and when the stall warning started, they pulled again.

High altitude UAS, upset and manual my ass. These errors are unforgivable even for a low time PPL in a Cessna 150 at 1000 ft.

The same goes for the AoA indicator. I have years insisting that airplanes are missing the most important flight instrument, maybe second only to the attitude indicator: the AoA indicator.

But this crew ignored the attitude indicator showing an impossible pitch, the vertical speed indicator showing an impossible climb, and the thing that resembles an AoA indicator most: the stall warning, a binary AoA indicator with only two values: AoA ok (off) and AoA dangerously high (on). in this case it indicated AoA dangerously high, and what did they do? They ignored it and increased the AoA even further.

Why would one think that they would have used an AoA indicator if there had been one available?

[3WE]

...my friend--a commercial pilot of various types for over 20 years-- said, "they lacked BASIC airmanship skills or forgot their training when faced with a relatively simple problem.

A unique pilot on a different board (banned from here) recently demonstrated in a simulator that by selecting the power levels, and attitudes and vertical speeds that he generally uses for various flight modes, he was able to succesfully maneuver and fly the "plane" without an airspeed indicator. Apparently he was 10 to 20 knots fast but....

I beleive this is commonly referred to as "attitude flying".

[Evan]

Why would one think that they would have used an AoA indicator if there had been one available?

If there was an AoA indicator and they had been trained to use it, there would be good reason to expect that they would have used it. There was a pitch indicator, and they weren't trained to use that, so they didn't.

The entire point of memory items is to provide time to stabilize both the aircraft and the pilot's awareness. Without these procedures properly affixed to memory, it just becomes a freestyle improv exercise performed by a stunned pilot.

Keep in mind that in normal/alternate law with autotrim active, once the stick is upset to command a pitch rate (load factor) and then released, it will maintain that pitch rate (load factor). Climbing in the A330 doesn't mean maintaining back pressure, or even having a hand on the stick. In their confusion, perhaps the initial pitch order was accidental and they didn't notice the pitch or vertical speed while focused on the airspeed and the ECAM.

[Myndee]

Question time. Help me out here gentlemen.

Last I checked, the dude or dudette with the four stripes is the head honcho. Why in God's name, when he was called back up, did he not throw out whoever was in the left seat? Unless they were inverted or held to the wall by some g's...why did he not take over? Barking orders from the back of the seats doesn't seem right to me.

Roll oscillations...we're talking side-to-side, right? Not like dutch rolls? I am wondering what this was like for the pax. Surely they knew they were going down?

I just don't understand how or why they would ignore the stall warning. One pilot pulls up, the other pulls down. From what I understand about stalls, you get the nose into it, get that lift over the wings, and get flying again. They had 38K feet to accomplish this.

The Airbus did what it was supposed to in my opinion. It was easy at first to blame the machine because you don't want to speak ill of the dead. It sounds like some pretty bad mistakes were made. All the same, if they weren't trained...how in the hell were they supposed to know what to do?

It is a travesty that all of these lives had to be lost for changes to be made. That's been the name of the game all of the years though. Tombstone mentality.

[3WE]

There was a pitch indicator, and they weren't trained to use that, so they didn't.

Flying lesson #1 in C150- This is a stall, it happens when AOA is too high, blah, blah, blah...

Instrument flying lesson #1 in instrument equipped C172- This is an attitude indicator, it is generally your primary instrument for maintaining attitude (pitch) when flying in instrument conditions.

But never mind, the concept of "fundamental basics" is total BS, and only Airbus memory checklist items are relevant.

[Evan]

Flying lesson #1 in C150- This is a stall, it happens when AOA is too high, blah, blah, blah...

Instrument flying lesson #1 in instrument equipped C172- This is an attitude indicator, it is generally your primary instrument for maintaining attitude (pitch) when flying in instrument conditions.

But never mind, the concept of "fundamental basics" is total BS, and only Airbus memory checklist items are relevant.

The issue is: what to do when the autoflight suddenly disconnects and the airspeeds are suddenly unreliable. This is essentially a shock situation, generating an impulse reaction. Memory items (not checklist items) are the most important thing at that point, and they must be trained.

[3WE]

The same goes for the AoA indicator. I have years insisting that airplanes are missing the most important flight instrument, maybe second only to the attitude indicator: the AoA indicator.

Gabriel, I'm glad we don't see 100% eye to eye, but planes really don't need AoA indicators. Attitude, airspeed, and gluteal accelerometers, and a little airmanship common sense are good enough.

As you yourself have said, all planes to have crude AoA indicators that give the following data, near or above 16 degrees, AoA or safely below 16 degrees AoA. Those AoA indicators have worked very well in all of these crashes that get us idiot PPL's so livid.

If the nose is skyward, the AoA might be getting critical. If the power is off and you are flying level and approaching stall speed, the AoA might be getting critical. If you are diving on your girlfriends house and the horn goes off as you pull up, your AoA might be getting critical. If you are flying fat dumb and happy at healthy airspeeds and attitudes, your AoA is extremely likely to be very healthy.

You think that a steam gauge would do something that buzzers and stick shakers can't?

I guess you have a point, if there's an AoA gauge and pilots would be made to look at them, maybe they would not forget light plane flying lesson #1 about stalls???

[3WE]

The issue is: what to do when the autoflight suddenly disconnects and the airspeeds are suddenly unreliable. This is essentially a shock situation, generating an impulse reaction. Memory items (not checklist items) are the most important thing at that point, and they must be trained.

Stopped up pitot tubes are something that the light plane world commonly talks about and trains for.

The memory checklist is real simple. Fly at attitudes, power settings, and vertical speeds that give you familiar, healthy airspeeds.

It works on light planes and works on someones CRJ simulator.

Think it might work on an Airbus?

[3WE]

I just don't understand how or why they would ignore the stall warning.

...ain't the first time.

[Evan]

Stopped up pitot tubes are something that the light plane world commonly talks about and trains for.

The memory checklist is real simple. Fly at attitudes, power settings, and vertical speeds that give you familiar, healthy airspeeds.

It works on light planes and works on someones CRJ simulator.

Think it might work on an Airbus?

5° pitch and full CL power work on the Airbus. That's the memory item.